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Premise and main argument:  
elaborating the new notion of violence against women’s health
Violence against women (VAW) has been the object of hundreds of studies, per-
taining to different areas of research. International law has been one of these areas, 
the analysis focusing on gender-based violence as a violation of human rights, in 
particular a violation of the principle of non-discrimination, the prohibition of 
torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, the right to life, the right to respect for 
private and family life, and on states’ obligations in preventing and combating the 
widespread phenomenon. VAW is characterised by three distinctive elements: its 
universality, since the phenomenon is not limited to a specific regional, cultural 
or religious context; the multiplicity of its forms; and the intersectionality of 
diverse kinds of discrimination against women.1 The then Secretary-General of 
the United Nations (UN), Kofi Annan, in an in-depth study published in 2006, 
considered discrimination against women both as a consequence and as a cause 
of VAW,2 in the sense that discrimination against women is at the same time at 
the very basis of any form of VAW and the outcome of VAW, an obstacle to the 
achievement of gender equality.3
In legal analysis great emphasis has been placed over time on discrimination 
on the basis of sex, which is often intertwined with other bases such as ethnicity, 
religion, age and sexual orientation. However, in investigating the phenomenon 
of violence, an aspect has not been explored sufficiently: violence may severely 
affect women’s health, and in particular reproductive health. As pointed out by the 
UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW 
Committee), ‘gender-based violence is a critical health issue for women.’4
Yet VAW does not relate solely to the right to health in consequential terms. 
As affirmed in 1999 by the then Special Rapporteur (SR) on Violence against 
Women, its Causes and Consequences, Radhika Coomaraswamy, ‘[v]iolence 
against women may occur within the context of reproductive health policy. 
Violence and violations of women’s reproductive health may result either from 
direct State action, via harmful reproductive policies, or from State failure to 
meet its core obligations to promote the empowerment of women.’5 Although 
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this argument has not been further developed at the international level, it appears 
essential in order to build a solid framework for reconceptualising states’ obliga-
tions in preventing and combating VAW as linked to the right to health and the 
right to reproductive health.
Using an international law perspective, this book will distil the relationship 
between violence against women and the right to health, including reproductive 
health, focusing on the following areas of analysis. Violation of the right to health 
is a consequence of violence (horizontal dimension), as much as (state) health 
policies might cause – or create the conditions for – violence against women 
(vertical dimension). The horizontal dimension aims to consider interpersonal 
relations, whereas the vertical dimension encompasses state health policies and 
laws. Both dimensions will be discussed and put to the test throughout the book. 
The analysis of the relationship will generate one key, innovative idea: violence 
against women’s health (VAWH). This concept is meant to capture the core of the 
violation of women’s rights to health and to reproductive health. Paraphrasing 
the definition included in the UN General Assembly (UN GA) Declaration on 
the Elimination of Violence against Women,6 violence against women’s health 
constitutes a violation of their right to health and reproductive health.
The idea of VAW is fundamental and well consolidated at the international 
level; however, despite referring to what I have conceived as the vertical dimen-
sion of violence, it mainly focuses on the horizontal, interpersonal dimension. 
Compared to the concept of VAW, VAWH will be capable of comprehensively 
grasping the two dimensions of violence affecting women’s rights to health and 
to reproductive health, and will add a new element to the definition: the limitation 
of women’s autonomy, which is absent from the notion of VAW as elaborated at 
the international level.
The main argument has been built on the paradigm of medicine which has 
been known since Hippocrates: anamnesis, diagnosis, treatment and prognosis.7 
The paradigm is a useful tool for constructing the idea of violence against wom-
en’s health, describing the state of the law and unearthing states’ obligations 
in countering VAWH. The re-conceptualising of states’ obligations will start 
from the international law of state responsibility and will focus on three types 
of obligation: obligations of result, due diligence obligations and obligations to 
progressively take steps. The relationship between VAW and women’s right to 
health is a matter of international human rights law. It allows a legal recognition 
of the harms to their health suffered by female victims/survivors of violence 
and, at the same time, it reinforces the justiciability of the right to health at the 
international, regional and domestic levels.
Background
The relationship between violence against women and the violation of the 
right to health has not raised as much attention at the international level as 
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has the violation of other rights,8 in particular civil and political rights. As 
early as 1980, during the Second World Conference on Women, VAW was 
considered as a social problem within the ambit of health policies.9 However, 
the relationship has never been overtly encapsulated in an international human 
rights treaty.
VAW emerged as a human rights issue only in the 1990s, as did the concept 
of reproductive health. Since then, over the years, many commentators, UN 
bodies, national and international courts have demonstrated that women’s health 
is a human rights issue, and that reproductive rights are a component of wom-
en’s right to health.10 The UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women of 1979 (CEDAW) obliges states ‘to eliminate 
discrimination against women in the field of health care’ (Article 12(1)), and 
the CEDAW Committee has interpreted access to health care, including care of 
reproductive health, as a basic right.11 The UN Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights Committee (ESCR Committee) acknowledged that the right to the ‘high-
est attainable standard of health’ includes ‘sexual and reproductive freedoms’ 
in its General Comment (GC) No. 14 (2000), interpreting Article 12 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 
and sixteen years later devoted an entire GC, No. 22, to the right to sexual and 
reproductive health.12
Consequences of violence on women’s health have been pointed out in com-
munications and concluding observations by the CEDAW Committee, which 
has also invited states to ensure the adoption of appropriate measures within the 
health sector.13 In 2015, UN human rights experts, the Rapporteur on the Rights 
of Women of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACommHR) 
and the SR on the Rights of Women, and Human Rights Defenders of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights presented a joint statement in which 
they stressed that ‘violence against women, harmful gender stereotypes and mul-
tiple and intersectional forms of discrimination based on sex and gender lead to 
the violation of women’s sexual and reproductive health rights.’14
However, what emerges from existing literature and jurisprudence is that 
violence affects women’s health, a concept that is conceived more as a ‘status’ 
than a human right.15 In other words, the right to health has been ‘absorbed’, and 
indirectly protected, by invoking civil and political rights, such as the prohibition 
of discrimination, the prohibition of torture, the right to respect for private and 
family life, and the right to life. For example, domestic violence (DV) and forced 
sterilisation have been identified by UN bodies as violations of human rights, in 
particular the right to life, and the prohibition of torture as clarified by the UN 
Human Rights Committee (HRC).16 The reason for what I will call the ‘indirect 
protection’ of the right to health is that the HRC, which has been – at least for 
the time being – one of the most active bodies at UN level in addressing issues 
of women’s health, is not competent to consider alleged violations of the right 
to health; this right is not enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), of which the HRC is the guardian.
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Similarly, at the regional level, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), 
for example, has only indirectly promoted and protected the right to health of 
female victims of violence, by applying articles of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) providing for civil and political rights, namely Articles 
3 and 8. Regional human rights courts and UN treaty bodies, by means of inter-
pretation, have easily overcome the absence of an express treaty provision on the 
right to health by applying ‘other’ human rights. In other words, international 
and regional jurisprudence has not directly ensured respect for the right to health; 
rather, it has indirectly promoted the right’s content by applying other, more 
‘justiciable’ rights. This affirmation does not reduce the importance of the right 
to health. The right to health is a human right and so is the right to reproductive 
health; despite being ‘latecomers’ among the human rights, that is economic, 
social, and cultural rights, these rights are human rights,17 which create legal 
obligations on states that ratified the international treaty in which the same rights 
are enshrined. Furthermore, at the domestic level, the right to health has found 
wide recognition; more than two-thirds of the world’s constitutions make some 
reference to the right to health, and ‘health-related litigation is now commonly 
pursued in domestic courts.’18 The right to reproductive health has recently gained 
momentum, thanks to an increasing number of cases, in particular on abortion- 
related issues. For all these reasons, it is time to reconsider the right to health and 
the right to reproductive health in their relationship with VAW, and put them at 
the centre of the analysis.
Violence against women: the knowledge so far
The CEDAW, adopted in 1979, which was aimed at drawing attention to  women’s 
inequality, did not include provisions on VAW.19 The UN GA adopted in 1985 
a resolution in which it invited states to enact measures in response to DV,20 and 
finally, in 1993, it approved a Declaration which addressed VAW as a ‘manifes-
tation of historically unequal power relations between men and women’ in its 
preamble.21 Article 1 of the Declaration defined VAW as ‘any act of gender-based 
violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological 
harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary 
deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life.’ The definition 
is very similar to the one provided in the year preceding the Declaration by the 
CEDAW Committee in its pivotal GR No. 19. VAW was conceived as ‘ violence 
… directed against a woman because she is a woman or that affects women 
disproportionately,’ including ‘acts that inflict physical, mental or sexual harm 
or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and other deprivations of liberty.’22 In 
the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating VAW and DV, 
adopted in 2011 and entering into force in 2014, VAW is defined as ‘a violation of 
human rights and a form of discrimination against women and shall mean all acts 
of gender-based violence that result in, or are likely to result in, physical, sexual, 
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psychological or economic harm or suffering to women, including threats of such 
acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or 
in private life’ (Article 3).
VAW can be considered from five different perspectives. Firstly, it is a form of 
discrimination against women, both de jure and de facto.23 Secondly, VAW is a 
form of gender-based violence, and ‘gender-based violence against women’ was 
precisely the expression chosen by the CEDAW Committee in its most recent GR 
No. 35, which replaces GR No. 19 of 1992.24 Violence against women is based on 
gender, on the fact of women being women. Violence does not ‘just happen’ to 
occur to women, but it is motivated by ‘factors concerned with gender,’ such as 
the need to assert power and control.25 The philosopher Susan J. Brison pointed 
out that the reason why
[i]t is so hard for so many to recognise acts of gender-based violence as such is that 
if it is an attack by a stranger, it is viewed as ‘a random act of violence,’ typically 
by a psychopath, a monster, ‘not one of us,’ whereas, if it is an attack by a date/
acquaintance/partner/spouse, it is considered to be a crime of passion – motivated by 
uncontrollable lust or jealous love (that is, if it is considered a crime at all, which, in 
all too many cases, it is not). That such violence constitutes a violation of women’s 
civil rights is seldom acknowledged.26
Thirdly, VAW is a violation of human rights. In GR No. 19, the CEDAW 
Committee identified the following rights as being infringed by VAW: the right 
to life; the right not to be subject to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment; the right to equal protection according to humanitarian 
norms in time of international or internal armed conflict; the right to liberty and 
security of person; the right to equal protection under the law; the right to equality 
in the family; the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health; the right to just and favourable conditions of work.27 Other rights can be 
considered, such as the right to privacy, including the right of the abused woman 
to change surname or to eliminate a surname if by virtue of the marriage she has 
obtained it, and the rights belonging to the so-called ‘third generation’ of human 
rights, such as the rights to peace and to a positive cultural context.28 Fourthly, I 
conceive VAW as an ‘umbrella term,’ a cluster of offences and harmful behav-
iours rather than an offence per se.29 The element of intent, which characterises 
offences in criminal law, is therefore not necessary to identify VAW and it is 
indeed absent from international and regional legal instruments on VAW, includ-
ing the Council of Europe Istanbul Convention on Preventing and Combating 
Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention). The 
element of intent is relevant only when it comes to assess individual responsibil-
ity for the commission of the specific offences (such as stalking, rape, DV) that 
can be brought within the terms of the more general framework of VAW. States 
are responsible for VAW when they violate their obligations to protect the human 
rights of women who are victims/survivors of violence committed by state and 
non-state actors. Although not intentionally, states cause or create the conditions 
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for VAW, because their systems encourage the perpetuation of patterns of dis-
crimination rooted in the society through policies and laws in the health sector, 
as I will show, even when these measures are (apparently) adopted for the benefit 
of women themselves. It has been argued that ‘the intention to discriminate may 
be systematic without being conscious, and thus intentional,’ and ‘requiring a 
showing of intent leaves potentially widespread and insidious unconscious dis-
crimination unremedied.’30 Fifthly, given the widespread recognition of VAW 
as a violation of human rights at the international, regional and national levels, 
it sounds reasonable to enquire whether there exists an international custom 
prohibiting VAW. The CEDAW Committee, in its landmark GR no. 35 on VAW 
of 2017, answered in the affirmative. The Committee posited that ‘opinio juris 
and State practice suggest that the prohibition of gender-based violence against 
women has evolved into a principle of customary international law,’ and that 
‘General recommendation No. 19 has been a key catalyst for this process.’31 The 
question is in fact two intertwined questions, as follows: does an international 
custom prohibiting gender-based VAW exist? If so, what is the content of this 
norm? The Committee has proved courageous, and the GR will probably spur 
the consolidation of a custom to that effect in years to come. For the time being, 
however, I consider this argument with caution, respectfully contending that 
international custom has embraced the prohibition of some forms of VAW, but 
not all of them, especially when violence is committed by the state through the 
implementation of laws and policies in the field of health. If we do not consider 
VAW a distinct crime, but rather a broad term including several offences and 
harmful behaviours that constitute VAW because they are based on gender, then 
we can separately analyse whether the prohibition of a specific form of violence 
has achieved the status of customary international law. In this book, as I will try to 
demonstrate, I might contend that the prohibition of the forms of violence in the 
horizontal dimension has gradually consolidated as an international custom, but 
not all forms of violence identifiable in the vertical dimension.
The reasons underlying the choice of the right to health and the right 
to reproductive health
In 1994, Mahmoud Fathalla, a professor of obstetrics and gynaecology, and Chair 
of the World Health Organization (WHO) advisory committee on health research, 
acknowledged that ‘society is not neutral with regard to reproductive rights,’ and 
that in many societies ‘the predominant objection against contraceptive use was 
directed at contraceptive control by women, rather than against contraception 
itself.’32 The same year, Rebecca Cook published an innovative paper com-
missioned by the WHO on Women’s Health and Human Rights, in which she 
emphasised the ‘pervasive neglect of women’s health.’33 In 1995, Aart Hendriks 
contended that ‘woman’s right to sexual and reproductive health is not only 
threatened by current expressions of deep-rooted, harmful practices – including 
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sexual violence against women and girls, forced marriage, and female genital 
mutilation – but is also challenged by progress in reproductive medicine.’34 It is 
noteworthy that almost twenty years after these outstanding contributions, Erin 
Nelson, in her remarkable work on the notion of reproductive autonomy, reflected 
on the fact that the ‘history of reproductive regulation is a history of attempting 
to enforce a traditional view of women as child-rearers.’35 In 2016, the working 
group on the issue of discrimination against women in law and in practice, estab-
lished at UN level, confirmed this view, by stating in its report that ‘women’s 
bodies are instrumentalized for cultural, political and economic purposes rooted 
in patriarchal traditions,’ and ‘instrumentalization occurs within and beyond the 
health sector and is deeply embedded in multiple forms of social and political 
control over women.’36
In appreciating the two dimensions at the core of the book – the violation of 
the right to health is a consequence of violence (horizontal dimension) as much 
as (state) health policies might be a cause of violence against women (vertical 
dimension) – which allow me to conceive the new idea of VAWH, the functional 
relationship existing between VAW and the rights to health and reproductive 
health should be emphasised. VAW has already been analysed from a human 
rights perspective, focusing, for example, on non-discrimination and the prohibi-
tion of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, or punishment.37 The right 
to health and the right to reproductive health are also worth exploring in detail, 
however, for the innovative contribution they can make to the analysis of VAW. 
First, these human rights – I will conceive them as human rights, and not as mere 
status – are always impaired by episodes of violence, as much as in all cases 
VAW is a form of discrimination against women. Secondly, these rights belong to 
the category of economic, social and cultural rights, which have been deemed less 
‘justiciable’ than other rights. It is time to debunk the myth by demonstrating the 
justiciability of the right to health and the right to reproductive health as linked 
to violence against women, and to encourage the inclusion of these rights in 
international legal instruments.38 A focus on economic, social and cultural rights 
would be extremely useful to empower women and to challenge the stereotyped 
visions of the role women play in society.39 It is striking indeed that the Council 
of Europe’s pivotal Istanbul Convention, adopted in 2011 and entered into force 
in 2014, contains just one provision concerning the right of the victim to receive 
compensation after suffering from a severe impairment of health.40 As correctly 
pointed out by Cheryl Hanna:
we legal scholars have been missing something. While our medical colleagues have 
done tremendous work in documenting the health effects of partner violence, to a 
large extent, legal scholars have been unsure exactly how physical and reproductive 
health, in particular, ought to factor into law. But, if we start with the premise that 
the right to health … is a basic human right, then we can begin to understand how 
including health in our arguments about affirmative state duties to end gendered 
violence can provide another perspective and another tool to persuade the powers 
that be to prioritize eliminating gendered violence.41
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Thirdly, the focus on these two rights allows me to reflect on the public/ private 
divide. Let us consider population policies. The anti-natalist programmes of 
many governments have concentrated on the ‘excessively’ fertile bodies of 
women belonging for example to ethnic minorities, and accordingly they have 
‘used language, made recommendations, and provided funds for activities that, 
in sum, suggest coercion.’42 Similarly, pro-natalist policies have employed coer-
cive methods. The criminalisation of abortion which has aimed to put ‘women, 
doctors, and other facilitators in danger and sometimes behind bars,’ and selec-
tive restrictions on contraception, both legal and administrative, ‘often in the 
name of women’s health,’ are just two examples.43 Here lies a challenging 
paradox. States have not traditionally intervened in matters related to DV, since 
it was considered as pertaining to the ‘private’ sphere, until the affirmation of 
VAW as a form of discrimination against women and a violation of human 
rights in the 1990s. States did however – and do in many cases – interfere with 
women’s ‘private’ choices concerning their reproductive health in the name of 
population policies, which have invariably been perceived as more relevant than 
the individual’s autonomy. Population policies also demonstrate the structural 
nature of discrimination against women, whose rights can be sacrificed for other 
purposes defined by state (male) authorities. Here this book critically reviews 
and challenges the traditional distinction private = women, public = men,44 
which is a true picture if we consider the political public sphere as populated by 
men and the state as male subject, but does not capture in its entirety the com-
plexity of the relationship which is at the core of this book. I will therefore argue 
that the domestic environment also is male and that this view has historically 
justified the absence of interference by states in cases of domestic violence.45 
Rhonda Copelon interestingly argued that ‘patriarchal ideology also constructed 
the private sphere of family and intimate relations as off-limits to State inter-
vention even where violence was concerned,’ and that ‘by adopting a hands-off 
policy, the public sphere supported the violent exercise of power in the so-called 
private sphere.’46 This view supports my choice to concentrate on women’s 
rights to health and reproductive health. They have been neglected because the 
private sphere has been conceived as male, and so domestic violence has been 
excluded from state interference and women’s health regarded as not suitable for 
leaving to women’s autonomy only. I contend that the right to health, including 
sexual and reproductive health, is always at stake in episodes of VAW – in 
terms of both immediate and lasting consequences – and that an analysis from 
this perspective is much more gender-sensitive, since, on one hand, it takes into 
consideration the ‘gendered experiences that affect [women’s] health,’47 and on 
the other hand it implies – in particular with regard to reproductive health – the 
‘ability’ to exercise reproductive autonomy,48 in other words, women’s right to 
decide. In this book I will use the expression ‘right to reproductive health,’ as 
chosen by the Committee on ESCR in its GC No. 22.
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Why human rights and why women’s rights?
As I explained, I will consider health and reproductive health as human rights, 
and not as mere status as envisaged by the WHO. It should be stressed at the 
outset that human rights law is not devoid of criticism. It is not the purpose 
here to review all the theories existing in the field – this analysis would go well 
beyond the scope of my research – but to admit that it is impossible not to mention 
the limits human rights have shown.49 For the purpose of my book, it is worth 
spending a few words on the universality issue, which is at the core of the debate 
on human rights, and in particular of women’s rights. Just consider the debate 
on whether human rights are universal or relative, and the role of culture, while 
dealing, for example, with female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C). Are these 
practices acceptable because they find their basis in culture? Is the prohibition of 
these practices at the international level a new form of Western imperialism?50 
The concept of ‘Asian values’ has been coined for the Asian continent,51 but does 
it mean that human rights law is not universal? The debate is too complex to be 
dealt with in few lines.52
Practices that significantly impair a woman’s or a girl’s bodily integrity have 
been condemned not only by European countries, but also by countries where 
FGM/C, for example, is tolerated, and even encouraged, by local  communities.53 
One should bear in mind that the victims are usually girls who are too young 
to express consent to undergo the practice. Even though the practice is trans-
mitted from mother to daughter and is accepted within a community, even if 
it is perpetrated and supported by women, FGM/C is VAW, as I have argued 
elsewhere,54 and it constitutes a violation of human rights, as well as a form 
of discrimination against women. Moreover, Chinkin and Charlesworth pointed 
out that what is striking is that ‘culture is much more frequently invoked in the 
context of  women’s rights than in any other area.’55 In GC No. 21, the ESCR 
Committee argued that ‘applying limitations to the right of everyone to take part 
in cultural life may be necessary in certain circumstances, in particular in the case 
of negative practices, including those attributed to customs and traditions, that 
infringe upon other human rights.’56
Nonetheless, the condemnation of practices such as FGM/C cannot be 
blind.  Other practices widespread in European and American countries, sup-
ported by similar stereotyped views of the role of women in society, must be 
assessed from the perspective of human rights law. Accordingly, this book will 
explore whether and to what extent genital cosmetic surgery can be compared 
to FGM/C, in particular in terms of the consent expressed by the girl/woman to 
the practice.57
As I anticipated, VAW is universal, rooted in every society and manifests 
itself in different forms. In European countries, ‘honour’ is still a ‘mitigating 
factor’ for certain forms of violence – not necessarily under the law but surely 
within society – and the ‘behaviour’ of a female victim of rape or sexual abuses 
determines whether or not she deserves compassion or dishonour.58
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It can be argued that human rights law has also failed to take into consid-
eration women’s specific needs, by ‘essentialising the category of women and 
the attendant privileging of the perspectives of First World women (or some 
of them) while failing to reflect the multiple factors that interact to constitute 
violations around the world.’59 However, the reasoning can go a bit further. In 
an inspiring book on sex-selective abortions affecting women of Indian origin in 
India and the United States, Sital Kalantry used the word ‘decontextualisation’ 
to contend that universalistic perspectives are limited in evaluating bans on 
practices that immigrants bring from one country to another.60 In her view, 
sex-selective abortion, which is a form of severe discrimination against women 
and girls in India, cannot be seen in the same way in the USA, where the 
practice, far from being widespread (as data have shown), has been condemned 
by anti-abortionist associations for limiting women’s autonomy. Context, which 
is not merely geographical but also social and economic, has therefore a role 
to play.61 This book suggests the expression ‘contextualised universalism’ as 
appropriate to protect women’s rights while taking into account the context in 
which violence is perpetrated. I argue that the debate shifts from the dichotomy 
universal–relative to the analysis of different grounds of discrimination. In 
other words, it is not a matter of which culture is at the basis of the violation 
of  women’s rights, but rather across which grounds – gender, ethnicity, class, 
social and economic conditions – discrimination is perpetrated. It has been 
contended that ‘neither a claim to universal principles nor a claim to cultural 
relativism adequately addresses the global aspect of gendered violence.’62 
Considering different grounds for discrimination, as interestingly argued, ‘will 
strengthen our capacity to realise the full humanity and equality of women – and 
other genders – everywhere.’63 This perspective permits us to overcome the 
differences between approaches, by capturing the meaning of discrimination 
against women, and against other genders as well. It also emphasises the aspect 
of intersectionality, which I will discuss further in the book. The international 
community has indeed started, slowly, ‘to explore ways to analyse women’s 
human rights that do not represent women as a monolithic category,’ meeting 
the request of feminists from the global South.64
So far, I have discussed women’s rights. What about those of other genders? 
Dianne Otto overcomes the duality masculine/feminine by conceiving sex and 
gender as a fully social and performative category, which implies that interna-
tional human rights law can reconceive sex/gender as ‘a fluid conception that 
has multiple forms of expression and identification.’65 By conceiving sex and 
gender as a dichotomy, women have always been depicted as vulnerable and in 
need of protection, the object of international treaties which only focus on their 
weaknesses and therefore reproduce the ‘maleness’ of the universal subject of 
international human rights law.66 The approach has evolved over time, thanks to 
the work of UN treaty bodies and the increasing focus on women as agents of 
change; however, one should keep in mind the beginning of the debate before 
reflecting on its evolution.
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Having said that, this book concentrates on women and girls because they 
are, as data demonstrates worldwide, the majority of victims/survivors of 
violence. This is a way, not to victimise women but rather to acknowledge the 
discrimination which is rooted in society. VAW is extremely entrenched in 
society and in history. This is clear if we consider, for example, the founding 
myth of Europe: a rape.67 To acknowledge the structural nature of VAW does 
not mean excluding episodes of violence committed against other genders, 
but rather emphasising a dramatic trait of every society. If governments still 
decide to appoint mostly male ministers, except maybe one or two; if it is still 
possible to object to women having freedom to choose regarding their body; 
then there is still room to write and to reflect on the topic. It is a matter of 
feminist studies, and human rights.
Perspective: the Hippocratic medical paradigm
Existing literature has extensively analysed the phenomenon of VAW and has 
commented on cases decided by regional and national courts, and by UN treaty 
bodies, regarding women’s health and reproductive rights. This study needed a 
conceptual model, which I found in the medical paradigm: anamnesis, diagno-
sis, treatment and prognosis. This might seem a simplistic scheme, which only 
takes into account part of the complexity of ‘illness’ (there is more than one 
disease; the patient’s reaction can differ according to the circumstances, etc.), 
but it turns out to be a useful backbone for the main argument. This choice 
draws heavily on the natural link between health and the field of medicine, 
but is also dictated by the fact that it has never been explored in these terms. 
This paradigm is a descriptive one, because it allows a clear systematisation 
of the different aspects of the research according to a plausible and logical 
structure. It is also a building paradigm, because through distillation of the 
relationship between VAW and the rights to health and to reproductive health 
it conceives a new notion, VAWH, which leads to the reconceptualisation of 
states’ obligations.
The medical paradigm composed of anamnesis, diagnosis, treatment and prog-
nosis owes its existence to Hippocrates. Hippocrates of Coen is the name given 
to the 400bce author of the Hippocratic corpus of writings which defined the 
school of medicine that bears his name. His life and his works are surrounded 
in an aura of mystery. As stressed by Edelstein, ‘the belief has been current that 
none of the so-called Hippocratic writings could be ascribed with any certainty to 
Hippocrates himself.’68 The Corpus Hippocraticum refers to 58 writings which 
introduced both a theory of disease and a complete description of diagnostics 
and treatment (‘On Fistulas,’ ‘On Fractures,’ ‘On Injuries of the Head,’ ‘The 
Book of Prognostics,’ etc.).69 Greek medicine differed from previous practices 
in its search for the true causes of health. Empirical observation was therefore 
necessary in order to understand the illness and its course.
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Anamnesis consists in the act of remembering, in the reconstruction of the 
medical history of the patient, which goes beyond mere observation of the body. 
As outlined by Leavy:
At least as early as Hippocrates’ time, it was recognised that human nature is not 
limited to that which can be observed by the examination of the body. Human nature 
is historical, and the first part of the examination, then as now, consisted of a history, 
an anamnesis as it is called, which means a calling to mind of a person’s past. Nor 
did Hippocrates make this anamnesis just a listing of earlier symptoms or earlier dis-
eases; it is also an account of experiences so far as they are thematically pertinent.70
Plato referred to anamnesis as ‘recollection’, although his thought has never been 
linked to medical history. In his introduction of the theory of recollection in the 
Meno, 81d, it is written that:
[a]s the whole of nature is akin, and the soul has learned everything, nothing prevents 
a man, after recalling one thing only – a process men call learning –  discovering 
everything else for himself, if he is brave and does not tire of the search; for 
 searching and learning, are, as a whole, recollection (anamnesis).71
In other words, anamnesis has a technical meaning within Plato’s epistemology. 
It is the process that permits the remembering of Ideas/Forms through the sensible 
world.
Diagnosis can be defined as the ‘identification of the nature of an illness or 
other problem by examination of the symptoms.’72 Diagnosis has been considered 
to provide the ‘true state of the patient,’ but this affirmation is problematic, 
since it is ‘a construct of medical knowledge and reasoning methodology applied 
in clinical decision-making.’73 Accordingly, Sadegh-Zadeh has distinguished 
between two terms: diagnostics, that is the investigation into the patient’s health 
conditions, and diagnosis, which is the outcome of the former.74 After making a 
diagnosis, a physician would proceed with treatment, in order to restore the bal-
ance that the illness has disrupted, and with prognosis. In Hippocratic medicine, 
as in every kind of medicine, prognosis is ‘the prediction of the outcome of the 
disease, as well as its fluctuations and transmutations.’75 If the physician ‘knows 
what course the disease will take, he is also better able to prepare for what is to 
come.’76 The ‘place of truth’ does not reside in the past (anamnesis), but rather 
in the future (prognosis), where it is possible to assess the appropriateness of the 
treatment and of the interpretative hypothesis from which it originates.77
Against this backdrop, it is necessary to ask whether this paradigm can be used 
in other fields of study. In the book The Therapy of Desire, Martha Nussbaum 
used the paradigm to study the schools of philosophy that developed in the 
Hellenistic period. Reflecting on Hellenistic ethics, Nussbaum identified three 
closely related ideas in the therapeutic investigative process.78 The first two ideas 
are relevant here, since they concern ‘a tentative diagnosis of disease, of factors, 
especially socially taught beliefs, that are most prominent in preventing people 
from living well,’ and ‘a tentative norm of health: a conception (usually general 
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and to some degree open-ended) of the flourishing and complete human life.’79 
Thus the ideas elaborated in Hellenistic thought are well suited to describe all 
aspects of human life.
In the field of international studies, the sociologist Johan Galtung applied the 
Hippocratic paradigm to the peaceful resolution of disputes between states in his 
famous work Peace by Peaceful Means.80 He argued that peace studies ‘have 
much to learn from the paradigm,’ and that ‘much thought, speech and action in 
the field of violence/peace diagnoses violence, but then only as direct and physi-
cal, and mainly the acute case.’81 He interestingly contended that the prognosis is 
that ‘unless treated, violence will be repeated.’ With regard to therapies, the ‘so 
what, what are you going to do about it?’, Galtung was convinced that ‘we need 
maps of the social reality in which violence and peace can unfold.’82 The question 
was therefore the following: how can peace researchers do peace work (therapy)? 
Accordingly, he elaborated different peace research paradigms.
The challenge this book faces is to build the new concept of VAWH. The book 
will not consider the woman as unique patient, because I believe that depicting 
women as vulnerable subjects does not help in eradicating VAW. Women are 
agents of change as much as they are victims when, for example, they bring their 
cases before domestic or regional courts, or before international bodies. Therefore, 
I contend in the diagnosis that VAWH is an illness that, by personally affecting 
individuals, affects the entire society. VAW is indeed a ‘public health’ concern, 
as stressed by the WHO;83 so is VAWH. The anamnesis will not consider the 
personal experiences and the emotions of women, but it will be conducted from 
an international law perspective. Mutatis mutandis, empirical observation and the 
act of remembering entail, from an international legal point of view, the analysis 
of state practice and of international, regional and domestic jurisprudence in order 
to find common trends and critically discuss the interpretation given to legal 
instruments in force.
The framework built in the first part of this book will pave the way for a recon-
ceptualising of states’ obligations under international law, which constitutes the 
treatment. As recently posited by the ESCR Committee in its GC on the right to 
sexual and reproductive health, ‘States parties have a core obligation to ensure, at 
the very least, minimum essential levels of satisfaction of the right to sexual and 
reproductive health. In this regard, States parties should be guided by contem-
porary human rights instruments and jurisprudence, as well as the most current 
international guidelines and protocols established by United Nations agencies, in 
particular WHO and the United Nations Population Fund.’84
The strength of my reasoning lies in the fact that both dimensions, the horizon-
tal and the vertical as conceived in this book, can be unified while discussing the 
reconceptualising of states’ obligations. In both dimensions, I will contend that 
– and provide examples of how – states bear legal obligations of result, due dili-
gence and to progressively take steps. I will show that the difference between the 
two dimensions does not concern the ‘type’ of the obligations, but rather the fact 
that obligations ‘specialise’ along one or other of the two explored dimensions.
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Structure of the book
The first chapter contains the anamnesis and is based on the analysis of selected 
jurisprudence of regional human rights and domestic courts, and of the qua-
si-jurisprudence of UN treaty bodies, related to both dimensions, focusing on 
the applicants, the direct or indirect application of the rights to health and repro-
ductive health, the relevance of women’s health in the analysis and reparations. 
The second chapter, the diagnosis, draws on the precedent and conceptualises 
the notion of VAWH, a new socio-legal notion, which will prove capable of 
encompassing both the horizontal and the vertical dimensions of violence. In 
this chapter I will construct the notion of VAWH as a form of discrimination 
against women, and a violation of the rights to health and to reproductive 
health. I will then reflect on autonomy and consent, and I will elaborate a 
human rights-based notion of autonomy as related to VAWH. In the third 
chapter, I will delve into treatment, which, in my view, is the reconceptualising 
of states’ obligations. I will start from basic notions of international law, before 
finding the most suitable category to apply to VAWH. I will provide examples 
of states’ obligations of result, due diligence and to progressively take steps 
putting both dimensions under the same umbrella. Finally, as prognosis I will 
provide some concluding remarks, challenging, for the last time, my paradigm, 
and wondering whether it is not international law itself that is the ultimate cause 
of VAWH.
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‘case history’ on violence against 
women, and against women’s rights to 
health and to reproductive health
The anamnesis, a two-dimensional approach
The anamnesis mainly consists in case history. However, Hippocrates went 
beyond the mere identification of ‘symptoms’ or ‘earlier diseases,’ and included 
in the anamnesis his own experience, as far as it was pertinent.1 Hippocrates 
also ‘listened’ to patients, to discover their ‘personalities, dream, daily habits,’ 
in a process that resembled the modern ‘psycho-therapeutic interaction between 
the doctor and the patient.’2 Mutatis mutandis, the role of a lawyer is to inves-
tigate case law, and his/her analysis is inevitably influenced by his/her own 
experience as a scholar. I am using this metaphor to introduce the analysis of 
the relationship between VAW and human rights to health and to reproductive 
health, distinguishing the two dimensions of the relationship that constitute the 
backbone of my argument, and that will frame the notion of VAWH in chapter 
2 (the diagnosis).
Violence against women’s health does not constitute simply a process of 
putting together ideas that are completely separate, but grasps the complexity 
of the relationship at the core of this book and constitutes a solid structure on 
which states’ obligations may be reconceived. The first dimension is character-
ised by violations of women’s rights to health and to reproductive health as a 
consequence of VAW; the second includes health policies or laws which might 
impact on women’s health and constitute a form of gender-based violence. The 
first dimension pertains to inter-individual relationships, and is ‘horizontal’ in the 
structure of my analysis.3 The second refers to behaviours of the state in the health 
sector – mainly through policies and laws – that produce, or create the conditions 
of, violence as defined in the introduction. It is ‘vertical’ and encompasses, as I 
will demonstrate through the anamnesis and the diagnosis, actions and behaviours 
of health personnel who exercise a public function, namely the provision of health 
services. I found a partial match with my understanding of the two dimensions of 
violence in the definitions provided by the WHO, according to which the horizon-
tal dimension consists in ‘interpersonal violence’: violence between individuals, 
including ‘family and intimate partner violence and community violence,’ the 
former committed within the context of the family, ‘community’ referring to 
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‘acquaintance and stranger violence,’ violence in workplaces and other institu-
tions.4 The WHO categorisation does not precisely match my vertical dimension, 
although we can regard the WHO notion of ‘collective violence,’ meaning social, 
political and economic violence, as also referring to violence committed through 
state laws and policies.
The bi-dimensional relationship will be explored using the jurisprudence of 
regional human rights courts and the activity of international human rights bodies, 
along with some relevant national judgments and state practice. I will study the 
decisions following three axes, which correspond to specific questions:
1. Who are the applicants?
2. Has the right to health been applied directly? In which ways was women’s 
health relevant in the decision?
3. What reparations, if any, have been granted to the person(s) whose rights have 
been violated?
I will propose cases which have been decided after the affirmation of the notion of 
reproductive health at the international level, hence after the mid-1990s. The pur-
pose of this book is not to elaborate a database of jurisprudence but to reflect on 
legal issues arising from selected decisions and judgments to support my paradigm 
or put it to the test. A comparative analysis is beyond the scope of my research. 
I will integrate regional jurisprudence and international quasi- jurisprudence with 
national judgments that are particularly significant and contribute to the definition 
of VAWH.
With regard to the first dimension, the rights to health and to reproductive 
health emerge as the main rights affected by episodes of violence. Violence 
against women ‘puts women’s lives and their health at risk.’5 I have selected three 
main areas to examine: domestic violence, rape committed in times of peace, 
including marital rape, and female genital mutilation/cutting. The analysis will 
allow me to cover different, and often interrelated, ‘contexts of violence,’ namely 
the family environment, the community context and the state. 6
Turning to the other dimension of the relationship, I argue that health policies 
or laws affecting women’s health might be a cause of violence. This affirmation 
might seem quite strong at first sight. It is not. As I discussed in the introduction, 
the notion of violence can be conceived as an ‘umbrella term’ beneath which 
many forms of gender-based violence can be referred, including ones originating 
from and/or ‘provoked by’ state laws and policies. This book will concentrate 
on some forms of violence that relate to the ‘vertical dimension’ of violence: 
abortion, involuntary sterilisation,7 maternal health and access to emergency con-
traception.8 On abortion, the form that will open the second part of the anamnesis, 
feminists and feminist lawyers have written extensively.9 In this book I will 
demonstrate, referring to several judgments, decisions and reports, that restrictive 
abortion laws cause violence to women, who suffer from depression, stress and 
physical injuries as a consequence of denial or limits to access to the practice by 
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the authorities. This violence is gender-based and rooted in the consideration of 
women as weak and ill-suited to making (what society perceives as) ‘appropriate’ 
decisions. As posited by a scholar, ‘laws that question the moral agency of 
women perpetuate stereotypes that women lack the capacity for rational decision- 
making.’10 Law and health policies can constitute a ‘barrier to women’s access to 
services.’11 I found maternal health another area well worth the investigating, and 
I will also focus on the underexplored issue of ‘obstetric violence,’ defined by the 
WHO as ‘disrespectful and abusive treatment during childbirth.’12
Both dimensions will demonstrate that when the state, acting as a ‘male’ actor, 
does not prevent interpersonal violence, or hinders access to health services, it 
perpetuates discrimination against women, and tolerates, contributes and causes 
VAWH.13
The horizontal, ‘interpersonal’ dimension
Domestic violence
Context and legal background
Domestic violence (DV) violates women’s fundamental rights, including the 
right to health and the right to reproductive health.
The term ‘intimate partner violence’ (IPV) is often used as a synonym of DV. 
However, the former is meant to include physical, sexual and emotional abuse 
and controlling behaviours by a current or former intimate partner, whereas DV 
is a broader concept that also encompasses violence between people that are not 
intimately related. Michelle Madden Dempsey, in her philosophical analysis, 
elaborated thirteen conceptual categories relating to the concept of DV. In par-
ticular, she represented DV in its strong sense as violence that occurs in domestic 
contexts and that tends to sustain or perpetuate patriarchy (wife battering, in 
Madden Dempsey’s example), and in its weak sense as not perpetuating patriar-
chy (Madden Dempsey cites the violent retaliation of the victim of DV against her 
abuser).14 The author further distinguished DV in its strong sense from ‘domestic 
abuse,’ the latter being meant to include actions which perpetuate patriarchy 
but are non-violent, such as refusing to allow the abused person to work outside 
the home or access to money.15 The map of conceptual categories she offered is 
interesting, although it does not grasp how psychological and economic pressure 
can be as severe as battering, even without evident physical harm, and affect 
women’s right to health. Arguing that ‘the right to be free from domestic violence 
is an international human right for which States can be held liable,’16 Bonita 
Meyersfeld identified a specific subset of DV that she calls ‘systemic intimate 
violence,’ having the following ‘internationalising elements’:
a) severe emotional or physical harm, including threat of such harm;
b) a continuum of violence;
c) a male perpetrator;
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d) the victim is part of a group which is discriminated against or is vulnerable;
e) violence is part of a system.17
The adjective ‘systemic’ clearly captures the essence of a behaviour which is 
rooted in society. In this section, I will use DV or IPV interchangeably, respecting 
the choice made by the court /UN body whose decision is under investigation, and 
I will stress the impact of this form of violence on women’s health.
DV was not recognised until as late as the 1990s in international legal instru-
ments. In the 1993 Declaration on the elimination of violence against women, the 
UN GA emphasised that VAW can be committed ‘in public or in private life.’18 In 
2004, the GA specifically addressed domestic violence in a landmark resolution, 
No. 58/147, which defined DV as ‘violence that occurs within the private sphere, 
generally between individuals who are related through blood or intimacy,’ and 
‘one of the most common and least visible forms of violence against women 
and [having] consequences [that] affect many areas of the lives of victims.’19 It 
also described the different forms of DV, including physical, psychological and 
sexual violence, and – disrupting the public/private divide – pointed out that 
‘domestic violence is of public concern and requires States to take serious action 
to protect victims and prevent domestic violence.’20 The GA also recognised one 
of the most hidden forms of DV, economic deprivation and isolation, and that 
‘such conduct may cause imminent harm to the safety, health or well-being of 
women.’21 The Resolution went on to express the Assembly’s concern that DV is 
still present in all regions of the world, and that such violence, including sexual 
violence in marriage, continued to be treated by some countries as a private 
matter.22 Then in 2017, 24 years after its 1993 Declaration, the GA confirmed the 
unchanged situation of DV in the world, despite measures adopted at the inter-
national, regional and national levels. In Resolution No. 71/170, it stressed that 
DV ‘remains the most prevalent and least visible form of violence against women 
of all social strata across the world,’ and that ‘such violence is a violation, abuse 
or impairment of the enjoyment of [women’s] human rights and fundamental 
freedoms [which] is unacceptable.’23
At the regional level, the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, 
Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women (Belém do Pará 
Convention) of 1994 elaborates the notion of violence in the different contexts 
where it occurs, including ‘within the family or domestic unit or within any other 
interpersonal relationship, whether or not the perpetrator shares or has shared 
the same residence with the woman,’ and considers it as encompassing different 
forms of violence, such as ‘among others, rape, battery and sexual abuse’ (Article 
2). The 2011 Council of Europe Istanbul Convention defines ‘domestic violence’ 
as ‘all acts of physical, sexual, psychological or economic violence that occur 
within the family or domestic unit or between former or current spouses or part-
ners, whether or not the perpetrator shares or has shared the same residence with 
the victim’ (Article 3(b)). It is interesting to note first that DV is considered under 
the Convention as one form of VAW; second, that DV is an open  definition, which 
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does not openly refer to women as victims of violence. Despite being clear that 
DV affects all genders, the Convention fails to capture ‘the very particular wrong 
of domestic abuse as a crime against women, which perpetuates patriarchy.’24
Judgments and decisions
Judgments regarding DV, especially at the national level, are often drenched in 
stereotypes and lack a gender-sensitive approach to the cases.25 Stereotypes may 
affect judges’ perceptions of whether DV occurs in same-sex relationships, or 
their views about witness credibility, for example.26 Stereotypes can also lead the 
judge to impose a lesser sentence on the perpetrators of violence. In a study on 
the practice of the Tribunal in Milan, Italy, which examined 96 proceedings for 
ill-treatment (maltrattamenti)27 in the household, judges considered as mitigating 
circumstances, among other things, difficult conditions at work, a high level of 
conflict existing in the relationship and the fact that the defendant’s behaviour 
was ‘irreprehensible … outside the household.’28 With regard to the latter, in 
particular, the absence of violence towards other people has been seen by judges 
as evidence that violence within the family was caused by an unexpected reaction 
to specific, difficult circumstances or by ‘emotional turmoil.’ The missing point in 
the legal reasoning of these judges is the fact that DV is a form of discrimination 
against women on the basis of gender, and is not necessarily the expression of a 
borderline violent personality.
The jurisprudence of regional human rights courts and the quasi-jurisprudence 
of UN treaty bodies have sometimes been responses to judicial stereotypes at 
the domestic level.29 My analysis will follow the three axes outlined in the intro-
duction to this chapter – in a first section I will outline the applicant’s identity 
and the background to the case, in a second I will consider whether the right to 
health or health considerations featured in the legal reasoning and in a third I will 
describe reparations made. I will investigate cases involving severe violations of 
the woman’s right to health, such as permanent disablement, or of her right to life 
(femicide);30 cases involving physical, psychological and/or economic violence; 
and cases of DV leading to the death of one of the woman’s relatives.
Who is the applicant?
In cases concerning DV, the applicant is usually the woman who endured/sur-
vived the violence, or one of her relatives, and they may be represented, when the 
system allows this, by an association protecting women’s rights.
Starting with cases of femicide or attempted femicide, the CEDAW Committee 
presented two related views in 2007.31 The first case concerned Fatma Yildirim, 
an Austrian national of Turkish origin. She had been repeatedly abused by her 
husband, who also threatened to kill her. In 2003, the police had issued an 
expulsion and prohibition order against the husband, and requested the Vienna 
Public Prosecutor to detain the man on account of the dangerous threats he 
addressed to the woman. The Prosecutor rejected the request. Yildirim was 
also stalked and threatened by her husband at her workplace. One night, while 
DE VIDO 9781526124975 PRINT.indd   26 24/03/2020   11:01
The anamnesis
27
returning home after work, she was stabbed to death in the street. Her husband 
was arrested, convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. A complaint was 
filed with the CEDAW Committee by the Vienna Intervention Centre against 
Domestic Violence and the Association for Women’s Access to Justice on behalf 
of Banu Akbak, Gülen Khan and Melissa Özdemir (descendants of Ms Yildirim). 
The second similar case, decided on the same day by the CEDAW Committee, 
also concerned an Austrian national of Turkish origin, Şahide Goekce, who was 
killed by her husband after being repeatedly threatened by him.
At regional level, two cases are worth mentioning here. The first, decided 
by the IACommHR, involved Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes, who had been 
abused by her husband for many years. The applicant and her family lived in 
Fortaleza, in the state of Ceard, Brazil. The violence culminated in two attempted 
murders. In the first, 1983, attempt, her husband shot her. She survived, but 
suffered irreversible paraplegia and psychological trauma. A criminal proceeding 
started against the husband but no final judgment had been achieved after more 
than fifteen years and the perpetrator had been free for the entire period, despite 
all the charges against him. Ms Fernandes filed a complaint with the Commission, 
citing the inaction of the authorities which had condoned the violence for years. 
In the Commission’s report of 16 April 2001 the complaint was considered 
admissible,32 even though the applicant had not exhausted all domestic remedies, 
because of the length of the proceedings and the related risk that the delay could 
have led to application of the statute of limitations.
More recently, the ECtHR handed down judgment in a case of femicide occur-
ring in Turkey.33 The applicants were the daughters and the son of the victim, 
Selma Civek. She had been abused by her husband for many years. One day, the 
man abducted her and injured her arm with a knife. Civek reported the case to 
the police. The authorities issued a protection order, which was not respected. 
Civek reported several times that her husband was threatening her with death. 
On 14 January 2011, she was killed in the street by her husband, who stabbed 
her twenty-two times. The man explained the act as a consequence of his wife’s 
infidelity. He was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The 
application was filed with the ECtHR some months after the murder, the appli-
cants claiming that the authorities had failed to protect their mother.
Dozens of cases of physical, psychological and/or economic violence have been 
investigated by international and regional judicial or quasi-judicial bodies. I have 
chosen examples that best stress the impact of DV on women’s health. Starting 
with the UN system, in A.T. v. Hungary the CEDAW Committee analysed the case 
of a woman who had been subjected to severe domestic abuse by her husband.34 
Despite having been threatened by him, A.T. could not leave her house and move 
to a shelter, because none was equipped to welcome her and her dis abled child. 
Even after she did manage to leave the apartment where they lived, her husband 
continued to stalk and beat her, as ten medical certificates demonstrated. She 
claimed that her physical integrity, physical and mental health, and life were at 
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serious risk and that she lived in constant fear. Criminal and civil proceedings 
started against the husband, without success. A.T. complained that the state had 
failed to provide her with effective remedies.
Three years later, the CEDAW Committee adopted pivotal views in V.K. v. 
Bulgaria,35 a case involving multiple forms of DV, including economic violence. 
The applicant, of Bulgarian nationality, lived in Poland with her husband and her 
children. She was not allowed to work or given access to the family’s income, 
except a small allowance to cover basic needs. In winter 2006–7, the family 
returned to Bulgaria for a holiday. During an argument, V.K.’s husband became 
violent and hit her. Her parents immediately reported the case to the police in 
Sofia. She was visited at the local hospital, where the doctors certified bruises on 
her forehead and hands. After several episodes of violence once back in Poland, 
she filed a request for protective measures with the Polish courts, without success. 
Despite support given by a centre in Warsaw, she could not escape her violent 
husband and stay in Poland, so decided to move to Bulgaria, where she applied 
for an immediate protection order, which she obtained. Notwithstanding all the 
evidence presented in court, her request for a permanent protection order was 
dismissed. Her husband, his friends and her mother-in-law were heard as wit-
nesses. V.K.’s appeal was rejected and she remained without any support, while 
her husband started divorce proceedings, asking for custody of their children. 
She claimed that the state was not able to provide her with effective protection 
against DV.
The psychological impact of DV significantly mattered in one of many cases 
heard by the ECtHR, Loreta Valiulienė v. Lithuania, decided in 2013.36 The appli-
cant, a Lithuanian national, had been beaten by her partner, a Belgian national, 
sustaining minor bodily harm. After an episode of violence in 2001, she filed an 
application with the District Court to start a private prosecution. However, the 
next year, the Court transferred the case to a public prosecutor after suspending 
the pre-trial investigation twice. In the meantime, a new law entered into force, 
providing that a prosecution for minor bodily harm should be brought by the 
victim in a private capacity. Accordingly, Valiulienė decided to start a private 
prosecution. Nonetheless, the Court refused to hear it, citing the statute of lim-
itations. The regional court upheld this decision in 2007. Valiulienė then filed 
a complaint with the ECtHR. In Angelica Camelia Bălșan v. Romania,37 the 
applicant suffered from multiple physical assaults by her husband, often in front 
of their children. She reported the episodes of violence to the police and used all 
the available legal measures to get protection from her husband. However, her 
applications were never successful. The Hunedoara County Court, for example, 
dismissed her appeal against the decision to dismiss her claim for damages as ill-
founded, arguing that she had provoked the acts of violence by her behaviour and 
that the acts had not reached the level of severity to justify damages. A letter she 
sent to the police asking for protective measures was not taken into consideration. 
She eventually filed a complaint with the ECtHR complaining about the lack of 
protection by the authorities.
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In many cases of DV, a relative of the woman dies as a consequence of the 
violence. Killing a relative is a form of VAW, along with the clear violation of 
the victim’s right to life. The IACommHR issued a historic decision against the 
United States in 2011. The claim was presented by the American Civil Liberties 
Union on behalf of Jessica Gonzáles (then Lenahan) and her three daughters, who 
had been murdered by their father (Lenahan’s former husband) in 1999.38 After the 
divorce, Lenahan obtained a – first temporary then permanent – restraining order 
from the authorities, which her former husband constantly violated. The night of 
the murder, she went to the police station claiming that her ex-husband had run 
off with their daughters. The police officer issued a missing person’s report, but 
then it took several hours to proceed with the ‘attempts to locate’. Later that night, 
the husband reached the police station, fired shots through the window and was 
wounded (fatally) by the officers, who then discovered the bodies of the three 
girls in his truck. Lenahan’s substantive and procedural due process claims, based 
on the lack of adequate investigation of the murders, were dismissed by the US 
Supreme Court.39 She then filed a complaint with the IACommHR, which con-
sidered her claim admissible because she had exhausted all domestic remedies.
A similar case was examined by the CEDAW Committee in its Angela 
González Carreño v. Spain views of 15 August 2014.40 The applicant, represented 
by Counsel Women’s Link Worldwide, was Angela González Carreño, whose 
daughter, Andrea Rascón González, was murdered by her father, the applicant’s 
former husband. After several episodes of violence and threats, González Carreño 
left the marital residence in 1999. Following a trial separation, she continued to be 
subjected to harassment and intimidation by her former husband, including death 
threats in the street and by telephone. Her daughter was frightened. González 
Carreño asked for protective orders to keep her former husband away from both 
her and her daughter. Despite several reports to the police, he was convicted 
for harassment only. On 24 April 2003, González Carreño took her daughter to 
social services to meet her father. Andrea never came back. She was found dead 
at her father’s house a few hours later: he had killed her and then committed sui-
cide. González Carreño tried several administrative and judicial appeals alleging 
miscarriage of justice on the part of the state, without success. On 30 November 
2010, she appealed in amparo to the Constitutional Court, alleging violation of 
her constitutional rights, but the Court dismissed the appeal. She eventually sent 
her complaint to the CEDAW Committee, which considered the case admissible.
The landmark case in Europe is Opuz v. Turkey, decided in 2009. The appli-
cant, Nahide Opuz, and her mother were victims of Opuz’s husband, H.O., over 
many years. Both women had filed several complaints to the public authorities 
and then withdrawn them, because they were under threat of death. No prosecu-
tion was brought against the husband, who eventually shot and killed his mother-
in-law. After the murder, he was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment, 
but released for good conduct pending appeal before the Court of Cassation. 
Following a domestic court’s decision, the police authorities took some measures 
to protect Opuz, who then filed a complaint with the ECtHR complaining about 
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the violation of several ECHR rights. The Court declared the case admissible and 
decided to examine in the merits stage the question of the effectiveness of the 
domestic remedies in providing protection to the applicant and her mother. Eight 
years later, the ECtHR rendered another pivotal judgment on DV, in the Elisaveta 
Talpis v. Italy case.41
Has the right to health been applied directly? In which ways was women’s 
health relevant in the judgment?
Application of the rights to health and to reproductive health depends to a great 
extent on the legal instruments on which the competence of the judicial or qua-
si-judicial body is based. I will examine my example cases in the order in which 
they were presented in the previous section.
In Fatma Yildirim, the applicants complained that Fatma had been the victim 
of a violation of Articles 1, 2, 3 and 5 CEDAW (principle of non-discrimination 
and related state obligations) by Austria. The Committee pointed out that the 
Austrian authorities ‘knew or should have known’ the risk she was facing,42 
and that the Public Prosecutor should not have turned down her requests to the 
police to arrest her husband. In response to the Austrian government, which 
contended that at that time an arrest was disproportionate, the Committee argued 
that ‘the perpetrator’s rights cannot supersede women’s human rights to life and 
to physical and mental integrity,’ and found the state responsible for violating the 
deceased Fatma Yildirim’s rights to life and to physical and mental integrity.43 
The responsibility of the state arose even though her husband was subsequently 
prosecuted ‘to the full extent of the law’ for killing his wife. In Şahide Goekce, 
the reasoning of the Committee in the merits was quite similar to that in Yildirim, 
so will not be reported here. In both cases, the right to health was not directly 
mentioned, although the Committee recognised a violation of both women’s 
right to physical and mental integrity, which was relevant in order to establish 
the violation of the rights protected by the ECHR, in particular the right to life.
Shifting my focus to the regional level, in Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes, 
the IACommHR found Brazil in violation of Articles 8 (right to a fair trial) 
and 25 (right to judicial protection) of the American Convention on Human 
Rights (American Convention) in relation to Article 1(1), and the corresponding 
Articles of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (American 
Declaration). Brazil was also considered responsible for violating the principle 
of equality before the law (Article 24 of the American Convention), along with 
Articles II (right to equality before the law) and XVIII (right to a fair trial) of 
the American Declaration. In particular, the Commission stressed the biased 
approach of the authorities towards DV: the courts had proved to be reluctant to 
prosecute and punish the perpetrator of DV, and the practices of some defence 
lawyers ‘sustained in turn by some courts – have the effect of requiring the victim 
to demonstrate the sanctity of her reputation and her moral blamelessness.’44 The 
Commission concluded that this had been a case of DV and that the state had tol-
erated the violence involved,45 and that several rights of the American Convention 
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had been violated, along with Article 7 of the Belém do Pará Convention, which 
was applied for the first time. The right to health was not explicitly mentioned, 
even though the Commission referred to the damage to da Penha’s physical and 
mental integrity.
In the ECtHR judgment in Selma Civek, the immediacy of the risk to her right 
to life played a pivotal role in the legal reasoning. The Court applied in this case, 
as well as in the Talpis judgment, the ‘Osman test’.46 This provides that, in order 
to avoid an excessive burden on the authorities, the positive obligation to protect 
the right to life requires that the authorities ‘knew or ought to have known at the 
time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified indi-
vidual or individuals from the criminal acts of a third party,’ and that ‘they failed 
to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, 
might have been expected to avoid that risk.’47 Where a third party poses a real 
and immediate threat to the life of an individual, the positive obligation consists 
in adopting all reasonable measures to protect against the risk.48 Even though the 
Turkish authorities had adopted some measures to prevent violence against Selma 
Civek, the Court highlighted that DV was a general problem, not just in Turkey, 
but also in all the other Member States of the Council of Europe.49 Saying that 
DV ‘does not concern women only,’50 however, the Strasbourg judges failed to 
capture the gendered roots of violence. The Court acknowledged that the victim 
and several witnesses had reported the threats made by the husband and that, 
despite taking several measures, the authorities had not reacted in a sufficient and 
concrete manner to prevent the killing of Selma Civek.51 The right to health had 
no role to play, even though more than once Civek had reported to the authorities 
her poor state of psychological health as a consequence of the repeated episodes 
of violence.52 The Court only referred to ‘different forms of violence,’ including 
physical aggressions and verbal abuses.53
In A.T. v. Hungary, the CEDAW Committee acknowledged that the state had 
not been able to provide immediate protection to A.T. and her children, and that 
domestic courts had not considered DV cases a priority. Owing to the absence of 
specific legislation on DV and sexual harassment, and the lack of provisions on 
protection orders, the Committee found that the state had violated Article 2(a), 
(b) and (e) CEDAW, and infringed A.T.’s human rights, in particular her right to 
security.54 An interesting aspect is that the Committee addressed the general atti-
tude of the authorities towards women. A.T. had never succeeded, temporarily or 
permanently, in preventing her husband from entering the apartment in which she 
lived. This demonstrated to the Committee that the authorities had a stereotyped 
view of the role of women in society. Hungary was also found in violation of 
Article 5 CEDAW.55 In V.K. v. Bulgaria, the complaint concerned Articles 2(c), 
2(e)–(g) and 5 on the obligation to eradicate stereotypes of women, and Article 16 
CEDAW on non-discrimination in all matters relating to marriage. In the merits, 
the Committee took into account that one reason presented by the domestic 
court for refusing permanent protection for the applicant was that no episode of 
violence had occurred during the one-month period required under national law 
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to justify a protection order. However, the Committee recalled that gender-based 
violence does not require ‘a direct and immediate threat to the life or health of the 
victim,’ and that ‘such violence … also covers acts that inflict mental or sexual 
harm or suffering, threats of any such acts, coercion and other deprivations of lib-
erty.’56 The domestic courts had only focused on the direct and immediate threat 
to life or health, ‘neglecting’ V.K.’s emotional and psychological suffering. The 
Committee stressed that psychological and economic violence constitute forms of 
violence as severe as physical harm. In its decision, the Committee also addressed 
the issue of gender stereotypes. The decision of the national court was considered 
to have lacked ‘gender sensitivity, in that it reflect[ed] the preconceived notion 
that domestic violence is to a large extent a private matter falling within the 
private sphere which, in principle, should not be subject to State control.’57 Even 
though, during the month preceding the request for a protection order, V.K. had 
not suffered any physical harm, she ‘nevertheless suffered from considerable fear 
and anguish.’58 That was enough for the Committee to conclude that the state 
had violated her human rights. In this way, V.K.’s right to health entered legal 
reasoning through the back door and played a pivotal role in determining the 
responsibility of the state for violations of the rights enshrined in CEDAW.
Turning to the ECtHR jurisprudence, in Valiulienė v. Lithuania the judges 
in Strasbourg applied Article 3 ECHR, even though the applicant had suffered 
minor bodily injuries, acknowledging in this way the psychological consequences 
of DV.59 The Court found that Lithuania had infringed Article 3 ECHR because it 
had not provided adequate protection to Loreta Valiulienė. The judgment paved 
the way for other judgments on DV in which analysis of the ‘level of intensity’ 
necessary to trigger Article 3 on the prohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment was reduced to a mere assessment of the relevance of 
the provision to the complaint.60 Furthermore, even though the right to health 
is not included in the ECHR, and therefore could not be directly invoked, the 
ECtHR jurisprudence has shown that VAW affects women’s health even where 
physical injuries are minor.61 As contended by Judge De Albuquerque in his 
concurring opinion, physical pain is only one of the effects of domestic violence, 
‘which has an inherent humiliating and debasing character for the victim.’62 
In Bălșan v. Romania, the Court analysed the issue of exhaustion of domestic 
remedies in the merits, under Article 3 ECHR, being relevant to the question 
of whether sufficient, effective safeguards against DV had been provided for 
Angelica Camelia Bălșan. In order to apply Article 3 ECHR, the Court stressed 
that physical injuries, ‘combined with her feelings of fear and hopelessness,’ had 
been ‘sufficiently serious to reach the required level of severity under Article 
3 of the Convention and thus impose a positive obligation on the Government 
under this provision.’63 As in previous cases, the European Court stressed that 
a state’s obligations arise when ‘the authorities knew or ought to have known 
at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk of ill-treatment of an 
identified individual from the criminal acts of a third party,’ and they failed to 
take measures.64 It was convinced that the Romanian jurisdictional authorities had 
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not granted any protection to Bălșan, and that the measure decided by the courts 
– an administrative fine – had no deterrent effect.65 The Court concluded that 
Romania had violated Article 3 ECHR. With regard to Article 14, in conjunction 
with Article 3, the ECtHR investigated the behaviour of national authorities and 
courts, which, owing to the length of the proceedings and the repeated denial of 
any forms of protection, clearly demonstrated ‘a discriminatory attitude towards 
the applicant as a woman.’66 Again, Bălșan’s health was relevant in addressing 
violations of other articles of the European Convention.
Jessica Gonzáles (then Lenahan) pointed out in her complaint before the 
IACommHR that she and her daughters had been in imminent danger of ‘harm 
to [her/their] emotional health or welfare’ because the defendant had not been 
excluded by the authorities from the family home.67 Even though its analysis 
was not based on Jessica Lenahan’s right to health, the Commission investigated 
the element of risk of harm when discussing state obligations under Article II 
of the American Declaration, and the duty of protection relating to the right to 
life, which is particularly rigorous in the case of children.68 In that sense, the 
Inter-American Commission considered that ‘the issuance of a restraining order 
signals a State’s recognition of risk that the beneficiaries would suffer harm from 
domestic violence on the part of the restrained party, and need State protection.’69 
The fact that the authorities ‘should have known’ the risk is combined with 
the element of discrimination linked to the enforcement of protection orders, ‘a 
problem that has disproportionately affected women,’ especially those belonging 
to ethnic and racial minorities.70 The Commission, relying on previous Inter-
American and European jurisprudence, and on UN treaty bodies’ quasi-jurispru-
dence, based its reasoning on the concept of due diligence obligations.71 Having 
considered the facts of the case, it concluded that the state had failed to act with 
due diligence to protect Lenahan and her daughters from domestic violence, and 
that it had violated the principle of non-discrimination and the right to equal pro-
tection before the law. Moreover, it had failed to undertake reasonable measures 
to prevent the murders of the girls, in violation of Lenahan’s daughters’ right to 
life under Article I of the American Declaration.72
In a similar case, Angela González Carreño v. Spain, the CEDAW Committee 
considered that the authorities and the social services had not showed any interest 
in evaluating all aspects of the benefits or the harms procured to the child as a 
consequence of the regime of unsupervised visits by her father. The element of 
discrimination is pivotal here: according to the Committee, it was the ‘stereotyped 
conception of visiting rights based on formal equality which, in the present case, 
gave clear advantages to the father despite his abusive conduct and minimized 
the situation of mother and daughter as victims of violence, placing them in a 
vulnerable position.’73 The best interest of the child, combined with the existence 
of a context of DV, must be taken into account in any judicial decision.74 In terms 
of the applicant’s right to health, the only reference is the passage in which the 
Committee noted that ‘the author … has suffered harm of the utmost seriousness 
and an irreparable injury,’75 the loss of her daughter and the violations suffered. 
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Hence it concluded that the absence of reparations constituted a violation of 
Article 2(b) and (c) – prohibition of all discrimination against women, and legal 
protection of the rights of women on an equal basis with men – and 16 CEDAW 
(elimination of discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage 
and family relations).76
As stated in the previous section, Opuz v. Turkey is the leading case on DV 
in the ECtHR jurisprudence, even though the analysis chiefly focused on the 
procedural aspects of the investigations at national level rather than on the effects 
of violence on Opuz’s health. The ECtHR found violations by Turkey of the right 
to life (protected in Article 2 ECHR), and of the prohibition of torture, inhuman 
or degrading treatment (Article 3) because the state had failed to protect Opuz and 
her mother. The Court also found that the state had breached the prohibition of 
discrimination (Article 14), in conjunction with the previous articles. The judges 
clearly acknowledged that ‘while a decision not to prosecute in a particular case 
would not necessarily be in breach of due diligence obligations, a law or practice 
which automatically paralyzed a domestic violence investigation or prosecution 
where a victim withdrew her complaint would be.’77 In the last example consid-
ered in this section, Talpis v. Italy, the ECtHR found, by a majority of six votes 
to one, that Italy had violated Article 2 ECHR, as a consequence of the death 
of Elisaveta Talpis’s son and the attempted murder of Talpis herself, and, by 
unanimity, that the state had infringed Article 3 ECHR because the authorities 
had failed to protect Talpis against violence. There was no reference to her right 
to health, even though the Court affirmed that national authorities ‘have a duty to 
examine the victim’s situation of extreme psychological, physical and material 
insecurity and vulnerability and, with the utmost expedition, to assess the situa-
tion accordingly.’78 With regard to Article 2 ECHR, the Court applied the ‘Osman 
test’. Given the circumstances of the case, it considered that her husband had con-
stituted a real threat to Talpis (and her right to health in the sense of physical and 
mental integrity), and that the state has an obligation to adopt concrete measures 
in order to protect an individual whose life is threatened. The Court also found 
that Italy had violated the prohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment, and the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of gender.79
Reparations
Reparations can take different forms.80 In GR No. 33 on access to justice, the 
CEDAW Committee asserted that ‘remedies should include as appropriate, res-
titution (reinstatement); compensation (whether provided in the form of money, 
goods or services); and rehabilitation (medical and psychological care and other 
social services).’81 For my analysis, I will mainly focus on monetary compen-
sation and on the decision to recommend general measures the state must adopt 
in order to redress violations of women’s human rights. Given the fact that each 
system for protecting human rights has its own peculiarities, the analysis that 
follows will assemble the cases judged by a particular jurisdictional or quasi- 
jurisdictional body.
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Starting from the UN level, the CEDAW Committee elaborated several general 
recommendations to Austria in Yildirim and Goekce, including to act ‘with due 
diligence to prevent and respond to such violence against women and adequately 
provid[e] for sanctions for the failure to do so;’ to prosecute perpetrators of 
domestic violence in a speedy manner; to ensure that criminal and civil remedies 
are utilised in cases where the perpetrator of domestic violence poses ‘a danger-
ous threat to the victim;’ to ensure enhanced coordination among law enforce-
ment and judicial officers; and ‘to strengthen training programmes and education 
on domestic violence for judges, lawyers and law enforcement officials.’82 Due 
consideration – added the Committee – must be given to women’s safety.83 The 
Committee did not mention any specific reparation for the claimant’s relatives. In 
A.T., a case that was decided two years before Yildirim and Goekce, the Committee 
recommended the state take ‘immediate and effective measures to guarantee the 
physical and mental integrity of A.T. and her family,’ ensure a safe home for 
A.T. and her children, and grant child support and legal assistance. The right to 
health enters the determination of reparations where the Committee stressed that 
they must be ‘proportionate to the physical and mental harm undergone and to 
the gravity of the violations of her rights.’84 The Committee also recommended 
the state adopt a series of measures aimed at ensuring the law’s ‘maximum’ pro-
tection of victims of violence, including training for law enforcement authorities, 
lawyers and judges, and rehabilitation programmes for offenders.85 Similarly, in 
the most recent case (González Carreño), the Committee called upon the state to 
grant the applicant appropriate reparation and comprehensive compensation, and 
to conduct exhaustive and impartial investigation; and, in general, to ensure that 
acts of domestic violence are taken into consideration when determining custody 
and visitation rights regarding children so that ‘the exercise of custody or visiting 
rights will not endanger the safety of the victims of violence, including the 
children.’86 The Tribunal Supremo de España considered the recommendations 
in Carreño as ‘binding,’ despite their notoriously ‘soft’ character, because of the 
international treaties Spain has ratified and in order to make rights and liberties 
‘reales y concretos.’87
Moving to the regional legal systems, in da Penha the IACommHR recom-
mended the state complete the proceedings against the perpetrator of the crimes 
against Maria da Penha, conduct serious and impartial investigation of the case, 
adopt measures to grant the victim actual compensation and continue reforms 
aimed at putting an end to the condoning by the state of DV against women in 
Brazil.88 In terms of general reforms, Brazil adopted a law, named after Maria 
da Penha, which came into force in 2006, to improve its system of protection of 
victims of DV.89 The IACommHR, in Lenahan, recommended the United States, 
inter alia, undertake an impartial investigation regarding the case, offer full 
reparations to Jessica Lenahan and her next-of-kin, reform existing legislation – 
and adopt measures aimed at ensuring enforcement – and promote the eradication 
of discriminatory socio-cultural patterns that impede women and children’s full 
protection from domestic violence.90
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Shifting to the European system, monetary compensation (just satisfaction 
under Article 41 ECHR) is granted to victims of domestic violence, or their 
relatives in cases of femicide, when the state is found responsible for not taking 
measures to prevent and to investigate violations of the applicants’ rights recog-
nised by the ECHR. The victim’s health conditions can play a role in determining 
the amount of the reparations. Hence, for example, in Opuz v. Turkey the Court 
noted that ‘the applicant ha[d] undoubtedly suffered anguish and distress,’ and 
granted her, on an equitable basis, €30,000 as reparation.91 Similarly, in deter-
mining reparations in Valiulienė, the Court considered the applicant’s ‘suffering 
and frustration,’ hence the mental effects of DV, which could not be compensated 
for ‘by a mere finding of a violation.’92 In Talpis v. Italy the Court decided that 
Elisaveta Talpis was entitled to €30,000 as moral damages. Referring to Opuz, 
in Bălșan the ECtHR noted the ‘anguish and distress’ suffered by the applicant 
‘on account of the authorities’ failure to take sufficient measures to prevent the 
acts of domestic violence perpetrated by her husband,’ and awarded her €9,800.93 
In the latter case, however, the Court could have appreciated, in deciding how 
much to award as non-pecuniary damages, the effect on Bălșan’s child of having 
witnessed DV. Turning to general measures, the ECtHR found that the adoption 
by the government of a strategy to prevent domestic violence had not ensured 
that the judicial system would be responsive, which granted impunity to the 
aggressors.94 The mental health of Selma Civek’s children was also taken into 
account by the Court when determining that the applicants in Civek were entitled 
to compensation amounting to €50,000 because of the ‘anguish’ suffered as a 
consequence of their mother’s death.95
Rape
Context and legal background
Rape is a form of sexual violence. Sexual violence, in the recent definition 
provided by the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (African 
Commission), means ‘any non-consensual sexual act, a threat or attempt to per-
form such an act, or compelling someone else to perform such an act on a third 
person,’ and it includes sexual harassment, rape, sexual assault, forced abor-
tion, forced sterilisation and human trafficking.96 The 2011 Council of Europe 
Istanbul Convention defines rape as a form of sexual violence consisting in 
‘non- consensual vaginal, anal or oral penetration of a sexual nature of the body 
of another person with any bodily part or object,’ where consent ‘must be given 
voluntarily as the result of the person’s free will assessed in the context of the 
surrounding circumstances’ (Article 36).
Sexual violence is gender-based, because, although men and boys are victims 
of it, women are particularly and disproportionately subjected to this form of 
violence, and are subjected to rape in armed conflict more often than men.97 Rape 
can amount to a war crime, a crime against humanity or even genocide. In the 
Elements of Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
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rape is included among the categories crimes against humanity and war crimes 
(Articles 7(1)g–1, 8(2)b(xxii)–1).
The absence of consent represents the key element of the crime, keeping in 
mind that force and coercion, which characterise armed conflict, negate consent. 
The CEDAW Committee contended that lack of consent rather than the use of 
force must be at the centre of the offence, and that sexual crimes must be consid-
ered as violations of a person’s right to bodily security, not as offences against 
decency.98 In M.C. v. Bulgaria, the ECtHR compared the legislation of European 
countries regarding rape, and affirmed that ‘the definition of rape contains ref-
erences to the use of violence or threats of violence by the perpetrator,’ and that 
‘it is significant … that in case-law and legal theory lack of consent, not force, 
is seen as the constituent element of the offence of rape.’99 Considering national 
legislation, as well as international criminal law jurisprudence, the European 
Court concluded that ‘any rigid approach to the prosecution of sexual offences, 
such as requiring proof of physical resistance in all circumstances, risks leaving 
certain types of rape unpunished and thus jeopardising the effective protection 
of the individual’s sexual autonomy.’100 It stressed that rape is a violation of per-
sonal autonomy and self-determination. In so doing, it considered this particular 
aspect of harm, ‘avoiding a paternalistic approach.’101 In Zontul v. Greece the 
Court expanded the definition of harm in sexual intercourse, by including anal 
penetration.102
Lack of consent, which seems to be undisputable, has nonetheless been highly 
controversial. Definitions of rape at national level differ a great deal. As Vanessa 
Munro argued, ‘even in jurisdictions where the doctrinal trigger for criminali-
zation in the law of rape is non-consensual intercourse conducted with requisite 
blameworthy intent or inadvertence, the force requirement has remained rather 
tenacious in practice,’ and ‘the consent threshold is operationalized against a 
context of profound suspicion of female sexuality and acute concern over false 
allegations, often (mis)represented as easy for malicious women to make.’103 
According to the then SR on VAW, Radhika Coomaraswamy, even though 
consent has been defined as the ‘legal dividing line between rape and sexual 
intercourse … the argumentation over consent, however, often degenerates into 
a contest of wills and credibility,’ and ‘many courts are reluctant to find the 
defendant guilty of rape in the absence of physical injuries.’104
There is an inherent stereotype in the crime of rape. Women’s sexuality has 
been usually perceived as men’s property. As Susan Brownmiller contended in 
her pioneer work Against Our Will, published in 1975, ‘women were wholly 
owned subsidiaries and not independent beings … Woman, of course, was viewed 
as the property.’ Rape was therefore deemed as a crime by a man against another 
man, a crime that was not committed against the woman, but rather against her 
father, husband or brother, in other words against the person who was entitled of 
a sort of ‘right to property’ in women.105 In Italy, for example, only as late as 1996 
did rape come to be considered a crime against a person and not a crime against 
public morality and decency. As Cook and Cusack argued in their landmark work 
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Gender Stereotyping, ‘when women are stereotyped as men’s sexual property, the 
stereotype operates to privilege male sexuality and to enable sexual exploitation 
of women through sexual assault and violence.’106
In international law, whether rape is committed in times of peace or in times of 
war, it is a clear example of VAW, a violation of women’s human rights,107 and, 
for my book’s purposes, of VAWH, because it affects women’s rights to health 
and to reproductive health.
In this section I will limit my analysis to rape committed in peace-time because 
‘rape as a war crime is not merely rape that occurs during the course of war … 
rape is war.’108 The jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals will therefore 
not be the object of specific analysis here.109 During war, the rape of women is an 
instrument of war. The context is so specific that it may influence the definition 
of rape, prove the existence of rape and be essential in elevating a rape to an 
international crime.110
Rape, as I will find in the cases that I am going to analyse in the following 
sub-sections, amounts to VAWH, because it affects a woman’s sexuality and her 
capacity to decide how her own body should be treated. It can have an impact on 
mental and physical health, it does cause minor, moderate or severe physical inju-
ries, and it may be the cause of sexually transmitted infections, or of unplanned 
pregnancies.111
Judgments and decisions
The selected decisions will explore the impact of rape on women’s health and 
reproductive health, and will be categorised as follows: marital rape, rape com-
mitted by organs of the state (such as individuals representing the state) and rape 
committed by private persons, with a focus on gang rape.
‘Marital rape’ requires a few introductory notes. It should be named spousal 
rape or intimate partner rape, because it does not matter whether the relationship 
consists in a marriage, occurs de facto or is regulated by a contract. Rape in 
Marriage is the title of the landmark work by Diane Russell, published in 1982.112 
At that time, only six states in the USA criminalised rape within marriage. 
Marital rape came to be considered as a form of VAW in the UN Declaration on 
Elimination of Violence against Women of 1993. More than twenty-five years 
have passed from this affirmation at the international level, and marital rape 
is still lawful in some countries in the world. In ‘The Global Rape Epidemic’ 
of 2017, the association Equality Now reported that rape of a woman or a girl 
by her husband is expressly legal in at least ten jurisdictions (out of eighty-two 
considered), namely Ghana, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Lesotho, Nigeria, Oman, 
Singapore, Sri Lanka and Tanzania.113 In four of these, marital rape is expressly 
legal even when the wife is a child, and the ‘marriage’ is in violation of laws 
setting a minimum age for marriage.
In many countries, marital rape is not explicitly a crime under the law.114 
Where it is, this is a recent development.115 In Italy, not until 1976 did a court 
condemn a husband for sexual violence against his wife, and only five years 
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later did the legislator repeal Italian provisions on honour crimes.116 In the UK, 
to propose another example, rape within marriage was criminalised as late as 
the early 1990s, after a report of the Law Commission published on 13 January 
1992 stated that Lord Hale’s dictum – a man ‘cannot be guilty of a rape com-
mitted by himself upon his lawful wife,’ since ‘by their mutual matrimonial 
consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband, 
which she cannot retract’117 – is now ‘unsupportable.’118 The report followed 
the House of Lords judgment in R. v. R. arguing that ‘the husband’s immunity 
… no longer exists.’119 In the USA, a marital rape exemption has persisted for a 
long time, transforming marriage into a ‘safe haven for rapists.’120 Despite being 
now illegal in all American states, marital exemptions are still contemplated. 
Nonetheless, courts went beyond the provisions of some states’ laws and clearly 
acknowledged the illegality of the exemptions. While DV is acknowledged to 
be a violation of human rights, ‘the specifically sexual component of violence 
against women in intimate relationships, including rape in marriage, is drastically 
under- recognised.’121 Regional jurisprudence and international quasi-jurispru-
dence is scarce on the issue, as well.122 I will follow in the following sub-sections 
the three axes of analysis, distinguishing the ‘types’ of rape as illustrated above.
Who is the applicant?
Let us start with marital rape, on which, as mentioned above, there have been few 
cases at the international and regional levels. The ECtHR ruled on two distinct 
but similar cases, decided on 22 November 1995, that there had been no violation 
of Article 7 ECHR (no punishment without law) with regard to the applicants, 
charged and convicted at national level with rape and sexual assault against their 
wives.123 The applicants were alleged to have committed rape, but relied on Lord 
Hale’s dictum that such a crime could not exist. The national court concluded that, 
through interpretation, judges had elaborated an increasing number of exceptions 
to the rule. Despite being interesting in the affirmation of the crime of marital 
rape, the two cases are not relevant for my analysis, since they make no reference 
to the impact of violence on women’s health.
To investigate marital rape in the light of the right to health, it is necessary 
to have a look at domestic jurisprudence as well. Two judgments are relevant 
here, the first handed down by the Court of Nepal in 2002.124 The applicants – the 
Forum for Women, Law and Development based at Thapathali, (police) ward no. 
11 of Kathmandu municipal corporation, and Advocate Meera Dhungana – filed 
a writ petition challenging the legitimacy of No. 1 of the chapter on rape in the 
criminal code of the country, which does not include in the definition of rape 
sexual intercourse between a couple without the woman’s consent. The second 
case occurred in India. Even though marital rape is not an offence in this coun-
try,125 the High Court in Gujarat at Ahmedabad reflected on marital rape within 
a spousal dispute, during which the wife refused the sexual perversions of her 
husband and sexual intercourse was forced.126 In its decision of 2018, the court 
applied several provisions of the Indian criminal code.
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Moving to cases of rape committed by state organs, it should be said at the start 
that an action by a state organ entails state responsibility in international law.127 
At first sight, it seems less pertinent to add a comment on violence committed by 
organs of the state when discussing the horizontal dimension of VAWH. Under 
my paradigm, however, the vertical dimension does not relate to the nature of 
the perpetrator – private individual or state organ – but, rather, to the fact that 
in the horizontal dimension violence involves a violation of the applicant’s right 
to health whereas in the vertical dimension a state’s policies, or practices in the 
health sector, cause VAW. Accordingly, the behaviour of state organs is relevant 
to both dimensions. In the European and the Inter-American systems of protec-
tion of human rights, rape committed by state organs (individuals representing 
the state) has been considered as amounting to torture, inhuman or degrading 
treatment. That was the conclusion, for example, of the IACommHR in the case 
Raquel Martín de Mejía v. Peru,128 decided in 1996. The complaint was filed 
by Raquel Martín de Mejía, by associations for protecting human rights and on 
behalf of Martín de Mejía’s husband, who had been tortured and killed by a group 
of military personnel who accused them of being members of the Movimiento 
revolucionario Tupac Amaru (Tupamaros). For the purpose of my research, I 
will focus on Martín de Mejía’s complaint of rape committed by state organs 
only. The couple lived in Oxapampa. One night, a number of military personnel 
with their faces covered entered the couple’s house, accusing them of being 
subversives. They repeatedly raped Martín de Mejía, and kidnapped her husband. 
She reported the abduction of her husband the following day, but was not heard. 
Her husband’s body was found a few days later. Martín de Mejía tried to obtain 
an effective remedy for the violations suffered, without success. She was contin-
uously threatened with further reprisals against herself and her family, to induce 
her to withdraw the case, so escaped, first to the USA then to Sweden, where she 
asked for protection. Martín de Mejía claimed to have suffered a violation of her 
rights to humane treatment (Article 5) and to privacy (Article 11) in connection 
with Article 1(1) of the American Convention.
The case of the ‘Las Dos Erres’ Massacre,129 decided by the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights (IACHR) in 2009, also involved violation of women’s 
rights to health and reproductive health. It concerned the massacre and mass rape 
of 216 people, committed in 1982 by a group of special forces soldiers. In 1982, 
a military junta was installed in Guatemala, and military operations were under-
taken with the knowledge of the highest authorities of the state. In the case, the 
applicants were the Office of Human Rights of the Archdiocese of Guatemala and 
the Center for Justice and International Law. They initially accepted a friendly 
settlement, then decided to continue the proceedings in front of the Commission, 
which presented its report in 2008, where it recommended the state investigate 
the facts rigorously and impartially. When Guatemala failed to implement its 
recommendations, the Commission submitted the case to the Court. Even though 
the state acknowledged its responsibility, the Court found it necessary to make 
further specifications in the determination of the facts of the case. The judicial 
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body considered as victims the 2 survivors of the massacre, and 153 next-of-kin 
of the deceased.
The following year, the IACHR decided Inés Fernández Ortega v. Mexico.130 
Inés, a young member of the indigenous group Tlapanec, was raped by military 
officers in the state of Guerrero. After the violence, she was taken to hospital and, 
along with her counsel and an interpreter, reported the incident to the authorities. 
At the hospital, a practitioner performed a physical and gynaecological examina-
tion from which she determined that ‘there was no evidence of violence.’131 The 
state’s Attorney-General referred the case to the Military Prosecution Service. 
Fernández Ortega asked for the case not to be tried under military jurisdiction; 
this was denied. She filed an amparo, but her case was considered inadmissible. 
She filed a petition with the IACHR with the support of human rights associations. 
The Commission, which issued a report in 2008 containing recommendations to 
the state, referred the case to the Court and asked the latter to declare the state 
responsible for violating Articles 5 (right to humane treatment), 8 (right to a fair 
trial) and 25 (right to judicial protection) of the American Convention.
In December 2018 the IACHR decided a case in which female protestors were 
raped in Texcoco and San Salvador Atenco. The case, Women Victims of Sexual 
Torture in Atenco v. Mexico, was filed by eleven women, who had been ver-
bally, physically and sexually abused by the police in May 2006 while protesting 
against a ban on selling flowers at the Texcoco market. Their petition was filed 
with the Inter-American Commission by the Miguel Agustín Pro Juárez Human 
Rights Center and the Center for Justice and International Law, alleging several 
violations of the rights protected by the American Convention.132 After a report 
on admissibility in 2011, the Commission referred the case to the Inter-American 
Court on 17 September 2016.133
Turning to the ECtHR system, the relevant case is Şükran Aydin v. Turkey, 
decided in 1997.134 The applicant, Şükran Aydin, was a Turkish citizen of Kurdish 
origin, 17 years old at the time of the facts. In 1993, she was questioned, along 
with her family and other families in the village where she lived, by the author-
ities, which wanted to know whether members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
(PKK) had visited the family home. She was then taken to the police headquar-
ters, where she was separated from her father, beaten, raped and humiliated. Once 
released, she reported the violence to the authorities, and the public prosecutor 
started an investigation, which proved ineffective. Aydin eventually decided to 
file a complaint with the European Commission of Human Rights, which issued a 
report concluding that Turkey had violated Articles 3 and 6 ECHR. The case was 
then brought to the ECtHR.
After discussing rape committed by state organs as revealed in the jurisprudence 
of regional human rights courts and UN treaty bodies, let us now turn to cases of 
rape committed by individuals who do not represent the state and do not belong to 
the victim’s household. In M.C. v. Bulgaria, mentioned earlier, the ECHR decided 
the case of a woman, 14 years old at the time of the act of violence, who after a 
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night spent in a bar was raped twice by a group of young men that she knew. It 
considered the events under both Articles 3 and 8 ECHR. M.C. and her mother 
had reported the case to the police. The prosecutor had refused to investigate the 
rape, and later dismissed a request to institute criminal proceedings against the 
alleged perpetrators. M.C. filed a complaint with the ECtHR, which considered 
rape as a violation of the prohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment 
under the European Convention.
The IACHR did not consider rape as torture in the well-known case Cotton 
Field, but it applied other articles of the American Convention when ruling, 
upon referral of the case by the Commission,135 on the disappearance and death 
of three women – Laura Berenice Ramos Monárrez, Claudia Ivette González and 
Esmeralda Herrera Monreal – at Ciudad Juárez, Mexico. The death of at least 370 
women had been reported over a period of ten years.136 The city, at the border 
between Mexico and the United States, has been called the ‘city of migrants’ 
and, from the 1960s onwards, saw the establishment of maquiladora (or maq-
uila) factories in which the majority of the murdered women had worked. The 
Asociación Nacional de Abogados Democráticos A.C., the Latin American and 
Caribbean Committee for the Defense of Women’s Rights, the Red Ciudadana 
de No Violencia y por la Dignidad Humana and the Centro para el Desarrollo 
Integral of the Mujer A.C. represented the alleged victims, who were relatives 
of the women who had disappeared and been brutally killed at Ciudad Juárez. 
The Inter-American Commission asked the Court to declare the state responsible 
for violating Articles 4 (right to life), 5 (right to humane treatment), 8 (right to 
a fair trial), 19 (rights of the child) and 25 (right to judicial protection) of the 
American Convention, and also of Article 7 of the Belém do Pará Convention 
(state’s obligations in cases of violence against women). In Cotton Field, rape 
had not been committed by state organs so, according to a rigorous and traditional 
interpretation of the crime, it could not amount to torture.
A revirement in the jurisprudence eventually occurred with the decision 
in Linda Loaiza López Soto and her relatives v. The Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela, referred to the IACHR by the Commission on 2 November 2016.137 
The Commission issued its report on 29 July 2016. Linda Loaiza López was 
abducted by Luis Carrera Almoina in Caracas in 2001, at the age of 18, and 
deprived of her liberty for several months until she was able to escape and call 
for help. During the kidnapping, she suffered physical, sexual and psychological 
violence, causing her permanent injuries. In the complaint, the applicants – López 
Soto and her relatives – claimed that the state had not investigated the case effec-
tively, despite López Soto’s sister repeatedly reporting her disappearance. The 
Court decided the case on 26 September 2018, and for the first time it considered 
rape committed by private actors to be ‘sexual torture.’138
Shifting to the African continent, there was an indirect reference to the victim’s 
right to health in the decision in Equality Now v. Ethiopia, handed down by the 
African Commission in 2015.139 The applicant is a non-governmental organisation 
(NGO), which brought to court the case of an Ethiopian girl – aged 13 at the time 
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of the violence – who was abducted and raped by a man who wanted to marry her. 
She was forced to sign a marriage contract. In 2003, the High Court found that 
she had consented to the marriage and accordingly to sexual intercourse, and the 
following year the Oromia Supreme Court concluded that there was no ground 
to judge the case, dismissing the appeal. The Commission lent its good offices to 
resolve the dispute in an amicable way upon request by the parties. However, the 
amicable settlement process was interrupted on 5 October 2012, and from that 
point only the merits stage continued.
Has the right to health been applied directly? In which ways was women’s 
health relevant in the judgment?
The ECtHR case is almost irrelevant for examining marital rape, because no 
reference to the woman’s right to health was included in the legal reasoning.140
Much more of interest for the purpose of my analysis is the judgment rendered 
by the Court of Nepal in 2002. The court referred in its legal reasoning to inter-
national legal instruments protecting women’s rights and criminalising rape. It 
argued that rape is ‘an inhuman act,’ which violates women’s human rights and 
has a ‘serious impact on individual liberty and [the] right to self-determination 
of victim wom[e]n.’141 The right to health is indirectly mentioned in several par-
agraphs of the decision. The court acknowledged, for example, that marital rape 
not only has an ‘adverse impact on [the] physical, mental, family and spiritual 
life of victim women, it also adversely affects [the] self-respect and existence of 
women.’ It then contended that ‘murder destroys [the] physical being of a person, 
but the offence of rape … destroys the physical, mental and spiritual position of 
victim women. Thus, it is a heinous crime.’142 It also argued that ‘where a wife 
is treated as an object or property or a means of entertainment and exploita-
tion, her personal health and her needs are ignored in an irrational and inhuman 
manner and in that situation, an unnatural and brutal act of rape of [the] wife is 
committed.’143 Marital rape is defined as a ‘brutal act’, and as a ‘social evil.’ The 
court pointed out that ‘it cannot be said that [the] Hindu religion and traditions 
exempts the heinous act of rape [of a] wife. Sexual intercourse in conjugal life 
is a normal course of behaviour, which must be based on consent. No religion 
may ever take it as lawful because the aim of a good religion is not to hate or 
cause loss to anyone.’144 The Court concluded that it was ‘appropriate, reasonable 
and contextual’ to define marital rape as a criminal offence.145 Nonetheless, it 
quashed the petition because the definition of rape was not per se inconsistent 
with the Constitution. It rather recommended that the Ministry of Law, Justice 
and Parliamentary Affairs introduce a bill bringing the necessary amendments to 
identified gaps in the legislation, namely the prohibition of marital rape.146
The High Court in Gujarat at Ahmedabad followed a similar reasoning, by 
arguing that ‘the total statutory abolition of the marital rape exemption [still in 
force in India, as anticipated] is the first necessary step in teaching societies that 
dehumanized treatment of women will not be tolerated and that the marital rape 
is not a husband’s privilege, but rather a violent act and an injustice that must be 
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criminalized.’147 The judge also stressed that, by contracting marriage, women 
are not deprived of their rights, in particular ‘their right to have control over 
and decide freely and responsibly on matters related to their sexuality, including 
sexual and reproductive health, free of coercion, discrimination and violence.’148 
He concluded that a husband could not be prosecuted for the offence of rape 
under the existing legislation, but could be prosecuted for unnatural sex under 
another section of the criminal code.149 In both domestic cases, judges pushed 
the legislator to amend the existing laws in order to include a prohibition of 
marital rape.
As for cases of rape committed by state organs, the IACommHR acknowledged, 
in Martín de Mejía, that ‘sexual abuse committed by members of security forces 
… constitutes a violation of the victims’ human rights, especially the right to 
physical and mental integrity.’150 When analysing the elements of the crime of 
torture as applied to the case, the Commission stressed the effects of rape on 
women’s health. In the words of the Commission, rape causes ‘physical and 
mental suffering in the victim,’ the victims are ‘commonly hurt,’ or become 
pregnant as a consequence of the rape. Furthermore, it pointed out, ‘the fact of 
being made the subject of abuse of this nature also causes a psychological trauma 
that results, on the one hand, from having been humiliated and victimized, and 
on the other, from suffering the condemnation of the members of their com-
munity if they report what has been done to them.’151 The Commission showed 
that all three elements of the crime of torture were present in the case at issue, 
and accordingly found Peru responsible for violating Article 5 of the American 
Convention, along with Article 11 (right to privacy), and Article 1(1) concerning 
states’ obligation to respect the rights and freedoms of the people subject to 
their jurisdiction.152
In a later case, Inés Fernández Ortega v. Mexico, the IACHR specifically 
referred to the Belém do Pará Convention to point out that VAW constitutes not 
only a violation of human rights, but also ‘an offence against human dignity,’ and 
‘a manifestation of the historically unequal power relations between women and 
men.’153 In light of my analysis of the right to health, it is worth noting that the 
Court confirmed precedent arguments made by the Commission in its report on 
the merits in 2008, which found that rape amounts to torture. In order to prove 
the commission of an act of torture, the Court stressed ‘the severe suffering 
of the victim’ as ‘inherent in rape, even when there is no evidence of physical 
injuries or disease.’154 It is interesting to observe that Inés Fernández Ortega 
underwent a gynaecological examination performed by a medical practitioner, 
who certified that there was no evidence of violence. This certificate did not 
prevent the Court from analysing the case, which was indeed reinforced by 
the testimony of Fernández Ortega, who never claimed that she had physically 
resisted the attack.155 The element of force is not essential – confirmed the Court 
– and ‘evidence of the existence of physical resistance to such acts cannot be 
required.’156 Even though Mexico acknowledged its international responsibility 
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in relation to what happened to Fernández Ortega, the Court decided to determine 
certain facts and it assessed that the criminal investigation had failed to comply 
with unacknowledged aspects of the guarantees arising from Articles 8(1) and 
25(1) of the American Convention, in relation to Articles 1(1) and 2 thereof, 
and also from Article 7 of the Belém do Pará Convention (state’s obligations in 
cases of violence against women) and Articles 1, 6 and 8 of the Inter-American 
Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture.157 There was a clear element of gender 
discrimination in the case, and the Court interestingly stressed how the general 
obligations stemming from the American Convention were ‘complemented and 
enhanced’ by the Belém do Parà Convention.158 Intersectional discrimination 
against women was also a key element of the analysis.159
The female applicants in ‘Las Dos Erres’ Massacre were pregnant women 
who had been subjected to induced abortions, rape and ‘acts of extreme cruelty,’ 
which provoked ‘grave damages to their mental integrity.’160 Their psychological 
health was immediately affected. The Court reiterated the findings in the Plan 
de Sánchez v. Guatemala case of 19 November 2004,161 according to which 
‘the rape of women was a state practice, executed in the context of massacres, 
directed to destroying the dignity of women at a cultural, social, family, and 
individual level.’162 The Court concluded that the state had violated several rights 
under the American Convention by not effectively investigating the massacre, 
and also Article 7 of the Belèm do Pará Convention (state’s obligations in cases 
of violence against women). The health of the victims/survivors was a relevant 
factor to confirm the violation of the American Convention, and the right to be 
free from violence under Article 6 of the Belém do Pará Convention.
In the Atenco case, the applicants claimed that several human rights had been 
violated, including Articles 5 (human treatment) and 25 (judicial protection) of 
the American Convention, along with Articles 6 (right to be free from violence) 
and 7 (state’s obligations in cases of violence against women) of the Belém do 
Pará Convention, and with the provisions of the Inter-American Convention 
that aim to prevent and punish torture. What is relevant for the purpose of this 
paragraph is the existence of several acts of physical and psychological violence 
and rape to which the applicants were subjected. The Commission, in its report, 
considered these acts to have been torture and determined that the women had 
been victims of physical, psychological and sexual torture during their appre-
hension, transfer to and arrival at the detention centre. Furthermore, the state 
was responsible for not having investigated the acts with due diligence and in 
reasonable time. The Commission also ruled that violations of the physical and 
moral integrity of the victims’ families had occurred. The IACHR confirmed 
the findings in its judgment of 2018, describing the violence suffered by the 
applicants as torture.163 It did not consider the right to health, but stated that the 
following all applied: the right to physical, mental, and moral integrity enshrined 
in Article 5(1) of the American Convention, the prohibition of torture under the 
Inter-American Convention against torture and the right to be free from violence 
under Article 6 of the Belém do Pará Convention. The impact of violence on 
DE VIDO 9781526124975 PRINT.indd   45 24/03/2020   11:01
Violence against women’s health in international law
46
the woman’s health and sexual health clearly emerges from several parts of the 
judgment. In particular, the Court stressed how sexual violence affects ‘essential 
aspects of a person’s private life,’ constitutes an interference in sexual life and 
‘annuls [a person’s] right to freely take decisions’ to have sexual intercourse, 
‘completely losing control over personal and intimate decisions.’164 In particular, 
it found that, even though men were also subjected to an excessive use of force, 
women were subjected to a ‘differentiated form of violence,’ having a clear 
sexual character and focused on intimate parts of their bodies.165 The Court also 
acknowledged that ‘medical violence’ had occurred, because the health personnel 
provided a ‘degrading and stereotyped’ treatment to the women, which became 
part of the sexual violence to which they were exposed.166 The authorities’ 
exercise of the duty to investigate demonstrated the persistence of stereotypes. 
According to the Court, the investigation and the medical examination both 
lacked a gender perspective; the women suffered verbal and physical aggression, 
and were addressed in sexist terms, which was done to exercise social control and 
perpetuate long-standing stereotypes of the roles of women in Mexican society.167
Turning to the ECtHR system, issues related to the woman’s health in the 
Aydin v. Turkey case were relevant to prove the violation of Article 3 ECHR. The 
applicant was in severe pain, and ‘experienced the acute physical pain of forced 
penetration, which … left her feeling debased and violated both physically and 
emotionally.’168 She was detained, and she was kept ‘in a constant state of physical 
pain and mental anguish.’169 The Court concluded that ‘the accumulation of acts 
of physical and mental violence inflicted on the applicant and the especially cruel 
act of rape to which she was subjected amounted to torture in breach of Article 3 
of the Convention.’170 With regard to Article 13 ECHR, the Court contended that 
an effective remedy would have entailed the payment of the compensation and a 
thorough and effective investigation capable of identifying those responsible of 
the crime. In the case under analysis, authorities only conducted an incomplete 
inquiry, and ordered examinations which were not objective, but circumscribed 
by instructions given by the prosecutor. The Court hence confirmed that Turkey 
also violated Article 13 ECHR.
As for rape committed by non-state actors, the relevant case in Europe is M.C. 
v. Bulgaria. The Court did not dwell on the impact of rape on M.C.’s health, 
but rather focused on the elements of the crime of rape, in particular the lack of 
consent. It concluded that the authorities had failed to sufficiently investigate 
the circumstances of the rape, owing to excessive emphasis on ‘direct’ proof of 
rape. The Bulgarian authorities were criticised because they did not consider the 
particular vulnerability of the applicant, minor at that time, and the special ‘psy-
chological factors’ involved.171 The reference to the psychological consequences 
of the violence is the only element linked to the right to health that can be found 
in the judgment. Judge Tulkens, concurring, emphasised the violation of both the 
right to personal integrity – physical and psychological – under Article 3, and the 
right to autonomy which falls under Article 8 ECHR.
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In the Inter-American system of protection of human rights, the Cotton Field 
case, decided on 26 November 2009, plays a key role in recognising the gender 
dimension of the violence, and the systemic discrimination against women. The 
killings that occurred in Ciudad Juárez had a common trait: their being gen-
der-based. The state was found in violation of several articles of the American 
Convention and of Article 7 (state’s obligations in cases of violence against 
women) of the Belém do Pará Convention, because the authorities had not effec-
tively investigated the crimes committed in Ciudad Juárez. The psychological 
consequences of the deaths and disappearances for the victims’ relatives were 
also taken into account in the legal reasoning. Nonetheless, even though the 
Court found a violation of Article 5 of the American Convention (right to humane 
treatment), it did not describe the acts as ‘torture’. The position it adopted was 
criticised by Judge Cecilia Medina Quiroga.172
The turning point in the jurisprudence of the IACHR, as mentioned earlier, was 
Linda Loaiza López Soto. In that case, the applicants claimed that the state had not 
investigated a case of abduction and abuse effectively, despite the fact that Linda 
López Soto’s disappearance was reported to the authorities by her sister. They 
claimed that this was a case of torture, an example of ‘institutional violence and 
re-victimization suffered by the women who are victims of sexual violence and 
seek justice in Venezuela.’173 López Soto, who had been abducted, was found to 
have suffered severe injuries, both physical and psychological, later confirmed by 
the forensic medical examinations. She had also endured several violations of her 
right to reproductive health, demonstrated by signs of genital trauma. The reports 
on her mental health confirmed the statements she made. The right to health could 
not be directly considered by the Commission, but factors concerning López 
Soto’s health and reproductive health were pivotal in its concluding that she had 
suffered violations of her rights to personal integrity, private life, autonomy and 
dignity, personal liberty, to equality and non-discrimination and to live a life free 
from violence.174 The Commission emphasised the gender-based nature of the 
violations of López Soto’s rights and that the acts could be described as torture. 
To support this argument, it referred to the UN Manual on effective investigation 
and documentation of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment of 2004.175 Had the jurisprudence not been enough, the Commission 
relied on ‘soft law’ to show that ‘sexual torture’ starts with forced nudity, and 
that verbal threats, insults and sexual jokes are part of sexual torture, because they 
increase the humiliation.176 The Commission found that the Venezuelan state had 
been ‘acquiescent and tolerant of the torture to which Linda Loaiza López was 
victim.’177 It applied the ‘powerlessness’ requirement well developed by the then 
Special Rapporteur Manfred Nowak,178 and referred to the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR in a paragraph which is worth reporting in extenso:
The Commission agrees with these developments under other protection sys-
tems, which, upon analyzing elements that would constitute conduct prohibited 
under Article 5(2) of the American Convention, have found that acts of physical, 
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 psychological, and sexual violence committed by non-State actors can be classified 
as such prohibited conduct, with emphasis on the characteristics of this type of 
violence and the serious effects it has on its victims. As far as the elements of 
State participation, the cited standards are consistent in considering failure in the 
duty to prevent and protect can be understood as a form of State tolerance and 
acquiescence with the corresponding legal implications of the ban on torture in a 
case like this one.179
The Commission concluded that Venezuela had violated all the rights López 
Soto mentioned in the complaint.180 The pioneer position of the Commission, in 
describing sexual violence as torture, was then confirmed by the IACHR. López 
Soto’s health is a recurrent element in the decision. The Court acknowledged 
that the proceedings had regarded as proved the ‘outrageous acts of physical, 
verbal, psychological and sexual violence’ suffered by Linda Loiza López Soto, 
which had impacted on her rights to personal integrity, dignity, autonomy and 
private life, as well as to her right to live free from violence.181 The state, which 
admitted that it had failed in the investigation, rejected the allegation that it 
could have been aware of the risks the victim was facing. Nonetheless, the Court 
interestingly argued that an alleged episode of VAW requires ‘a reinforced due 
diligence.’182 This means that the response of the authorities to a risk of violence 
must be prompt and immediate, especially when there is a risk to the woman’s 
life and bodily integrity. In particular, a report that a woman has disappeared or 
been abducted is, in itself, sufficient for the state’s due diligence obligation to be 
triggered. As interestingly argued, ‘the Court thus departed from prior decisions 
[Cotton Field] where it had additionally required proof of the State’s awareness 
of a context of violence against women.’183 To demonstrate that in this specific 
case sexual violence had amounted to torture, the Court further highlighted the 
impact on López Soto’s health: her kidnapper had exercised a control over every 
aspect of her life, including her feeding and her physiological needs, ‘leading to a 
status of absolute defencelessness.’184 Her abduction had also amounted to sexual 
slavery, an aspect which cannot be explored further here.185 The Court showed 
in this judgment that its legal reasoning has evolved to include a reflection on 
the specific character of states’ obligations to prevent violence and on the nature 
of this violence. The state was found responsible for violating several rights of 
López Soto, including the rights to personal integrity, personal liberty, dignity, 
autonomy, private life, the prohibitions of torture and of slavery, and the right to 
be free from violence under the Belém do Pará Convention.
The final case proposed in these pages was decided by the African Commission 
in Equality Now v. Ethiopia. The applicant complained of violation of the wom-
an’s rights to equal protection under the law (Article 3); protection from cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment (Articles 5 and 4); protection from discrimi-
nation (Article 2); and to bodily integrity and security of the person (Articles 
6 and 4 African Charter). At the time of the events, prosecution for rape was 
excluded when the perpetrator married his victim. The law was repealed in 2005; 
nonetheless, the practice of abducting, raping and forcing a woman to marry 
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the perpetrator remained common at the time of the complaint. The language 
used by the Commission is particularly strong, and condemns ‘one of the most 
repugnant traditional practices,’ that recalls ‘a proverbial ancient past’ when a 
man could ‘hunt’ the woman he wanted.186 The respondent state did not deny 
what happened to the woman, and also acknowledged that the police officers and 
prosecutor had not investigated the events diligently. The Commission invoked 
Article 1 of the African Charter, which obliges state parties to give effect to the 
rights enshrined in the Charter, and to respect, protect, promote and fulfil those 
rights. In a remarkable passage of the decision, the Commission pointed out that 
‘by rape, the victim is treated as a mere object of sexual gratification against 
his or her will and conscience,’ and that ‘the victim is treated without regard 
for the personal autonomy and control over what happens to his or her body.’187 
Turning to the consequences for the victim’s health, the Commission highlighted 
that ‘[i]nevitably, rape may, and often does, inflict physical pain and invokes in 
the victim a sense of helplessness, worthlessness, and gross debasement, which 
cause unimaginable mental anguish beyond the physical suffering. Clearly, rape 
degrades and humiliates the victim.’188 In considering violations of rights pro-
tected by the Charter, the Commission contended that the state ‘was aware’ or 
‘must be deemed to have been aware’ of the practice of marriage by abduction 
and rape, and of the fact that girls were under ‘the continuing threat of being 
abducted, raped and forcibly married.’189 This argument recalls the immediacy 
of the risk elaborated by the European and the Inter-American jurisprudence, 
and will be relevant for the identification of states’ obligations. The Commission 
failed however to acknowledge that this was a case of discrimination against 
women. It argued that not all forms of VAW ‘necessarily [amount] to or ought to 
be termed “discrimination” to be condemned as violations of women’s rights.’190 
However, VAW is a form of discrimination against women; it affects women 
because they are women, or affects women disproportionately. The fact that 
the Commission could not use a comparator – how men are treated in the same 
situation – should not have prevented it from finding a violation of the principle of 
non-discrimination. It is indeed because of the role of women in that society that 
ancient practices such as marriage by rape continue and affect women only. Even 
so, the decision is remarkable for addressing issues of VAW under a human rights 
law perspective and focusing on the impact of violence on the woman’s health.
Reparations
The Inter-American system of protection of human rights has showed an inter-
esting evolution in the determination of reparations as a consequence of the 
assessment of state responsibility for acts of sexual violence against women 
committed by state organs or private parties. It is beyond question that the victims 
and/or their relatives should be awarded adequate compensation once a violation 
of their human rights has been assessed by an adjudicatory body. It is also agreed 
that the defendant state must conduct an impartial and effective investigation.191 
What has emerged from the most recent reports issued by the Inter-American 
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Commission and from the judgments rendered by the IACHR, however, is the 
gradual inclusion of health concerns in determining reparations. For example, in 
Cotton Field Mexico was required by the Court not only to provide compensation 
to the victims’ relatives and to continue investigation of their deaths, but also to 
provide appropriate medical support free of charge to all the next-of-kin.192 In 
Fernández Ortega, the Court granted the victims different amounts of money as 
compensation, considering several elements, among them ‘the sufferings caused 
to the victims and the way they have been treated,’193 and found that reparations 
should also consist in ‘appropriate care for the physical and psychological effects 
suffered by the victims, which attend to their gender and ethnicity.’194 In Mariana 
Selvas Gómez (Atenco), the IACommHR recommended that the victims receive 
full compensation, including moral damages, for violations of their human rights. 
Furthermore, it decided that the state should provide free medical and psycho-
logical treatment to the victims and continue the investigation with due diligence 
and in reasonable time. The IACHR followed the Commission’s approach, and 
argued that, given the severe consequence to the victims’ personal integrity, 
reparations must pay adequate attention to their physical and mental suffering. 
It specifically ordered the state to provide free medical treatment to the victims, 
including immediate psychological and psychiatric treatment, whether requested 
by the victims within six months from the judgment or not.195 The Court also 
decided that the state had an obligation to continue investigation – despite the 
important steps forward that had been taken – and to reinforce the mechanism 
for prosecuting cases of sexual torture of women. The victims were awarded 
US$70,000 each for non-material damage.196
Under the European system for protecting human rights, it is worth highlight-
ing how, in Aydin, the right to health was relevant in determining the amount 
of compensation. Given ‘the enduring psychological harm’ Aydin suffered as 
a consequence of rape, the Court awarded her £25,000 sterling as non-pecuni-
ary damages.197 The African Commission requested Ethiopia to adopt general 
measures, including the publication of convictions to put prospective offenders 
on notice, and the elaboration of statistics on cases of marriage by abduction and 
rape.198 In setting monetary compensation, the Commission considered the phys-
ical, psychological and emotional trauma in deciding to award US$150,000.199
Female genital mutilation/cutting
Context and legal background
Female circumcision, female genital surgery, female genital mutilation and 
female genital cutting all describe procedures which affect female genital organs 
for non-medical reasons. Female circumcision seems the most misleading word, 
since the procedure does not resemble male circumcision.200 Female genital 
mutilation is the expression used by several NGOs and international organisa-
tions, including the WHO, to describe ‘all procedures that involve partial or total 
removal of the external female genitalia, or other injury to the female genital 
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organs for non-medical reasons.’201 In the analysis that follows, I will use the 
expression chosen by UNICEF: female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C). 
There are four major types of FGM/C, described by the WHO as follows:202
Type I – Partial or total removal of the clitoris and/or the prepuce (clitoridectomy).
Type II – Partial or total removal of the clitoris and the labia minora, with or without 
excision of the labia majora (excision).
Type III – Narrowing of the vaginal orifice with creation of a covering seal by 
cutting and appositioning the labia minora and/or the labia majora, with or without 
excision of the clitoris (infibulation). When it is important to distinguish between 
variations in infibulations, … subdivisions are proposed: …
Type IV – All other harmful procedures to the female genitalia for non-medical 
purposes, for example: pricking, piercing, incising, scraping and cauterization.
The practice is ancient. It was reported by Herodotus as early as the fifth century 
bce and practised by the Phoenicians, Hittites and Ethiopians.203 It was also 
known in Roman times.204 According to a recent study by UNICEF, FGM/C is 
highly concentrated in countries ‘from the Atlantic coast to the Horn of Africa, 
in areas of the Middle East such as Iraq and Yemen and in some countries in 
Asia like Indonesia.’205 The practice has also been reported in some countries 
in South America (Colombia), and in Asia, Malaysia, Oman, Saudi Arabia and 
the United Arab Emirates. It is performed in immigrant communities in Europe, 
Australia and North America. It was reported that in the UK, between October 
and December 2016, 2,332 attendances at NHS trusts and GP practices were 
reported where FGM was identified or a procedure for FGM was undertaken.206 In 
the world, 200 million women and girls in 30 countries have undergone the pro-
cedure, of which 44 million are girls below 14. The origins of the practice, which 
is not generally supported by governmental or religious authorities,207 are not 
easy to track. Social pressure, control of women’s sexuality (virginity, chastity), a 
ritual of ‘admission’ to a community, intertwined with socially constructed roles 
for women and men, count among the reasons explaining FGM/C. Refusing the 
practice might lead to a woman being excluded from her community of origin, or 
her community in a destination country. It may even be considered a stain on the 
honour of the family and a matter of deep shame.
From a medical point of view, all forms of FGM/C can cause severe physical 
and psychological harm.208 Immediate medical complications include bleeding, 
and health hazards relating to performance outside healthcare facilities and poor 
sterilisation of the cutting instruments. Infections as a consequence of the pro-
cedure might lead to the woman’s or girl’s death,209 and have an impact on her 
physical and psychological health. In the long term, type III in particular can 
cause urinary tract and chronic pelvic infections, cysts and complications during, 
before and after childbirth.
From a legal point of view, the practice has been generally condemned at the 
international level. Article 5 CEDAW requires states to take all appropriate meas-
ures ‘to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, 
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with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other 
practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either 
of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women,’ and the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child of 1989 clearly protects children from harmful practices 
prejudicial to their health (Article 24(3)). The CEDAW Committee drew up a GR 
on female circumcision in 1990, requiring states to ‘take appropriate and effective 
measures with a view to eradicating the practice of female circumcision.’210 A 
few years later, more than 170 countries committed to work to end FGM/C in 
the ICPD Programme of action (Cairo 1994), and in the Bejing platform (1995). 
Other bodies have condemned the practice: for example, in 2008 the then UN 
Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, Manfred Nowak, affirmed that ‘even if a law authorizes the practice, 
any act of FGM would amount to torture and the existence of the law by itself 
would constitute consent or acquiescence by the State.’211 In its GC No. 21, the 
ESCR Committee, despite acknowledging the existence of an individual and a 
collective right to take part in cultural life,212 posited that ‘female genital mutila-
tion and allegations of the practice of witchcraft, are barriers to the full exercise 
by the affected persons of the right enshrined in Art. 15, para. 1 (a) [ICESCR].’213
At a regional level, prohibition of FGM/C is included in the 2003 Protocol 
to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women 
in Africa (Article 5), and in the Council of Europe Istanbul Convention of 2011 
(Articles 38 and 42). The latter also includes grounds for jurisdiction that allow 
the prosecution of female genital mutilation committed abroad by or against 
nationals or residents of the ratifying states (Article 44(1) and (2)).214 The Istanbul 
Convention requires states to criminalise the following behaviours: excising, 
infibulating or performing any other mutilation to the whole or any part of a 
woman’s labia majora, labia minora or clitoris; coercing or procuring a woman to 
undergo any of these procedures; inciting, coercing or procuring a girl to undergo 
any of these procedures.
At a European level, the EU and the Council of Europe institutions have 
repeatedly condemned FGM/C, at least the first three types, without exception. 
National laws in all regions of the world have gradually outlawed the practice, or 
at least some types of FGM/C.215 Sudan, for example, made infibulation illegal 
in 1946.
Before examining some key judgments and decisions that are relevant to the 
horizontal dimension of my analysis, it is worth considering the cultural per-
spective to understand whether the practice can be accepted and, if so, under 
which circumstances. Might we identify different levels of harm in order to allow 
certain types of FGM/C and not others? What about medicalising it: a procedure 
performed in a secure environment, using sterile instruments? Is that legitimate or 
not? Is the prohibition a form of Western cultural imperialism or a commitment 
to protect women’s human rights? The International Federation of Gynecology 
and Obstetrics (FIGO) has repeatedly condemned all forms of FGM/C, and asked 
healthcare professionals not to perform it, even though performing the practice in a 
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sterile environment might reduce the most severe consequences. As it has recently 
stated, ‘medicalisation of FGM/C – encouraged by some healthcare  professionals 
– is not an acceptable practice because it violates medical ethics and further 
legitimises and perpetuates the practice.’216 The reason lies in the fact that the 
procedure has no medical purpose, and violates a woman’s rights to health and to 
reproductive health. As I have argued elsewhere,217 FGM/C constitute VAW, in all 
their forms, because they are performed without the consent of the woman or girl 
– except re-infibulation, which I will discuss in chapter 2218 – and they cause irrep-
arable physical and psychological damage. This does not mean that the ‘Western’ 
point of view should prevail in defining which individual human rights deserve 
protection. These harmful practices are also criminalised in Africa and Asia, but 
they persist in some communities. FGM/C are also practised in immigrant commu-
nities in European countries. They cause physical and psychological harm to girls 
and women and have no explanation other than tradition or ‘religion’.219
Judgments and decisions
Courts, especially national courts, have played a key role in the prohibition of 
FGM/C and in shaping the general perception of this practice as a violation of 
women’s rights. As far as I am aware, no court has ever found the practice jus-
tified on cultural grounds. Lower sanctions might have been applied, depending 
on the gravity of the injury, but the violation of a woman’s or girl’s rights has 
never been condoned by courts. I will investigate the cases summarised in the 
next sub-section along my three axes of analysis, taking into consideration that 
there have been different decision typologies: decisions on the legitimacy of 
the practice; decisions related to the prosecution of individuals who performed 
FGM/C; decisions on requests for refugee status coming from women who risk 
being subjected to the procedure in their country of origin. For the following 
analysis, I found more interesting cases relating to FGM/C at the national level 
than at the regional level.
Who is the applicant?
Let us start from decisions on the legitimacy of the practice. Two judgments 
rendered by national courts in Africa and South America are worth discussing 
here. The first is Law and Advocacy for Women in Uganda v. Attorney General,220 
filed in 2007 and decided by the Ugandan Constitutional Court in 2010. The 
applicant was an NGO that required the court to declare FGM a violation of 
several articles of the Ugandan Constitution. The petition was supported by five 
affidavits, including one presented by a professional practitioner. The applicant 
presented evidence of the consequence of FGM on the lives of women and girls.
Moving to South America, which has rarely been mentioned as an area where 
the practice is performed, in 2008 the Juzgado Promiscuo Municipal [Municipal 
Court] in Colombia received a complaint that 16-day-old infants had been abused 
and, as a consequence of genital mutilation in the Emberá-Chamí community 
(Río San Juan Embera-Chamí native reservation), developed fever and vomiting 
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owing to an acute infection.221 The Court received reports from the municipal 
police and from the Ombudsman of Pueblo Rico of alleged abuses against indig-
enous girls. Through a writ issued soon after, the Court chose to start proceedings 
on behalf of the three new-born girls. It heard evidence from doctors, a nutrition-
ist and anthropologists, before deciding the merits of the case.
Shifting to cases concerning the prosecution of individuals for performing the 
practice, it should be said at outset that, even though generally prohibited by 
law, FGM/C is frequently practised within immigrant communities in European 
countries. Few cases have been brought to the attention of national courts, 
though.222 The UK first prohibited FGM/C in 1985 with the Prohibition of Female 
Circumcision Act; replaced this with the Female Genital Mutilation Act of 2003, 
which came into force in 2004; and amended the 2003 Act by sections 70 to 75 of 
the Serious Crime Act 2015. These sections extended the scope of extraterritorial 
offences, in light of the Istanbul Convention (which the UK has signed but not yet 
ratified), granted victims lifelong anonymity and introduced the offence of failing 
to protect a girl from the risk of FGM.223 France, without specifically criminalising 
the conduct,224 registered dozens of cases against West African immigrants during 
the 1980s and 1990s, starting from 1983, when the Cour de Cassation ruled FGM 
a mutilation that falls within the scope of the rule prohibiting personal injury.225 
In Italy, after the entry into force of the 2006 law criminalizing FGM,226 the first 
case brought to court concerned G.O., a Nigerian midwife living in Verona, who 
practised FGM on a 2-month-old child. G.O. and the mother of the victim (X) 
were charged with the offence under Article 583bis of the Italian criminal code. 
G.O. was also charged with the offence of attempting to commit the crime, as she 
was arrested while entering a house where another infant lived. The proceedings 
were initiated by the Italian authorities.227
In a landmark case decided by the Supreme Court of New South Wales, 
Australia, three people were convicted and sentenced to 15 months’  imprisonment 
– and referred to be assessed for suitability for home detention – for committing 
acts contrary to section 45 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), adopted in 1994, 
which prohibits FGM. The defendants, who all belonged to the Dawoodi Bohra 
community, a sect of Shia Islam, were A2 (the mother of C1 and C2), KM (a 
retired midwife) and Mr Vaziri, the highest authority among the Dawoodi Bohra 
in Sydney. They were accused of performing FGM/C on two young girls, C1 and 
C2. The case was reported to the Department of Family. None of the children 
needed to be removed from the care of their parents. The applicant in the criminal 
proceedings was the Crown.228
The majority of cases that I could find at both national and regional levels involved 
requests for refugee status submitted by women who feared being subjected to the 
practice once back to their country of origin. In a report published in 2014 cover-
ing the EU, it was estimated that around 16,000 women and girls who arrived in 
the EU in 2013 could potentially have already endured FGM at the time of their 
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arrival.229 The UNHCR estimated that, although little or no data on the point had 
been collected by national asylum authorities, more than 2,000 asylum claims on 
grounds of FGM/C may have been received in 2011 in the EU.230
Starting at the regional level, the ECtHR has dealt with FMG/C in cases related 
to women seeking asylum in order to escape the practice in their country of 
origin, and concluded that the cases were not admissible.231
National courts have demonstrated themselves more open to the requests of 
women escaping countries where they might be subjected to FGM/C. Countries 
that have ratified the Council of Europe Istanbul Convention are obliged to afford 
refugee status to women escaping violence, under its Article 60. I will put for-
ward two European examples, in Italy and the UK (only the former is a state party 
to the Istanbul Convention), and a US case. In Fornah, decided in the United 
Kingdom in 2005, the applicant was a young woman aged 15 who had escaped 
from Sierra Leone. She asked for refugee status because she feared undergoing 
FGM if returned to her country of origin. The Secretary of State for the Home 
Department granted her leave to remain until she turned 18, and could have 
extended the period for a further three years on humanitarian grounds. Zainab 
Fornah asked to be recognised as a refugee. The Court of Appeal held that FGM 
of ‘young, single and uncircumcised Sierra Leonean women’ does not constitute 
persecution ‘for reasons of’ their membership of a ‘particular social group’ for 
several reasons, among which were the fact that ‘however harshly we may stig-
matize the practice as persecution for the purpose of Article 3, it is not, in the 
circumstances in which it is practised in Sierra Leone, discriminatory in such a 
way as to set those who undergo it apart from society.’232 Fornah’s appeal against 
this decision was allowed by the then House of Lords in 2006. In its decision, the 
then House of Lords referred to another judgment, decided in 2005 in the United 
States, Mohamed v. R. Gonzales.233 Mohamed had applied for asylum in the USA 
when she was 17 years old, and declared her fear of persecution if returned to 
Somalia, where she had already been subjected to FGM. Past persecution was 
put forward as ground for refugee status. When her request was refused, she 
appealed, but the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied it. Her motion to 
reconsider was dismissed by the same board; the US Court of Appeals, Ninth 
Circuit, with which the complaint was eventually filed, considered this decision 
‘rife with errors and inconsistencies.’234
As for Italy, the Corte d’Appello in Catania (Court of Appeal) handed down a 
landmark judgment in 2012, granting refugee status to a woman who had escaped 
from Nigeria where people of her community had tried to force her to undergo 
FGM.235
Has the right to health been applied directly? In which ways was women’s 
health relevant in the judgment?
Despite the evident impact of FGM/C on the health of women and girls, the rights 
to health and to reproductive health have been seldom invoked in the decisions 
under analysis.
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As illustrative example, in Law and Advocacy for Women in Uganda the 
Ugandan Constitutional Court referred, on one hand, to Article 37 of the 
Constitution, which recognises the right to culture, and on the other hand, to 
Article 44 of the same legal instrument, which provides that no derogation is 
admitted to freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or pun-
ishment. The Court concluded that ‘the practice of female genital mutilation is a 
custom which is wholly inconsistent with the above mentioned provisions and 
it is now the duty of this court to declare the custom void.’236 The judge also 
acknowledged that, while the case had still been pending, the government had 
started a discussion on a new law outlawing the practice. The right to health was 
not directly applied, even though the Constitution contains a provision which 
grants all Ugandans ‘access to health services.’237
Turning to South America, in the Emberá-Chamí Community FGM case, 
the Colombian Court referred to Article 246 of the Colombian Constitution 
which recognises the authority of indigenous peoples to exercise jurisdictional 
functions ‘within their territorial scope, in accordance with their rules and pro-
cedures, provided that they are not contrary to the constitution and the laws 
of the republic.’ Previous jurisprudence had established that limitations to the 
exercise of this jurisdiction were confined to a hard core of rights – the right to 
life, the prohibition of slavery, the prohibition of torture, respect for due process 
– determined according to the beliefs of the respective indigenous tribe, and, in 
criminal matters, the lawfulness of crimes and punishments.238 The Court did not 
consider the practice as DV, despite being committed within the family, but as 
a custom within the Emberá-Chamí indigenous community. From a procedural 
point of view, the decision of the court is fundamental, because the indigenous 
authorities, which normally have jurisdiction over DV cases, were not found 
competent to decide FGM/C cases. The Court posited that FGM/C ‘is a conduct 
that violates human rights and that must be subject to a different treatment 
[than DV],’239 and concluded that ‘since FGM threatens the lives and personal 
integrity of indigenous girls, it violates fundamental constitutional rights that are 
senior to the constitutional values of ethnic diversity. Thus, we cannot uphold 
the autonomy of the indigenous community in said matter.’240 The Court also 
recognised that the agreement concluded between the government and the indig-
enous community, which included a commitment to oppose harmful practices, 
did not work and could not protect children. Not considering FGM as DV, the 
Court found that the law on DV could not be applied and that violence suf-
fered by the children was not a matter to be resolved through family protection 
laws. It also did not decide family protection measures, but declared that FGM 
performed in the Emberá-Chamí community was ‘a barbaric and inhumane 
practice that violates the rights of the women and girls of that community, and 
is arbitrary and unjustifiable,’ and that ‘it disregards the National Constitution 
and International Human Rights Treaties signed by Colombia.’241 Furthermore, 
the Court found that the rights which were violated, namely the right to life and 
to bodily integrity, ‘have greater weight and, as a consequence, override the 
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constitutional rights derived from the respect for cultural diversity and autonomy 
of indigenous peoples.’242
Turning now to cases relating to the prosecution of alleged perpetrators of the 
practice,243 in the Australian cases that I mentioned in ‘Who is the applicant?’ 
above the Supreme Court found that mutilation had occurred, and that the degree 
of injury or harm would have been relevant for determining the penalty after con-
viction.244 The jury found the alleged perpetrators guilty on 15 November 2015. 
The children were heard as witnesses. The Supreme Court determined the penalty 
– 15 months’ imprisonment – in 2016, marking the first case of prosecution and 
conviction for FGM/C in Australia.245 A2 (the children’s mother) made a formal 
apology and other elements could have been taken into account in mitigating 
the sentence imposed on the defendants, but the Court posited that, in the case 
of FGM/C, general deterrence was necessary to ‘point to an ongoing pattern of 
attitudinal change in the Dawoodi Bohra Community, against a background of 
centuries old adherence to the practice of khatna.’246 It also explained that the sen-
tence could not be taken as a model for further cases occurring after 20 May 2014, 
when the maximum penalty was raised from 7 to 21 years’ imprisonment. There 
was no reference to the girls’ right to health. One commentator, considering that 
the physical harm was not severe, asked ‘where is the harm [in this case]?’247 
I will discuss the level of harm, which is both physical and psychological, in 
chapter 2, ‘Consent and autonomy in the horizontal dimension: FGM/C’.
Shifting to cases in which fear of FGM/C could be considered a ground for 
recognising refugee status, the ECtHR has been reluctant to extend international 
protection to women escaping violence in their country of origin, arguing, for 
example, that the applicant could have moved to another part of the country 
instead of leaving it or that the woman’s family could have protected her, being 
opposed to the practice.248 In these cases, the right to health was not an issue, 
although the Court found that FGM can amount to torture, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, because of the severe impact these practices have on 
physical integrity.
Turning to national judgments on refugee status, in Fornah, decided by the 
then UK House of Lords, Lord Bingham posited that ‘women in Sierra Leone are 
a group of persons sharing a common characteristic which, without a fundamental 
change in social mores, is unchangeable, namely a position of social inferiority 
as compared with men … it is a characteristic which would exist even if FGM 
were not practised, although FGM is an extreme and very cruel expression of 
male dominance’ and went on to acknowledge that ‘there is a perception of these 
women by society as a distinct group. And it is not a group defined by persecu-
tion: it would be a recognizable group even if FGM were entirely voluntary, not 
performed by force or as a result of social pressure.’249 The right to health was 
not mentioned in the case, and the reasoning of the House was rather guided by a 
sort of ‘assessment’ of the patriarchal culture of the country of origin. As stressed 
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by Ruth Mestre and Sara Johnsdotter, ‘it is important that courts in Europe have 
access to knowledge about culture-specific contexts when they handle suspected 
cases of FGM in criminal courts,’ which does not mean arguing in favour of 
cultural relativism, but rather that courts need to demonstrate ‘multicultural 
sensitivity.’250
The US Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, in Mohamed v. Gonzales, affirmed 
that there is no doubt that FGM amounts to persecution under US asylum law,251 
and that Mohamed had been persecuted ‘on account of her membership to a social 
group,’ which the Court identified either as Somalian women, or more narrowly, 
as young girls in the Benadiri clan.252 According to the Court, ‘it was the only 
plausible construction.’253 It compared FGM to forced sterilisation, described in a 
previous case as a ‘continuing harm that renders a petitioner eligible for asylum, 
without more.’ That is the closest reference to the rights to health and reproduc-
tive health which can be found in this judgment. Mohamed’s motion to have her 
petition reopened and reconsidered was eventually granted.254
The Italian Corte d’Appello in Catania, in A.F., affirmed that A.F.’s situation 
deserved analysis under refugee law, as she had expressed a reasonable fear 
of being subjected to gender-based violence ‘being [a] woman.’ Furthermore, 
she faced the risk of being subjected in her country of origin to an inhuman 
and degrading treatment, ‘like infibulation is.’ The Court based its reasoning on 
A.F.’s deposition, which was supported by ‘reliable sources’ such as a report 
prepared by Amnesty International and UN documents. The decision of the lower 
tribunal was overruled and A.F. was granted refugee status.255
Reparations
Compensation to the victims of FGM/C was not an issue in the decisions on the 
legitimacy of the practice, nor in the prosecution of the alleged perpetrators. In 
prosecutions, parallel proceedings could have been started in order to obtain 
redress from the perpetrator. In the case filed by Law and Advocacy for Women 
in Uganda and in the case of the Emberá-Chamí community, given the nature of 
the proceedings, compensation was not an issue. However, the Colombian state 
authorities were required to urgently ban the practice of FGM/C in the Emberá-
Chamí community, and private entities and NGOs were asked to take action to 
support the immediate and urgent elimination of FGM.
In all cases on refugee status,256 reparations consisted either in a re-examina-
tion of the applicant’s case or in the direct acceptance of her request.
The vertical, ‘state policies’ dimension
Abortion
Context and legal background
The purpose of this section of the chapter is to reflect on cases concerning 
abortion in order to identify the elements of violence against women’s health 
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that pertain to the second, ‘vertical’ dimension of my analysis. The issue is 
extremely sensitive, because it entails considerations that go beyond law and 
touch upon ethics and morality.257 I have selected cases decided by courts at both 
the national and regional levels, and by UN treaty bodies. I will study the cases 
under analysis through an innovative lens, which builds on my paradigm, and 
allows me to eventually unravel the challenging ‘conflict’ between the interests 
of the pregnant woman and those of the foetus. The reasoning that I will elaborate 
does not exclude the potential for the foetus to become a person,258 but rather 
emphasises the fact that, in the name of the foetus, decisions that are pivotal for 
the woman’s health have been left in the hands of ‘others’, thereby adumbrating a 
stigmatised vision of ‘woman’ that cannot but want to become mother and needs 
protection in order to make what the society considers the ‘correct’ choice.259 
Even though it is not the purpose of this book to take a position on the concept of 
personhood,260 a few preliminary remarks seem unavoidable. It is worth pointing 
out that it is extremely difficult to determine the moment at which an embryo or 
foetus is ‘morally entitled to, at least, consideration.’261 Prenatal personhood has 
been sustained or denied by scholars, activists, religious authorities and courts,262 
but, as one author contends, ‘prenatal personhood is often not something that is 
taken seriously by its proponents; rather it is a vehicle for justifying restrictions 
on women’s sexual and reproductive rights and, more specifically, for trumping 
the right to choose.’263 Who is the focus of the ‘narrative’? The woman, or the 
foetus, or both? Sifris has made the argument that states restricting access to 
abortion ‘generally fail to provide practical support to help prevent unwanted 
pregnancies from occurring in the first place and to assist such women when they 
become mothers,’ with the consequence that ‘legislation restricting access to 
abortion rests on discriminatory assumptions about women and does not only rest 
on concern for the rights of the foetus.’264
At the international level, it is hard to argue that abortion is a stand-alone 
right.265 The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on 
the Rights of Women in Africa (Maputo Protocol) is the only regional binding 
legal instrument which openly acknowledges ‘the reproductive rights of women,’ 
and authorises medical abortion ‘in cases of sexual assault, rape, incest, and 
where continued pregnancy endangers the mental and physical health of the 
mother or the life of the mother or the foetus.’266 This provision directly ‘situat[es] 
abortion as a human right that is recognised in the substantive provisions of a 
regional treaty.’267 Where other explicit provisions are not present in regional and 
international legal instruments, women’s right to have access to abortion services 
is protected by international human rights law, under which denial of abortion 
amounts to a violation of women’s rights.268
The criminalisation of abortion, in particular a criminalisation without excep-
tions, is an example of VAW, and, I am arguing, also of VAWH, that originates 
from a state health policy. The close relation between the criminalisation of 
abortion and the rights to health and reproductive health was emphasised by 
Rebecca Cook:
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When a state criminalizes induced abortion …, it is constructing its social meaning 
as inherently wrong and harmful to society. Through criminal prohibition, a state is 
signaling conditions in which abortion is criminally wrong, reflecting the historical 
origin of crime in sin that can and should be punished. In contrast, the legal framing 
of abortion as a health issue constructs meanings of preservation and promotion of 
health. A state is signaling that abortion is a public health concern, and should be 
addressed as a harm reduction initiative.269
The working group on the issue of discrimination against women in law and in 
practice has correctly categorised the control exercised by the state over decisions 
taken by women as a form of ‘instrumentalisation of women’s body’: ‘patriarchal 
negation of women’s autonomy in decision-making leads to violation of women’s 
rights to health, privacy, reproductive and sexual self-determination, physical 
integrity and even to life.’270 Instrumentalisation includes the discriminatory use 
of criminal law, such as provisions on termination of pregnancy, the enforcement 
of which ‘generates stigma and discrimination.’271
Abortion laws differ from country to country,272 and they are highly influenced 
by religious communities, in particular the Catholic Church,273 and traditions. 
According to a study published in 2013 by the UN Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs, 97 per cent of governments permit abortion to save a woman’s 
life; two-thirds of countries permit abortion when the physical or mental health 
of the mother is endangered, but only half of the countries surveyed do so when 
the pregnancy results from rape or incest or in cases of foetal impairment.274 Only 
about one-third of countries permit abortion for economic or social reasons or 
on request. On one hand, we can find countries such as Sweden that grant free, 
safe and legal abortion for all women to the extent of preventing physicians from 
invoking conscientious objection; on the other hand, there are countries such 
as Ireland, which criminalised abortion in 1861 and amended its Constitution 
in 1983 to include a provision giving the unborn equal right to life with the 
mother.275 This provision was challenged by a referendum in 2018, which led 
to the adoption of the Health (Regulation of Termination of Pregnancy) Act in 
December of that year, allowing abortion care on request up to the twelfth week 
of pregnancy, so long as a three-day waiting period has elapsed.276 A total ban on 
abortion is written in the laws of the Dominican Republic, El Salvador,277 the Holy 
See, Malta and Nicaragua.278 After twenty-eight years of criminalisation Chile has 
recently enacted a new law which ensures women have access to abortion in 
specific situations.279 In Muslim-majority countries, it has been reported that the 
approach to abortion varies from state to state, although it is widely permitted 
when there are risks to the pregnant woman’s life or health, and in cases of rape 
(incest being far less often discussed).280 In the Middle East and North Africa, 
the laws may require authorisation by more than one practitioner or require the 
husband’s approval.281 In Africa ‘virtually all member states of the African Union 
have regulated abortion through a crime and punishment model that has been 
indifferent to women’s reproductive health,’ and African abortion laws mirror 
those in the countries that colonised them, without respect for women’s rights.282 
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The situation has gradually changed since the adoption of the Maputo Protocol. 
Ethiopia and South Africa have the most liberal laws, Nigeria and Malawi the 
most restrictive ones.283 Several African countries now recognise rape, incest 
or foetal malformations as grounds for abortion, as well as risks to the pregnant 
woman’s health.284 States belonging to a federal system, such as the United 
States or Australia, may significantly differ in the approach to abortion within 
the country, at the expense of women’s rights.285 In Asia abortion is permitted in 
countries such as China and Japan, but prohibited, for example, in South Korea.286
Judgments and decisions
The cases I have selected, which do not include cases of forced abortion,287 will 
demonstrate how states can cause, or create the conditions of, violence against 
women. I will separately investigate cases of abortion hampered by the law, 
and cases of abortion hampered by practical difficulties in the implementation 
of the law (including conscientious objection). The former is a situation of de 
jure prohibition of abortion, while the latter is a form of de facto prohibition of 
abortion. The jurisprudence of both national and regional human rights courts, 
as well as the quasi-jurisprudence of UN treaty bodies, will be under scrutiny, 
and will be analysed along the three main axes that guided the anamnesis in the 
horizontal dimension.288
Abortion hampered by the law
Under this category, I will consider cases in which abortion is completely banned 
under the law in force, or in which abortion is only partly banned but the reason 
for abortion invoked by the applicant(s) was not among the options recognised 
by the law.
I will reflect on how landmark judgments handed down by domestic courts 
and views by the HRC have been capable of unsettling the almost total ban on 
abortion existing in some countries, stressing the importance of the protection of 
women’s rights. A legal change is also encouraged by the IACommHR, which 
has urged states to adopt ‘comprehensive, immediate measures to respect and 
protect women’s sexual and reproductive rights,’ arguing that ‘denying access 
by women and girls to legal and safe abortion services or post-abortion care can 
cause prolonged and excessive physical and psychological suffering to many 
women, especially in cases involving risks to their health, unviability of the 
foetus.’289
Who is the applicant?
Let us start from Latin American countries. A pivotal domestic case that put into 
question the de jure prohibition of abortion was decided by the Constitutional 
Court of Colombia, which ‘liberalised’ the Colombian abortion law in 2006.290 
The law prohibited abortion without exceptions. The importance of the judgment 
lies in the fact that ‘it was one of the of the first judicial decisions in the world to 
DE VIDO 9781526124975 PRINT.indd   61 24/03/2020   11:01
Violence against women’s health in international law
62
uphold abortion rights on equality grounds and the first decision by a constitu-
tional court to review the constitutionality of abortion in line with a human rights 
framework.’291 The judges argued that the Constitution requires the provision 
of abortion services in cases of rape and incest.292 The applicants, Colombian 
nationals Mónica del Pilar Roa López, Pablo Jaramillo Valencia, Marcela Abadía 
Cubillos, Juana Dávila Sáenz and Laura Porras Santillana, requested in separate 
complaints a declaration that some articles of Law No. 599 (2000) criminalising 
abortion – in particular Article 122 – were unconstitutional.
In Brazil, the penal code adopted by decree during the Vargas dictatorship 
in 1940 makes abortion a serious criminal offence.293 Abortion is a crime in all 
circumstances except rape and when the life of the woman is at risk. Women 
who undergo abortions can be punished with one to three years’ imprisonment; 
physicians who provide abortions are sentenced up to twenty years’ imprison-
ment.294 Since 2012, abortion has become legal when the foetus is diagnosed with 
anencephaly.295 This hypothesis was contemplated by the Federal Supreme Court 
in a pioneer decision presented on 12 April 2012.296 The case had been brought 
before the courts in 2004 as a claim of non-compliance with a fundamental 
precept by the Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Saúde, which repre-
sented dozens of cases of women delivering an anencephalic child,297 in particular 
Gabriela de Oliveira Cordeiro, a poor woman aged 19 living in the suburbs of 
Rio de Janeiro.298 Luis Roberto Barroso, at the time a lawyer and constitutional 
law professor, then judge of the Supreme Court, wrote the complaint on behalf 
of the Confederação. The complaint did not address the constitutionality of the 
provisions in the penal code criminalising abortion, but rather asked the courts to 
interpret these provisions in order to include among the justifications for abortion 
anencephaly in the child.299 The development of Brazilian jurisprudence gained 
momentum with writ of habeas corpus no. 124.306, decided by the first panel 
of the Federal Supreme Court on 29 November 2016.300 The case concerned 
healthcare providers at a clandestine abortion clinic in Rio de Janeiro who were 
arrested for providing illegal abortion services. The decision challenged the pre-
trial detention of doctors and nurses of the clinic.
Another Southern American court gave a broad interpretation to the few 
exceptions allowed under a law prohibiting abortion in order to legitimise the 
termination of pregnancy in cases of anencephaly, but in itself the judgment 
was, as I will contend, a form of violence against women’s health. The Supreme 
Court of Argentina mitigated the Argentinean abortion prohibition in the 2000 
judgment T., S. v. Gobierno de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires.301 The applicant was 
a woman who was denied the induction of labour or a caesarean after her foetus 
was diagnosed with anencephaly; she then started an amparo action against the 
Hospital Materno Infantil Ramón Sardá complaining that her rights to health and 
to physical integrity had been violated.
El Salvador bans abortion under all circumstances, even where health issues 
endanger the pregnant woman’s life.302 Women are arrested, investigated and 
eventually imprisoned if they experience complications during their pregnancies 
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that require medical intervention.303 This is a clear example of VAWH, since 
it not only bars women from access to abortion even in cases where their life 
is at risk, but also stigmatises them and puts them at risk when imprisoned in 
detention centres. The Supreme Court has not helped encourage a change in the 
law.304 In 2013, Beatriz, a pregnant woman carrying an anencephalic foetus and 
suffering from lupus and kidney disease, was denied access to abortion by the 
Salvadoran Constitutional Chamber because the threat to her life was not ‘actual 
and imminent.’ The Chamber argued that ‘the rights of the mother cannot be 
privileged over those of the foetus.’305 The case was brought before the IACHR 
as a matter of urgency.306 More recently, in March 2017, the IACommHR ruled 
admissible the case of Manuela y Familia v. El Salvador, supported by the 
US-based Center for Reproductive Rights. Manuela was a poor illiterate woman 
living in a rural area. She had been diagnosed with cancer in 2006. In 2008, seven 
months pregnant, she experienced a miscarriage and was taken to hospital, where 
the doctor reported the case to the authorities. She was arrested, investigated 
and sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment. Conditions in the prison, including 
vaginal inspections, caused her huge suffering and her health deteriorated. She 
was eventually moved to a hospital, where she started chemotherapy. She died in 
2010. The case was brought before the IACommHR, which considered that the 
requirement for exhaustion of domestic remedies had been met.307
In Europe, my focus will be on Ireland, where abortion law has been the object 
of investigation by both the ECtHR and the HRC.308 A., B., C. v. Ireland was 
decided by the ECtHR in 2010.309 Here, I will limit my analysis to the first two 
applicants. A. and B. claimed that the prohibition of abortion for all reasons other 
than risk to the woman’s life was a violation of Articles 3, 8, 13 and 14 ECHR. 
Applicant A. had four young children, was unmarried, unemployed and lived 
in poor conditions. She had borrowed money to travel abroad to seek abortion. 
Once back in Ireland, she started bleeding and was taken to hospital; after being 
discharged, she did not seek further medical advice. B. also faced difficulties 
meeting travel costs. She was told that her pregnancy could be ectopic but, before 
undergoing the procedure, she discovered that this was not the case. She travelled 
to London, alone, for an abortion and sought medical assistance back in Ireland, 
asking for a clinic affiliated to the English one. The HRC examined two cases, 
Mellet v. Ireland and Whelan v. Ireland,310 in which the situation of the two 
women was similar to A., B., C. – having to travel abroad because their case was 
not contemplated by domestic law – but differed since the foetuses were affected 
by a congenital malformation. Foetal impairment was not at that time a ground for 
termination of pregnancy in Ireland, so both women were recommended either to 
travel abroad or to ‘wait for nature to take its course.’311 Both women decided to 
fly to Liverpool. The physicians at the Irish hospital dealing with Amanda Mellet 
attempted to dissuade her from getting an abortion and provided little information 
on options for undergoing the procedure in the UK. Mellet had her abortion in 
the 24th week of pregnancy, Whelan in the 21st. Neither received any financial 
assistance and both had to fly back to Ireland soon after the procedure. The former 
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received no support at the Irish hospital, but was offered access to post-abortion 
counselling at a family planning organisation. Whelan received medical care 
once back in Ireland, though she was never offered any counselling. They both 
complained that their rights protected by the ICCPR had been infringed.
Moving east, in the judgment of 11 April 2019,312 the South Korean 
Constitutional Court decided that two provisions of the Criminal Act (as 
amended in 1995) which criminalise abortion, were not in conformity with the 
Constitution. The applicant was an obstetrician-gynaecologist who was charged 
with the offence of procuring abortions for sixty-nine women between 2013 and 
2015 in violation of the law. While the decision was pending before the lower 
court, the applicant filed a motion to refer the case to the Constitutional Court for 
constitutional review.
Has the right to health been applied directly? In which ways was women’s 
health relevant in the judgment?
In the judgments under analysis, the adjudicatory bodies often took the right to 
health and the right to reproductive health, when enshrined in the constitutions 
of the country, into account in their legal reasoning, and also referred to the 
women’s right to autonomy.
In case C-355/2006 decided by the Constitutional Court of Colombia, the 
applicants invoked several articles of the Constitution, including Article 49 on 
the right to health, which was directly applied to the case. In particular, the Court 
contended that women’s right to health includes reproductive health, and that the 
constitutional protection granted to this right includes protection against intrusion 
or interference by the government or any third party.313 Moreover, ‘this latter 
dimension of protection from violation, or obligation on the state to not interfere, 
is closely related to the duty of every individual to be responsible for his or her 
own health. From this perspective, certain measures adopted by the legislature 
that disproportionately restrict the right to health are unconstitutional.’314 The 
Court seems to refer to the principle of proportionality and the principle of the 
‘undue burden’ as elaborated by US courts,315 when it concluded that the crimi-
nalisation of abortion in cases of rape and incest ‘amounts to a disproportionate 
and unreasonable infringement on the liberty and dignity of women.’316 When the 
pregnant woman’s health or life is at risk, the judges described the criminalisation 
of abortion as ‘excessive’:
If the criminal penalty for abortion rests on valuing the life of the developing foetus 
over other constitutional interests involved, then criminalization of abortion in these 
circumstances would mean that there is no equivalent recognition of the right to life 
and health of the mother.317
Considerations of the woman’s right to health were also incorporated into the 
final stages of the Brazilian complaint before the Federal Supreme Court, stress-
ing that the ban on abortion where foetal anencephaly is diagnosed puts women’s 
physical integrity at risk. Human dignity constituted the backbone of advocate 
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Barroso’s argument, and emerged in the final 2012 decision of the Court, adopted 
by a vote of eight to two.318 In particular, one of the judges stressed that ‘the 
termination of pregnancy of [an] anencephalic foetus is a measure protective of 
the physical and emotional health of women, avoiding psychological disorders 
she would suffer were she forced to carry on a pregnancy that she knew would 
not result in life.’319 The Court did not discuss the right to life of the foetus, and 
did not comment on other foetal malformations. It clearly concluded that the 
judgment was limited to pregnancies involving an anencephalic foetus.320 This 
situation was more ‘accepted’ than other forms of disability because the lack of 
brain activity was perceived as impairing the exercise of the right to life after 
delivery.321 As correctly outlined, ‘because it lacks cerebral functioning, granting 
the anencephalic foetus constitutional protection is inappropriate because it has 
neither life nor the potential for life.’322 The debate in Brazil has recently been 
resumed after the spread of the Zika virus and its correlation with the increased 
number of new-born babies presenting microcephaly. In August 2016 a group of 
attorneys filed a petition with the Brazilian Supreme Court to allow women who 
have contracted the Zika virus and are in a state of ‘great mental suffering’ access 
to abortion.323 The case has not been decided yet.324
In a 2016 decision of the Supreme Federal Court, concerning the detention 
of healthcare providers at a clandestine abortion clinic in Rio de Janeiro, two of 
the judges argued that there were no legitimate conditions for detention, while 
the other three, Justices Luis Roberto Barroso, Rosa Weber and Edson Fachin, 
put directly into question the criminalisation of abortion during the first trimester 
of pregnancy. Even though the judgment only applies to the case at issue, it has 
paved the way for further reflections in legal scholarship. The rights to health and 
to reproductive health emerged in the reasoning of the three judges constituting 
the majority. They considered that prohibition of abortion during the first trimes-
ter violates the sexual and reproductive rights of women, ‘who cannot be forced 
by the State to maintain an unwanted pregnancy,’325 the autonomy of the woman, 
the physical and psychological integrity of the pregnant woman and gender equal-
ity. The Court acknowledged that the foetus’s right to life is a matter for debate, 
but at the same time it found that the dependence of the foetus on the woman’s 
body is de facto indisputable.326 A paragraph of the judgment is of utmost interest, 
because it stressed that ‘a central aspect of [the woman’s] autonomy is the power 
to control her own body and to take decisions’, including ‘on termination of preg-
nancy,’ and then raised a question: how could a state, through its organs, ‘impose 
on a woman’, at the beginning of her pregnancy, the duty to bring it to an end ‘as 
if it were a womb in the service of society, and not an autonomous person,’ cap-
able of being, thinking and living?327 Criminalisation leads to the consideration 
of women as instruments for the perpetuation of society. As to proportionality, 
the Court considered that criminalisation did not reduce the number of abortions, 
it simply made them more dangerous; that other measures were more effective 
than criminalisation, such as education and distribution of contraceptives, and 
that criminalisation was disproportionate in the narrow sense, because it produced 
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social harms. The Court put into question the very existence of the crime, which 
was relevant for how the pre-trial detention was taken into account. An element 
for criticism is the reference the Court made to the practice of ‘developed and 
democratic’ countries with regard to the termination of pregnancy. The ‘shadow 
of “Northern legal hegemony”’ – as one author put it328 – risks reducing the 
importance of the judgment in recognising of women’s sexual and reproductive 
rights. Few months after the judgment, in March 2017, the Socialism and Freedom 
party presented a petition – an Arguição de Preceito Fundamental (Interrogation 
of Fundamental Principles) – to the Brazilian Supreme Court to request the 
decriminalisation of abortion up to the 12th week of pregnancy.329
In Argentina, the T., S. case is highly problematic. Even though the Supreme 
Court of Argentina mitigated the Argentinean prohibition of abortion by its deci-
sion, it did not take into consideration women’s rights. The legal reasoning was 
indeed based on the impossibility that the child could survive as a consequence 
of anencephaly. From this, the Court determined that the premature delivery 
of an anencephalic foetus – not its abortion – could not be considered a crime 
provided that this occurred after the twenty-eighth week of pregnancy, since the 
foetus’s death would be a consequence of its condition and not of the procedure. 
This decision, based on a fictitious ‘viability’, is capable of causing even further 
violence against women, in the form of distress and agony while waiting for the 
point that such ‘premature delivery’ can take place.330
In the Matter of B., one day before the decision of the Constitutional Chamber, 
the IACHR granted provisional measures requiring El Salvador to take all neces-
sary measures to protect Beatriz’s life and personal integrity. El Salvador agreed 
that Beatriz could undergo a caesarean section, technically not an abortion. The 
new-born died a few days later. In Manuela y Familia, the complaint filed with 
the IACommHR referred to the violation of several articles of the American 
Convention, including the right to life, the prohibition of torture, the right to 
personal integrity and the prohibition of discrimination, but also of Article 7 of 
the Belém do Pará Convention (state’s obligations in cases of violence against 
women). On the basis of the latter article, in particular paragraphs (a) and (e), it 
seems that the Commission, whose findings are non-binding, could argue that El 
Salvador had caused VAW by enacting and applying a total ban on abortion. The 
abortion law of El Salvador is currently under review and its Congress has been 
asked to examine a proposal, highly urged by UN experts, to allow the termina-
tion of pregnancy in the case of risk to the life of the woman, when it is the result 
of rape and in all circumstances in which the foetus would not survive.331
Turning to Ireland, A., B., C. was examined by the Grand Chamber of the 
ECtHR, which dismissed the complaints under Article 2 (proposed by C.) and 
under Article 3 ECHR; the Chamber did not consider it necessary to separately 
examine the applications under Articles 13 and 14. Concerning A. and B., 
the Court reiterated its main findings in Vo v. France, confirming that it was 
not possible to answer the question whether the unborn was a person under 
Article 2 ECHR, ‘so that it would be equally legitimate for a State to choose 
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to consider the unborn to be such a person and to aim to protect that life.’332 
The core issue was the following: since an interference with the right enshrined 
in Article 8 ECHR had occurred, to what extent did this interference pursue a 
legitimate aim and was it necessary in a democratic society? In other words, 
how wide is a state’s margin of appreciation to determine on which grounds 
abortion is legitimate? The Court found that Ireland had pursued a legitimate 
aim of ‘protection of morals of which the protection in Ireland of the right to 
life of the unborn was one aspect,’333 and that a broad margin of appreciation 
must in principle be accorded to the state.334 Despite a quite wide consensus 
among the contracting states of the Council of Europe towards allowing abor-
tion on less restrictive grounds than those accorded under Irish law, ‘the Court 
[did not] consider that this consensus decisively narrow[ed] the broad margin 
of appreciation of the State.’335 In particular, considering that women could 
lawfully travel abroad to have access to abortion, and had access to appropriate 
information and medical care, Ireland was not infringing Article 8 ECHR. 
Needless to repeat, the right to health was not directly considered since such 
a provision is not present in ECHR; however, the applicants’ health was at 
the core of the complaints. The Court referred to the psychological effects of 
not having access to abortion, without elaborating further on the effect on the 
health of A., B. and C. As for the attitude of the Court towards abortion, some 
authors have argued that recognition by the judges of a European consensus 
on abortion might lead in the future to a ‘more interventionist’ approach in 
abortion cases, given the development of the Court’s jurisprudence concerning 
transsexual cases.336 Very different was the outcome of the two complaints filed 
with the HRC, which focused on the prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment (Article 7 ICCPR), the right to privacy (Article 17 
ICCPR), the right to freedom of expression (Article 19 ICCPR), the right to 
equality before the law (Article 26), the prohibition of discrimination (Article 
2(1)) and the equal rights of men and women (Article 3). The Committee 
examined the allegations under Articles 7, 17 and 26. The right to health was 
not directly invoked but the physical and mental health of Mellet and Whelan 
constituted the backbone of the Committee’s reasoning, which considered the 
‘intense stigma and loss of dignity’ to which they had been subjected, along 
with ‘a high level of mental anguish’ attributable to a ‘combination of acts and 
omissions of the State party.’337 Lack of key, medically indicated information, 
which ‘exacerbat[ed] her distress,’ was also a factor cited by the Committee to 
show violation of the prohibition of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.338 It 
is with regard to the right to privacy that the most striking differences between 
the reasoning of the ECtHR and that of the HRC can be found. In both cases, 
the HRC considered that the state’s interference with the woman’s decision was 
unreasonable and arbitrary in violation of Article 17 of the Covenant. In par-
ticular, the Committee argued that the balance that the state party had chosen ‘to 
strike between protection of the foetus and the rights of the woman … cannot be 
justified.’339 The mental condition of both Mellet and Whelan – the prohibition 
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of abortion was a cause of ‘intense suffering’ – were again at the core of 
the main argument. In Whelan, the Committee stressed that the interference 
had been ‘intrusive.’340 On the principle of non-discrimination, the Committee 
departed from the main arguments presented in the complaint by stressing that 
there had been discrimination within the same gender and not between genders. 
In other words, the experts found that the treatment of patients after miscarriage 
or delivery of a stillborn child diverged from that of women who choose 
to terminate a non-viable pregnancy.341 However, the Committee’s members 
highlighted that discrimination on the basis of sex had also occurred. Sarah 
Cleveland, in her opinion concurring with the views in Mellet, posited that ‘the 
near-comprehensive criminalisation of abortion services denies access to repro-
ductive medical services that only women need, and imposes no equivalent 
burden on men’s access to reproductive health care.’342 She concurred also with 
the findings in Whelan, and agreed with Yadh Ben Achour, who affirmed that 
Whelan had been subject to a gender-based stereotype according to which ‘a 
woman’s pregnancy should be continued no matter what the circumstances.’343
In the final case I am analysing here, decided by the South Korean Constitutional 
Court, four judges argued that the provisions on the criminalisation of abortion, 
which ‘force a pregnant woman to continue her pregnancy by imposing crim-
inal punishment on the woman who violates the ban,’ did not conform with 
the Constitution, and ordered the legislative to amend them by 30 December 
2020. Most of the judges referred to the principle of human dignity enshrined 
in the Constitution, endorsed the medical view that a foetus is viable at around 
 twenty-two weeks’ gestation, and reflected on the consequences of the ban:
It forces her to seek out expensive procedures to procure an abortion, making it 
difficult for her to seek relief in the event of medical malpractice during an abortion, 
and rendering her vulnerable to retaliatory harassment that could be committed by 
her ex-boyfriend or civil lawsuits involving domestic matters that could be filed by 
her ex-partner.
The few exceptions provided by the Mother and Child Health Act in force could 
not cover economic and social reasons for seeking an abortion. Even considering 
the state’s aim to protect the foetus, the majority of the judges concluded that 
the principle of the balance of interests had not been respected, because the law 
was ‘heavily in favour of the public interest in protecting foetal life,’ which had 
‘absolute and unilateral superiority’ over women’s autonomy.344 This pivotal 
judgment will pave the way for intervention by the legislative.
Reparations
Given the nature of the judgments examined in this section, some of them handed 
down by the highest courts of the country, the issue of reparations becomes more 
complex, or not even an issue. For instance, in case 355/06 the Constitutional 
Court of Colombia confirmed the constitutionality of Article 122 of the penal 
code, provided that abortion is decriminalised in three circumstances:
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a) when the continuation of the pregnancy presents risks to the life or the health 
of the woman, as certified by a medical doctor;
b) when there are serious malformations of the foetus that make the foetus not 
viable, as certified by a medical doctor; and
c) when the pregnancy is the result of any of the following criminal acts, duly 
reported to the authorities: incest, rape, sexual abuse, or artificial insemination 
or implantation of a fertilized ovule without the consent of the woman.345
Similarly, in the case filed by the Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores 
na Saúde, the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court did not decide on any form of 
compensation to women who were forced to carry a foetus until the scheduled 
delivery knowing that it could not live, but, within its competences, it broadened 
the interpretation given to the limited exceptions to the prohibition of abortion 
provided by the law.
The Constitutional Court of South Korea did not repeal the challenged provi-
sions, but it ordered their application to be temporary, setting a time limit for the 
legislative to amend them.
Cases in which a complaint is filed with a judicial (quasi-judicial) body com-
petent to receive individual complaints for alleged violations of human rights are 
different. In the twin cases Mellet and Whelan v. Ireland, the HRC concluded that 
the respondent state was under an obligation to provide women with an effec-
tive remedy, including ‘adequate compensation’ and ‘any needed psychological 
treatment.’ The state was also encouraged to amend the law on termination of 
pregnancy, ‘including if necessary its Constitution,’ to ensure compliance with 
the Covenant, ‘including effective, timely and accessible procedures for preg-
nancy termination … and take measures to ensure that health care providers are 
in a position to supply full information on safe abortion services without fearing 
being subjected to criminal sanctions.’346 In the Matter of B., the IACHR ordered 
the state to adopt the measures needed to allow doctors to perform ‘opportune and 
desirable’ procedures to avoid permanent harm to women’s rights to life, personal 
integrity and health. No reparation was decided by the ECtHR in A., B., C. case 
for A. or B., whose complaint was not successful. The case of C. is discussed in 
the next section of this chapter.
Abortion hampered by obstacles to implementation of the law
Even when abortion is liberalised, usually within the first months of pregnancy, 
and when a pregnant woman faces one of the conditions for legitimate abortion 
admitted by law, she can encounter practical difficulties in gaining access to 
abortion services. In this sub-section, different conditions will be considered: eco-
nomic difficulties; conscientious objection; denial of access to services, including 
lack of complete information or provision of misleading information; pressure 
from third parties, etc. Conscientious objection means that a person refuses to 
perform an action or to provide a service on the grounds that doing so is against 
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their conscience.347 Granting the right to such objection is meant to protect ‘the 
right of individuals to differ in thought, belief and opinion for religious, political, 
philosophical, humanitarian or other reasons.’348 Used to refuse to perform com-
pulsory military service, conscientious objection might be invoked by physicians 
who do not want to perform abortions; however, it has correctly been argued that 
‘the legitimate exercise of conscientious objection is much more delicate when it 
is used against a person in a vulnerable position.’349 National jurisprudence has 
determined that conscientious objection cannot be used as justification by judicial 
officers,350 by administrative assistants,351 or by midwives whose only task is to 
coordinate the work of a labour ward.352 In cases concerning abortion hampered by 
obstacles to the implementation of the law, behaviour or personal beliefs of health 
personnel emerge as a pivotal factor barring a woman from access to abortion.
As confirmed by the CEDAW Committee in its GR No. 35 of 2017, acts 
committed by private actors ‘empowered by the law of that State to exercise 
elements of the governmental authority, including private bodies providing 
public services, such as health care or education, or operating places of detention’ 
shall be considered as ‘acts attributable to the State itself.’353 When I examine 
‘pressure’ from third parties, which might include pro-life activists and religious 
communities, the vertical dimension of my analysis seems, at first sight, to turn 
into the horizontal one. Although such pressure cannot be defined as interpersonal 
violence, it can be seen as a form of interference within the community that the 
state must prevent; interference that in some cases turns into violence. Despite 
interference from third parties, what matters from a legal point of view is the 
behaviour of health personnel, whose actions determine the access or the lack of 
access to abortion services.
Who is the applicant?
A pivotal case in which economic difficulties constituted an obstacle to access 
to abortion is Lakshmi Dhikta v. Nepal, handed down by the Supreme Court of 
Nepal in 2009. Nepal had a very restrictive law on abortion, which was amended 
in 2002 to allow abortion on broad grounds. Despite the evolution of the law, 
however, poor women continued to face enormous difficulties in gaining access 
to the service. In the judgment, the Court recognised abortion as a ‘constitution-
ally protected fundamental right.’354 The applicants represented a poor woman 
living with her husband and five children in far-western rural Nepal.355 Another 
child would have meant an enormous additional financial burden. She went to 
hospital with her husband to request an abortion, under the amended legislation, 
which makes abortion legal within the first three months of pregnancy. However, 
the fee for an abortion amounted to 1,130 rupees, which the family could not 
afford at that time.
Turning to the second example of obstacles to the access to abortion service, 
conscientious objection, a paramount case comes from Italy, where abortion is 
available but women still encounter many difficulties in gaining access to it. 
Under Law no. 194 (1978),356 abortion is lawful in Italy during the first three 
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months of pregnancy, when ‘the continuation of the pregnancy, childbirth, or 
motherhood would seriously endanger [women’s] physical or mental health,’ 
and also where justified by ‘[the pregnant women’s] state of health, their eco-
nomic, social, or family circumstances, the circumstances in which conception 
occurred, or the probability that the child would be born with abnormalities or 
malformations.’357 After the first ninety days, voluntary termination of pregnancy 
‘may be performed … a) where the pregnancy or childbirth entails a serious 
threat to the woman’s life; b) where the pathological processes constituting a 
serious threat to the woman’s physical or mental health, such as those associated 
with serious abnormalities or malformations of the foetus, have been diagnosed.’ 
Conscientious objection is recognised by law, although it does not exempt health 
personnel from providing care prior to and following any termination of preg-
nancy. Nonetheless, access to abortion in Italy is reduced in practice by the high 
number of conscientious objectors. A complaint about this situation was brought 
by the Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL) before the European 
Committee of Social Rights in 2013.358 The competence of the Committee is 
based on the European Social Charter, as amended in 1996, a Council of Europe 
treaty that guarantees social and economic rights. The monitoring system consists 
in collective complaints filed by social partners and other NGOs. The outcome is 
not binding, but still relevant because it derives its strength from a binding legal 
instrument. In the case under analysis, the applicant, an Italian labour union, 
argued that Article 9 of Law no. 194 of 1978, which regulates the conscientious 
objection of medical practitioners and other medical personnel in relation to 
abortion services, is not ‘properly applied in practice.’359
As my third example, I have chosen the denial of abortion services as example 
of VAW, which might severely impair pregnant women’s rights. I will move from 
the international to the regional and eventually the domestic level. In this area, 
two cases decided by UN treaty bodies with regard to Peru are worth mentioning. 
In Peru, abortion is admitted to save the mother’s life or to avoid serious and 
permanent harm to her health. In Karen Noelia Llantoy Huamán v. Peru, decided 
in 2005 by the HRC,360 Karen Huamán became pregnant aged 17 and discovered 
that she was carrying an anencephalic foetus. A gynaecologist at the hospital 
in Lima informed her of the foetal abnormality and the risks to her life should 
she continue the pregnancy. The director of the hospital refused to authorise an 
abortion, since abortion in cases of malformation of the foetus is illegal under 
Peruvian law and only when the pregnant woman’s health is severely impaired 
is there a legitimate ground for abortion. Huamán eventually gave birth to an 
anencephalic baby girl, who died four days later. She was obliged to breastfeed 
her baby during the few days of her life. After her daughter’s death, Huamán fell 
into deep depression. Since no administrative remedy would have allowed her 
to terminate the pregnancy on therapeutic grounds, nor any effective and quick 
judicial remedy, the UN treaty body considered the complaint admissible.
Six years later, Peruvian abortion law was brought to the attention of the 
CEDAW Committee, in L.C.361 The applicant, who like Huamán was a minor, got 
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pregnant after suffering sexual abuse. She fell into depression and attempted sui-
cide. L.C. survived but risked permanent disability. Surgery was delayed because 
of her pregnancy, and when she asked for therapeutic abortion the medical board 
of the hospital denied the request because it considered that the life of their 
patient was not at risk. She submitted an appeal. In the meanwhile, she miscarried 
and, only after that, was she operated on. After the operation L.C. needed inten-
sive physical therapy and rehabilitation, which her family could not afford. The 
CEDAW Committee found the case admissible, because neither the amparo nor 
a civil action for compensation had been deemed appropriate to offer effective 
relief to L.C.362
Three cases filed with the ECtHR against Poland, concerning women encoun-
tering different difficulties during their pregnancies, pertain to my analysis. In 
Poland, the 1993 Family Planning Act provides that abortion can be carried 
out only by a physician where there are risks to the mother’s life or health; 
where prenatal tests show that the foetus will be severely damaged or suffer 
from an incurable, life-threatening ailment; or where there are strong grounds 
for believing that the pregnancy is the result of a criminal act.363 In the first two 
cases, abortion can be performed until the foetus becomes viable, whereas in the 
third case it is available until the end of the twelfth week of pregnancy. In Alicja 
Tysiac v. Poland,364 decided by the ECtHR in 2007, the applicant was a pregnant 
woman who suffered from severe myopia, which, in the opinion of three oph-
thalmologists, would have worsened if the pregnancy carried to term. A general 
practitioner issued a certificate in which he declared that the pregnancy consti-
tuted a threat to Alicja Tysiac’s health. Nonetheless, the head of the gynaecology 
and obstetrics department at a clinic in Warsaw declined her request to terminate 
the pregnancy. Without the possibility of access to a timely procedure to review 
the doctor’s decision, Tysiac carried her pregnancy to term, and her eyesight 
seriously deteriorated to the extent that she was qualified as significantly disabled 
according to the Polish social system. She then tried to get compensation, filing 
complaints with domestic courts, but all her claims were rejected. She eventually 
brought the case before the ECtHR.
In R.R. v. Poland,365 decided by the fourth section of the ECtHR in 2011, the 
applicant was a Polish woman who, although she had already been informed that 
the foetus might be affected by Turner syndrome, could not gain access to the 
medical test needed to ascertain its actual impairment. After medical practitioners 
delayed all tests, she was not eligible for an abortion within the time limits pro-
scribed by Polish law. R.R. sought compensation at national level. The Supreme 
Court, to which the case was referred, quashed the judgment of a lower court 
which had awarded her an inadequate sum in compensation. The Kraków Court, 
to which the case was remitted, awarded a higher amount. R.R. complained 
before the ECtHR that she could not get access to the genetic tests that were 
needed to assess the foetus’s possible malformation, and that her rights to be free 
from torture, from inhuman or degrading treatment, and to private and family life 
had been violated.
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In a case concerning a minor who became pregnant in consequence of a rape, 
the fourth Chamber of the ECtHR had the opportunity to reflect on the application 
of legal provisions allowing abortion. In P. and S. v. Poland, decided in 2012, the 
applicants were a girl (P.) who had been raped by a boy her own age and reported 
the fact to the authorities, and her mother (S.), who helped P. to gain access to 
abortion. P. encountered numerous difficulties in doing so, including failures of 
confidentiality and contradictory information given by personnel at the hospital, 
and delays in the examination of her case. One doctor advised S. ‘to get her 
daughter married.’ Another doctor asked her to sign a statement that she under-
stood that the procedure could lead to P.’s death. Both P. and her mother faced 
criminal proceedings, to the extent that S.’s parental rights were put into question 
by Catholic and pro-life associations which released confidential information 
on P. (a minor), whom they approached to try to convince her not to undergo 
abortion. P. was also arrested in the execution of a court ruling, which decided to 
place her in a juvenile centre. P. did manage to gain access to abortion in the end, 
but ‘the events surrounding the determination of the … applicant’s access to legal 
abortion were marred by procrastination and confusion,’ since the applicants 
(P. and her mother) were given ‘misleading and contradictory information.’366 
Furthermore, even though the Ministry of Health authorised the procedure, it was 
carried out many kilometres away from the applicants’ home city, and conducted 
– despite being legal – in a ‘clandestine’ manner. P. and S. filed complaints with 
the prosecution authorities, but one court found that cases of teenage pregnancy 
give rise to controversy and are legitimate subjects for discussion by social and 
church organisations. The government suggested that the applicants could have 
started civil litigation, but the ECtHR found that such litigation would not have 
offered good prospects and therefore deemed the case to be admissible.367
The A., B., C. v. Ireland case is relevant in this analysis, because applicant C., 
who had been treated for a rare form of cancer, underwent a series of tests for 
cancer, contraindicated during pregnancy, without being aware of that fact. She 
could have been given access to abortion, according to the law. However, she 
failed to obtain complete information on the effects of the tests on her foetus and 
on the effect of her health conditions on the pregnancy itself, so decided to fly 
to England to gain access to abortion services. Once back home, she complained 
about not having received adequate post-abortion care.
Moving to the Inter-American system of protection of human rights, the case 
of Paulina del Carmen Ramírez Jacinto v. México was filed with the IACommHR 
and concluded with a friendly settlement agreement.368 Paulina Jacinto, 14 years 
old at the time, fell pregnant in consequence of rape. Under Mexican law, she 
could have been given access to abortion, but she faced manipulation and misin-
formation by personnel at the hospital, and pressure from representatives of the 
Catholic Church to withdraw her request for the procedure. In the end, Jacinto’s 
mother decided to refuse the procedure.
Moving to North America, one US case is worth mentioning: Whole Woman’s 
Health et al. v. Hellerstedt,369 decided in 2016. The USA falls into the category I 
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am analysing in this sub-section, because several states have adopted restrictive 
laws on abortion, therefore hampering de facto access to the procedure. These 
statutory provisions have been adopted despite the affirmation in Roe v. Wade 
of a woman’s right to an abortion prior to the viability of the foetus as protected 
by the Constitutional right to privacy.370 The Whole Woman’s Health judgment 
struck down House Bill 2, enacted in 2013 in Texas with the declared purpose 
of protecting women’s health. My purpose here is not to analyse the dispute in 
detail, but to highlight the main aspects of the Supreme Court’s judgment that are 
pivotal for this book. The applicants were not women, but abortion providers in 
Texas, supported by associations for the protection of women’s rights, and they 
challenged the Texas law which fixed two requirements for abortion services to 
meet: admitting privileges (a physician performing abortion must show admitting 
privileges at a hospital within 100 miles of the abortion site), and a requirement 
that abortion providers meet the minimum standards for surgical centres. As 
a consequence of the law, abortion centres closed. The case reached the US 
Supreme Court after a complex legal dispute.371
Laws can also oblige practitioners to provide misleading or inaccurate infor-
mation to women seeking abortion, or to perform ultrasounds before granting 
abortion. In the United States, for example, several states’ counselling laws 
require health personnel to make statements to patients about specific ‘risks,’ 
including infertility, linked to abortion procedures. Ian Vandewalker has called 
them ‘biased counselling laws,’ because ‘they are not intended to ensure that 
patients give their informed consent to abortion, but rather are intended to make 
women less likely to terminate their pregnancy.’372 This approach was adopted 
by Indiana, through the adoption of the House Enrolled Act 1210 in 2011, which 
obliged practitioners of Planned Parenthood Indiana to inform women seeking 
an abortion that ‘objective scientific information’ shows that ‘a foetus can feel 
pain at or before twenty weeks of post-fertilization age.’373 Planned Parenthood 
Indiana brought the case before US courts, and sought to obtain a preliminary 
injunction.374 In a more recent case, Planned Parenthood Indiana challenged a 
provision of the Indiana code, amended in 2016, which required the performance 
of an ultrasound at least eighteen hours before access to abortion.375 The law 
mainly affected women with a low income or precarious jobs, or victims of 
domestic violence, who were obliged, first, to travel to the (few) premises offer-
ing ultrasound scans, and then, after the mandatory eighteen hours, had to make 
another journey to the clinic, and meet further costs, to get access to abortion.
Has the right to health been applied directly? In which ways was women’s 
health relevant in the judgment?
In the ground-breaking decision in Lakshmi Dhikta, the Supreme Court of Nepal 
analysed issues of equality, sexuality and motherhood. The Court also tackled the 
challenging issue of personhood, by saying that ‘what we do know is that a foetus 
does not have a separate existence and it can only exist within a mother’s womb. 
That’s why even if we do recognize a foetal interest, we cannot say that it shall 
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prevail over a mother’s interest.’376 The Court referred to many rights, includ-
ing the right to reproductive health, which is enshrined in Article 20(2) of the 
Constitution, and contended that ‘women are … considered to have the right to 
make decisions relating to reproduction free from interference. This means that a 
woman is the master of her own body.’ In an interesting passage, the Court stated 
that ‘when forced, the … pregnancy can become [a] cause of violence against 
women.’377 Cook, Dickens and Fathalla, in their pioneer work, clearly made the 
point that ‘there is little to choose between coerced contraception, sterilization, 
or abortion, because society does not want the child, and coerced motherhood, 
because society wants the child. Both interventions deny women the dignity of 
making a choice in their reproductive lives.’378
In the conscientious objection case CGIL v. Italy, the European Committee 
of Social Rights directly applied the right to health, as enshrined in the Revised 
European Social Charter.379
Cases of denial of access to abortion examined by UN bodies are much more 
interesting in terms of application of the rights to health and to reproductive 
health. In K.N.L.H. v. Peru, the HRC found that Peru had violated Articles 2 
(obligations of state parties), 7 (prohibition of torture), 17 (prohibition of unlaw-
ful interference with privacy) and 24 (right of the child to measures of protection) 
of the ICCPR. In particular, it stressed the vulnerability of K.N.L.H., who had 
been a minor at the time of the pregnancy, and the effect of the denial of access 
to abortion services on her mental conditions. The right to health was not directly 
considered because it is not provided in the ICCPR, but K.N.L.H.’s health was 
relevant when the Committee described the suffering she faced.380 These views 
were entirely based on her declarations, given the lack of information provided 
by the state party. Consideration of the right to health eventually came with the 
case L.C. v Peru, in which the CEDAW Committee directly applied Article 
12 CEDAW (which ensures women access to healthcare services on a non- 
discriminatory basis) and emphasised the failure of the state to protect women’s 
reproductive rights, which is even more severe given the vulnerable condition of 
L.C., being a minor and a victim of sexual abuse.381 Two elements are particularly 
interesting in these views, beyond the direct application of the right to have access 
to health care services in a non-discriminatory way.382 The first is the Committee’s 
affirmation that ‘legislation to recognise abortion on the grounds of sexual abuse 
and rape are facts that contributed to L.C.’s situation.’383 Bearing in mind my 
paradigm, this means that the legislation caused or created the conditions in 
which violence against the applicant occurred. The second element concerns 
the violation of Article 5 CEDAW, laying down the actions states must take to 
eliminate prejudices against and stereotypes of the roles of women in society. The 
Committee argued that ‘the decision to postpone the surgery due to the pregnancy 
was influenced by the stereotype that protection of the foetus should prevail over 
the health of the mother.’384
At regional level, the ECtHR focused on Article 8 ECHR in Tysiac, and con-
cluded that Poland had violated Tysiac’s right to respect for private and family 
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life, because it did not provide ‘any effective mechanisms capable of determining 
whether the conditions for obtaining a lawful abortion had been met in her case.’385 
The Court referred to her health in terms of the ‘severe distress and anguish’ that 
Tysiac suffered, and stressed the absence of compensation granted by the Polish 
authorities to cover ‘the irreparable damage to her health.’386 In R.R. v. Poland, 
the Court applied Article 8 ECHR, ruling that Poland had violated R.R.’s right to 
respect for private and family life by not providing ‘any effective mechanisms that 
would have enabled the applicant to seek access to a diagnostic service, decisive 
for the possibility of exercising her right to take an informed decision as to whether 
to seek abortion or not.’387 The Court, ‘in an unprecedented move,’388 also found 
Poland in violation of Article 3 ECHR, since R.R. had ‘suffered acute anguish’ 
and ‘humiliation,’ as a consequence of the fact that her concerns ‘were not prop-
erly acknowledged and addressed by the health professionals dealing with her 
case.’389 Furthermore, delays in the provision of services had prevented her from 
making an informed decision within the time limit provided by the law. Article 3 
ECHR was also applied in P. and S. v. Poland, along with the rights enshrined in 
Articles 8 and 5. The Court in Strasbourg concluded that Poland had been respon-
sible for violating the applicants’ rights. In particular reference to Article 8, P. and 
her mother had received ‘misleading and contradictory information,’ and been 
deprived of ‘appropriate and objective medical counselling.’390 Furthermore, civil 
courts could not provide them an effective remedy, because no case law featured 
compensation for the damage caused to a woman by ‘the anguish, anxiety and 
suffering entailed by her efforts to obtain access to abortion.’391 This is the closest 
affirmation of P.’s health conditions. In A., B., C. v. Ireland, specifically C.’s case, 
the ECtHR acknowledged the existence of guidelines for practitioners, which 
should have helped identify the legitimate grounds for abortion, but considered 
that they did not provide clear criteria for doctors in assessing the risks related to 
the pregnancy. This uncertainty had a chilling effect on practitioners’ acceptance 
of permission to perform abortion, owing to the risk of ‘a serious criminal convic-
tion and imprisonment in the event that a decision taken in medical consultation, 
that the woman was entitled to an abortion in Ireland given the risk to her life, was 
later found not to accord with Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution.’392 Furthermore, 
C.’s interests could not have been said to be protected by the availability of judi-
cial proceedings, since, according to the Court, ‘constitutional courts [a remedy 
also invoked by the government] are [not] the appropriate forum for the primary 
determination as to whether a woman qualifies for an abortion which is lawfully 
available in a State.’393 As a consequence, Ireland had no effective and accessible 
procedures in place, demonstrating a ‘striking discordance’ between the provi-
sions of the law and its practical implementation.394 Ireland was therefore found in 
violation of Article 8 ECHR.
The case of Paulina Ramírez Jacinto was settled and the agreement between 
Ms Ramírez Jacinto and the Mexican States was endorsed by the IACommHR. 
The Commission stressed that women ‘cannot fully enjoy their human rights 
without having a timely access to comprehensive health care services, and to 
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information and education in this sphere,’ and that ‘the health of sexual violence 
victims should be treated as a priority in legislative initiatives and in the health 
policies and programs of Member States.’395 Nonetheless, the agreement only 
contained the government’s assent ‘to strengthen their commitment toward ending 
violations of the right of women to the legal termination of a pregnancy,’396 and 
failed to refer to practices within the healthcare system that had contributed to 
reproductive rights violations.397
With regard to the law in Texas that had raised significant obstacles to the 
provision of abortion services, the US Supreme Court, in a five to three decision, 
shed light on the controversial issue of abortion in the USA. Judge Breyer deliv-
ered the opinion of the Court, joined by four judges. The judgment referred to 
criteria including viability elaborated by previous Supreme Court jurisprudence, 
in particular Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood of Southeast Pennsylvania 
v. Casey.398 The latter introduced the concept of ‘undue burden’, which means 
that a law is unconstitutional when ‘its purpose or effect is to place a substantial 
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the foetus attains 
viability.’399 In Whole Woman’s Health, the majority of the judges concluded that 
the health provisions in force in Texas had no health benefit for women seeking 
abortion, and posed an ‘undue burden on their constitutional right to do so.’400 
The right to health was not addressed, and references to women’s health were 
scant and only focused on the absence of health benefits deriving from the law, 
not on the consequences of such provisions for women’s health. The relevance 
of women’s health was however stressed by an amicus curiae brief in support of 
the petitioners, presented by social science researchers. They emphasised that the 
delays and the increased costs stemming from the application of the Texas law 
‘hurt women – physically, psychologically, and economically.’401 Furthermore, 
there was an intrinsic element of discrimination, also reported in the final judg-
ment, which unravelled the fact that other outpatient procedures were not subject 
to the same restrictive rules. What is striking is the fact that women’s rights, in 
particular reproductive rights, are nowhere mentioned in the text of the judgment. 
It is possible to argue that the recognition of women’s rights is implicit in deter-
mining the ‘undue burden’ posed by the statutory provisions. I can also support 
the fact that the Court tried to clarify the practical meaning of the test, but, still, 
it would have been a good opportunity for the Supreme Court to affirm women’s 
rights, in particular the right to health and the right to reproductive health. It is 
even more striking to see that the dissenting opinions focused more on the state’s 
interest than on women’s rights. Judge Thomas argued that the ‘made-up test’ 
decided by the majority to achieve a specific outcome ‘seriously burdens States, 
which must guess at how much more compelling their interests must be to pass 
muster and what “common sense inferences” of an undue burden this Court will 
identify next.’402 He also disagreed with the premise that women have a right to 
obtain abortion protected by the Constitution.403
In terms of transmission of ‘misleading information’ to women seeking abor-
tion, in Planned Parenthood Indiana, suspending the case for other legal reasons, 
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the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit argued that ‘requiring Planned 
Parenthood Indiana Practitioners to state that “objective scientific information 
shows that a foetus can feel pain at or before twenty week of postfertilization 
age”’ may be ‘false, misleading, and irrelevant.’404 The decision was guided 
by  the acknowledgement that Planned Parenthood only performed abortions 
during the first trimester, and it specifically referred neither to the bias underlying 
the law, which confirmed the state’s patriarchal attitude towards women, nor 
to the  potential effects on women’s health. In the most recent complaint filed 
by Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky, on the requirement for an 
ultrasound scan at least eighteen hours before an abortion, the US Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit did not refer to women’s right to health, nor to the 
intersectional discrimination underlying the law – poor women, with a precarious 
job, and women subjected to DV were much more affected by the requirement 
imposed by law. However, by upholding the findings of the District Court it 
addressed these points indirectly.405
Reparations
Reparations have taken very different forms according to the procedure. In 
Lakshmi Dhikta, for example, the Supreme Court in Nepal ordered the state to 
adopt a series of measures, including a comprehensive abortion law, a government 
fund to cover the costs of abortion procedures for poor women, the promotion of 
access to safe services for all women and campaigns to educate the public about 
abortion rights.406 The CGIL v. Italy decision by the European Committee of 
Social Rights did not envisage any form of compensation, since the applicant was 
not a direct victim but, as provided by this system of complaints, an association 
acting on behalf of (currently or potentially) pregnant women in Italy not able to 
access abortion owing to the significant number of conscientious objectors.
Turning to the denial of access to abortion services, the decisions by UN treaty 
bodies are of utmost interest, despite their non-binding character. In K.N.L.H., 
decided by the HRC, the respondent state was required to provide K.N.L.H. with 
an effective remedy, ‘including compensation,’ and, as general measures, to ‘take 
steps to ensure that similar violations do not occur in the future.’407 In L.C., the 
CEDAW Committee required the state to provide reparation, such as adequate 
compensation, covering rehabilitation as well as material and moral damages, and 
to adopt a series of general measures, including reviewing its laws to establish a 
mechanism for ‘effective access to therapeutic abortion,’408 which I will discuss 
further in chapter 3, ‘Methodology for treatment, Positive obligations of result, 
To provide access to health services’.
Moving to the European system, in one of the three judgments against Poland, 
Tysiac was awarded €25,000 in non-pecuniary damages and €14,000 to cover 
fees and expenses by the ECtHR. Interestingly, non-pecuniary damages took 
into account the ‘considerable anguish and suffering, including fear about her 
physical capacity to take care of another child and to ensure its welfare and 
happiness.’409 As for A., B., C. v. Ireland, C. was not granted just recompense 
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for her journey abroad to gain access to abortion, because she had not invoked 
the abortion regulatory provisions in force in Ireland. She could indeed have 
legitimately asked for an abortion, given her state of health, but not being 
provided the necessary information, she decided to travel abroad. Nonetheless, 
she was awarded €15,000 in non-pecuniary damages for the anxiety caused by 
the obstacles to abortion.
In the agreement that concluded Ramírez Jacinto, a more detailed set of reme-
dies was envisaged, including monetary compensation (legal expenses, money to 
pay for education and school supplies for the child, etc.), non-repetition remedies 
such as legislative proposals, public acknowledgement of the violation and a 
national survey to ascertain progress in implementating a national programme for 
preventing and raising attention about domestic and sexual abuse, and violence 
against women.410
In the USA, reparations were not an issue in the Supreme Court decision in 
Whole Women’s Health. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s judgment, 
which had upheld Texas law. In Planned Parenthood Indiana of 2011, the Court 
of Appeals granted the applicants’ motion for a preliminary injunction against 
the plaintiffs’ restrictions on first-trimester abortions.411 In the 2018 judgment, 
the Court upheld the lower court’s ruling that requiring an ultrasound to take 
place at least eighteen hours before an abortion constitutes an ‘undue burden’ 
on women.412
Involuntary sterilisation
Context and legal background
Involuntary sterilisation consists in the surgical removal or impairment of a per-
son’s reproductive organs being performed without full and informed consent. 
It can be imposed on all genders, but women – and transgender and intersex 
persons – have been disproportionately subjected to the procedure.413 As reported 
in a 2014 interagency statement drafted by several bodies including UN Women 
and the WHO, coercive and involuntary sterilisation was one instrument used 
by states to control populations and public health between 1870 and 1945, a 
period during which several eugenic laws were enacted (in Germany, Japan and 
the United States, for example).414 Eugenics purported to ‘improv[e] the human 
gene pool by eliminating genes deemed undesirable.’415 In 1922, nineteen US 
states had in force eugenic sterilisation laws which targeted ‘confirmed crimi-
nals,’ the ‘feeble-minded,’ and also ‘idiots,’ ‘imbeciles,’ ‘hereditary insanity or 
incurable chronic mania or dementia,’ ‘epileptics’ and those addicted to drugs 
or alcohol.416 In 1948 Japan adopted a Eugenic Protection Law, which forced 
sterilisation and abortion on people with intellectual and mental illness and severe 
disabilities, and included among the grounds for abortion the woman’s or her 
spouse’s hereditary mental or physical illness.417 The purpose was to ‘prevent 
the proliferation of genetically inferior offspring and to promote the growth of a 
“healthy” population.’418
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Despite the Japanese example, eugenic laws were gradually abandoned after 
the Second World War,419 although sterilisation has been used to control popu-
lations, in particular minority populations, in almost all continents during recent 
decades. In China, the fear that overpopulation would lessen national economic 
development and social advancement led to the adoption of the ‘One Child 
Policy’ in 1979 to limit the population to a manageable level.420 Implementation 
of the policy included abortion, sterilisation, economic incentives and huge fines 
on those breaking the law.
Why women? Involuntary sterilisation reflects the unequal power relations 
existing between women and men in a given society. Sifris argues that ‘women’s 
bodies continue to be objectified and viewed as the property of society as a 
whole.’421 Women are subjected to sterilisation more often than men because 
of the ‘false stereotype of women as incapable of making rational decisions.’422 
Johanna Bond makes the point that, in particular in patriarchal societies (and 
indirectly even in those where de facto discrimination is still recurrent), women’s 
reproduction is ‘the prerogative of men.’423
Why women living in particular conditions? Sterilisation has generally affected 
marginalised women, such as HIV-positive women, poor and uneducated women, 
women belonging to minorities, women in jail and disabled women.424 States 
have relied on sterilisation as an instrument of health policy, with the purpose of 
fighting HIV, disregarding the fact that the use of anti-retroviral drugs reduces the 
transmission of HIV from mother to child to below 5 per cent.425 Minorities and 
indigenous women have been targeted for involuntary sterilisation, as well. The 
IACommHR expressed its concern about involuntary sterilisation of indigenous 
women in Canada in a statement in January 2019.426 States have used sterilisation 
against minorities to safeguard the majority population – striking in that respect 
is the declaration of the Slovak Minister of Health in 1995: ‘[t]he government 
will do everything to ensure that more white children than Romani children are 
born.’427 Also women in jail: the California State Auditor reported in 2013 that, 
from 2005 to 2012, 144 female inmates were sterilised by bilateral tubal ligation, 
and that ‘the state entities responsible for providing medical care to these inmates 
… sometimes failed to ensure that inmates’ consent for sterilization was lawfully 
obtained.’428 According to Alexandra Minna Stern, guiding a team on this issue at 
the University of Michigan:
[T]he majority of these female inmates were first-time offenders, African-
American  or Latina. Echoing the rationale of the eugenicists who championed 
 sterilization in the 1930s, the physician responsible for many of these operations 
blithely explained they would save the state a great deal of money ‘compared to 
what you save in welfare paying for these unwanted children – as they procreated 
more.’429
A bill banning sterilisation in California state prisons was eventually approved in 
2014,430 but the case reopened the debate on the violation of women’s rights in 
detention centres.
DE VIDO 9781526124975 PRINT.indd   80 24/03/2020   11:01
The anamnesis
81
Disabled women constitute another vulnerable group. In 1927, the US Supreme 
Court upheld Virginia’s eugenic sterilisation law in Buck v. Bell, concerning the 
sterilisation of three women considered ‘feeble-minded.’431 Judge Holmes argued 
that a law enforcing sterilisation on individuals suffering from mental disability 
or epilepsy did not violate the equal protection and due process clauses. His infa-
mous sentence reads: ‘it is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute 
degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society 
can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind[;] three 
generations of imbeciles are enough’. For many years it was written in stone, and 
it is now taken as an example of the paternalistic attitude of judges and legislators 
in matters pertaining to women’s autonomy.432
Given the above, involuntary sterilisation is not only a form of discrimination 
against women, but also a clear example of intersectional discrimination, based 
on different multiply interrelated grounds, including gender, ethnicity, health, 
and personal economic or social condition. Women are sterilised not only because 
they are women, but because they are women and HIV-positive, or women and 
black, etc. The term ‘intersectionality’ was coined in 1989 by Kimberlé Crenshaw 
‘to capture the applicability of black feminism to anti-discrimination law,’433 
and it has been widely explored in feminist scholarship.434 Nonetheless, when 
examined by courts, the aspect of intersectionality is rarely taken into account. 
Catharine MacKinnon has argued that:
[t]he conventional framework fails to recognise the dynamics of status and the 
power hierarchies that create them, reifying sex and race not only along a single axis 
but also as compartments that ignore the social forces of power that rank and define 
them relationally within and without. In this respect, conventional discrimination 
analysis mirrors the power relations that form hierarchies that define inequalities 
rather than challenging and equalising them.435
The question is, on one hand, whether or not the person subjected to sterilisation 
was correctly informed before the performance of the procedure, and on the 
other, whether the behaviour of the health personnel involved was guided by 
discrimination, and if so on which grounds. The element of intersectionality, as I 
will demonstrate, matters to states’ obligations.436
Needless to say, involuntary sterilisation is a violation of human rights, includ-
ing the right to privacy, and of women’s rights to health and to repro ductive 
health.437 It may amount to torture, inhuman, cruel or degrading treatment, or 
punishment.438 When it is part of a widespread or systematic attack against a 
civilian population, enforced sterilisation constitutes a ‘crime against humanity’ 
according to Article 7(1)(g) of the Rome Statute. It is also a form of violence 
against women considered in the vertical dimension of my paradigm. As the 
then SR on VAW argued in one of her reports, ‘direct State action violative of 
 women’s reproductive rights can be found, for example, in government regula-
tion of population size, which can violate the liberty and security of the person if 
the regulation results in compelled sterilization and coerced abortion.’439
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Judgments and decisions
In the analysis that follows, I will investigate decisions, judgments and views 
regarding sterilisation of HIV-positive women, and women belonging to minor-
ities or to other vulnerable groups. In addition to the three axes that have guided 
my analysis so far, I will also reflect on whether the court or human rights body 
being examined has taken into consideration the element of intersectionality 
in the merits of its decision. I have decided not to investigate cases of forced 
sterilisation during armed conflict; as explained earlier, war is sui generis, and 
would require consideration of the context of coercion in which the act occurred.
Women with disabilities have also been subjected to involuntary sterilisation 
for a long time. In this section, however, I will not delve into specific cases of 
sterilisation of disabled women for two main reasons. First, once eugenic laws 
are repealed, the sterilisation of women and girls with disabilities is decided 
by courts, often on request of people that are responsible for their care and on 
medical opinion. Courts have elaborated over time a jurisprudence that is guided 
by the pursuance of the ‘best interest’ of the person with disabilities.440 The 
challenging issue is whether and to what extent it is possible to avoid having 
to obtain the consent of the person with disabilities.441 This is a topic that goes 
beyond the scope of my research, even though my paradigm could open future 
reflection on the issue. Secondly, sterilisation is often imposed on minors, a 
fact that entails further ethical and legal consideration of parental authority.442 
It should be remembered that the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, adopted in 2006 and entering into force in 2008, states that ‘[p]ersons 
with disabilities, including children, retain their fertility on an equal basis with 
others’ (Article 23). UN bodies have widely acknowledged the need to obtain the 
consent of a person with disabilities before performing sterilisation.443
Who is the applicant?
One landmark judgment concerning HIV-positive women comes from Namibia, 
where coerced sterilisation has not diminished despite the adoption by the gov-
ernment of a national plan to fight against HIV/AIDS. In L.M. and others v. 
Government, decided on 30 July 2012,444 the High Court of Namibia granted 
compensation to three women who were sterilised in a procedure to which they 
had not consented. The Supreme Court of Namibia upheld the judgment on 
3 November 2014, dismissing the government’s appeal. The applicants were 
surgically sterilised at two state hospitals between 2005 and 2007. The procedure 
was performed at the same time as caesarean sections. The three women sought 
compensation for violation of their rights to personality or alternatively to human 
dignity, the right to liberty and the right to found a family guaranteed by the 
Namibian Constitution. The applicants proposed a second claim, arguing that 
they had been sterilised because they were HIV-positive. Only one of the plain-
tiffs could understand and read English. Nurses had talked to the patients in their 
own language (Oshiwambo), but had not provided all the information needed for 
fully informed consent.
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Other cases can be mentioned in this connection, still pending before national 
courts (one before the IACommHR). In South Africa, it was reported that 7 per cent 
of the respondents included in a study conducted by the Human Sciences Research 
Council (10,473 people, HIV-positive) declared that they had been coerced into 
being sterilised.445 In 2015 three women’s rights advocacy groups filed a complaint 
with the national Commission for Gender Equality denouncing the forced and 
coerced sterilisation of women living with HIV in South Africa. The complaint was 
supported by forty-eight documented cases of involuntary sterilisation occurring 
in Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal between 1986 and 2014. In some cases, consent 
had been obtained while the women were in labour. The applicants asked the 
Commission to launch an investigation. The Commission, which accepted the com-
plaint, was asked to investigate episodes of coerced sterilisation in public hospitals 
and to propose remedial actions, including law reforms and compensation.446
Another case is pending before the High Court of Kenya, filed by six applicants 
(four victims and two advocacy groups).447 Alicia Ely Yamin, Policy Director of 
the Francois-Xavier Bagnoud Center for Health and Human Rights, stressed 
in the complaint both the violation of women’s health and reproductive rights and 
the aspect of intersectional discrimination.448
The final pending case on HIV-positive women that I would like to mention 
here is F.S. v. Chile, which was filed with the IACommHR. The applicant is a 
HIV-positive woman living in a rural town in Chile. When she discovered her 
HIV status, she started an anti-retroviral therapy and arranged for a caesarean 
delivery. During the delivery, she was sterilised without her consent. Vivo en 
Positivo,449 a HIV people’s rights association, brought F.S.’s case to the Chilean 
court system in 2002 as a domestic complaint, without success. The association, 
along with the US Center for Reproductive Rights, then filed a complaint within 
the Inter-American system of protection for human rights. The IACommHR has 
found the case admissible.450
As anticipated, women belonging to minorities have been widely affected by 
involuntary sterilisation. Several cases have been decided by UN bodies and 
regional human rights courts alike. In 2006, the CEDAW Committee handed 
down its views in Andrea Szijjarto v. Hungary,451 which was the first case in 
which a UN body found a state party to the CEDAW responsible for failure to 
obtain fully informed consent in a reproductive health procedure.452 The appli-
cant, a Hungarian Roma woman, was sterilised in 2001 at a Hungarian hospital 
during surgery to remove her dead foetus. She had countersigned a hand-written 
note added to the bottom of a form, where the Latin word for sterilisation was 
used. Within seventeen minutes of Andrea Szijjarto’s arrival at the hospital, the 
caesarean section had been performed, the dead foetus removed and her fallopian 
tubes tied. The sterilisation had a profound impact on her life, and she was later 
treated for depression. Szijjarto sought redress before the CEDAW Committee.
Moving to the regional system, in V.C. v. Slovakia, decided by the ECtHR in 
2011,453 the applicant, of Roma origin, was sterilised in a public hospital during 
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the delivery of her second child via caesarean section. She signed a consent 
form after she was told that either she or the baby would have died if any future 
pregnancy continued to delivery. The record of V.C.’s pregnancy and delivery 
reported her Roma origin. She had sought redress both in civil proceedings and 
through a constitutional complaint, but was not successful. A similar case is N.B. 
v. Slovakia, where N.B. underwent sterilisation without giving informed consent 
during the delivery of her second child via caesarean section.454 She sued the hos-
pital for damages, started a criminal complaint against the doctors and initiated 
a constitutional complaint, and only obtained around €1,500 in compensation. 
In another case brought before the Court by three women of Roma origin, I.G., 
M.K. and R.H. v. Slovakia,455 the first applicant had been a minor at the time of 
her sterilisation. I.G. and M.K. were sterilised without giving consent, while R.H. 
signed a document without understanding its content. They had tried all the forms 
of complaint available in Slovakia.
Turning to the Inter-American system, it is worth mentioning the case of María 
Mamérita Mestanza Chávez, a 33-year-old Peruvian indigenous woman, mother 
of seven children, who died from an aggravated infection caused by the absence 
of medical attention after being sterilised.456 María Mestanza Chávez, who lived 
with her partner in the Encañada district, was approached by district health pro-
fessionals applying a Voluntary Surgical Contraception Program, who visited her 
and tried to convince her, upon threat of being sent to jail, to undergo sterilisation. 
She and her partner initially refused. She eventually decided to undergo the 
procedure, without however receiving either appropriate information or medical 
attention. She died a few days after the operation. Her husband filed a complaint 
for negligent homicide, but his request was never heard by the authorities. Several 
NGOs brought an action against Peru on behalf of the Chávezes before the 
IACommHR. It was closed in 2001 by amicable settlement.
A first, and almost unique,457 instance of sterilisation of a migrant woman 
was decided in 2016 by the IACHR. In I.V. v. Bolivia,458 the applicant was the 
Ombudsperson (Defensor del Pueblo de la República de Bolivia) of Bolivia, and 
brought the action on behalf of a Peruvian woman, mother of three children, 
who was subjected to a tubal ligation procedure during a caesarean section in a 
Bolivian public hospital in 2000. At the age of 17, I.V. was accused of ‘apology 
[for] terrorism’ and arrested in Peru. While in detention, she was subjected to 
several forms of physical and psychological violence. After many years, she 
managed to flee to Bolivia, where she was granted asylum. In 2000, I.V., preg-
nant, went to the Women’s Hospital in La Paz, where she underwent a caesarean 
section during which her fallopian tubes were tied. I.V. and her partner were 
informed of the procedure only after it had been performed. Even if she had 
been consulted during the operation (which would have involved oral consent at 
best), I.V. argued that her consent would have been vitiated by anaesthesia and 
surgical stress. The Public Prosecution Office filed criminal charges against the 
doctor who performed the sterilisation for causing severe bodily harm, but after 
four years two judicial resolutions terminated the proceedings. The case was first 
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decided on the merits by the IACommHR, which found several violations of the 
rights enshrined in the American Convention and of Article 7 of the Belém do 
Pará Convention (state’s obligations in cases of violence against women). The 
Commission then referred the case to the IACHR.
Has the right to health been applied directly? In which ways was women’s 
health relevant in the judgment?
Involuntary sterilisation clearly affects women’s rights to health and to repro-
ductive health. In L.M. and others v. Government, decided by the High Court 
of Namibia, reporting Judge Elton focused on the concept of autonomy and 
informed consent. He argued that informed consent is not just written consent, 
and that ‘the patient should be informed of advantages and disadvantages of 
alternative contraception methods.’459 The applicants also argued that they had 
been sterilised because they were HIV-positive. This argument was dismissed by 
the Court, which was convinced that there was no evidence to support any claim 
of discrimination based on HIV status. The rights to health and to reproductive 
health were not directly considered in the decision. Some concerns can be raised 
about the judgment’s dismissal of the second argument proposed by the appli-
cants.460 Discrimination on the basis of the applicants’ health status should have 
been at the core of the Court’s reasoning, along with the impairment of the 
physical and psychological health of the three women. Intersectionality should 
have played a major role. There were three elements worthy of attention in the 
case: gender, health and ethnicity.461 Intersectionality would have emphasised 
the ‘motivating reason for forced and coerced sterilisations,’ which is ‘to deny 
specific populations the ability to procreate due to a perception that they are less 
than ideal members of society.’462
Concerning Roma women, Andrea Szijjarto claimed before the CEDAW 
Committee that Hungary had violated Articles 10(h) (right to get information and 
advice on family planning), 12 (elimination of discrimination in access to health-
care services), and 16(1)e (right to decide freely and responsibly on the number 
and spacing of children) CEDAW. From a procedural point of view, it is inter-
esting to note that the Committee found the complaint admissible even though 
the sterilisation had occurred before the CEDAW Protocol for Hungary came 
into force. It acknowledged that the procedure was permanent in its effects, and 
that the facts of the case could be considered as continuous in nature. Therefore, 
admissibility ratione temporis was justified.463 In the merits, the Committee con-
cluded that Hungary had violated all of the articles of the Convention invoked 
by Szijjarto. It argued that the right protected by Article 10(h) CEDAW includes 
the right to receive specific information on sterilisation and alternative procedure 
for family planning. Andrea Szijjarto had arrived at the hospital in poor health, 
so ‘any counselling must have been given under stressful and inappropriate con-
ditions.’464 Her right to access appropriate health services (Article 12 CEDAW) 
had also been violated. In particular, the Committee noted that ‘it is not plausible 
that during that [short] period of time hospital personnel provided the author with 
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thorough enough counselling and information about sterilization, as well as alter-
natives, risks and benefits,’ to ensure that Szijjarto could make ‘a well-considered 
and voluntary decision to be sterilized.’465 Intersectionality was not mentioned, 
although it was clear that this had been a case of discrimination based on both 
gender and ethnicity. The case anticipated some of the decisions of the ECtHR.466
Turning to that court’s jurisprudence, in V.C. v. Slovakia it acknowledged that 
sterilisation constitutes ‘a major interference with a person’s reproductive health 
status,’ which ‘concerns one of the essential bodily functions of human beings,’ 
and ‘bears on manifold aspects of the individual’s personal integrity including 
his or her physical and mental well-being.’467 The fact that sterilisation had not 
been a case of life-saving surgery was relevant; nor, in the case at issue, was it 
of immediate necessity from a medical point of view.468 Taking into account the 
effects of the sterilisation procedure – which provoked feelings of ‘fear, anguish 
and inferiority’ and affected V.C’s relationship with her husband – the Court 
concluded that Slovakia had violated Article 3 ECHR. It posited that there was 
‘no indication that the medical staff acted with the intention of ill-treating the 
applicant,’ but acknowledged that ‘they nevertheless displayed gross disregard 
for her right to autonomy and choice as a patient.’469 VAW had occurred despite 
no intent to harm the patient being proven, and the state was found responsible 
for this violence. The Court also found a violation of V.C.’s right to private and 
family life (Article 8 ECHR), because Slovakia had not complied with its positive 
obligation to secure her sufficient protection, ‘giving special consideration to 
the reproductive health of the applicant as a Roma woman.’470 Although this 
affirmation evoked the principle of non-discrimination, the Court did not find it 
necessary to separately consider a violation of Article 14 ECHR (non-discrimi-
nation).471 In N.B., the Court referred to the impairment of N.B.’s reproductive 
health in determining that Article 8 ECHR had been violated.472 Nonetheless, 
it did not separately analyse the case under Article 14 ECHR, having already 
determined one violation of the rights enshrined in the Convention. In I.G., M.K. 
and R.H., the first and the second applicants – R.H. died during the proceedings 
and her children were not granted standing to continue it – the Court found a 
procedural and substantive violation by Slovakia of Articles 3 and 8 ECHR. 
It referred to the judgments mentioned above to elaborate its conclusions. It is 
striking that the Court failed again to consider the violation of the principle of 
non-discrimination (Article 14 ECHR), which is far from being a secondary 
aspect. As correctly argued by Judge Ljiljana Mijović in her dissenting opinion 
to the V.C. judgment, the application of Article 14 was ‘the very essence of the 
case.’ In particular, the fact that V.C.’s record mentioned her ethnic origin was a 
clear sign of discrimination affecting a specific minority. Mijović recommended 
the application of Article 14 ECHR by arguing that ‘the sterilisations performed 
on Roma women were not of an accidental nature, but relics of a long-standing 
attitude towards the Roma minority in Slovakia.’473
In the agreement which settled María Mamérita Mestanza Chávez, Peru 
acknowledged the violation of Chávez’s rights, namely the rights to life, to human 
DE VIDO 9781526124975 PRINT.indd   86 24/03/2020   11:01
The anamnesis
87
treatment and to equal protection as enshrined in the American Convention, and 
the violation of Article 7 of the Belém do Pará Convention.
In the landmark case I.V. v. Bolivia, the IACommHR, with which the case 
was initially filed, found that Bolivia had not only violated several rights of I.V. 
enshrined in the American Convention, including the right to personal integrity, 
but also Article 7 of the Belém do Pará Convention, and argued that ‘non-con-
sensual surgical procedure [is] not only a form of discrimination, but also a form 
of violence.’474 It stressed the ‘multiple forms of discrimination suffered by the 
victim.’475 The Commission referred the case to the IACHR, which handed down 
its judgment on 30 November 2016. It is not my purpose here to analyse in depth 
the decision of the Court, but to highlight the main aspects which are relevant 
for the anamnesis. Although the American Convention does not encompass either 
the right to health or the right to reproductive health, the Court referred to I.V.’s 
right to reproductive health several times, by emphasising how the procedure 
had constituted a violation of ‘sexual and reproductive rights’, which affected 
her reproductive capacity, ‘causando infertilidad e imponiendo un cambio físico 
grave y duradero sin su consentimiento,’ as well as deep suffering, both physical 
and mental. The Court found a violation of I.V.’s right to bodily integrity.476 
The attitude of the health personnel, who had assumed that sterilisation was the 
best option for I.V., was described as ‘unjustified paternalistic medical inter-
vention’ without a ‘free, full and informed consent,’ which severely ‘restricted 
[the patient’s] autonomy concerning her body and her reproductive health.’477 
The Court also delved into the issue of multiple discrimination, distinguishing it 
from intersectional discrimination, the latter defined as the intersection of several 
elements which characterise a particular discrimination.478 As such, it is not the 
mere sum of grounds of discrimination, but a form of specific discrimination 
where more elements operate simultaneously.479 In this case, the Court did not 
find that the decision to sterilise I.V. had specifically been guided by her national 
origin, her refugee status or her socio-economic situation.480 Nonetheless, it con-
sidered that these grounds of discrimination, as interrelated, could determine the 
magnitude of the harm I.V. suffered. The Court also found that the social and 
economic conditions and I.V.’s migrant status had impaired her ability to gain 
access to justice.481
Reparations
Monetary compensation is the most common way that violations suffered by the 
victims of involuntary sterilisation have been redressed. In L.M. and others, for 
example, the High Court of Namibia, to which the Supreme Court referred the 
case after dismissing an appeal filed by the government, determined the quantum 
of damages payable to the women.
General measures addressed to the government are also fundamental, though. 
Thus the views issued by the CEDAW Committee in Szijjarto v. Hungary are rel-
evant for my analysis. The state was asked to provide appropriate compensation 
to Szijjarto, ‘commensurate with the gravity of the violations of her rights,’ and to 
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adopt general measures: to ensure that the personnel in private and public health 
centres were informed of the content of the CEDAW Convention and of the rele-
vant CEDAW General Recommendations; to review domestic legislation on the 
principle of informed consent in cases of sterilisation; and to monitor public and 
private centres to ensure that all patients express fully informed consent before 
any sterilisation procedure.482
In the ECtHR judgments on involuntary sterilisation, which highlighted the 
shortcomings of the national legislation at the time of the facts,483 the applicants 
were awarded sums of money in non-pecuniary damages and expenses; no par-
ticular consideration was given to the impact of the violence on women’s health 
in determining the sums.484
The agreement which settled María Mamérita Mestanza Chávez tackled the 
issue of reparations via a commitment by the state to redress the violation of 
Chávez’s rights. Her health and the lack of informed consent were taken into 
account in the determination of reparations. In particular, the settlement required 
Peru to pay monetary compensation to Chávez’s relatives, along with US$7,000 
to cover psychological support. Mr Chávez was also granted health insurance for 
the rest of his life, and US$20,000 to buy land or a house; their children were 
given free education in public schools.485 The state was required to adopt a series 
of general measures to investigate cases of violation of women’s rights, to ensure 
that centres where sterilisation is conducted respect the requirements established 
by the state family-planning programme, to ensure that health professionals 
attend courses in reproductive rights, violence against women, human rights and 
gender equality and to implement mechanism to file and tackle cases reported to 
the authorities quickly.486
In I.V. v. Bolivia, the IACHR ordered the state to provide I.V. with free, 
immediate and effective medical treatment and compensation for monetary and 
non-monetary damages, and to include the family in the therapy.487 The Court 
stressed that reparations should pay adequate attention to I.V.’s physical and 
psychological suffering, taking into account the gendered nature of the discrim-
ination.488 The different grounds of discrimination at the basis of involuntary 
sterilisation were relevant in determining the amount of compensation as a 
consequence of the violation of I.V.’s right to personal integrity.489 The state 
was also required to make the judgment public and acknowledge responsibility, 
to ensure that consent to sterilisation is always obtained in advance, free, 
informed and full, to provide clear and accessible information on women’s 
rights to reproductive health and to adopt permanent programmes for medical 
students and professionals on informed consent.490 Despite the achievement 
of this judgment, an author has argued that the Court should have addressed 
society at large, with awareness-raising education and campaigns, and that 
I.V.’s children should have been awarded compensation, beyond being involved 
in the rehabilitation.491




Context and legal background
Several legal instruments contain human rights provisions that seek to advance 
safe motherhood.492 The ICESCR, for example, provides, at Article 10(2), that 
‘[s]pecial protection should be accorded to mothers during a reasonable period 
before and after childbirth.’ Article 12(2) CEDAW requires states parties to 
ensure that women have access to ‘appropriate services in connection with 
pregnancy, confinement and the post-natal period.’ In 1985, the WHO and the 
Pan-American Health Organization organised a conference on appropriate tech-
nology for birth, which led to the adoption of a long list of recommendations, 
some of them aimed at preventing mistreatment during birth. These included free 
access to a chosen member of the woman’s family during birth, and women’s 
right to decide about clothing, food, disposal of the placenta and other culturally 
significant practices.493 The international conference on safe motherhood held 
in Nairobi in 1987 considered maternal health a means to improve women’s 
status in the economic, social and political spheres, and identified strategies 
for safe motherhood.494 Ensuring universal access to sexual and reproductive 
health and reproductive rights is included as Sustainable Development Goal 
No. 5 (5.6) in the Agenda 2030 of the United Nations.495 Notwithstanding these 
achievements, human rights in safe motherhood have traditionally been given 
small importance.496
Safe motherhood means both access to emergency obstetric care to prevent 
complications and maternal death, and freedom from mistreatment during labour 
and delivery. Maternal mortality, mistreatment and abuse during labour (known 
as ‘obstetric violence’ or OV) are ‘the greatest social injustice of our times,’ 
which highlight ‘the failure and refusal of political, religious, health and legal 
institutions to address the most fundamental way in which women differ from 
men.’497 Nonetheless, if on one hand public health policies and programmes 
have been adopted over the years to reduce maternal health,498 on the other hand 
obstetric violence has received less attention.
Maternal mortality is defined by the WHO as ‘the death of a woman while 
pregnant or within 42 days of termination of pregnancy, irrespective of the dura-
tion and site of the pregnancy, from any cause related to or aggravated by the 
pregnancy or its management but not from accidental or incidental causes.’499 
According to the data provided by the organisation, every day approximately 830 
women die from preventable causes related to pregnancy and childbirth. Maternal 
mortality dropped by about 44 per cent between 1990 and 2015, and the goal is 
to reduce the global maternal mortality rate to less than 70 per 100,000 live births 
before 2030.500 Maternal mortality is higher in less developed countries and it is 
linked to the status of the woman in the society: women belonging to minorities, 
poor women and women living in rural areas have proved to be disproportionately 
affected. Maternal mortality and morbidity have been addressed in numerous 
concluding observations adopted by UN treaty bodies.501
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OV occurs in all countries in the world even though it is not yet fully recog-
nised.502 In 2014, the WHO eventually issued a statement in which it acknowledges 
that ‘many women across the globe experience disrespectful, abusive or neglect-
ful treatment during childbirth in facilities.’503 It stressed that ‘abuse, neglect or 
disrespect during childbirth can amount to a violation of a woman’s fundamental 
human rights.’504 In 2015, UN and regional human rights experts, the Rapporteur 
on the rights of women of the IACommHR and the Special Rapporteurs on the 
rights of women and human rights defenders of the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights issued a joint statement explicitly calling on states to 
address ‘acts of obstetric and institutional violence.’505 Mistreatment and abuse 
during childbirth include physical, verbal and sexual abuse, discrimination and 
neglect, denial of privacy or of confidentiality and poor-quality care. More than 
fifty years ago, the Ladies’ Home Journal in the USA published a shocking 
article under the title ‘Cruelty in maternity wards,’ which reported the stories of 
nurses and women about inhuman treatment in labour and delivery.506 In 1958, 
a Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Pregnant Women was established 
in the United Kingdom. The situation has not improved in recent years.507 In a 
report of 2011 by the Perseu Abramo Institute in Brazil, 25 per cent of the 2,365 
women interviewed reported some form of violence during childbirth, including 
verbal abuses and vaginal examination.508 In September 2017, the Osservatorio 
sulla violenza ostetrica Italia (Ovo), published a report on obstetric violence, 
based on interviews of 5 million Italian women aged 18 to 54 with at least 
one child aged 14 or less.509 The inquiry, which was followed by the protest of 
thousands of women through the campaign ‘#Basta tacere’ on Twitter, showed 
that four in ten women considered their child’s birth as harmful to their dignity 
and psycho- physical integrity. Approximately 1 million women in Italy – 21 per 
cent – claimed to have been victim of a form of physical or psychological OV 
during their first child’s birth.
Experts from different countries have documented cases of beatings, hitting, 
slapping, kicking, pinching, the use of mouth gags and bed restraints, of harsh or 
rude language, of judgmental or accusatory remarks.510 Coercive or unconsented 
medical procedures, such as forced caesarean surgery (sometimes through a court 
order), episiotomy, the Kristeller manoeuvre and induced labour – when they 
are not clinically justified – and also detention of women and their new-borns in 
facilities after birth for inability to pay constitute other examples of obstetric vio-
lence. OV also consists in the refusal to provide relief for pain during labour, with 
possible negative consequences for the woman’s rights to health and reproductive 
health. Obstetric practices ‘inadvertently perpetuate VAW by using coercion.’511 
In the most severe cases, OV leads to the woman’s death. As one author outlined, 
‘this is a problem that resides at the intersection of astonishing progress in med-
ical technology on the one hand, and regressive attitudes about the rights and 
responsibilities of pregnant women on the other.’512
OV found legal recognition in Venezuela’s 2007 Organic Law on women’s 
right to a life free from violence, which first defined obstetric violence as
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the appropriation of a woman’s body and reproductive processes by health personnel, 
in the form of dehumanizing treatment, abusive medicalization and pathologisation 
of natural processes, involving a woman’s loss of autonomy and of the capacity to 
freely make her own decisions about her body and her sexuality, which has negative 
consequences for a woman’s quality of life.513
Article 51 of the same law includes some examples of OV, such as incapacity 
to respond to obstetric emergencies, forcing women to deliver lying on their 
backs with their feet in stirrups, preventing the mother and child from staying 
together after birth, altering the natural process of delivery by using induced 
labour without ‘voluntario, expreso e informado’ consent, performing a coerced 
caesarean section when the conditions for a natural childbirth were present, with-
out fully informed consent. The law requires the perpetrator (‘al responsible o la 
responsible’, irrespective of gender) to pay a fine and a copy of the judgment to be 
sent to the professional association which can decide whether to proceed against 
its member.
In 2009, the Argentinean congress admitted that ‘the provision of maternal 
care in health facilities had become a source of VAW,’ and it adopted in 2009 
the Integral Law for the Sanction, Prevention, and Eradication of Violence 
against Women.514
In a report presented in 2012 as a follow-up mechanism to the Belém do 
Pará Convention, the Committee of Experts recommended that states include 
provisions that ‘not only make obstetric violence a punishable offense, but that 
also elaborate on the elements of what constitutes a natural process before, during 
and after birth, without excessive reliance on medication.’515
In Italy, a draft law aimed at the protection of women in labour and the 
new-born, and at the promotion of natural childbirth was presented on 11 March 
2016.516 Although not all the provisions were in line with the law’s declared 
purpose to protect women’s dignity, the draft law marked a huge step forward in 
defining obstetric violence as ‘the actions or omissions’ of health personnel which 
‘deprive the woman of her autonomy and dignity during childbirth’ (Article 14 
of the draft).
These laws attempt to respond to a paternalistic view of medicine, which has 
led both to the phenomenon of ‘over-medicalisation’ – the use of medical pro-
cedures where not strictly necessary and without fully informed consent517 – and 
of ‘under-medicalisation’, for example the denial of pain relief during birth. As 
clearly put by Erdmann, ‘a health system wears the inequalities of the society in 
which it functions.’518
Judgments and decisions on ‘obstetric violence’
In this paragraph, I will analyse cases of OV. The difficulties that emerged in 
the selection of cases for analysis derive from several factors. Firstly, compared 
to abortion, obstetric violence has been dealt with by judges more in terms of 
negligence of health personnel than of violation of women’s human rights. In the 
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United States, a scholar has reported that ‘justice is elusive for many American 
women who experience obstetric violence,’ even though the common law of tort 
‘in most jurisdictions provides that anyone subjected to unconsented touching 
may sue for battery.’519 Cases of obstetric violence are usually dealt by the civil 
justice system in the United States, with the consequence that ‘it treats the matter 
as either a medical error or an interpersonal conflict similar to a fistfight on a street 
corner.’520 In particular, OV has come to court usually when it caused more or less 
permanent physical damage, which might lead to malpractice lawsuits. Secondly, 
OV is not perceived as violence by women themselves. From a feminist point of 
view, it is possible to argue that a male-centred society underestimates the harm 
caused to women while bearing children. If women are conceived as reproductive 
objects, and the birth of children as a ‘normal’ part of every woman’s life, it 
is easier to understand why OV has only recently attracted interest. Women’s 
suffering has always had a purpose: to serve society by giving birth to a child.521
A specific case of OV which affects women in prison is perinatal shackling, 
which I consider a form of VAW in its vertical dimension. It is also a form of 
intersectional discrimination, combining multiple and intersecting grounds of dis-
crimination: gender, social and health condition, and ethnicity. Perinatal shack-
ling in prison is an example of VAWH directly committed by states’ officials, and 
it has been a standard practice in the United States, even after the adoption of laws 
prohibiting it. The first SR on VAW, Radhika Coomaraswamy, acknowledged in 
her report of 1999 on the United States that ‘women in labour are also shackled 
during transport to hospital and soon after the baby is born,’ and that she ‘heard 
of one case where shackles were kept on even during delivery.’522 She concluded 
that ‘the use of these instruments violates international standards and may be 
said to constitute cruel and unusual practices.’523 In 2006, the UN Committee 
against Torture expressed its concerns about ‘incidents of shackling of women 
detainees during birth,’ and recommended the United States ‘adopt all appropri-
ate measures to ensure that women in detention are treated in conformity with 
international standards.’524 More than ten years after Coomaraswamy’s report, the 
SR Rashida Manjoo stressed that despite the efforts and the existence of a Federal 
Bureau of Prisons’ policy on shackling, pregnant women have been reported to 
be routinely shackled on their way to and from hospital, and sometimes even 
during labour, delivery and after delivery.525 Even when laws prohibiting the use 
of shackles on women in labour have been adopted, they are seldom applied.526 
A report published in May 2016 by the Prison Birth Project and Prisoners’ Legal 
Services of Massachusetts found that Massachusetts prisons and jails had violated 
their newly adopted anti-shackling law by continuing to ‘subject pregnant women 
to illegal, unsafe, and degrading treatment.’527
Who is the applicant?
As anticipated, judgments relating to mistreatment during childbirth have often 
been dealt with by courts in terms of compliance with legal standards of clinical 
practice by health professionals. The civil justice system is mainly used to address 
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OV. Hence, for example, in G., M.C.Y. v. Hospital Luis Lagomaggiore, the Third 
Chamber of Mendoza, Argentina, analysed the case of a young woman who was 
subjected to a caesarean section and an episiotomy in terms of tort liability.528 
The former was not clinically necessary, and the episiotomy was ‘incorrectly 
performed’ and caused severe health consequences to G., including uterine infec-
tions and damage to her sphincter muscles. In particular, the episiotomy was not 
performed by experienced healthcare staff. G. did not consent to either procedure.
Cases in Italy of malpractice during childbirth, which can amount to man-
slaughter (omidicio colposo), are generally linked to harms suffered by – or the 
death of – the new-born,529 or to maternal mortality or morbidity. In a case decided 
by the Italian Cassazione sez. civile (Supreme Court) in 2010, a woman was 
subject to episiotomy during childbirth which caused her severe and permanent 
health consequences (incontinence), and affected her intimate relationship with 
her husband.530 The woman and her husband both sued the hospital and asked 
for compensation, for the injury and for the damage to their matrimonial life. 
They obtained compensation in both instances, but considered the amount too 
little given the permanent incontinence affecting the woman after the delivery. 
Accordingly, they appealed to the Cassazione.
A recent case of OV was decided by the High Court of Kenya at Bungoma in 
March 2018, which applied a human rights-based approach to the case.531 J.O.O., 
a low-income woman, suffered abuse and mistreatment while in labour at the 
Bungoma County Referral Hospital, which should have provided maternal health 
services at no charge. She received no assistance while in labour, and was forced 
to walk alone to the delivery room. J.O.O. eventually gave birth on the floor as the 
delivery room was occupied by other patients, and was shouted at by two nurses. 
She sought redress from the hospital and both national and local governments 
before the Kenyan Court, invoking her human rights.
The ECtHR has not specifically dealt with cases of obstetric violence, but in 
Dubská and Krejzova v. Czech Republic it tackled the complaint of a woman 
who, choosing home birth as a consequence of OV, suffered during her first deliv-
ery.532 The case was first decided by a Chamber of the Court and then referred 
to the Grand Chamber. The case is relevant here to reflect on the possibility that 
forced or coerced hospitalisation for delivery is a form of violence against women 
in its vertical dimension. Home birth is not prohibited in the Czech Republic, and 
there is no record of midwives being prosecuted for attending home births per se. 
Midwives, however, have been prosecuted for alleged malpractice during home 
births. Šárka Dubská endured OV during her first delivery so she decided to give 
birth to her second child at home. She could not find a midwife willing to assist 
her and finally she gave birth alone. The second applicant, Alexandra Krejzová, 
gave birth to her first two children with the assistance of a midwife. During her 
third pregnancy she was not able to find anyone available to assist her, and when 
she was informed that home birth was not covered by public insurance, she chose 
a maternity hospital, which did not respect all her wishes. One of the applicants 
had sought redress in front of the constitutional court, which dismissed the appeal.
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A famous case on perinatal shackling was filed in 1993 in the USA as a class 
action. The plaintiffs were female prisoners incarcerated in three facilities in the 
District of Columbia. They complained of sexual harassment and inadequate 
obstetric and gynaecological care offered to female prisoners. In the judgment 
of the District Court, it was reported that ‘when Defendants transport pregnant 
women prisoners on medical visits they customarily place women in leg shackles, 
handcuffs and a belly chain with a box that connects the handcuffs and belly 
chain,’ and that ‘a physician’s assistant stated that even when a woman is in 
labour “their ankles and their hands are cuffed”.’533 Twenty-five years later, in 
the case Shawanna Nelson v. Correctional Medical Services, the US Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit marked a pivotal step in the protection of female 
inmates’ rights.534 Shawanna Nelson was assigned to the McPherson Correctional 
Unit in Newport, Arkansas, after being convicted for credit fraud. When she went 
into labour, she was first denied a transfer to the hospital, then finally escorted 
there by a female correctional officer. Her legs were placed in shackles. Despite 
the request of the nurse and the physician, the applicant remained shackled for 
most of the procedure, until shortly before her baby was born. She experienced 
a hip dislocation and an umbilical hernia. After childbirth she was immediately 
reshackled to her hospital bed by an officer who had replaced the first one. She 
was unshackled only on the second night of her stay at the hospital.535
Has the right to health been applied directly? In which ways was women’s 
health relevant in the judgment?
In G., M.C.Y. v. Hospital Luis Lagomaggiore, decided by the Third Chamber 
of Mendoza, Argentina, the right to health was considered in terms of the 
 practitioner’s duty to ensure women’s health during childbirth. The judges con-
cluded that the obstetrician had been negligent. The core of the judgment was the 
behaviour of the practitioner, rather than G.’s individual rights.
Turning to the Italian case of malpractice during childbirth, with health 
consequences for the woman, the Cassazione, to which the couple appealed, 
acknowledged that separate cases had to be considered for the couple, because the 
impact of the medical procedure was different for the woman and her husband. 
In particular, the Court referred to the dignity of the affectio coniugalis and to 
‘the constitutional value of the marriage,’ meaning that ‘it is not only a matter of 
health, but of the essence of matrimonial life.’ It is striking to note that the repro-
ductive and sexual health of the woman only mattered inasmuch they affected 
the matrimonial life of the couple. The right to reproductive and sexual health is 
a component of the right to health, as affirmed in international human rights law, 
and a more gender-sensitive approach would have highlighted how episiotomy 
not only caused incontinence – with severe consequences in daily life – but also 
affected the reproductive and sexual health of the woman, not of the woman in 
her relationship with her husband.
The High Court of Kenya referred to the constitutional right to health and to 
the legal instruments the country had ratified. It concluded that J.O.O. had been in 
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a vulnerable state, and that the behaviour of the nurses was inexcusable, leading 
to a violation of J.O.O.’s rights ‘as a woman.’536 The judgment went further, 
since the complaint had been filed against the national and local governments as 
well. In the assessment of the Court, the authorities ‘have not devoted adequate 
resources to health care services, have not put in place effective measures to 
implement, monitor and provide minimum acceptable standards of health care, 
thus violating our [very own] Constitution and international instruments that we 
have acceded to as a country.’537 The Kenyan Court declared that J.O.O.’s rights 
to dignity and to be free from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment had been 
breached, and that the violation was caused by the national and county govern-
ments failing to ensure adequate health care services. By finding the authorities 
responsible for violating J.O.O.’s rights, the Court acknowledged that the state, 
through inadequate implementation of the law and the lack of guidelines on free 
maternal care, had contributed to the violence she had suffered.
In Dubská and Krejzova the ECtHR approached the case from the angle of 
positive obligations to ensure respect for the applicants’ private life, and analysed 
whether the interference in private life had been ‘in accordance with the law,’ 
‘necessary in a democratic society’ for the pursuit of ‘legitimate aims.’538 It said 
that the interference was provided by the law, which allowed home births only 
when the activity of the midwife met specific requirements. The law was foresee-
able and clear.539 The Court accepted that the Czech state’s policy was aimed at 
protecting the health and safety of mothers and children during delivery.540 On the 
legitimacy of the interference, it recognised a wide margin of appreciation given 
to states in deciding whether to allow or prohibit home birth. Following a line of 
argument similar to one used in abortion cases, the Court pointed out that there 
was no consensus among the member states of the Council of Europe with regard 
to home birth. National authorities can make the first assessment of where a fair 
balance must be struck. The courts must then supervise whether ‘the interference 
constitutes a proportionate balancing of the competing interests involved.’541 A 
majority of twelve judges agreed that the interference had not constituted a viola-
tion of Article 8 ECHR, and encouraged the Czech authorities to keep the relevant 
legal provisions under constant review in order to ‘reflect medical and scientific 
developments whilst fully respecting women’s rights in the field of reproductive 
health, notably by ensuring adequate conditions for both patients and medical 
staff in maternity hospitals across the country.’542
As for perinatal shackling, the District Court of the District of Columbia, 
deciding on the shackling of female prisoners in the District, held that ‘[w]hile 
a woman is in labor … shackling is inhumane,’ and the practice violated her 
Constitutional rights, in particular the Eight Amendment, which reads that 
‘excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and 
unusual punishment inflicted.’543 In Shawanna Nelson, the US Court of Appeals 
stated that the law ‘clearly established’ that shackling a female prisoner during 
labour and delivery, without evident security justification, constituted ‘cruel and 
unusual punishment’ and violated the Eight Amendment. The appellate court 
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argued that the corrections officer should have been aware that her actions were 
not Constitutional, and concluded by a majority of six to five that she was not 
entitled to qualified immunity.544 The details of the judgment will not be reported 
here,545 but it is worth highlighting that there was no reference to the impact 
of perinatal shackling on Shawanna Nelson’s rights to health and to reproduc-
tive health. The only reference to health matters consists in the description of 
shackling practices as ‘degrading, barbaric, humiliating, and life threatening to 
both mother and child.’546 What about the state? A complaint could have been 
filed with the IACommHR raising the issue of violation of Articles VII (special 
protection to women during pregnancy and nursing period), and XXV (right to 
humane treatment during custody) of the American Declaration. The case of 
perinatal shackling is a clear example of gender-based violence against women, 
which is characterised by being based on two specific conditions relating to the 
woman: pregnancy and detention. Another condition determining the treatment 
of women in detention is ethnicity. As argued by Priscilla Ocen, perinatal shack-
ling appears ‘as a manifestation of the punishment of “unfit” or “undesirable” 
women for exercising the choice to become mothers. Within the  prevailing 
punishment regime, undesirability is synonymous with race, as  the impulse 
to punish such women is rooted in the stereotypical constructions of Black 
women.’547 Perinatal shackling is a way to ‘export’ rules in prison, which are 
male-centric, to the hospital.548 In Nelson, the officer was a woman, but the 
‘prison’ is a male actor, in which the subordination of women to men is perpetu-
ated to the extent of being normalised and felt as compulsory by female officers 
as well as male. Perinatal shackling is a violation of human rights, including the 
right to health, and it also disregards the UN Standard Minimum Rules which 
require that prisons make special accommodation for the care and treatment of 
pregnant women.549
Reparations
Reparations in cases of OV mainly consist in monetary compensation, usu-
ally as a consequence of the permanent impairment of the woman’s life. In 
G., M.C.Y. v. Hospital Luis Lagomaggiore, for example, compensation was 
granted to the applicants. However, as Vacaflor has argued, the judges did 
not consider the absence of consent to the procedures, which in itself would 
have amounted to a form of violence even if no physical harm had resulted. 
What is more, ‘the judicial reasoning in this case focused on awarding relief 
for the physiological malpractice during childbirth, but failed to recognize the 
damages to women’s emotional, and psychosocial needs, or consider their 
choices and preferences.’550
In the Italian case, the amount of the compensation was determined by the 
court of appeal to which the Cassazione referred the case. However, as I con-
tended above, the issue here is that the Court diminished the impact of this form 
of violence on the woman’s health, by referring only to the ‘essence of matrimo-
nial life’ threatened by the procedure.
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The Kenyan Court awarded Kshs. 2,500,000 (around €21,000) to J.O.O. as 
compensation for the violation of her rights and ordered that a formal apology by 
the hospital and the nurses be made to her.
In the US class action on perinatal shackling, the Court ordered the defendants 
to ‘develop and implement a protocol concerning restraints used on pregnant and 
postpartum women,’ providing that ‘a pregnant prisoner shall be transported in 
the least restrictive way possible consistent with legitimate security reasons.’551 
In Nelson, the Court sent the case back for jury trial, which determined compen-
satory damages in the amount of $1.552
Judgments and decisions on maternal mortality
In GR No. 24, the CEDAW Committee contended that under Article 12(2) 
CEDAW states have the legal obligation to ‘ensure women’s right to safe mother-
hood and emergency obstetric services and they should allocate to these services 
the maximum extent of available resources.’553 The Human Rights Council, in its 
Resolution No. 11/8 adopted in 2009, identified human rights directly implicated 
by maternal mortality and morbidity, including the rights to life, to be free to 
seek, receive and impart information, and to enjoy ‘the highest attainable standard 
of physical and mental health, including sexual and reproductive health.’554 Some 
cases decided by the CEDAW Committee, domestic and regional human rights 
courts are worth exploring here.
Who is the applicant?
The pivotal case with regard to maternal mortality is Alyne da Silva Pimentel 
Teixeira (deceased) v. Brazil, decided by the CEDAW Committee in 2007.555 
In the words of Rebecca Cook, Teixeira marks ‘the first decision of an interna-
tional treaty body [to hold] a government accountable for a preventable maternal 
death.’556 The applicant was Alyne Teixeira’s mother, Maria de Lourdes da Silva 
Pimentel, who filed a complaint in her own name and on behalf of the family of 
her deceased daughter with the Committee, claiming violation of Articles 1, 2 
and 12 CEDAW. Teixeira, a poor woman of Afro-Brazilian descent aged 28, who 
already had a child, visited a private clinic in the state of Rio de Janeiro presenting 
symptoms of a high-risk pregnancy. The physician sent her home. She returned 
to the hospital, where the doctor was unable to detect foetal heartbeat. She gave 
birth to a stillborn foetus, and the placenta was only removed fourteen hours later. 
Given her medical conditions, Teixeira was transferred to a public healthcare 
institution, but had to wait another eight hours. When she arrived at the hospital, 
she was hypothermic, and her blood pressure dropped to zero. She died after 21 
hours of agony without medical attention. The autopsy found the official cause 
of death to be digestive haemorrhage. The pathologist said that it was attributable 
to the delivery of the stillborn foetus. However, when Maria Pimentel returned 
to the hospital, doctors argued that her daughter’s death was due to the fact that 
she had carried a dead foetus in her womb for several days. Two lawsuits were 
filed on behalf of Teixeira, one at domestic, the other at international level. In 
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November 2007, the Center for Reproductive Rights and Advocacia Cidadã pelos 
Direitos Humanos filed a complaint with the CEDAW Committee.
In the European system, Strasbourg judges dealt with a case of mater-
nal health in Byrzykowski v. Poland, decided in 2006.557 The applicant was 
Byrzykowski’s husband. She died after going into coma as a consequence of 
epidural anaesthesia, necessary to perform a caesarean section. Investigations 
were still ongoing at the time of the complaint before the ECtHR; after more 
than seven years, no final decision had been taken in any of the domestic pro-
ceedings. In a more recent case, Z. v. Poland, decided in 2012,558 Z.’s daughter 
was diagnosed with ulcerative colitis while pregnant. She was admitted to a 
number of hospitals without success. Her condition rapidly deteriorated, and 
the doctors, after finding that the foetus had died in her womb, removed it. Z.’s 
daughter died later of septic shock. Z. started different proceedings in front 
of Polish judicial authorities, before filing a complaint with the ECtHR. The 
following year, the Court decided a complaint, Şentürk v. Turkey, submitted 
by the husband and the son of a woman who had died in a private ambulance, 
without the support of medical staff.559 She had suffered huge pain and gone to 
several hospitals which discharged her, one after another. She was examined by 
a midwife and not a doctor in the first three hospitals. On arrival at the fourth 
hospital, she was finally examined by a gynaecologist, who performed an ultra-
sound scan that showed that her foetus was dead and needed to be removed. 
Since she could not afford the fee for the operation, she was transferred to 
another hospital, but died during the journey. An investigation led to an open 
verdict, concluding that the doctors had committed no fault. The Supreme 
Administrative Court upheld the appeal, and the applicants filed a complaint 
with the European Court.
Turning to the Inter-American system, in 2010, the IACHR dealt with the 
issue of maternal mortality in its judgment Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community 
v. Paraguay, which concerned the right of an indigenous community to ances-
tral property.560 The case was submitted to the Court by the Inter-American 
Commission, which issued a report on 17 July 2008 including specific recommen-
dations for the state. The application was filed by members of the organisation 
Tierraviva a los Pueblos Indígenas del Chaco on behalf of and in representation 
of the members of the Community. Among the deaths that had occurred in the 
community, one is relevant for my analysis. Remigia Ruíz died in 2005 because, 
while pregnant, she did not receive adequate medical care. She represented an 
example of death during labour without access to health services, lack of docu-
mentation on cause of death and exclusion for extreme poverty.561
At national level, I have found remarkable the judgments issued by Indian 
courts. In Laxmi Mandal v. Deen Dayal Harinagar Hospital, the High Court 
of Delhi decided a case filed on behalf of Shanti Devi, a poor woman who was 
refused adequate maternal care despite being entitled to free services according to 
the existing state-sponsored schemes.562 Shanti Devi, who suffered from anaemia, 
became pregnant for the sixth time, and died in January 2010 after giving birth 
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at home to a daughter who was two months premature; the daughter survived. In 
another case, the High Court started proceedings on its own, following a newspa-
per report of a destitute woman who had died on a busy street after giving birth 
to a baby girl, to address discrimination and denial of medical care to homeless 
women, and lactating women.563
Has the right to health been applied directly? In which ways was women’s 
health relevant in the judgment?
In Alyne da Silva Pimentel Teixeira (deceased) v. Brazil, the Committee rejected 
the argument presented by the state that Teixeira’s death was non-maternal and 
that the probable cause of her death was digestive haemorrhage. The Committee 
was convinced that Teixeira’s death had been linked to obstetric complications 
related to pregnancy, and that there was a link between gender and the possible 
medical errors committed.564 It found Brazil responsible for failure to control 
private institutions providing medical services, and that this was in violation 
of Article 2(e) CEDAW providing for the elimination of discrimination by any 
organisation or enterprise.565 According to the Committee, appropriate maternal 
health services in the state party had failed to meet ‘the specific, distinctive health 
needs and interests of women,’ which constituted a violation of Article 12 (2) 
CEDAW, but also discrimination against women under Articles 12(1) and 2 
CEDAW. It is interesting to note the emphasis put on the intersecting forms of 
discrimination that Teixeira suffered, ‘not only on the basis of sex, but also on 
the basis of her status as woman of African descent and her socio-economic back-
ground.’566 The convergence or association of the different elements –  posited 
the Committee – ‘may have contributed to the failure to provide necessary and 
emergency care to her daughter, resulting in her death.’567 Rebecca Cook says 
that this was the first time that a UN treaty body considered discrimination in a 
country’s healthcare system from the perspective of a poor woman belonging to 
a minority, and the first time that maternal death was declared to be preventable, 
‘and when governments fail to take the appropriate preventive measures, that 
failure violates women’s human rights.’568 The Committee concluded that the 
state had violated the principle of non-discrimination by failing to accommodate 
sex-specific health care.569
Compared to the views in the Pimentel Teixeira case, the judgments handed 
down by the ECtHR are quite limited, because they do not reflect on the issue of 
maternal mortality as a matter of concern in European countries. Even though it 
is clear that the right to health could not be applied to these cases – since no such 
provision is in the ECHR – a reference to the fundamental rights of a woman, as 
linked to or as a part of the right to life, and to international legal instruments on 
the topic would have been positive. In Byrzykowski v. Poland, the Court found 
that the state had violated the right to life enshrined in Article 2 ECHR by not 
effectively investigating the case of a woman who died after going into coma as 
a consequence of epidural anesthesia, necessary to perform a caesarean section. 
The Court reiterated its previous jurisprudence, saying that:
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positive obligations require States to make regulations compelling hospitals, 
whether public or private, to adopt appropriate measures for the protection of their 
patients’ lives. They also require an effective independent judicial system to be 
set up so that the cause of death of patients in the care of the medical profession, 
whether in the public or the private sector, can be determined and those responsible 
made accountable.570
In all cases in which the harm has not been caused intentionally – the Court 
pointed out – the positive obligation does not require the provision of a criminal 
law remedy. It is enough that the system provides a remedy in civil courts, ‘either 
alone or in conjunction with a remedy in the criminal courts,’ which enables 
‘any liability of the doctors concerned to be established and any appropriate civil 
redress, such as an order for damages and for the publication of the decision, to be 
obtained.’571 Despite the medical question being complex, the Court pointed out 
that the overall length of the investigation had been unjustified.572
Similarly, in Z. v. Poland, it was a matter of procedural obligations under 
Article 2 ECHR. The ECtHR concluded that the authorities had dealt with the 
case with the level of due diligence required by Article 2 ECHR, and that there 
had been no violation of Z.’s daughter’s rights.573 It did not focus on conscientious 
objection, which Z. argued was the reason why health personnel had refused her 
daughter a full endoscopy, because it was not established that this was the factor 
that determined the medical decision. Z. contended that her daughter had been 
subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment ‘as a result of the doctors’ delib-
erate failure to provide the necessary medical treatment.’574 The Court argued 
that, while there was no doubt that ‘the applicant’s daughter’s illness caused her 
inordinate pain,’ she had received ‘treatment in various specialised hospitals and 
[been] subject to various medical tests,’ and ‘it is not [the Court’s] function to 
question the doctors’ clinical judgment as regards the seriousness of Y’s condi-
tion or the appropriateness of the treatment they proposed.’575 The case presented 
some disputed facts, which could have mattered in terms of relevance to women’s 
reproductive health. Z., for example, submitted that during her stay her daughter 
had been humiliated by a doctor, but the hospital denied the accusation.576
The following year, in Şentürk v. Turkey, the ECtHR argued that positive 
obligations under Article 2 ECHR imply ‘that a regulatory structure be set up, 
requiring that hospitals, be they private or public, take appropriate steps to ensure 
that patients’ lives are protected.’ States are also required to put in place an 
efficient and independent judicial system to assess the cause of death of an 
individual.577 The Court noted that ‘the deceased woman, victim of a flagrant mal-
functioning of the hospital departments, was deprived of the possibility of access 
to appropriate emergency care.’578 Judges were convinced that it was not a mere 
error or medical negligence, but rather that the doctors working there, ‘in full 
awareness of the facts and in breach of their professional obligations, did not take 
all the emergency measures necessary to attempt to keep their patient alive.’579
As for the Inter-American system, in Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community 
the Court found that the state had violated Remigia Ruíz’s right to life, that she 
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had died because of lack of adequate medical assistance during childbirth, and 
requested that it adopted several measures to prevent maternal mortality.580 No 
account was specifically taken of the violation of Ruíz’s right to reproductive 
health, and the legal reasoning did not take into account the existence of intersec-
tional discrimination: it should be said, however, that the case was particularly 
complex owing to the large number of applicants and of alleged violations of 
human rights.
At national level, in Laxmi Mandal, the High Court of Delhi stressed the inef-
ficiency of the support schemes: ‘instead of making it easier for poor persons to 
avail of the benefits, the efforts at present seem to be to insist upon documentation 
to prove their status as “poor” and “disadvantaged”.’581 Reference to the right 
to reproductive health and the right to life is clear in the judgment. The Court 
stressed that the complaint focused on the right to health, a ‘survival right’ that 
formed part of the right to life, which included ‘the right to access and receive 
a minimum standard of treatment and care in public health facilities, and in 
particular the reproductive rights of the mother.’582 The Court also mentioned the 
relevant international human rights law instruments on women’s rights to health 
and to reproductive health,583 and acknowledged the right to maternal health care 
as a constitutionally protected right.
Reparations
In terms of reparations, Pimentel Teixeira is the most interesting case. The 
Committee presented several recommendations to the state, including ensuring 
‘women’s right to safe motherhood and affordable access for all women to ade-
quate emergency obstetric care;’ providing ‘adequate professional training for 
health workers, especially on women’s reproductive health rights;’ and ensuring 
that private health care facilities comply with relevant national and international 
standards on reproductive health care. These recommendations will be thor-
oughly analysed in chapter 3.584 The state was asked to provide adequate financial 
compensation to the relatives of Teixeira, ‘commensurate with the gravity of the 
violations against her.’585 After ten years, in 2013, the Rio de Janeiro Trial Court 
awarded moral damages and a pension to Teixeira’s daughter, retroactively from 
her mother’s death until she turned 18.
The ECtHR has granted monetary compensation to victims, or victims’ rela-
tives. In Byrzykowski, judges only granted the applicant, Byrzykowski’s husband, 
non-pecuniary damages (€20,000), dismissing his request for pecuniary damages 
to covering the lost earnings of his late wife and the cost of the medical care 
which was necessary for his son.586
The judgment of the IACHR in the case concerning the Xákmok Kásek 
Community was considered per se a form of reparation. The state was requested 
to pay compensation amounting to US$260,000 to the leaders of the Community, 
who would then distribute the amount among its members.587 The Court ordered 
Paraguay to establish a permanent health clinic, equipped with the supplies and 
medicines necessary to provide adequate health care.588
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The High Court of Delhi, which acknowledged the right to maternal health 
care as constitutionally protected, granted financial compensation to Mandal’s 
relatives, and in particular to her daughter, and addressed the main shortcomings 
of the scheme that had been meant to help poor people gain access to medical 
services. In a later judgment, started by the High Court itself after the death of 
a destitute woman on a street, the Court held that the government of Delhi had 
an obligation ‘to demarcate or hire or create at least two shelter centres meant 
for destitute pregnant women and lactating women so that proper care can be 
taken to see that no destitute woman is compelled to give birth to a child on 
the footpath.’589
Access to emergency contraception
Context and legal background
In this section, I will specifically deal with emergency contraception (EC), which 
has raised several ethical issues in scholarship. EC has been defined by the 
WHO as ‘methods of contraception that can be used to prevent pregnancy after 
sexual intercourse.’590 In GC No. 22, the ESCR Committee posited that it is 
an essential medicine, and should be available.591 Individuals have the right to 
receive information on all aspects of sexual and reproductive health, including on 
contraceptives.592
Depending on the perspective adopted, whether based on ethics, culture or 
religion, EC has been considered either an abortifacient or a contraceptive meas-
ure. It has been reported for example that between 2000 and 2010 high courts in 
Latin American countries decided several cases on the legitimacy of the selling 
of EC.593 If, on one hand, some courts have acknowledged the perceived abortive 
effects of EC or based their argument on the ‘reasonable doubt’ attributable to the 
scientific status of research on the effects of EC,594 other courts have contended 
that EC has only contraceptive, and not abortive, effects.595 Four authors have 
pointed out that ‘the event in human reproduction from which personhood or indi-
viduality can be considered to have begun will probably never be conclusively 
determined, since decisive events are selected to serve different and sometimes 
conflicting purposes;’596 nonetheless, the definition provided by the WHO does 
not leave much doubt that EC is contraception. The updated WHO factsheet 
states that EC pills prevent or delay ovulation and ‘do not induce an abortion,’ 
they cannot interrupt an established pregnancy or harm a developing embryo.597 
The IACommHR held hearings during its 149th session from 24 October to 8 
November 2013, during which it ‘received troubling information on barriers that 
exist in terms of women’s access to emergency contraception.’598 In particular, 
the Commission received information confirming ‘the major challenges women 
face for complete access to emergency contraception, as well as a troubling 
tendency to restrict or ban its availability.’599 Limited access to emergency con-
traception has been proved to be related to high rates of clandestine abortions, 
especially for teen pregnancy – which is often the result of sexual violence – and 
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cases of suicide among adolescent girls. In a joint statement issued in 2015, UN 
experts argued that ‘the criminalization of or other failure to provide services that 
only women require, such as abortion and emergency contraception, constitute 
discrimination based on sex, and is impermissible.’600
Judgments and decisions
Judgments and decisions relating to access to EC are not as numerous as the ones 
analysed in this chapter relating to other forms of violence. The reason is that it 
is difficult to demonstrate, in a specific case, the causal link between the lack of 
access to contraceptives, in particular EC, and, for example, the death of a woman 
after an unsafe abortion.
Who is the applicant?
I will propose in this sub-section, exceptionally, given the scant jurisprudence 
on the matter, the CEDAW inquiry on the Philippines related to Executive order 
No. 3 of 2000 issued in Manila.601 The case was brought to the attention of the 
CEDAW Committee by a group of NGOs. Despite a clear prohibition on the use 
of modern contraception not being included in the order, in practice implemen-
tation of the order severely limited women’s access to sexual and reproductive 
health services, resulting in unavailability of modern contraceptives in Manila. 
The Executive order recalled the ‘sanctity of life’ and the protection of the lives 
of the mother and the unborn child, and it affirmed that the city of Manila would 
have promoted ‘responsible parenthood.’
In the Inter-American system for protecting human rights, the US-based Center 
for Reproductive Health, along with Promsex, DEMUS and Paz y Esperanza, has 
filed a complaint against Peru with the IACommHR on behalf of an adolescent 
rape survivor who was denied access to essential medical treatment following 
the assault on her.602 The case concerns Peru’s ban on the distribution of EC in 
public hospitals.603 The survivor, Maria, was kidnapped, drugged and gang-raped. 
She eventually gained access to EC in a private pharmacy, but received no 
information on how to take the medicine. The Inter-American Commission will 
have the opportunity to assess the compatibility of these state measures with the 
protection of fundamental human rights, including, hopefully, the rights to health 
and to reproductive health.
At national level, the Colombian Constitutional Court decided in 2012 the 
case of 1,280 women who filed a joint tutela, objecting to false information on 
EC provided by the Attorney-General of Colombia.604 He had publicly stated that 
the medicine for EC is an abortifacient, and that the right to life is granted by the 
Constitution.
A related issue is conscientious objection in the provision of contraception, 
in particular EC. The Attorney-General of Colombia, in the case just mentioned, 
was accused of encouraging this. In a case concerning the selling of contracep-
tives (not EC), the ECtHR dismissed a complaint presented by two pharmacists 
who claimed that their right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
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had been infringed after they were convicted in France for refusing to dispense 
contraceptives to three women who held medical prescriptions. The Court of 
Cassation confirmed the decisions of the lower courts arguing that ‘personal 
convictions … [could] not constitute for pharmacists, who have the exclusive 
right to sell medicines, a legitimate reason’ under the Consumer Code to refuse 
the purchase.605
Has the right to health been applied directly? In which ways was women’s 
health relevant in the judgment?
As assessed by the CEDAW Committee in the case of Manila, an order which 
in practice limited access to contraceptives led to the ‘withdrawal of all supplies 
of modern contraceptives from all health facilities funded by the local govern-
ment, in the refusal to provide women with family planning information and 
counselling … and in misinformation about modern methods of contraception, 
including those methods listed on the World Health Organization Model List of 
Essential Medicines.’606 The Committee demonstrated the existence of a ban on 
modern methods of contraception ‘in all public health facilities run by the local 
government, namely hospitals, health centres and “lying-in clinics”.’607 It further 
noted that the prohibition of EC was ‘indicative of the ideological environment 
prevailing at the time and its retrogressive impact on the provision of reproductive 
health services and commodities.’608 The Committee concluded in its inquiry that 
the Philippines had violated Article 12 CEDAW, since ‘given that only women 
can become pregnant, lack of access to contraceptives is … bound to affect their 
health disproportionately.’609 In other words, the policy had caused a violation 
of women’s right of access to health care. The UN treaty body also ‘took note’ 
of the ‘potentially life-threatening consequences of unplanned and/or unwanted 
pregnancies as a direct consequence of the denial of access to the full range of 
contraceptive methods, as well as of the strict criminalisation of abortion without 
any exemptions provided for in the State party’s legislation,’ and acknowledged 
that ‘complications resulting from unsafe and illegal abortion are a prominent 
cause of maternal death in Manila.’610
The Colombian Constitutional Court, considering the affirmation of the 
Attorney-General that EC is an abortifacient, based its legal reasoning on the 
Constitution, and on Article 12 CEDAW, to affirm the right to information on 
reproductive health. In particular, it acknowledged that ‘reproductive rights are 
implicit in the fundamental rights to human dignity and life, to equality, to 
the free development of personality, to information, to health and to education, 
among others.’611 In the Court’s view, women’s rights to health and to reproduc-
tive health also encompass a right to adequate and unbiased information.
Reparations
The Inquiry on the Philippines did not lead to reparations, given the nature of the 
proceedings, but rather to a series of recommendations by the CEDAW Committee, 
which called upon the government to ensure, to adults as well as to adolescents, 
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‘universal and affordable access to the full range of sexual and reproductive health 
services, commodities and related information … including oral contraception 
and emergency contraception.’612 It further asked the state, which was found 
responsible for the action of the Manila government, to ‘reintroduce emergency 
 contraception … to prevent early and unplanned pregnancies and in cases of 
sexual violence,’ and ‘to promote and raise awareness about the benefits of emer-
gency contraceptives in such situations, in particular among adolescent girls.’613
As reparation to the 1,280 women who had filed the tutela, the Colombian 
Constitutional Court ordered the Attorney-General, within forty-eight hours from 
the notification of the judgment, to make a public statement to explain that EC is 
not an abortifacient, and that in no case can women be charged with the crime of 
abortion when buying it.614
Conclusions: paving the way for the diagnosis
The conclusion of the anamnesis constitutes the diagnosis, which will be the 
object of chapter 2. These cases, which, admittedly, constitute a small portion 
of the cases that have been decided in the world,615 have been important to guide 
my analysis of the two dimensions of violence as conceived in this book. The 
two dimensions are different in nature, but at the same time they share some 
key aspects: the effects on women’s rights to health and to reproductive health, 
the fact that violence is grounded in the stereotyped role of women in society 
and the responsibility of states for directly or indirectly causing violence, or for 
‘tolerating’ and not preventing interpersonal violence.
As for the actor starting the proceedings, I noticed that, varying with the type 
of complaint, the applicants were women subjected to violence, victims’ rela-
tives, associations representing women’s interests, an Ombudsperson, the alleged 
perpetrators of an offence, or professionals providing health services for women. 
As anticipated in the introduction, I am not considering the women involved as 
‘patients’ in a very simplistic way, but rather as victims/survivors and as agents of 
change who, by filing complaints with national or international fora, contribute to 
the evolution and the protection of women’s rights. Agents of change can include 
a victim’s relatives, or the associations that file complaints on behalf of women, 
giving them voice and an instrument for seeking redress.
As highlighted throughout this chapter, the right to health and the right to 
reproductive health have not always entered the legal reasoning of the courts and 
the UN treaty bodies. This is not because the importance of these rights is minor, 
but rather attributable to the intrinsic limits on the competence of the judiciary and 
quasi-judicial bodies. The health of women who endure and/or survive violence 
has been taken into consideration in many proceedings without implying the 
direct application of the rights to health and reproductive health, which, as I will 
demonstrate, means that the content of these rights has been indirectly promoted 
by applying other rights enshrined in the relevant legal instrument.
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In few cases have the reparations awarded by judicial and quasi-judicial bodies 
been innovative. The innovation brought by some judgments and decisions was, 
nonetheless, ground-breaking. Beyond monetary compensation, as I will argue 
further, reparations must include measures that disrupt the underlying causes of 
violence in the two dimensions that are theorised in this book. In some judgments, 
reparations were not even an issue, because of the nature of the proceedings that, 
for example, challenged the constitutional legitimacy of a provision of the law.
I will now turn to the identification of the ‘illness’ in its diagnosis, conceptual-
ising the new idea of VAWH, and I will discuss states’ obligations in chapter 3.
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a conceptualisation of VAWH
Unravelling the notion of violence against women’s health
The anamnesis leads us now to the diagnosis. In this chapter I will unravel the 
innovative notion of VAWH as conceived in this book, which will pave the way 
for the analysis of states’ obligations in chapter 3 (the ‘treatment’). Going back to 
the philosophical metaphor that I used as fil rouge of this book, Greek physicians 
undertook detailed histories and examinations of patients, noting all elements 
that were useful for the diagnosis, including the course of the disease over time.1 
In my book, these elements have been the judgments of human rights courts and 
national courts, and the views of UN treaty bodies, related to specific aspects 
of the relationship between VAW on one hand, and the rights to health and to 
reproductive health on the other. It should be said that my analysis might seem 
limited – I looked into around seventy decisions. A database is not the purpose 
of this book, which aims to reflect on a precise relationship and analyse it using 
a medical metaphor to achieve a reconceptualisation of states’ obligations in 
the field. It is true, indeed, that Hippocratic medicine was also founded on the 
 available – hence, surely not 100 per cent complete – evidence-based knowl-
edge.2 As interestingly argued by one author, who relied on the rhetorical theory, 
‘all theoretical discussions of international law are incomplete in one way or the 
other,’ and the reason is that theorists ‘choose,’ they emphasise different aspects 
of the discipline.3
To paraphrase the most common definition of VAW – violence against women 
is a violation of women’s human rights – violence against women’s health consti-
tutes a violation of women’s right to health and right to reproductive health. From 
the analysis in chapter 1, the notion of VAWH can encapsulate both a vertical and 
a horizontal dimension of violence, namely the interpersonal dimension between 
individuals and an institutional one, which is characterised by laws and policies in 
the field of health. VAW always violates a woman’s rights to health and to repro-
ductive health. At the same time, state policies and laws in the field of health, 
such as the criminalisation of abortion (as showed in chapter 1), might themselves 
cause, or contribute to cause, violence. From the anamnesis, however, I draw the 
lesson that it is essential to consider as state policies and laws in the field of health 
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the practice of private parties, such as health personnel and hospitals, exercising 
public functions. Sonya Charles first linked DV and forced medical treatment – 
respectively belonging to the horizontal and vertical dimensions of my analysis 
– and examined them both as forms of VAW.4 Her argument anticipated mine. 
Nonetheless, from a legal point of view, although both are examples of VAW, 
in the case of DV the state is responsible for not preventing and/or suppressing 
VAW committed by private parties, whereas the state is responsible in cases of 
forced medical treatment because of its laws, or as a consequence of the action of 
its organs (for example the courts that authorise coercive practices), or because 
of the action of the health personnel, who are performing a public function in the 
field of health. In terms of state obligations, this difference matters.
One might wonder why the definition of VAW is not sufficient to encompass 
both the dimensions as I conceive them in this book. If we look at General 
Recommendation No. 35, adopted in 2017, it is clear that the CEDAW Committee 
conceived all forms of violence as potentially falling within the definition of 
VAW, including the criminalisation of abortion, for example. The Committee also 
argued that an international custom on the prohibition of VAW had consolidated. 
Nonetheless, I contended in the introduction that this latter affirmation – pivotal 
and progressive it might be – only partly corresponds to state practice.5 VAW is 
usually conceived as interpersonal violence, in which the actors might also be 
organs of the state, and less as a system of health policies and laws which cause 
VAW.6 However, if we look at VAW from the perspective of the right to health, 
then it is possible to argue that the macro-concept of VAWH can encapsulate both 
dimensions of violence. Like that of VAW, the concept of VAWH is not a term in 
criminal law, but rather an ‘umbrella’ definition that grasps the two dimensions of 
violence, each characterised by specific, gender-based crimes or practices. I will 
argue in these pages that, compared to the idea of VAW, this new concept can be 
enriched by another element, the limitation of women’s autonomy, which will be 
construed in these pages along human rights-based lines.
In the introduction, I ‘de-constructed’ the idea of VAW, analysing it from five 
different perspectives; in this chapter I will ‘construct’ the concept of VAWH, 
in an attempt to provide the clearest conceptualisation of my argument. Being a 
framework definition, VAWH does not include the element of intent. Nonetheless, 
I will argue in favour of the identification of a pattern of conduct in relation to 
VAWH, which will be relevant for re-conceptualising states’ obligations. I will 
conclude the chapter by reflecting on the public/private divide and how it might 
be challenged by the concept of VAWH.
What is violence against women’s health?
The definition of VAW included in the Council of Europe Istanbul Convention, 
which reflects legal developments on this issue at the international level, con-
stitutes an excellent starting point for the analysis. VAW means ‘all acts of 
gender-based violence that result in, or are likely to result in, physical, sexual, 
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psychological or economic harm or suffering to women, including threats of such 
acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or 
in private life’ (Article 3(a), Istanbul Convention). The concept of VAWH can 
also encompass all acts that cause or are likely to cause harm to women. This 
book theorises that these acts can be either ‘horizontal’ or ‘vertical’ forms of 
violence. Like VAW, VAWH makes no reference to the gender or the nature of 
the perpetrator. It emerged from chapter 1 that the perpetrator is not necessarily 
a male actor. For example, it is common practice that FGM/C are performed by 
women belonging to the community of the girl who undergoes it. Obstetricians 
might be women. In my book, the state can also be a perpetrator, not just through 
its agents, but also through laws and policies in the field of health that cause, or 
create the conditions for, VAWH.
In this paragraph, I will specifically reflect on the term ‘harm,’ although my 
purpose is not to investigate all the theories that legal scholars have elaborated 
over the centuries on this legal concept. Harm is usually related to criminal law, 
but in this book I see VAWH as an ‘umbrella’ concept, rather than a distinct 
crime, which is more comprehensive and better describes the two dimensions of 
violence as I theorised them in chapter 1. In this section I will not consider harm 
in relation to specific crimes which fall under the concept of VAWH, either.
Let us start from an apparently easy question: what is harm? In 1859 John 
Stuart Mill elaborated the following principle:
The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in 
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That 
the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of 
a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, 
either physical or moral, is not sufficient warrant.7
In a very simple, and admittedly not exhaustive, description, harm consists in 
a violation of legally protected interests. In his famous work of 1984, the legal 
philosopher Joel Feinberg conceived harm as a ‘wrongful setback to interests,’8 
which is an interesting definition even though a ‘set-back to interests is not 
considered as harmful if it has been voluntarily consented to.’9
What protected interest is violated in cases of VAWH? When considering 
rape, it was argued that the harm ‘lies in the violation of sexual autonomy and 
bodily integrity,’ with the consequence that the protected interest can be precisely 
identified in sexual autonomy.10 To turn to VAWH, I consider that the protected 
interests capable of embracing the two dimensions of violence are a woman’s 
rights to health and to reproductive health, which include, but are not limited 
to, sexual and reproductive autonomy. Hence, harm consists (or, better, harms 
consist) in violation of those rights to health and to reproductive health. As has 
been argued, ‘different harms may ensue from the same violations and one of the 
determining factors may be the gender of the victim.’11
The second, related, question concerns whether or not it is possible to ‘meas-
ure’ harm in international human rights law. In the Valiulienė v. Lithuania case 
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decided at European level, for example, Loreta Valiulienė suffered DV at the 
hands of her former partner. Her physical injuries were minor, but she was 
repeatedly, and violently, verbally abused. Was the violation of her human right 
– in this case, freedom from torture, inhuman or degrading treatment – less severe 
because she was not permanently, physically injured? Psychological harm might 
be disregarded, and often has been, and considered ‘less important’ than physical 
harm. Quite to the contrary, psychological harm has long-lasting consequences. 
The ECtHR argued, in Valiulienė, that it could not ‘turn a blind eye to the 
psychological aspect of the alleged ill-treatment … psychological impact is an 
important aspect of domestic violence,’12 and it found that Lithuania had violated 
Article 3 ECHR. It can be argued that, according to this jurisprudence, there is 
no pre-determined ‘threshold’ below which an act of gender-based violence is 
considered as not violence. Confirming this point, in several cases of DV the 
ECtHR has applied Article 3 prohibiting torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, 
without proceeding to analyse the level of severity. In her dissenting opinion 
on Valiulienė, Judge Jŏcienė contended that the applicant’s right to respect for 
private and family life had been violated, and not her right to be free from torture, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, because Article 3 ECHR requires 
a certain level of intensity to be triggered.13 The position of the judge deserves 
some attention, and it is not devoid of legal arguments, but on one hand it raises 
doubts about how far severity should be considered in cases of DV, which risks 
minimising psychological harm, and on the other hand reference to the victim/
survivor’s right to privacy might be counter-productive, since it might bring the 
analysis back to the public/private divide that has been fought over by feminists 
for decades.
In her work on reproductive freedom and torture, Ronli Sifris considered 
that ‘there is clearly no bright line dividing pain that is sufficiently intense to be 
categorised as severe, and pain that falls below this threshold.’14 She then turned 
to restrictions on abortion, and argued that ‘legally coercing a woman to carry an 
unwanted pregnancy to term is not only an abuse of her basic human rights, but 
may also be extremely damaging from a mental health perspective.’15 The use 
of the adverb ‘legally’ is interesting for my purposes, because it identifies the 
perpetrator as the state, through its laws and policies. Restrictions on abortion 
might also have physical effects, especially when a woman decides to undergo 
‘unsafe abortions,’ an expression which includes procedures carried out below 
the minimum medical standards and performed by individuals without the nec-
essary skills.16
VAWH not only causes harm, manifesting as bodily injury, fear, anguish and 
psychological pressure, but also leads to the adoption of behaviours that limit 
women’s autonomy, causing further harm. Consider, for example, that many 
women who have been raped adjust their behaviour because they fear being 
raped again – they might never leave their house alone, or at night – and suffer a 
new form of harm.17 It is a double harm: the harm of rape, and the harm caused 
by the psychological consequences of rape. The same can be said for DV, when 
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a woman, fearing abuse, decides to stay at home or to avoid contact with friends 
or relatives. Fear of being subjected to traditional practices such as FGM/C may 
prevent a woman from going back to her country of origin. The kind of harm that 
is discussed in these pages is fundamental where OV has occurred. As I saw in 
chapter 1, cases of obstetric violence tend to be brought to court only when they 
lead to permanent physical injuries to a woman and, as a consequence, to a com-
plaint of malpractice or of negligent behaviour by a practitioner. Nonetheless, this 
is only a limited view of the problem, because in the majority of cases, I venture 
to say, OV causes psychological and possibly long-lasting harm(s).
Finally, harm must be considered in the social context of the unequal power 
relations of women and men. Harm is ‘gendered’. Harm may be caused to women 
because they are women, or may affect women disproportionately, so is inflicted 
on women as a group. Needless to say, this does not mean that harm must be 
conceived as collective and not as individual. Such a position would echo some 
national laws that considered rape as a crime against ‘morality,’ against the male 
actor exercising his control over the woman.18 Instead, it means that an act of 
violence that a woman endures is not just an individual act, but also the product 
of an ‘institution,’ which ‘reinforces the group-based subordination of women to 
men.’19 Ruth Rubio-Marín has contended in that respect that ‘looking at the harms 
produced by violations allows for an understanding of rights violations … as a 
distortion of relationships and network systems that are sustained by these rights 
in a way that is especially relevant for women.’20
VAWH as a form of discrimination against women: patterns of discrimination
VAWH is a form of discrimination against women because they are women and/
or that affects women disproportionately, and it is structural, meaning that this 
form of violence is rooted in society, and based, as explained by the Council of 
Europe Istanbul Convention, on the ‘crucial social mechanisms by which women 
are forced into a subordinate position compared with men.’21 It is structural subor-
dination, which is clarified by the control of sexuality exercised over girls through 
FGM/C, but also in the subjugation of women in rape and domestic violence. In 
the vertical dimension, the element of structural subordination is shown in the 
attitude towards women in the medical sector, where doctors decide on behalf 
of women, or after obtaining a ‘coerced’, not entirely informed or free, consent 
– and laws and policies allow them to do so. Even though juridical equality has 
been gradually accepted by states, and forms of subjugation of women have been 
legally removed, ‘lifting legal impediments [i]s not sufficient to dislodge the 
deeply ingrained patterns of prejudice and disadvantage suffered by women.’22 
Substantive equality is far from being achieved.
From a legal point of view, the structural aspect of VAWH can be seen in ‘pat-
terns of discrimination’, which will be useful when we come to reconceptualise 
states’ obligations in chapter 3. A ‘pattern of discrimination’ means not just social 
and cultural patterns that are rooted in society, but also the persistence of and the 
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‘tolerance’ states demonstrate towards VAW, and in particular to VAWH, as it is 
conceived here. The ‘societal’ pattern of discrimination and the ‘state’ pattern of 
discrimination are, needless to say, interconnected and mutually reinforcing. This 
distinction is pivotal in terms of states’ obligations: the state has legal obligations 
to prevent VAWH by changing cultural patterns that consider the woman as 
subordinated to the man,23 but it also, as I will discuss in chapter 3, has obligations 
to disrupt the ‘pattern of discrimination’ represented by laws and policies in the 
health field that, directly or indirectly, perpetuate the stereotyped gender roles of 
women and men in society, and thereby cause violence. The ESCR Committee, in 
its GC No. 20, clearly defined systemic discrimination in this key passage:
The Committee has regularly found that discrimination against some groups is per-
vasive and persistent and deeply entrenched in social behaviour and organization, 
often involving unchallenged or indirect discrimination. Such systemic discrimi-
nation can be understood as legal rules, policies, practices or predominant cultural 
attitudes in either the public or private sector which create relative disadvantages for 
some groups, and privileges for other groups.24
Let us focus first on the horizontal dimension. Both the Inter-American and the 
European mechanisms for protecting human rights have referred to ‘patterns’ of 
discrimination in judgments concerning DV. For instance, in Maria da Penha v. 
Brazil, the IACommHR held that:
tolerance by the State organs is not limited to this case; rather, it is a pattern. 
The condoning of this situation by the entire system only serves to perpetuate the 
psychological, social, and historical roots and factors that sustain and encourage 
violence against women … the violence … is part of a general pattern of negligence 
and lack of effective action by the State in prosecuting and convicting aggressors 
… general and discriminatory judicial ineffectiveness also creates a climate that is 
conducive to domestic violence.25
In Lenahan (Gonzáles) v. United States, the IACommHR found ‘[t]he systemic 
failure of the United States to offer a coordinated and effective response to protect 
Jessica Lenahan and her daughters from domestic violence [which] constituted an 
act of discrimination … and a violation of their right to equality before the law.’26 
A ‘more general context of gender violence and impunity’ was emphasised 
in  the  report of the IACommHR in López Soto v. Venezuela, 27 and reinforced 
by the IACHR, which stressed how the ‘judicial inefficiency’ provoked an ‘envi-
ronment of impunity,’ which in turn facilitated the repetition of acts of violence.28 
The  IACommHR described sexual violence as a ‘multi-dimensional problem,’ 
the product of a ‘social environment in which violence is tolerated.’29
Turning to the European human rights law system, in Opuz v. Turkey the 
ECtHR found Turkey responsible for violating Article 14 ECHR (prohibition of 
discrimination) because, although it had adopted a law to counter DV, discrim-
ination resulted ‘from the general attitude of the local authorities, such as the 
manner in which the women were treated at police stations when they reported 
domestic violence and judicial passivity in providing effective protection to 
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victims.’30 Despite the number of DV cases reported in the area where Nahide 
Opuz lived, the police did not investigate her complaints of DV and the courts 
easily dismissed them, reproducing the public/private divide which international 
human rights law had begun to disrupt starting from the 1990s. The ECtHR 
also emphasised how the ‘general discriminatory judicial passivity … created 
a climate that was conducive to domestic violence.’31 This outcome is con-
firmed in another judgment, Talpis v. Italy, where the Court found that Italian 
authorities had ‘condoned’ the violent acts against Elisaveta Talpis – whose son 
was killed by her husband – and that she had been a victim of discrimination. 
The Court also referred to the ‘socio-cultural attitude of tolerance of DV.’32 
Quite interestingly, and surprisingly to a certain extent, the Court departed from 
a previous judgment also involving Italy, filed by Giulia Rumor,33 explicitly 
saying that the circumstances were different, because in Rumor the legislative 
framework existing in Italy was effective in punishing the perpetrator, whereas 
in Talpis the criminal law system ‘had not had an adequate deterrent effect.’34 
The reasoning of the Court regarding the application of Article 14 ECHR in 
Talpis v. Italy is thus not straightforward. I can argue that the reason lies in 
the fact that the Court mixed the patterns of discrimination discussed in this 
paragraph. As pointed out by Judge Eicke in his dissenting opinion, there was no 
‘appearance of discriminatory treatment of women who are victims of domestic 
violence on the part of the authorities such as the police, law-enforcement or 
health-care personnel, social services, prosecutors or judges of the courts of 
law.’35 That is precisely the description of a pattern of discrimination in laws 
and policies of the state: accordingly, either the findings in Rumor were wrong, 
or in Italy this specific pattern of discrimination, which permeates state policies, 
cannot be demonstrated. The Court was right to state that social and cultural 
patterns of discrimination are still persistent in Italian society, though. A quick 
look at Italian newspapers will show, for example, that DV is routinely treated 
as an ‘episode of insanity’ by the partner, or a murdered woman’s behaviour is 
scrutinised to find out whether she had cheated on her husband, as this would 
‘explain’ or even ‘justify’ the act of violence.
In the case under analysis here, though, I can go a bit further, because one 
element of the facts of the Talpis case was not sufficiently discussed by the Court 
and could have led to identification of a pattern of discrimination by the state. Had 
it confirmed the existence of such a pattern, not in society but in the behaviour of 
the state and its organs, the Court could have concluded, in a more effective way, 
that Italy had violated the prohibition of discrimination as enshrined in Article 
14 ECHR. Let us go back to the facts. Talpis had found refuge from her violent 
husband with a local association. However, after some months, the social services 
of the municipality of Udine notified the association that no funds were available 
to guarantee her another refuge or to pay for the refuge found by the association. 
Talpis then returned home. The government argued that the social services in 
Udine, which had developed a programme for victims of violence, were not 
in charge of the situation and therefore could not pay for a refuge managed by 
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a  private association; Mrs Talpis should have contacted the social services to 
ask for help. The Court could have chosen to apply Article 14 ECHR, and then 
held that, despite remarkable steps forward in protecting women from domestic 
violence, the Italian legislative framework as applied by the Udine authorities 
systematically discriminated against women.36 The Italian authorities did discrim-
inate by blaming Elisaveta Talpis for not having asked the competent authorities 
for help in due time, and by not supporting associations which assist women 
victims of abuse. This can be defined as a pattern of discrimination preventing 
abused women from having free and immediate access to social services.
In support of the main argument of these pages, I should also mention the 
views of the CEDAW Committee in Angela González Carreño, which clearly 
contended that:
[w]hen there is evidence of systematic patterns of violence against women, or when 
the incidence of violence against women is inordinately high, as reflected in a high 
rate of domestic violence, it is clear that the State knows or should know of the risks 
faced by women who have complained of violence from their partners or former 
partners.37
Furthermore, in a case of rape and abduction, the African Commission stressed 
how the state does not respect its obligations ‘when it tolerates a situation where 
private persons or groups act freely and with impunity in violation of the rights’ 
under the African Charter.38
If we turn to the vertical dimension, the pattern of discrimination can be seen 
either in laws and policies in the field of health care that directly or indirectly cause 
VAWH – for example the criminalisation of abortion or provisions on forced 
sterilisation – or in the state’s ‘tolerance’ of discriminatory behaviours by medical 
personnel, both in the public and the private sector, which cause VAWH. Hence, 
for example, in CGIL v. Italy, the European Committee of Social Rights argued in 
2013, that, despite the law granting women access to abortion, and the monitoring 
activity started by the government, ‘the shortcomings which exist in the provision 
of abortion services in Italy … remain unremedied.’39 Another example of a pat-
tern of discrimination taken from the case law analysed in chapter 1 concerns the 
provision of misleading information to women, either because directly required 
by the state, the male actor I have referred to several times, which can replace the 
woman in pivotal decisions concerning her body; or because medical personnel 
are guided by the stereotype that the woman will always decide to protect her 
foetus, no matter what medical treatment is necessary to do so. Health personnel, 
whether in public or in private healthcare, perform a public function in the field 
of health. With regard to abortion, from a social perspective, as Ronli Sifris has 
interestingly argued, ‘coercing a woman to continue with a pregnancy has the 
effect of coercing her to become mother.’40 The direct consequence of doing this 
is to reinforce a socially imposed construction of a woman’s role in society, and to 
reduce the possibility, given the way many workplaces organise themselves, for 
her to live a professional life: ‘legal restrictions on access to abortion  discriminate 
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against women in [a] myriad of ways. They are formulated and implemented in a 
social context in which gender inequality reigns.’41
The pattern of discrimination in the vertical dimension can be also seen in all 
cases of involuntary sterilisation. As I discussed in chapter 1, sterilisation without 
the consent of the woman, or without fully informed consent, can be imposed by 
the adoption of eugenic laws by the state. In this regard, the CEDAW Committee, 
in its concluding observations on Japan, noted that ‘the State party, through the 
Prefectural Eugenic Protection Committee, sought to prevent births of children 
with diseases or disabilities and, as a result, subjected persons with disabilities 
to forced sterilization.’42 It was a pattern of discrimination, in this case on the 
ground of disability, by means of a law in the field of health. Several cases of 
involuntary sterilisation have been reported in many countries, and the ECtHR 
has handed down pivotal judgments in which it applied the right to respect for 
private and family life and the prohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. Nonetheless, when it comes to the prohibition of dis-
crimination under Article 14 ECHR, as I have already mentioned, the Court has 
missed the opportunity to tackle these cases as discrimination, and intersectional 
discrimination more specifically.43 In I.G. and others v. Slovakia, for example, 
the Court first found that the practice of sterilising women without their prior, 
informed consent ‘affected vulnerable individuals from various ethnic groups,’ 
but then noticed that ‘it cannot be established … that the doctors involved acted 
in bad faith, that the first and second applicants’ sterilisation was a part of an 
“organised policy,” or that the hospital staff’s conduct was intentionally racially 
motivated.’44 Before a decree of the Ministry of Health in 2013, which set out 
procedures to guarantee that a woman could only be sterilised after free, prior 
and informed consent, the Public Health Act had allowed physicians ‘to deliver 
the sterilization without the information procedure generally specified when it 
seems to be appropriate in given circumstances.’45 The existence of a pattern of 
discrimination, at the time when sterilisation occurred, seemed to be confirmed 
by the most recent report of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD) in Slovakia, which, with regard to the right to health, 
expressed its concern ‘about reports of discriminatory treatment by medical per-
sonnel against Roma and segregation of Roma, particularly women and girls, in 
different hospital departments.’46 The Committee acknowledged that, despite the 
measures adopted to prevent forced sterilisation, access to justice for those who 
suffered involuntary sterilisation still remained difficult.47 Where women belong 
to minorities, the woman’s body is ‘used’ to discriminate against an entire group, 
and women are considered as ‘incapable of making rational decisions.’48 Why 
not promote campaigns of contraception or sterilisation for men? Ronli Sifris has 
clearly answered this question:
If a woman’s body belongs to the men in her life and the male paradigm of the State, 
then it is logical that involuntary sterilisation procedures should be carried out on 
women more than men, even though the medical procedure for men is much simpler 
than that for women.49
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The relevance of intersectionality in describing patterns of discrimination
The term ‘intersectionality’ was first introduced by Kimberlé Crenshaw in the 
late 1980s, to stress the specific conditions of Black women in US society. It is 
not a concept that applies only to marginalised groups, it is rather ‘an aspect of 
social organisation that shapes our lives,’ with the consequence that ‘groups may 
be advantaged or disadvantaged by structures of oppression.’50 Intersectionality 
has not had much attention in legal scholarship, though. Defined as an ‘analytical 
tool,’51 it has rarely been invoked in court. In these pages, I use the definition of 
intersectionality proposed by Lorena Sosa, who, in her remarkable book, con-
siders intersectionality ‘a tool for interpreting human rights in general, and for 
violence against women in particular, consisting of an explicit interdisciplinary 
approach to the study of race, gender, class and other social categories of distinc-
tion.’52 This idea, she argues, captures the ‘socio-structural nature of inequality.’53 
From a legal point of view, intersectionality can be used as ‘interpretative meth-
odology’ for exploring international legal norms on VAW,54 and for ‘empowering 
these norms.’55
Why is intersectionality appropriate for conceptualising the idea of VAWH?
Although the issue of intersectionality has mainly emerged in connection with 
involuntary sterilisation, intersectionality permeates all the types of violence that 
I proposed in chapter 1. Starting from the horizontal dimension, in cases of DV 
the ‘tolerance’ of the state for episodes of DV, manifested in lack of or delay in 
investigation, and absence of effective remedies, can become more intense in all 
cases in which the woman belongs to a minority. Hence, for example, in Lenahan 
(Gonzáles), amici curiae presented several reports during the proceedings before 
the IACommHR, one of which precisely concerned the effects of DV on minor-
ity women and children and the law enforcement response.56 Even though the 
Commission, deciding the case, did not consider intersectionality as an issue in its 
report, it stressed the existence of multiple grounds of discrimination, recognising 
that ‘certain groups of women face discrimination on the basis of more than one 
factor during their lifetime, based on their young age, race and ethnic origin, 
among others, which increases their exposure to acts of violence.’57 This has 
consequences in terms of measures that the state must adopt in order to change 
socio-cultural patterns of discrimination.
Intersectionality is relevant when a woman is raped, because she is a woman, 
and because she belongs to a specific minority. The decision of the IACHR 
in Inés Fernández Ortega v. Mexico is an example in that respect. The Court 
elaborated the state’s obligation to guarantee access to justice by referring to the 
specific situation of indigenous women. As I will elaborate further, the pattern 
of intersectional discrimination in cases of FGM/C seems much more apparent 
in state reactions to such cases than in reactions to other violations of a woman’s 
physical integrity.58 Without denying that FGM/C is a form of VAWH, as I will 
contend, the response of the state to these violations of women’s rights to health 
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and reproductive health has proved to be discriminatory, especially against adult 
women belonging to minorities in which this practice is performed.
Turning to the vertical dimension, from the anamnesis elaborated in chapter 
1 I can draw several cases of intersectional discrimination. It seems that another 
ground of discrimination is specifically relevant to access to abortion, for exam-
ple: the social and economic conditions of the woman seeking such access. 
When access is withheld because abortion clinics do not exist in the area where 
the woman lives,59 or because practitioners opt for conscientious objection,60 or 
because the fees are too high,61 or because the law does not allow women access 
to abortion and they are obliged to travel,62 it is evident that these health laws and 
policies cause VAWH, and their impact is much more severe for those who do 
not have the economic means to gain access to safe abortions. Unsafe abortions 
are extremely dangerous for women’s health.
Ethnicity as a ground for discrimination combined with gender is seen both 
in cases of involuntary sterilisation, and in cases of OV. Going back to its recent 
report on Slovakia, CERD affirmed that it had received information relating to 
‘verbal and physical violence faced by Roma women when accessing sexual and 
reproductive health services.’63
The anamnesis was particularly useful in highlighting how some courts, in 
particular the ECtHR, have been reluctant to apply the concept of intersectional 
discrimination, or, despite recognising the existence of different grounds of dis-
crimination, have not drawn adequate conclusions about the state’s obligations. 
In its GR No. 35, the CEDAW Committee acknowledged that ‘because women 
experience varying and intersecting forms of discrimination,’ VAW ‘may affect 
some women to different degrees, or in different ways, so appropriate legal and 
policy responses are needed.’64 This means, in other words, that intersectionality, 
far from being a mere feminist naïveté, is fundamental to accurately identifying 
states’ obligations, such as the obligation to provide access to effective remedies. 
In my analysis of VAWH, the concept is especially pertinent because inter-
sectionality particularly matters in the field of health policies and laws, with 
regard to women’s rights to health and to reproductive health, and it matters in 
both dimensions of violence explored in this book.
As I will show further in chapter 3, the notion of intersectionality allows us to 
reflect on the ‘costs’ of services for women. Should emergency contraception be 
free? Should access to abortion be covered by health insurance? What about the 
differences in access to health and social services for poor women and women 
belonging to minorities? I am referring not only to the US system, characterised 
by a system of private insurances, but also, for example, to travel insurance. 
Without mentioning any particular company (since I am sure similar provisions 
appear in many contracts), a travel insurance purporting to cover costs related 
to injuries and illnesses while abroad clearly excludes ‘voluntary termination of 
pregnancy,’ ‘assisted reproduction’ and ‘related complications.’ Accordingly, a 
woman who seeks abortion outside her home country has to bear all the costs of 
the procedure plus the risks deriving from possible medical complications.
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VAWH as a form of gender-based violence
Violence against women, as repeatedly confirmed in international and regional 
legal instruments alike, is based on gender. VAWH is also gender-based, because, 
to quote GR no. 35 adopted by CEDAW in 2017, it is founded on stereotypes 
rooted in our societies, it is a ‘social – rather than individual – problem, requir-
ing comprehensive responses, beyond specific events, individual perpetrators 
and victims/survivors.’65 The Council of Europe Istanbul Convention also 
‘link[ed]  gender-based violence to gender stereotypes,’66 and the expression of 
 gender-based violence is understood ‘as aimed at protecting women from vio-
lence resulting from gender stereotypes.’67
A stereotype is ‘a generalized view or preconception of attributes or character-
istics possessed by, or the roles that are or should be performed by, members of 
a particular group (e.g., women, lesbians, adolescents).’68 Stereotypes are ancient 
and persistent. They are ancient – it is possible to find traces of them in literature 
and in popular idioms. Bruna Bianchi argued that DV is ‘widespread in all social 
classes and cultural contexts, invisible, silenced, condoned, often the object of 
complacent humour which crystallised in popular idioms, songs and nursery 
rhymes.’69 As early as the beginning of the nineteenth century feminists started 
to fight against stereotypes that depict women as vulnerable, incapable of taking 
autonomous decisions and completely dependent on their husbands or male rel-
atives. Stereotypes are persistent because, for all that feminists could achieve 
excellent results in promoting gender equality in the law, VAW and VAWH 
characterise all societies of today. As has interestingly been argued, ‘when a 
State applies, enforces or perpetuates a gender stereotype in its laws and policies, 
it institutionalises the stereotype giving it the force and the authority of law and 
custom.’70
Stereotypes can be seen in all the cases I analysed in chapter 1. As with the 
cases of intersectional discrimination, human rights courts have not always been 
ready to construct their arguments on the existence of stereotypes. UN treaty 
bodies have demonstrated themselves more attentive in assessing the existence 
of stereotypes in cases of VAW. For example, in A.T. v. Hungary the CEDAW 
Committee referred, in a case of DV, to the ‘persistence of entrenched traditional 
stereotypes regarding the role and responsibilities of women and men in the 
family.’71 In the views on a rape case, Vertido v. The Philippines, the CEDAW 
Committee stressed that:
the judiciary must take caution not to create inflexible standards of what women or 
girls should be or what they should have done when confronted with a situation of 
rape based merely on preconceived notions of what defines a rape victim or a victim 
of gender-based violence, in general.72
In this case, Karen Vertido was raped by a senior colleague after a dinner to which 
she and another male colleague had been invited. She could not obtain justice, 
since the national court acquitted the perpetrator on the basis that it was not clear 
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‘why the woman had not escaped when she allegedly appeared to have had so 
many opportunities to do so.’ The stereotype of the woman that must demon-
strate resistance to rape or be assumed to have consented to it permeated the 
national court’s judgment. Another gender bias was the court’s affirmation that 
‘an accusation for a rape can be made with facility,’ implying that women may 
lie when it comes to reporting unwanted sexual intercourse.73 Viewed through 
the lens of VAWH, rape caused Vertido both physical and psychological harm, 
which was exacerbated by the re-victimisation she suffered during proceedings 
in front of the domestic court. The Committee found that the Philippines had 
violated Articles 2(f) and 5(a) of the CEDAW Convention because the state had 
failed to respect its due diligence obligations to banish gender stereotypes.74 The 
affirmation is particularly strong and not devoid of legal consequences, in terms 
of actions that the state must adopt to eradicate prejudices.
At first sight we can argue that courts have responded to FGM/C through judg-
ments that, although not always directly, have emphasised the stereotyped role 
of women in the societies where this practice is performed. Courts have granted 
refugee status to women escaping countries in which there was a risk of being 
subjected to FGM/C, a practice that has been defined as ‘cultural,’ ‘barbaric,’ ‘tor-
ture.’ These judgments must be welcomed, although I will try to go a bit further in 
the analysis. I am convinced that, even though it is practised by women, and has 
a ritual and ancestral meaning, FGM/C is a form of VAWH, which entails severe 
consequences for women’s and girls’ health and reproductive health. It is based 
on stereotypes that identify a specific role for women in society. Nonetheless, as 
I will discuss further, courts themselves, while condemning FGM/C, and while 
accepting requests for refugee status, perpetuate stereotypes. If we look at the 
language used by the courts, this argument is crystal-clear. The Constitutional 
Court of Uganda, in the pivotal case Law and Advocacy for Women in Uganda v. 
Attorney-General, condemned FGM/C by also referring to Article 33(1) and (3) 
of the Ugandan Constitution, which states that ‘women shall be accorded full and 
equal dignity of the person with men,’ and that ‘the state shall protect women and 
their rights taking into account their unique status and natural maternal functions 
in society.’75 This assumes that the state can better protect women, since they 
occupy a condition of vulnerability. I am not arguing that national courts should 
not have condemned the practice, quite the contrary; but when it comes to my par-
adigm and my notion of VAWH, I cannot disregard practices that, despite having 
similarly permanent and dangerous effects for a woman’s health, are accepted 
by society without any – or with very little – concern. Fighting stereotypes 
using other stereotypes of women does not seem the most adequate approach to 
identifying and eradicating the rooted causes of VAWH.
The vertical dimension shows many examples of stereotypes. The recurrent 
stereotype of the mother who cannot decide what is best health practice for her 
child and herself is pervasive. One author calls it the ‘ideology of motherhood,’ 
which may lead to prohibitions on contraception and abortion, and is character-
ised (given the stereotyped role of women as caretakers) by a lot of emphasis 
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on, for example, ‘the importance of breastfeeding for children’s nutrition, the 
bond between mother and child established through pregnancy and women’s 
sensitive and caring nature.’76 The CEDAW Committee examined a tragic case 
of lack of access to abortion, and acknowledged for the first time ‘the impact of 
stereotyping on the rights of individual women.’77 In L.C. v. Peru, the stereotype 
was to regard the woman as a vessel for reproduction, letting the interests of the 
foetus prevail over those of L.C. This stereotype caused a doctor to delay the 
decision to perform spinal surgery on a minor who had been raped and attempted 
suicide, severely injuring herself. L.C. was also refused therapeutic abortion. 
Similar stereotypes operate to restrict access to contraception: pharmacists and 
health personnel in public dispensing have claimed, for example, their right to 
conscientious objection in refusing to accept requests for contraceptives and 
refusing to fill a doctor’s prescription of contraceptives.78
Conversely, involuntary sterilisation goes in the direction of denying women 
motherhood. The stereotype here sees the woman as not capable of deciding what 
is the best for her, because she is HIV-positive or because she is a convicted 
criminal (say), and others – practitioners or the state directly – as better quali-
fied to decide on her behalf. Ethnic biases are particularly prevalent in cases of 
involuntary sterilisation, as I realised after investigating issues of intersectional 
discrimination where the state has decided that women belonging to a particular 
minority must be prevented from having children.
Finally, the stereotype is evident in OV. If a woman’s role is to have children, 
and she is not considered ‘complete’ without them, one might assume that she 
will do whatever she is asked to achieve this outcome, without questioning too 
much the practitioner’s opinion: when deciding on an unnecessary caesarean 
section, say,79 or manoeuvres or other practices during the birth. The stereotype 
is also normalised by women, who do not report cases of OV, believing that they 
are ‘normal’ practices.
The anamnesis confirmed the main arguments in the feminist discourse regard-
ing the female body and the approach of medicine over time. Laura Purdy has 
contended that the process of ‘medicalisation’ of women’s health, meaning the 
‘tendency to define normal events in women’s lives … and natural states … as 
pathological and requiring medical attention,’ is surely an aspect of our times, 
but that it cannot be simply demonised. As she pointed out, ‘a medical approach 
to bodily conditions (medicalisation) is not the problem, but rather the culture of 
medicine itself.’80
VAWH as a violation of the right to health and the right to reproductive health
VAWH consists in violations of the women’s rights to health and to reproductive 
health. In the anamnesis in chapter 1 my analysis of case law showed that these 
rights are seldom invoked. The outcome is not surprising. The right to health is 
not included in the ICCPR, nor in the European and American regional conven-
tions on human rights. The American Convention (Article 5(1)) and the Belém do 
DE VIDO 9781526124975 PRINT.indd   147 24/03/2020   11:01
Violence against women’s health in international law
148
Pará Convention (Article 4(c)) provide rights to respect for physical and mental 
integrity, but do not include the right to the ‘highest attainable standard of health’ 
as elaborated in the ICESCR. Accordingly, failure to apply the rights to health 
and to reproductive health does not suggest that the right to health is regarded as 
less justiciable, but simply that this right was not envisaged in regional human 
rights legal instruments characterised by developed monitoring mechanisms of 
compliance. Courts have referred to the health conditions of the applicant in 
many judgments, as have UN treaty bodies in their views, and found violations 
of three major human rights: the right to privacy, which includes the respect for 
reproductive autonomy; the right to life, in the most serious cases that have led 
to the death of the woman or of one of her relatives; the right to freedom from 
torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
In cases of DV, the ECtHR has often based its main argument on the physical 
and psychological conditions of the woman. In Valiulienė, as discussed in ‘What 
is violence against women’s health?’, the Court emphasised the severe mental 
consequences of DV.81 In Opuz, references to the health condition of Sahide 
Opuz were relevant to assessing that her right to be free from torture, inhuman or 
degrading treatment had been violated.82 Even though the ECtHR cannot apply 
a right that the European Convention does not convey, it observed that, among 
the ‘factors that can be taken into account in deciding to pursue a prosecution,’ 
authorities must consider ‘the continuing threat to the health and safety of the 
victim.’83 The IACHR referred to the rights to privacy and to humane treatment 
in pivotal cases of rape committed by the military such as Ana, Beatriz and Celia 
González Pérez v. Mexico and Ortega v. Mexico. The right to privacy includes 
sexual and reproductive autonomy. In López Soto the IACommHR stressed in its 
report the violations of Linda López Soto’s physical integrity, and characterised 
her kidnapping, and the sexual assault she suffered, as ‘expression of acute cruelty 
… of an extreme intensity’, violating her rights to humane treatment, personal 
liberty, privacy, autonomy and dignity.84 The protection of personal integrity was 
also mentioned by the Municipal Court of Pueblo Rico in a case of FGM/C within 
the Emberá-Chamí indigenous community.
Turning to the vertical dimension, the rights to personal integrity and to free-
dom from violence were mentioned in the report of the IACommHR in the case 
Manuela y Familia v. El Salvador, regarding a woman who was imprisoned after 
having a miscarriage and died while in detention.
The lack of access to abortion has been examined under several provisions 
of both the ECHR and the ICCPR, and the aspects relating to health have been 
mentioned in order to support conclusions that a specific right had been violated. 
In Mellet, for example, the HRC highlighted the ‘high level of mental anguish’ 
Amanda Mellet suffered. In Tysiac v. Poland, the ECtHR referred to the ‘terrible 
anguish’ Alicja Tysiac, who was refused abortion, was subjected to, while in R.R. 
v. Poland it applied for the first time Article 3 ECHR in a case which resembled 
Tysiac in terms of the obstacles to gaining access to abortion services. With no 
right to health, but referring to the health consequences of violence, the Court 
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has relied on other human rights to ascertain the effects of violence on women’s 
health.
Some national courts have directly applied the rights to health and to repro-
ductive health in cases brought to their attention. For example, in the C-355/2006 
judgment, the Colombian Constitutional Court ruled that a law criminalising 
abortion in all circumstances was unconstitutional. In particular, it argued that 
women’s right to health encompasses reproductive health, including freedom 
from state interference in women’s decisions. The Supreme Court of Nepal 
applied the constitutionally granted right to health in Lakshmi Dhikta, which 
concerned economic difficulties in gaining access to abortion.
At national level, the rights to health and to reproductive health were also 
mentioned in the G., M.C.Y. v. Hospital Luis Lagomaggiore judgment on OV 
decided by the Court of Mendoza in Argentina, and by the High Court of Delhi in 
a case regarding maternal mortality.85
At regional level, it is worth mentioning the decision in CGIL v. Italy, where the 
European Committee of Social Rights applied the right to health in the analysis of 
the de facto difficulties in gaining access to abortion services attributable to the 
number of conscientious objectors operating in Italian hospitals. The mechanism 
of collective complaints provided by the European Committee, although unique, 
is not capable of filling the gap in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR where social 
and economic rights are not protected in its founding treaty, however.
At the international level, needless to say the CEDAW Committee has offered 
the best protection of the rights to health and to reproductive health, given that its 
governing convention includes the principle of non-discrimination in the field of 
health care (Article 12(1)), and obliges state parties to ensure to women appro-
priate services in connection with pregnancy, confinement and the post-natal 
period (Article 12(2)). Cases such as L.C. on access to abortion, Andrea Szijjarto 
v. Hungary concerning involuntary sterilisation and Alyne da Silva Pimentel 
Teixeira v. Brazil on maternal health are excellent examples of the affirmation 
of the right to health as justiciable. Let us focus on these cases to assess whether 
the outcome of these decisions was different to those in cases in which the right 
to health was indirectly applied. If the focus is (only, although importantly) on 
the right of the victim/survivor to receive justice, and on compensation for the 
harm suffered because of the violation of human rights, applying the rights to 
health and to reproductive health, whether directly or indirectly, does not seem 
to change much, at least at first sight. As one author has argued about a case of 
DV, ‘the inclusion of the right to health may not have changed the outcome of the 
decision, but it would have provided the Court with a far more honest and accu-
rate assessment of the harms that were suffered’ by women.86 I would say that the 
outcome would be similar, but not identical. Application of the rights to health 
and to reproductive health can better shape states’ obligations, as I will discuss in 
chapter 3, in the form of positive obligations to provide health services to women.
The main objection to this argument is that, even if my assertion is so, and 
application of the rights to health and to reproductive health would change the 
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outcome of a case, we cannot alter the nature of legal instruments that are the 
product of the will of the state. It is up to states to amend provisions included 
in international treaties. One might also object that the cases in which the rights 
to health and to reproductive health have been applied were brought before 
either the courts of states whose constitutions include the right to health, or 
the CEDAW Committee whose founding convention encompasses these rights 
and whose decisions are not binding. Still, even without specific provisions, the 
ECtHR and the IACHR, along with the HRC, have been able to address issues 
of health in their judgments/views. In other words, international and regional 
jurisprudence has not directly ensured respect for the right to health; rather, it 
has indirectly promoted the right’s content by applying other, more ‘justiciable’ 
rights. The expression ‘more justiciable rights’ does not imply different levels 
of justiciability but that some rights have been more easily applied, owing to the 
way the complaint has been presented or a body’s competence not extending into 
key areas. This is of interest for my purposes. Until the recent judgment in López 
Soto, the case law of human rights courts has had a ‘knock-on effect’, upholding 
individual rights in several articles of the conventions of which they are the 
guardians, and could pave the way for amendments to those conventions or the 
addition of new protocols to them.87 This does not mean ‘inventing’ new rights or 
placing excessive burden on human rights courts, but rather implies conceiving 
a material right that already exists in other legal instruments, and has been the 
object of interpretation by courts. The future could bring some light and some 
‘justiciability’ to the right to health before UN treaty bodies, thanks to the entry 
into force of the Protocol to the ICESCR, giving the corresponding committee 
competence to accept individual complaints against the states that have ratified it 
(at the moment, few).
Direct application of the rights to health and to reproductive health would 
have some fundamental consequences. First, even though we can agree with the 
courts that DV and rape amount to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, it is also true that where regional courts get rid of the assessment of 
the level of intensity their reasoning is not always straightforward. Furthermore, 
the right to be free from torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 
application of which is almost automatic in cases of DV and rape, is not necessar-
ily applicable in all cases of VAWH. The IACHR has not applied the prohibition 
of torture in cases of DV or rape committed by private individuals, for example,88 
because of the specific characteristics of the crime of torture.89 In cases of lack 
of access to abortion, the first judgment in which the ECtHR applied Article 3 
ECHR was handed down in 2011, two years after the well-known Opuz judgment 
on DV.90 Second, as I will show, the main consequence of considering the viola-
tion of the rights to health and to reproductive health concerns states’ obligations. 
Third, application of the rights to health and to reproductive health – the latter as 
part of the former – will reinforce the justiciability of the right to health, which 
as a social and economic right has suffered the same status of ‘Cinderella right’ as 
the other rights included in the ICESCR. If direct application is not possible, con-
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siderations on the right to health and reproductive health should permeate more 
extensively the legal reasoning of courts and human rights bodies. Fourth, from a 
feminist legal perspective, this argument would help women, because application 
of the rights to health and to reproductive health would better emphasise the 
multiple angles of VAWH, which causes serious physical and psychological 
harm, and would embrace both the dimensions I discuss in this book. Julie and 
Sandra Levison have argued that ‘although violence and abuse are an integral 
part of the lives of many people, and the single greatest cause of injury to women, 
the subject of violence has not been systematically addressed as a major issue 
in women’s health.’91 They refer to data and national surveys, but I realised in 
my research how the rights to health and to reproductive health have only been 
protected indirectly, and how they would play a fundamental role in enhancing 
the protection of women’s rights at the international level. As was reported in a 
manual of the National Academy of Women’s Health, women’s health:92
includes the values and knowledge of women and their own experience of health and 
illness; recognizes the diversity of women’s health needs over the life cycle and how 
these needs reflect differences in race, class, ethnicity, culture, sexual preference 
and levels of education; includes the empowerment of women … to be informed 
participants in their own health care.
VAWH and intent
In the short analysis of the definition of VAW contained in the introduction,93 
I argued that intent is not a necessary element of the definition, and that VAW 
can be conceived as a framework encompassing acts of gender-based violence 
against women rather than a distinct crime or behaviour. I have already shown in 
this chapter that VAWH grasps both dimensions of violence, and describes well 
the relationship between VAW on one hand, and the rights to health and to repro-
ductive health on the other. I will confirm the absence of the element of intent in 
the definition of VAWH conceived in this book, and further explore an element 
that I outlined in ‘VAWH as a form of discrimination against women: patterns of 
discrimination’, namely the ‘pattern of discrimination’ that can be found in both 
dimensions of violence.94
I am not discussing here the concept of intent in criminal law, which goes 
beyond the scope of this book, and would require a comparative analysis of dif-
ferent legal systems and of international criminal law.95 Intention, in a very simple 
and clearly non-exhaustive summary, is related to the purpose of an action. 
It is the ‘guilty mind’ of the perpetrator.96 It could be said that the purpose of 
VAWH is to discriminate against women because they are women. Nonetheless, 
discrimination is structural, and permeates societies to the extent that it might 
be difficult to prove that an individual and/or the state intended to discriminate 
against women while committing an act of violence. VAW, and VAWH as it 
is conceptualised here, is defined as a form of discrimination against women. 
In other words, acts of violence may not aim to discriminate against women, 
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but constitute themselves forms of discrimination, are directed against women 
because they are women and/or affect women disproportionately.
The concept of intent is extremely complex in international law, especially 
when it concerns states. Could a state have a ‘guilty mind’? As put by Ronli 
Sifris, who interestingly has analysed limitations to reproductive freedom from 
the point of view of the crime of torture, ‘when a State legally restricts access 
to abortion, can it be viewed as intending to cause severe pain or suffering’?97 
Relying on an argument made by Rhonda Copelon,98 she concluded that, since 
severe pain and suffering is ‘a foreseeable consequence of both involuntary ster-
ilisation and restrictions on abortion,’ the requirement for intention is ‘satisfied 
in both of these cases.’99 This analysis is of utmost interest. Nonetheless, it has 
proved very difficult not only to consider intention on the part of the state, a 
collective entity,100 but also to examine state responsibility for the sole exercise 
of the legislative power.101 Furthermore, the responsibility of the individual must 
be distinguished from the responsibility of the state. As I have argued with regard 
to genocide, if we consider the state as a de facto entity, we might say that it 
has a ‘guilty mind’, although intention would manifest itself in a different way: 
not as ‘mental, individual status,’ but rather as ‘state policy’ and a ‘pattern of 
conduct.’102
Let us consider a case taken from the vertical dimension. When a practitioner 
communicated misleading information to a woman seeking abortion, was there 
an intent to cause VAWH as a form of discrimination against women? From 
the point of view of the responsibility of the individual, the analysis should be 
conducted in terms of medical malpractice litigation, and it would lead to the 
assessment of the ‘negligence’ of the practitioner rather than of the intentions.103 
This level of analysis is not relevant here, however, because I am not discussing 
the intent of the perpetrators of the single actions that can be referred to VAWH, 
but the intent – or the lack of intent – in the concept of VAWH itself. Since 
VAWH is not conceived as a distinct crime but as a framework, the analysis of 
intent seems superficial. Nonetheless, the anamnesis suggests that a ‘pattern of 
conduct’ by the state, in my case ‘a pattern of discrimination,’ exists in all cases 
of VAWH intended in its vertical dimension, and whenever a repeated tolerance 
is demonstrated in the horizontal dimension. The ‘pattern of conduct’, in other 
words, associates both dimensions as conceived in this book. This argument will 
prove useful in elaborating states’ obligations, in particular the policies and laws 
that must be adopted in the long term to eradicate violence, and will emphasise 
the importance of the principle of non-discrimination in human rights cases.
In Opuz, the ECtHR contended that there was no need to prove intent while 
assessing state responsibility for violating Opuz’s human rights in a case of 
DV.104 However, while deciding whether Turkey had violated Article 14 ECHR, 
the Court referred to the general attitude of the authorities, and concluded that it 
had.105 I saw that the ECtHR has not demonstrated in all cases a structural toler-
ance by national authorities investigating cases of DV.106 In a case on involuntary 
sterilisation, hence concerning the vertical dimension, I.G. and others v. Slovakia, 
DE VIDO 9781526124975 PRINT.indd   152 24/03/2020   11:01
153
The diagnosis
the Court argued that there was no evidence that the practitioners had acted in bad 
faith or that sterilisation was part of an organised policy, and it did not proceed 
to investigate the case under Article 14 ECHR. In this case, however, a pattern of 
discrimination could have been demonstrated, given a long-standing attitude in 
the health sector to discriminate against Romani people.
Considering the vertical dimension, it should be said that, directly or indirectly, 
the pattern of discrimination can be showed in all cases in which health laws and 
policies cause VAWH: directly, when the law itself causes VAWH, for example 
by criminalising abortion; or indirectly, for example when, despite a law granting 
access to abortion, services and practitioners responsible for a public interest 
activity (in the field of health care) do cause VAWH. Back in the 1980s, one 
author contended that, in the United States, ‘legislative proposals to allow invol-
untary sterilisation of certain groups on eugenic grounds have a long history,’ and 
the public policy showed ‘a systematic, state-sanctioned character of involuntary 
sterilisation,’ which was later replaced by sterilisation programmes ‘more subtle 
but nonetheless motivated by population control objectives.’107 The only context 
in which it seems that the pattern of discrimination cannot be demonstrated is 
when the individual’s action is not related to any form of policy of the state or the 
structure, e.g. hospital, for which he/she works.
In the horizontal dimension, a pattern of discrimination can be verified, as 
human rights courts have underlined, when the state shows ‘tolerance’ for acts of 
gender-based violence. Is ‘negligence’ showed by organs of the state sufficient 
to demonstrate state responsibility for VAWH? Where pain and severe suffering 
are the consequences of negligence, the requirements for considering an act as 
torture are not met (because to be torture, there must have been an intent, and a 
very strong one). In other words, negligence is not enough to demonstrate that 
torture has been committed.108 Nonetheless, I would argue that negligence by 
state organs might be sufficient to prove state responsibility for VAWH because 
of the existence of a pattern of discrimination against women. By tolerating 
violence or by promoting policies that perpetuate the subordination of women in 
society, states repeatedly ‘tolerate’ a form of discrimination against women and, 
to paraphrase the ECtHR in a case of domestic violence, create ‘a climate that [is] 
conducive’ to VAWH.109
Consent and autonomy in the concept of VAWH
The conceptualisation of VAWH does not seem complete without exploring the 
issue of the woman’s consent (or lack of consent), which is not, prima facie, part 
of the definition. The concept of VAW, as elaborated in international and regional 
legal instruments, does not refer to consent either. However, consent is relevant 
for both the horizontal and vertical dimensions: lack of consent is an element of 
the offence of rape, just as lack of ‘informed’ consent characterises, for example, 
forced sterilisations.
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Consent is an expression of autonomy, and ‘autonomy is self-determination.’110 
Francesca Rescigno has defined self-determination as ‘a fundamental right,’ 
which is not expressive of ‘egoistic liberty,’ but rather an ‘aware [and informed] 
choice of the individual within a community and not against it.’111
In its GC No. 22, the ESCR Committee considered the right to sexual and 
reproductive health as ‘indispensable to [women’s] autonomy.’112 As argued by 
Erin Nelson, autonomy is ‘the ability to be self-determining and to act on one’s 
own values in making decisions about reproduction.’113 Autonomy is a pivotal 
concept in philosophy, bioethics and law; as outlined by Sheila McLean, it is ‘the 
transcending principle of modern bioethics.’114 Marilyn Friedman contends that 
autonomous choices are self-reflecting, in the sense that, on one hand, they are 
caused by a woman’s ‘reflection on wants and desires that characterise her,’ and 
on the other hand they must reflect wants, desires, cares, values and commitments 
that someone reaffirms when attending to them.115 Autonomy is, for the purpose 
of this analysis, the capacity of a woman to decide about her health, and her 
reproductive health more specifically.
There is a huge literature on autonomy, from different perspectives.116 From 
a philosophical and ethical point of view autonomy would be of utmost interest 
to discuss, but I cannot even attempt to do it justice here. The purpose of this 
sub-section is not to dwell on all the existing theories on autonomy, but to assess 
how consent and autonomy matter for conceptualising the idea of VAWH, and 
how these are cross-cutting issues for both dimensions. A few preliminary notes 
seem useful, however.
Individualistic accounts of autonomy have prevailed since ‘the change of 
emphasis’ from paternalism, which was common in ancient medicine, to auton-
omy.117 In the 1970s, feminists stressed how this notion of autonomy expressed 
a ‘liberatory potential for women.’118 Nonetheless, individualistic autonomy has 
been accused of disregarding social context, the network of duties and obliga-
tions, and relationships and interests, of the community.119 This is why scholars, 
and feminist scholars in particular, turned in the 1980s, and more clearly in the 
1990s, to a relational concept of autonomy, considering women as embedded in 
social relations. Hence, for example, Carol Gilligan, who theorised the ‘different 
voice’ of women characterised by responsibility for ‘others,’ saw care as com-
plementary to individualistic autonomy.120 Interpersonal relations were at the 
core of her reasoning. Susan Sherwin, who discussed this issue ten years after 
Gilligan, did not consider merely interpersonal relations, but rather, and to a great 
extent, ‘the full range of influential human relations, personal and public.’121 She 
elaborated a concept of relational autonomy, which was based on the understand-
ing of ‘how forces of oppression interfere with an individual ability to exercise 
autonomy.’122 Her perspective belongs to radical feminism, which has repeatedly 
highlighted the limited control women have over healthcare institutions. Without 
denying the importance of the individual decision, relational theories show ‘the 
damaging effects on autonomy of internalised oppression.’123 In other words, 
what is internalised is structural and individual, pertains to society and is interi-
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orised by the individual. In the words of Simone de Beauvoir, ‘a free individual 
blames only himself for his failures, he assumes responsibility for them; but 
everything happens to a woman through the agency of others, and therefore 
these others are responsible for her woes … she insists on living in her situation 
precisely as she does – that is, in a state of impotent rage.’124 In other words, 
anyone has a ‘choice’, but the constraints that shape women into women ‘can 
make it virtually impossible for them to exercise this freedom in the world.’125 
Relations are therefore fundamental to understanding the patterns of oppression 
of women. Relational, in the understanding of Sherwin, means ‘contextualised,’ 
or ‘socially situated.’ In both individualistic and relational autonomy, Sherwin 
highlighted the importance of informed consent, which, in the case of her account 
of autonomy, must take into consideration the social location of the woman, and 
how this location can affect her autonomy.
Susan Dodds, more recently, followed the relational approach. Unlike Susan 
Sherwin, however, she reconceived the idea of consent, suggesting that ‘an ade-
quate understanding of respect for autonomy in health care must extend to an 
understanding of the development and exercise of the capacity for autonomous 
decision-making, rather than focusing solely on informed consent or even rational 
choice.’126 Even though a person may have all the information she requires, this 
fact does not guarantee autonomy. The woman must have ‘autonomy competen-
cies’ to determine ‘how to choose authentically.’127 Accordingly, what is needed 
is a process of counselling that helps a woman determine what she wants in 
the given context; this process should assist the person to ‘re-examin[e], when 
possible, one’s preferences, goals, values.’128 This theory, although interesting, 
especially when it reflects on the capacity to decide critically, is not devoid of 
criticism. Erin Nelson, for example, contends that the adjective ‘relational’ is 
unhelpful and might be risky, since ‘it can be understood to mean that if you are 
not in the right kinds of relationships … you cannot be autonomous.’129 It might 
lead to an effect that contradicts the initial purpose of countering oppression, by 
‘justifying paternalistic ideas and arguments about which decisions can legiti-
mately count as autonomous.’130 Furthermore, the activity of ‘counselling’ that 
Susan Dodds recommends can be in itself biased by stereotypes which might 
well have been internalised by the practitioners. I agree with Nelson when she 
endorses a ‘social’ conception of autonomy, which reconciles individualistic 
choice with feminist recognition of the reality of oppression, without entirely 
embracing the relational approach.131
Based on the right to autonomy is the doctrine of consent, which implies that 
‘decisions must be made following the provisions of information by a competent, 
non-coerced individual and [one] may even expect to see some evidence that 
the person has understood the information they have been given.’132 The law on 
consent varies from country to country, but a general principle is encapsulated 
in the 1997 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the 
Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine (Oviedo 
Convention), under which an intervention in the health field ‘may only be carried 
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out after the person concerned has given free and informed consent to it’ (Article 
5). Furthermore, according to the Declaration adopted by the General Conference 
of UNESCO in 2005, ‘any preventive, diagnostic and therapeutic medical inter-
vention is only to be carried out with the prior, free and informed consent of 
the person concerned, based on adequate information’ (Article 6). The meaning 
of ‘adequate information’ was clarified in the report on consent submitted by the 
International Bioethics Committee of UNESCO in 2008, which identified the 
following elements to be taken into account to show the consent of a patient to a 
medical intervention:
• the diagnosis and the prognosis;
• the nature and the process of the intervention;
• the expected benefits of the intervention;
• the possible undesirable side effects of the intervention; and
• possibilities, benefits and risks of alternative interventions.133
McLean has interestingly argued that, even though in theory consent does 
represent autonomy, when translated from ethical rhetoric to legal reality it seems 
to be a rather empty vehicle ‘to protect doctors from liability.’134 According to the 
theories on autonomy that I proposed, consent does not automatically guarantee 
autonomy, and I will unravel the problems inherent in both the individualistic 
and the relational approach by explaining how consent and autonomy matter in 
conceptualising the idea of VAWH. Before elaborating an autonomous notion 
of autonomy that, for the purpose of this research, will be ‘contextualised’ and 
‘human rights-based,’ let us see how consent operates in the horizontal and in the 
vertical dimensions.
Consent and autonomy in the horizontal dimension
In the horizontal dimension that I have elaborated in this book, encompassing 
cases in which VAW within interpersonal relationships causes a violation of 
women’s rights to health and to reproductive health, the lack of consent is the key 
aspect. When a woman endures FGM/C, rape or DV, she loses autonomy in the 
field of reproductive health, either because the practice permanently and severely 
affects her reproductive capacity or because, as with DV, her capacity to make 
decisions is impaired by the pressure coming from the violent partner.
Domestic violence
DV diminishes women’s autonomy.135 Nonetheless, the limitation of autonomy 
is not solely the result of the actions of the perpetrator. The authorities must 
intervene when a woman reports an episode of violence, but what happens if the 
abused woman wants to return to live with her abuser or when she withdraws her 
complaint to the police? Should the authorities disregard her consent, and act for 
her well-being?
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The analysis in this area by Friedman is relevant for my purposes. She warned 
against posing the question why women stay, which patently blames the victim, 
and to turn it over: why do men abuse women?136 On one hand, reasonable factors 
might lie behind her decision to stay, including the coercive environment in which 
she lives, the fear of losing custody of her children, incapacity to survive with-
out the husband’s financial resources. On the other hand, however, religious or 
moral norms might guide women to misunderstand what is happening to them.137 
According to Friedman, failing to prosecute the abuser would increase the risk of 
future abuses, and the negation of autonomy in the short run will be replaced by 
autonomy in the long run.138 Nonetheless, to achieve this objective, authorities and 
police forces need to be adequately trained to avoid secondary victimisation, and 
act in a gender-sensitive way.139 This disrupts the public/private divide: it means 
bringing DV into the public sphere, and criminalising behaviour that in the past 
only occurred within the husband–wife relationship. The disruption of this divide 
‘comes [at] a price,’ namely loss of control over the legal consequences that 
follow DV, and short-term loss of autonomy.140 From another perspective, how-
ever, even in the short run there is no lack of autonomy. Privacy, as Meyersfeld 
has interestingly pointed out, ‘cannot be understood merely as the right to be 
left alone; rather, it is linked affirmatively to liberty, the right to autonomy and 
self-determination;’ it means, in other words, that ‘privacy is not in opposition to, 
but is an affirmation of, women’s safety in the home.’141 Technologies might be 
of help in that respect: for example, bracelets or wristbands can be designed to be 
life-saving devices, capable of detecting situations of danger for a woman who 
has already reported to the authorities episodes of violence, or has approached a 
women’s rights association.
Rape
As I proceeded with the anamnesis, I saw how relevant the lack of consent is in 
cases of rape.142 In M.C. v. Bulgaria, the ECtHR clearly argued that state practice 
demonstrates how lack of consent is the pivotal element of the crime in the major-
ity of national criminal law systems, and how rape is a violation of sexual auton-
omy. In international criminal law, the Elements of Crimes of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) provide that the crime against humanity of rape occurs 
when ‘the invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion … 
or by taking advantage of a coercive environment, or the invasion was committed 
against a person incapable of giving genuine consent.’143 Accordingly, proofs 
of non-consent are ‘irrelevant in a context of inherent coercion.’144 Theories of 
relational autonomy help us to understand the social context in which rape occurs, 
both in times of peace and in wartime. Requiring the ‘utmost resistance’ by the 
victim, as some judges have done,145 means completely disregarding the role of 
women in society, trapped in a network of relations characterised by oppression. 
As for marital rape, it has only recently been considered from a legal point of 
view, and not by all countries, as a crime. Relational autonomy might explain 
why consent has been presumed, precisely because the relation between husband 
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and wife is supposed to imply consent. Nonetheless, minimal requirements for 
providing valid consent to sexual intercourse must be ‘an assurance of a cer-
tain level of freedom, so that consent is not the result of either wrongful threat 
or oppression.’146
FGM/C
It is easy to say that girls a few months old who undergo FGM/C cannot 
express their consent to it. It is the family that decides for them. Nonetheless, 
there might be cases in which adult women ask to be re-infibulated after, for 
example, giving birth to a child. The key issue is then whether the consent of 
the woman is enough in these cases to authorise the practice. In other words, is 
the woman’s consent expressive of her autonomy? If we consider the relations 
within which the woman is situated, it can be argued that the community and/
or the family can significantly influence a particular decision, and even impose 
it. It would be possible to contend, following the interesting position elaborated 
by Sherwin, that oppression is internalised and that it is difficult to consider 
the genuine nature of the consent within the context of a network of existing 
(presumably oppressive) relations. However, the criticism to the relational 
approach proposed by Erin Nelson is especially relevant here. We risk endors-
ing a patriarchal and Western approach, which decides which relations are 
the best for the woman: the norms within the society of the host state prevail 
over those of the society of the country of origin. Although harm to young 
women’s genitalia is never acceptable, regardless of how ‘minor’ the injury, 
because harm, as I explained, can also be psychological, and these practices 
affect a girl’s rights to health and to reproductive health,147 it is important to 
reflect on the possibility that the woman can give consent when she is adult. 
Some scholars might find this possibility unacceptable, but I think that it is 
not when we challenge the relational approach in order to avoid imposing a 
‘model’ of autonomy which belongs to Western countries. For example, in 
the UK a case of re-infibulation requested by a woman after childbirth ended 
with the practitioner being acquitted, and this happened despite the strong 
legislation against FGM/C in force in the UK.148 The judgments on FGM/C 
that I discussed in chapter 1 were actually based on ‘relations,’ because courts 
from different countries took into consideration the degree of oppression for 
women in their country of origin. In the majority of the interesting judgments 
I found, domestic courts accepted requests for refugee status filed by women 
who might have been subject to FGM/C if returned to their home country. 
From a legal point of view, and according to my analysis, the arguments were 
correct, because FGM/C does cause VAWH.149 In all of these cases the woman 
refused consent to the practice, and escaped her country of origin. Nonetheless, 
there is a ‘tendency to make “culture” more important than it is in explaining 
events in non-Western or minority cultures, whilst minimising its significance 
elsewhere.’150 European and American societies call ‘culture’ something that 
‘we cannot otherwise understand.’151
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Let us take for example another practice, genital cosmetic surgery (GCS). I 
can easily contend that it is culturally embedded in Western societies. Genital 
cosmetic surgery usually consists in labiaplasty, which means to reduce the 
size of the labia minora – the flaps of skin either side of the vaginal opening.152 
One might say that the woman consents to GCS, and that the practice does not 
affect new-born girls, so FGM and GCS are not comparable.153 Nonetheless, 
in the United Kingdom, girls as young as 11 request the operation.154 On its 
website the National Health Service says that the surgery should not be per-
formed on girls younger than 18, but it is not prohibited on minors per se. This 
operation is also called ‘designer vagina surgery,’ which clearly stresses that, 
in the great majority of cases, it is unnecessary (there is no medical indication 
of its  usefulness) and harmful (because it causes bodily injury). How genuine, 
meaning devoid of any form of actual or internalised oppression, is the consent 
of girls as young as 11 that do not like their genitalia and ask for them to be 
surgically altered? If we go back to relational autonomy, it is clear that the net-
work of relations is fundamental to understanding the complexity of consent. 
The image of beauty in Western society is ‘cultural’ in the same sense as a 
practice that considers FGM/C the act of belonging to a community. Hence, the 
question is: why should FGM/C be prohibited and not GCS? There is no obvi-
ous answer to the question, which surely requires reflection at societal level. 
For the time being, it can be said that this practice is not often considered from 
the perspective of human rights law. It should be, just as FGM/C is considered 
as a violation of human rights. For the purpose of this chapter, I argue that 
both these practices constitute a form of VAWH. This is why consent matters 
in the elaboration of the notion of VAWH and in the definition of the offences 
that  belong to this concept. GCS, which causes permanent injuries, can be 
equated with FGM/C, and should be prohibited when performed on minors 
who cannot express genuine and well-informed consent.155 Furthermore, why 
should a woman, aged 18 or above, not be competent to ask for re-infibulation, 
but be competent to ask for GCS? A reconsideration of the elements of the 
crime of FGM/C, including the element of lack of consent, and consideration 
of when and how GCS violates human rights, would be helpful in addressing 
cases of VAWH. An adult woman can consent to both practices, and she can 
even accept that they are part of her group’s tradition or a mere standard of 
beauty; what is relevant here is that she must be aware and fully informed 
of the consequences for her health so that she can express her genuine, 
non-coerced, consent.
Consent and autonomy in the vertical dimension
In the vertical dimension, informed consent is the key, as it was in my argument on 
FGM/C and GCS. As anticipated in explaining the general theories on autonomy, 
free and informed consent means that a person receives ‘adequate information,’ 
including the effects of medical intervention on her health.
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Abortion
In terms of consent and autonomy, abortion is a highly controversial issue. What 
constitutes informed consent in the case of abortion? What information or coun-
selling should a woman receive when deciding whether to undergo abortion? Are 
mandatory procedures such as transvaginal ultrasounds necessary to ‘inform’ 
her? More than in other cases, stereotypes and biases pervade consent in the field 
of access to abortion. As clearly contended by Cook:
[t]here is a generalized view that all women should become mothers, irrespective 
of their distinctive reproductive health capacity and physical and emotional circum-
stances, or their individual priorities. It does not matter for purposes of defining 
the stereotype that an individual woman, say Mary, may not wish, for whatever 
reason, to become a mother. Precisely because Mary is categorized as a woman, it is 
believed that motherhood is her natural role and destiny.156
Stereotypes lead to biased information, which emphasises the foetus’s interests 
at the expense of the woman’s. The state, acting as a male actor, protecting 
the woman from ‘wrongful’ decisions, engages in ‘reflecting what it sees as 
legitimate social policy,’157 with the doctor becoming the ‘mouthpiece’ for state 
interests.158
With the State and the doctor potentially bearing down on the patient with their 
own interests in the foetus, how is the distinctly private and individualistic nature of 
reproductive choice protected?159
Describing the situation in the United States, Pamela Laufer-Ukeles explains 
that doctors ‘assume’ what the woman wants to know, or should know, in order 
to take the ‘right’ decision, about the condition of the foetus and the possibil-
ity of foetal pain while performing abortion. Nonetheless, information can be 
‘unabashedly biased and reflect … ideological interests of the State as long as 
it is deemed not misleading or untruthful.’160 In the USA, even though abortion 
was recognised as a right in Roe v. Wade, state laws seek to restrict women’s 
ability to exercise this right through, for example, laws that require pre-procedure 
counselling with a list of information the physician must provide, laws provid-
ing waiting periods between the consultation and the procedure, and laws that 
oblige the woman to undergo an ultrasound.161 The stereotype of the relationship 
between the woman (as potential mother) and the foetus is at the basis of this 
legislation, with the consequence that the gender dimension of discourses on 
abortion has been ‘eclipsed, more specifically, by metaphysical or otherwise 
non-legal discourses that focus on the beginning of human life and the protection 
it deserves.’162 Jennifer Hendricks considered the ‘challenge’ as being to ‘assign 
appropriate value’ to the relationship between the woman and the foetus ‘without 
becoming deterministic about women’s roles.’163 Sheilah Martin contended that, 
when the law talks about ‘foetal rights’ or ‘doctor knows best,’ pregnant women 
are placed in ‘a separate category, where their rights are frequently denied.’164 
Laufer-Ukeles suggested a relational perspective on informed consent, focusing 
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on discussion, dialogue and ‘the need to interact and understand the competing 
interests, influences and social pressures involved.’165 She warns against denying 
the importance of the relationship, and focuses on the need to recognise the status 
of pregnancy ‘for the purpose of supporting the pregnant person’s autonomy and 
dignity, and to protect the unique relationship, not to undermine the  woman’s 
personhood for the sake of the foetus that grows inside her. The context and 
purpose of recognizing pregnancy matters.’166 Accordingly, ‘ignoring the inter-
dependency and focusing on a woman’s full individual autonomy does not enable 
consideration of the support women need during pregnancy both for their own 
sakes and for the sake of the foetus.’167 Greasley interestingly pointed out that 
the foetus ‘cannot partake in international relations of any kind … as can the 
neonate,’ and that the foetus’s engagement with the world is ‘mediated through 
the body of the pregnant woman.’168 Nonetheless, as argued by McLean, a more 
relational account of autonomy ‘would see the pregnant women as intimately 
linked to her social network, perhaps especially to her embryo/foetus,’ with the 
consequence that women ‘should always and at all times act for the benefit of 
their foetuses.’169 This route leads us to the elaboration of a notion of human-
rights based autonomy: ‘the relational account … may result in the deprivation of 
fundamental freedoms;’ it means that women need equal rights, in particular ‘the 
right not to have treatment (or punishment) imposed upon them in the purported 
interests of their embryos/foetuses.’170
In the judgments that I analysed in chapter 1, courts rarely took a position 
on the status of the embryo, hiding behind the wall of the state’s margin of 
appreciation (ECtHR), or avoiding any reference to women’s rights, by preferring 
to measure a state’s provision for abortion against other standards (the undue 
burden in US jurisprudence, for example). In some cases, judgments have even 
caused VAWH, such as in T., S. v. Gobierno de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, 
where abortion of an anencephalic foetus was admitted as ‘premature delivery’ 
with the obvious consequence of its death, and severe psychological harm for T. 
Accordingly, ‘some women’s lives [and health] have been effectively ruined by 
the law’s failure to hold to the autonomy rights of individuals.’171
I anticipated in chapter 1 the sensitive ethical issue that lies beneath every 
legal discussion on abortion. The relationship between the pregnant woman and 
her foetus has been depicted as ‘maternal/foetal conflict,’ stressing the element 
of hostility. Put in this way, however, this ‘conflict’ might mean that the woman 
and her foetus are considered as two separate biological entities. It is not a matter 
of biology, though, but rather a decision that the legislator or courts can make, 
to ‘highlight either foetal differentiation from, or connection to, the woman.’172 
The difficulties consist in the prevalence of ‘non-legal arguments on abortion,’ 
which ‘place abortion discourses beyond the law’s grasp, couching it in terms that 
appear to be non-negotiable for the law and that sit uncomfortably with modern 
legal arguments.’173 If we follow the legal reasoning, it is possible to argue that 
the embryo has a ‘status’ – and we can even say a gradual status that grows 
week after week174 – but it is not a holder of rights, at least according to the legal 
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instruments in force and state practice. As outlined by Laufer-Ukeles, ‘the full 
set of rights and interests of personhood begins at birth despite political, religious 
and humanitarian desires to protect foetal life.’175 Having a status means that it is 
more than a simple group of cells, as described by the Committee of Inquiry into 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Warnock Committee) in 1984,176 but that 
its interests cannot prevail over those ones of its mother. Birth is the turning point: 
‘a cataclysmic event [that] propels the foetus into the context in which it can … 
be brought into membership with other human beings.’177 Moving to my concept 
of VAWH, I can argue a bit further that its interests cannot prevail when the lack 
of access to abortion causes VAWH. When state policies in the field of health 
directly or indirectly cause VAWH as conceptualised in these pages, the rights to 
health and to reproductive health of the woman must guide the reasoning. VAWH 
occurs, for example, when the woman cannot have access to abortion despite 
severe foetal impairments, or when her life and/or her physical and psychological 
health are at risk, or when she encounters insurmountable difficulties causing her 
anguish and psychological pressure. Using the paradigm elaborated in this book, 
it is not a conflict between the foetus and the mother that must be resolved. States 
must prevent VAWH and they have obligations in that respect, as I will discuss 
further in chapter 3; they also are obliged to provide adequate health services. 
This argument is further supported by the acknowledgement that ‘the act of 
abortion cannot be separated from the social conditions in which impregnation 
occurs and pregnancy is experienced,’ and that laws on abortion should first 
consider ‘matters like sexual aggression, inadequate or unavailable contraception, 
special legal controls on the conduct of pregnant women, and the patchwork of 
provisions … on maternity leaves, pregnancy discrimination and childcare.’178
Involuntary sterilisation
The IACHR, in I.V. v. Bolivia, defined informed consent as ‘the positive decision 
to undergo a medical act, derived from a previous, free and informed decision 
or process,’ characterised by ‘an interaction between the doctor and the patient, 
through which the patient actively participates in the decision making process, 
moving away from the paternalistic approach of medicine and focusing on indi-
vidual autonomy.’179 It combined the individualistic view on autonomy with the 
more relational aspect of the interaction between the doctor and the patient.
As explored in chapter 1, involuntary sterilisation occurs when misleading 
information is provided to a woman in order to coerce her to undergo the pro-
cedure. The consent of the woman in these cases does not grant autonomy, 
the coerced consent resulting in a form of VAHW. I analysed several cases 
in chapter 1, such as the CEDAW Committee views in Szijjarto v. Hungary, 
decided in 2006. Andrea Szijjarto, belonging to a minority, was induced while 
in hospital to have her Fallopian tubes tied, and to sign a document the content 
of which she could not understand. The Committee clarified that, in cases of this 
kind, hospital personnel must inform the woman and provide information and 
counselling about sterilisation, as well as about alternatives. As I explained, these 
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cases are expressions of intersectional discrimination. The autonomy of a woman 
undergoing involuntary sterilisation is limited, not just because she is a woman, 
but also if she belongs to a specific minority, or is in one of several social or 
health conditions. Consent is not a genuine expression of autonomy in cases of 
involuntary sterilisation.
Obstetric violence and maternal health
As mentioned earlier, OV is a form of VAWH, and it is rarely recognised by laws 
and in courts, unless it leads to permanent and severe injuries or maternal death 
that call in question the responsibility of health personnel. Stereotypes interfere 
with the exercise of women’s autonomy during pregnancy. Women’s autonomy 
is impaired by decisions taken by others, or by health professionals, which affect 
reproductive freedom. The trend towards the ‘medicalisation’ of every process 
pertaining to women’s reproductive rights is demonstrated by the state’s male 
tendency to protect women even when this is not clinically necessary.180 An 
example of non-consensual obstetric intervention, which amounts to VAWH, is 
forced caesarean section. Such interventions might be ordered by a court, with 
the aim of protecting the foetus, and against the woman’s will.181 Nonetheless, 
one could also reflect on the consent to vaginal delivery as the ‘normal’ and 
accepted form of delivery: should a woman be free to decide autonomously, 
informed of all possible consequences? Medicalisation does not only include 
forced interventions in the woman’s body, but also tests and other technologies 
to which women consent. The ‘normalisation of technology’ in pregnancy is a 
concern for feminists, because it is not straightforward that the consent of the 
woman is ‘sufficiently informed as to represent a genuine instance of informed 
choice.’182 Normalising certain tests means that they are considered as a routine 
which is difficult to avoid, and even to question.
‘Normalisation’ also affects the place in which a woman gives birth to her 
child. The autonomy of the woman might indeed be limited when she cannot 
decide where to give birth, and is forced to choose a hospital over home birth. As 
Judge Tulkens pointed out in his opinion concurring with Ternovszky, decided 
by the ECtHR in 2010, in which a woman complained of not receiving adequate 
professional assistance during a home birth:
Freedom may necessitate a positive regulatory environment which will produce the 
legal certainty providing the right to choose with effectiveness. Without such legal 
certainty there is fear and secrecy, and in the present context this may result in fatal 
consequences for mother and child.183
I argue that denying home birth might amount to a form of VAWH, especially 
when the woman prefers home birth in order to avoid a repetition of mistreatment 
or unconsented practices in hospitals that she experienced on a previous occasion. 
From a legal point of view, this is a violation of the woman’s rights to health and 
to reproductive health, and her right to autonomously decide where to safely give 
birth to her child.
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Access to contraception
Free and informed consent to contraception implies knowledge of the effects and 
side-effects of contraceptives pills. In particular, misleading information that EC 
is an abortifacient can impair a woman’s decision, which should be autonomous 
and personal. Considerations related to this situation are similar to those I have 
already proposed for abortion and involuntary sterilisation.
A human-rights based autonomy: a new element for conceptualising VAWH?
I am borrowing the argument made by McLean to elaborate my own notion 
of autonomy, which helps the conceptualisation of VAWH. In her view, the 
language of human rights caused the relationship between doctor and patient 
to evolve during the twentieth century, and ‘the rights that are central to every 
human rights declaration or treaty are essentially equivalent to respect for auton-
omy.’184 As a consequence, the very idea of autonomy is inseparable from human 
dignity.185 I would say that the very idea of autonomy is inseparable from the 
rights to health and to reproductive health. McLean also stressed how human 
rights are both individualistic and relational, therefore recognising that individual 
autonomy in the light of human rights law does not preclude consideration of the 
rights of groups and communities.186 Autonomy permeates human rights law. The 
ECtHR refers to Article 8 ECHR (right to respect for private and family life) when 
dealing with cases of personal autonomy. For this reason, for example, in Pretty v. 
United Kingdom, the ECtHR brought the notion of personal autonomy within the 
scope of application of Article 8 ECHR, as an ‘important principle underlying the 
interpretation of its guarantees.’187 In K.A. and A.D. v. Belgium, the Court argued 
that the right to entertain sexual relationships comes from the right to dispose of 
one’s body, which is ‘partie intégrante’ of the notion of personal autonomy.188
A human rights-based autonomy contains both the dimensions we have dis-
cussed, namely the individual and the relational: the first, because it is the indi-
vidual, as a human being, who has the right to make decisions about his/her own 
body, and the second, because the decision is taken in a context of relationships 
that inevitably affect it, even if we adhere to the purest model of individualism. A 
human rights-based autonomy is relevant when considering the legal instruments 
through which to realise the human rights to health and to reproductive health. For 
example, since no right to health is enshrined in the ECHR, the ECtHR referred 
to Article 8 as a legal pretext for discussing and protecting personal autonomy. 
Moreover, since free and informed consent is an expression of autonomy, then 
consent contributes to the realisation of this right.
In conceptualising the notion of VAWH, considering that the notion of auton-
omy is not part of the original definition of VAW, I argued that autonomy 
permeates both dimensions of the analysis. Common to both dimensions is the 
fact that a woman’s autonomy diminishes when she is exposed to VAWH. It 
is also common that in both dimensions, the lack of consent – rectius, genuine 
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consent – causes the violation of the woman’s rights. In that respect, I could add 
a further element to my definition of VAWH, namely the limitation of women’s 
autonomy. VAWH is therefore a violation of human rights and a limitation of 
women’s autonomy.
A human rights-based autonomy encompasses the principle of non- 
discrimination, and hence contributes to a process of ‘gendering’ autonomy, 
with the consequent analysis of whether, and if so, to what extent, limitations of 
women’s autonomy derive from the fact of their being women. The legal conse-
quences of this argument can be appreciated in different contexts. As for FGM/C, 
for example, I suggested that other practices that impair women’s and girls’ 
rights to health and to reproductive health, such as GCS, should be conceived as 
violations of human rights, unless genuine, informed consent of a woman older 
than 18 can be proved. This conceptualisation of VAHW, as read in conjunction 
with the analysis of the principle of autonomy, could well allow a reconsideration 
of the crime of FGM/C itself.
The notion of autonomy and consent will also be pivotal in criminalising 
OV, which few countries consider as an offence in their national penal code, but 
also in paving the way for the adoption of guidelines and recommendations for 
practitioners, which would constitute codes for conducting the activity of public 
hospitals. Considering a human rights-based autonomy also means considering a 
woman as holding human rights when deciding in matters related to her rights to 
health and to reproductive health (mutatis mutandis the reasoning on a human-
rights based concept of autonomy can be extended to all genders). A state’s poli-
cies on abortion must not cause, or contribute to causing, VAWH. Conscientious 
objection to abortion or to the provision of EC also represents the exercise of 
a right to self-determination, but is often abused, with the consequence that 
‘self-determination matters more or less depending whether it is exercised by the 
doctor or the woman.’189 The thought of Francesca Rescigno precisely caught 
the point: a secular – truly secular – state (and for this scholar Italy is not) is a 
state in which the law does not interfere with self-determination, following the 
principles of equality and solidarity.190 Society must be capable, in Rescigno’s 
view, of adopting measures of prevention, education and assistance which affirm 
the ‘freedom not to have an abortion,’ and must ‘step back before the woman’s 
self-determination and will.’191 Similarly, Rodríguez-Ruiz has contended that ‘the 
choice of the woman must be autonomous,’ and ‘this includes the possibility of 
saying No to an unexpected pregnancy but also of saying Yes to it unimpeded by 
socio-economic constraints.’192
Conclusions
The concept: new elements and old ones
The diagnosis has allowed us to conceptualise the new concept of VAWH, 
which shares many elements with that of VAW, but at the same time better 
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encompasses the two dimensions of violence as conceived in this book. In 
particular, I followed the reasoning of the CEDAW Committee in its GR No. 35 
when it contended that criminalising abortion, for example, is a form of VAW, 
and, more specifically, of gender-based violence against women. However, in 
state practice, and in the jurisprudence of human rights courts as well as in 
the quasi-jurisprudence of UN treaty bodies, VAW is generally conceived as 
interpersonal violence, or violence within the community, and it is harder to 
find clear affirmations of violence committed by the state through the adoption 
of laws and policies in the field of health. This is why the idea of VAWH can 
fill this gap. The concept of VAW can be complemented and enriched, but not 
replaced, by that of VAWH, to grasp the complexity of violence that derives 
from patterns of discrimination existing in society and in states’ policies along 
a double dimension. VAWH is a form of discrimination against women, and a 
violation of their rights to health and to reproductive health, characterised by 
acts that produce physical and psychological harm. The element of intent is not 
relevant, much as it is not relevant in the definition of VAW; however, in both 
the horizontal and vertical dimensions it is possible to identify a ‘pattern of dis-
crimination,’ which courts and UN treaty bodies have defined in different ways: 
as ‘tolerance’ to violence, but also in terms of ‘repetition’ of certain types of 
conduct. I also pointed out the importance of intersectionality in the analysis of 
‘patterns of discrimination,’ which will prove to be helpful in theorising states’ 
obligations, and in reflecting on reparations. Compared to the notion of VAW, I 
added to the notion of VAWH the element of consent, which expresses and gives 
strength to women’s autonomy. VAWH is a limitation of women’s autonomy 
and alters their consent.
Challenges to the public/private divide
My concept allows us to reflect on the ‘public/private divide’ developed, and 
challenged soon after its conceptualisation, by (Western) feminist scholarship. 
A product of the industrialisation process, this divide ‘denotes the ideological 
division of life into apparently opposing spheres of public and private activi-
ties, and public and private responsibilities.’193 The public/private distinction 
has also appeared in international law, where ‘public’ is the world of inter-state 
relations, whereas ‘private’ means national affairs.194 Women have traditionally 
been excluded from international law and its legal structures.195 The ‘private’, an 
author has argued, identifies what is ‘free’, ‘the sphere in which others do not 
interfere,’ while ‘public’ acquires ‘a different meaning depending on the source 
of the interference.’196 However, for women the ‘private’ sphere has been a zone 
of oppression, and of violation of their human rights.
Even though the distinction between public and private has been important 
when theorising and emphasising the unequal power relations between women 
and men, feminists have challenged it, considering it a myth. For example, Hilary 
Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin and Shelly Wright stressed ‘the myth that State 
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power is not exercised in the “private realm” allocated to women masks its 
control.’197 Others have pointed out that the sphere of the ‘public’ and the ‘pri-
vate’ is too indeterminate.198 And, indeed, the state has traditionally interfered in 
 women’s decisions about their sexuality and reproductive health, but refrained 
from intervening in the family context. Liberal states started to regulate repro-
duction during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when industri-
alisation and universal suffrage ‘began to transform laissez-faire State into mass 
(welfare) societies.’199 The regulation of sex was deemed as essential in emergent 
welfare states. This was – and unfortunately seems to still be200 – the product of a 
patriarchal understanding of society. Why are women’s bodies always considered 
the prime locus of population control policies, and not men’s? The answer is 
related to the stereotyped roles of the women in societies.201
In light of these views of the public/private divide, I can argue that women’s 
rights to health and to reproductive health have been neglected because of the 
male conception of the private sphere. In this sense, the two approaches to the 
public/private divide, one in favour of it, the other more critical, can be reconciled 
to a certain extent. DV was a private matter in as much as reproductive decisions 
could not be left to the woman only. In both cases, women’s autonomy was set 
aside.
The question is then to what extent must the state interfere in the private 
sphere? Gavison has proposed an interesting perspective. She said that what is 
‘private’ can support claims both of non-interference – for example, in some 
decisions such as the timing and spacing of children – and of interference – for 
example, to fight against abuses – and that ‘though we must assess such conflict-
ing arguments to reach a conclusion, the fact that the same feature (privateness) 
may point in both directions does not undermine its utility.’202
After conceptualising the notion of VAWH, I can contend that the state must 
interfere in private life to the extent necessary to counter violence, without inter-
fering with the exercise of women’s autonomy in all instances related to their 
sexual and reproductive health. In other words, when we talk about violence and 
health, the state must interfere where there is an episode of violence that occurs 
within the community or within the family, but its intervention must stop when 
women’s autonomy comes into play. To propose a clear example, rape must be 
prevented, and punished when it occurs, and it requires a clear intervention by the 
state both through laws and through specific actions ad hoc measured in relation 
to the situation of the victim. However, if the rape causes a pregnancy, then the 
state must refrain from interfering in whatever autonomous decision is taken by 
the woman relating to her reproductive health. Its intervention would in turn cause 
another form of violence against her health, perpetuating a patriarchal mechanism 
that the evolution of human rights law is progressively trying to dismantle. The 
state must intervene in cases of DV to protect the woman, and prosecute the 
perpetrator. In this example, it is clear how the divide is dismantled, and how DV 
comes into the public sphere. The protection of a woman who suffers violence, 
as Friedman has argued, ‘comes with a price’: loss of control over the legal 
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consequences that follow DV.203 However, under my paradigm, the state must 
stop when its action causes VAWH in turn, for example in cases of secondary 
victimisation, provoking psychological violence. In that sense, the law should 
be ‘more sensitive to the needs of crime victims.’204 It is also possible to argue 
that states do not cause VAWH when they interfere with a woman’s autonomy in 
ways ‘required and justifiable to preserve individuals’ human rights,’ an example 
being the definition of a legal minimum age for marriage in order to save young 
women from the health risks of premature childbearing.205
To propose another example, to phase out OV the state – which acts through 
healthcare services and health personnel – must not interfere with a woman’s 
free choice, and must always wait for her free and informed consent, unless it 
is a matter of urgency which leaves the practitioner no choice. Cases of OV 
analysed by national courts have proved to focus on malpractice rather than on 
the violation of the woman’s human rights. This is not per se negative, because 
malpractice litigation can lead to a form of reparation for the suffering caused to 
the woman, but it does not take into account the violation of her rights to health 
and to reproductive health.
The example of FGM/C is more complex. The state must interfere to sup-
press this form of violence against girls’ bodily integrity – irrespective, as I 
argued, of the ‘intensity’ of the harm, given the impact on physical and mental 
health – but must also pay attention to a woman’s consent when she is capable 
of expressing her free consent without manipulation. I analysed this aspect in 
detail in ‘Consent and autonomy in the horizontal dimension: FGM/C’. It was 
surprising to note that cases of FGM/C have mainly been decided at national 
level, especially in Europe and in the United States, rather than in front of 
regional human rights courts, and that they mainly concerned the recognition 
of refugee status of women escaping violence. This is less surprising when we 
consider the paternalistic attitude with which some courts have approached 
the problem, considering the girls and the women subjected to the practice as 
victims in need of protection from the ‘brutality’ of a traditional practice that 
comes from another ‘culture’.206 If I limit my analysis to FGM/C only, then my 
paradigm can be challenged, and sharply criticised because it is based only on 
a particular perspective of human rights which does not take into consideration 
cultural differences; however, if I develop my argument a bit further, as I did 
in ‘Consent and autonomy in the horizontal dimension: FGM/C’, and consider 
other practices, then the analysis is much more in line with my paradigm, and 
I can support my main argument on the presence of VAWH when consent to a 
practice, such as cosmetic genital surgery, is not free and genuine. I agree with 
the affirmation that ‘culture is much more frequently invoked in the context of 
women’s rights than in any other area,’207 and that culture has been invoked in 
order to justify violations of women’s rights. Here, indeed, I am not challenging 
this argument, but rather turning it into a reflection on women’s autonomy and 
consent, considering that VAWH is a cultural phenomenon in every society. As 
Susan Deller Ross has argued:
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No ethical defense can be made for preserving a cultural practice that damages 
women’s health and interferes with their sexuality. It is important, however, that 
those who are alien to the culture make themselves familiar with the causes and 
meanings of cultural practices and relate them to ideas of sex roles in their own 
societies.208
Victims/survivors and perpetrators
The notion of VAWH does not define a specific gender for the perpetrator. Men 
and women cause VAWH. Not prescribing a gender for the perpetrator does not 
diminish the understanding of VAWH as discrimination based on gender and 
characterised by unequal power relations between women and men. When a 
female obstetrician commits violence against women’s health, she probably does 
not intend to commit violence. She might have experienced and internalised, or 
better, ‘normalised,’ the stereotype of the woman as mother, this way reproducing 
patterns of discrimination.
The woman who was subjected to a form of VAWH has been called, in the 
judgments and decisions I analysed in chapter 1, a victim, the applicant, the 
patient, occasionally the survivor, which is the language used (positively) in GR 
No. 35 adopted by the CEDAW Committee in 2017. From a legal perspective, 
one might argue that calling a woman ‘survivor’ instead of ‘victim’ does not 
change the substance of the complaint. Probably not, but it changes the lens 
through which the woman is seen during proceedings: not as a human being who 
cannot defend herself, always in need of help, but rather as an active agent of 
change.
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re-conceptualising states’ obligations in 
countering VAWH
Starting from the beginning: the nature of state obligations
This chapter consists in the treatment, and it attempts to find an answer to the 
question which obligations states must abide by with regard to VAWH? There 
is often no univocal response – and hence a treatment – to a disease. However, 
the current legal instruments underestimate – to the point of not even mentioning 
women’s rights to health and to reproductive health – the point that focusing 
on health is a way, in considering states’ obligations as in other discussions, 
to counter VAW committed, whether by private or public actors (or both), in 
interpersonal relations, or perpetrated through policies, laws and, as underlined in 
chapter 2, accepted practices in the public or private health sector, in the field of 
health and reproductive health.
In the analysis of VAWH as conceived in this book, I will reconceptualise 
states’ obligations including both dimensions. In the horizontal dimension, inter-
personal violence, it is easier to find elaborations of states’ positive obligations, 
expressed as ‘prevention, protection, prosecution and policies,’ to use the pillars 
of the Council of Europe Istanbul Convention – and jurisprudence is quite abun-
dant in that respect. In the vertical dimension, as Rebecca Cook has argued, ‘the 
challenge remains of requiring States to satisfy the positive duty of providing 
qualified services where women have no access to them on their own.’1 This is 
especially true, for example, in the field of access to contraceptives, since this 
‘may depend on governments’ financial resources and the political will to allocate 
them to the service of such rights.’2 If, on one hand, ‘the right to reproductive 
choice as a negative right has been successfully asserted in many countries by 
judicial decisions restricting governmental intervention,’ the right to such choice 
‘has not been as successfully advanced as a positive right, since courts are less 
willing and able to direct governmental discretion on resource allocation.’3
My paradigm will allow us to put the two dimensions ‘under the same 
umbrella’ in terms of states’ obligations, and to find that states’ obligations 
‘specialise’ along one or other of the dimensions. In this section, I will elaborate 
further the intuition of the CEDAW in GR No. 35 of 2017, which stressed that 
states have obligations stemming from actions committed by state and non-state 
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actors and, with regard to the former, to ensure that laws, policies, programmes 
and procedures do not discriminate against women.4 The recommendation does 
not refer, however, or only partly, to cases in which it is the state that, through 
its policies in the field of health, causes violence against women. The GR then 
refers to due diligence obligations under the paragraph on ‘responsibility for acts 
or omissions of non-State actors,’5 missing the opportunity to clarify the concept 
better and to conceive due diligence obligations in terms of the vertical dimension 
of violence as conceptualised in this book, as well as the horizontal dimension.
It is necessary to start, although briefly, from states’ obligations and state 
responsibility. In exploring the literature, the different ways in which states’ 
obligations have been ‘categorised’ have not always been clear. In particular, the 
framework used in international human rights law – to respect, to protect and to 
fulfil human rights – was confused with other ‘categories,’ such as obligations of 
conduct and of result. There might be some overlap, but distinctions should be 
made. After analysing possible ways to pigeonhole states’ obligations, I will find 
the category within which my paradigm works, in order to proceed with the legal 
analysis of states’ obligations in countering VAWH, as conceived in its double 
dimension. The concept of due diligence, despite being criticised and put to the 
test by legal scholarship, will also play a pivotal role, and cannot be neglected, 
given the fact that it has been elaborated by jurisprudence,6 by UN bodies includ-
ing the Special Rapporteurs on State Responsibility,7 and scholars alike. A cate-
gorisation of states’ obligations with regard to VAWH is not devoid of meaning 
and cannot be considered merely descriptive, because, as has been pointed out, 
‘la différente nature et la différente structure de l’obligation internationale a 
nécessairement une influence sur la nature et la forme de la responsabilité en cas 
de violation de cette obligation.’8
To discuss state responsibility it is worth starting from a key text, the Draft 
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts of 2001, 
whose Article 2 reads as follows: ‘there is an internationally wrongful act of a 
State when conduct consisting of an action or omission: (a) is attributable to the 
State under international law; and (b) constitutes a breach of an international 
obligation of the State.’9 The text does not provide a definition of international 
obligation, except that it can consist in an action or an omission, and can derive 
from any legal instrument, not necessarily a treaty. As outlined by the then UN 
SR on State Responsibility James Crawford:
One notable feature of this provision consists in the absence of any requirement 
concerning fault or a wrongful intent on the part of the State in order to ascertain the 
existence of an internationally wrongful act … it reflects the consideration that dif-
ferent primary rules on international responsibility may impose different standards 
of fault, ranging from ‘due diligence’ to strict liability.10
A major objection can be raised here from a feminist point of view. In their 
pioneer work, Christine Chinkin and Hilary Charlesworth argued that ‘the tra-
ditional rules of State responsibility have provided a number of obstacles to 
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the recognition of women’s concerns as issues of international law.’11 That was 
attributable to the distinction between ‘public’ actions and ‘private’ ones, the 
latter not triggering state responsibility, until the disruption of the public/private 
divide in the 1990s. Hence, the question could be posed this way: why is it 
plausible to rely on traditional concepts of international law to counter VAW, and 
in particular VAWH? Why, in other words, use categories that have proved to be 
guided by a patriarchal view of international law?
The answer will find its way in this chapter. What is indisputable is that it is 
not worth creating a parallel system of states’ obligations, and a parallel regime of 
state responsibility in case of breach of these obligations, but better to challenge 
the traditional categories of international law from a feminist law perspective. 
The recognition of state responsibility for acts or omissions that originate in 
actions of non-state actors ‘eliminates distinctions between public and private 
sector conduct in a way that feminist analysis endorses,’12 for example, and its 
development has started with the traditional rules on the protection of foreigners. 
The concept of due diligence, which is not unknown to international law,13 is 
another illustrative example. Despite being criticised and considered too vague, 
it is the key concept for the identification of the content of states’ obligations and 
the determination of the responsibility of states for violations of women’s rights. 
Some remarks on the long-standing debate in international law seem therefore 
unavoidable.
Obligations of conduct and of result
The first coherent structure for the rules on state responsibility was conceived by 
the then SR Roberto Ago, whose mandate lasted from 1969 to 1972. He argued in 
favour of a distinction between obligations of conduct and obligations of result, or 
rather, between ‘obligations that call categorically for the use of specific means’ 
(conduct), and those that leave the state free to choose among various means 
(result).14 This is the first category that I will analyse, to see whether or not it is 
suitable for my paradigm. In the fifth report elaborated by Ago, Article 20 of the 
Draft Articles on State Responsibility referred to obligations ‘calling for the State 
to adopt a specific conduct,’15 and the specific conduct of the state required by the 
international obligation could be ‘a course of action,’ such as enacting laws, or an 
‘act of omission,’ meaning not adopting particular laws or regulations.16 In terms 
of state responsibility, an action or omission not in conformity with the ‘specif-
ically required’ conduct constituted ‘an immediate breach of the obligation in 
question.’17 Applying the two dimensions elaborated in this book, both the failure 
to adopt laws on preventing and suppressing DV, for example, and the adoption 
of laws criminalising abortion without exceptions, would constitute violations of 
an obligation of conduct. This approach is not devoid of interest, even though, 
as I found in chapter 1, it is far from what the jurisprudence means by ‘conduct’, 
which is linked more to the standard of ‘due diligence.’ Article 21 of the Draft 
Articles proposed by SR Ago concerned violations of an ‘obligation requiring the 
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State to achieve a particular result.’ Obligations of result require a state to ensure 
a particular outcome, leaving the state a free choice of means to achieve it.18 
More problematic was the article on obligations of prevention (Article 23). Two 
conditions sine qua non were required:19 ‘the event to be prevented must have 
occurred,’ and, secondly, it must have been ‘made possible by a lack of vigilance 
on the part of State organs.’20 Lack of vigilance and occurrence of the event had 
to be in a causal relation.
These definitions prompted criticism among international scholars. The dis-
tinction between obligations of conduct and obligations of result is indeed known 
to civil law countries, but has a meaning different to the one elaborated by Ago. 
Special Rapporteur Crawford, in his second report of 1999, argued concerning the 
basic distinctions between conduct, result, and prevention, that ‘there is a strong 
case to simply delet[e] them,’ and that ‘means and ends can be combined in 
various ways,’ being that the distinction is a ‘spectrum’ rather than a dichotomy.21 
Dupuy explains that Ago’s position created confusion, since he meant the obli-
gation of conduct in a sense that was opposite to the classic civil law tradition.22 
According to the latter, the obligation of conduct is an obligation of endeavour, a 
‘best efforts’ obligation, whereas the obligation of result is aimed at achieving a 
precise result, with the consequence that ‘lack of due diligence is a breach of the 
obligation of conduct.’23 The debate on the obligation of prevention surrounded 
the question whether it was an obligation of conduct or of result, and it was not 
clear at the time which position Ago had taken in that respect.24 The International 
Law Commission departed from the notion elaborated by the Special Rapporteur, 
and approved at a first reading this version of Article 23:
When the result required of a State by an international obligation is the prevention, 
by means of its own choice, of the occurrence of a given event, there is a breach 
of that obligation only if, by the conduct adopted, the State does not achieve that 
result.25
What determined breach of the obligation was the failure to achieve a result 
and not the actual conduct of the state. Contra, Dupuy clearly argued that it was 
necessary to ‘get rid of the idea that obligations of prevention are obligations of 
result.’26
The distinction between obligations of conduct and obligations of result has 
rarely been mentioned by UN Treaty bodies, except in some soft law acts, such 
as General Comment No. 3 on Article 2 of the ICESCR, elaborated by the ESCR 
Committee in 1990. The Committee considered that Article 2 encompassed both 
obligations of conduct and obligations of result.27 As for the latter, they referred to 
the basic commitment by the parties to the ‘full realisation’ of the rights enshrined 
in the Covenant, whereas obligations of conduct consisted in the adoption of 
measures, ‘including legislative measures.’ The Committee was extremely clear, 
however, in contending that ‘the adoption of legislative measures, as specifically 
foreseen by the Covenant, is by no means exhaustive of the obligations of States 
parties.’28 In 1994, Rebecca Cook considered obligations of means and of result 
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with regard to the CEDAW, contending that an example of the latter was to 
embody the principle of equality between women and men, whereas an obli-
gation of means was provided in Article 2(c), ‘to establish the legal protection 
of women,’ which, in Cook’s view, ‘leaves to State parties choice of means.’29 
Her position departs from the framework elaborated by Ago, and adheres to the 
version of obligation of means as a ‘best efforts’ obligation. In GR No. 28, the 
CEDAW Committee argued that Article 2 CEDAW entails both obligations of 
means or conduct and obligations of results.30
The distinction, which led to some confusion, was soon abandoned. As antici-
pated, the categorisation was not eventually included in the final Draft elaborated 
in 2001. The debate around it never stopped, though. In Italian scholarship, 
for example, Antonio Marchesi proposed a tripartite structure of international 
obligations, in order to reconcile the different approaches that had emerged over 
time: obligations of conduct as elaborated by the International Law Commission 
at the time of Ago’s mandate; obligations of conduct according to the ‘French’ 
traditional understanding of it (due diligence); obligations of result.31
Positive and negative obligations
Positive and negative obligations have become, write Dinah Shelton and Ariel 
Gould, ‘a major part of human rights law,’ to the extent of expanding in some 
cases ‘both rights and obligations beyond the strict textual confines of interna-
tional instruments.’32 This opinion is mirrored in Pisillo Mazzeschi’s complete 
study for the Hague Academy of International Law, where he affirmed that 
positive obligations have become more and more of interest in international law, 
especially after the development of international human rights law.33 This does 
not come as a surprise, given the fact that, to use Alston’s words, ‘the world is 
much more poly-centric than it was in 1945,’ and that ‘non-State actors are loom-
ing even larger on the horizons of international and human rights law.’34 If the 
obligation to prevent was conceived at Ago’s time as referring to the protection 
of foreign nationals, and in particular foreign states’ ambassadors – and hence, 
to a certain extent, his definition as obligation of result was understandable – in 
today’s world the state is required by international human rights law to prevent 
private parties, under specific circumstances, from committing actions such as 
DV, for example by a person against his/her partner or a former partner.
UN treaty bodies and regional human rights courts often refer to positive 
obligations as a unique category of obligations, under which several obligations 
can be included, from obligations towards an individual who has suffered a 
specific violation to more general obligations. The distinction between negative 
and positive obligations seems adamant: the former are conceived as obligations 
to abstain from interfering in the sphere of rights and individual freedoms, the 
latter require the state to perform certain actions, to intervene, and they are meant 
to promote the ‘realisation of individual rights and freedoms.’35 The two types 
of obligation are not so neat as this; they may overlap, and the state may be 
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able to abide by both in a particular sector. Even though the debate on negative 
and positive obligations gained momentum with the affirmation of human rights 
law, Pisillo Mazzeschi warned against the separation of this branch of interna-
tional law from international law itself. The category of obligations developed 
in international human rights law must be brought under the general umbrella of 
international law, because the principles underpinning it were drawn ‘from the 
more traditional doctrines of the law of State responsibility.’36 It is interesting 
to note that, despite being relevant for the affirmation of women’s human rights, 
from a feminist point of view positive obligations have rarely been explored; 
much more attention has been devoted to a specific aspect of positive obligations, 
namely due diligence obligations.
Pisillo Mazzeschi explained the notion of positive obligations having hori-
zontal effects, which can be compared to the responsibility to protect elaborated 
at UN level.37 It refers to the responsibility of the state for the acts of individ-
uals. Despite considering the category negative/positive obligations relevant, he 
identified three sub-categories to better grasp the consequences in terms of state 
responsibility for the violation of a specific obligation: positive obligations of 
result, positive obligations of due diligence, positive obligations of progressive 
realisation.38 The former can include legislation which respects and protects 
human rights; the positive obligation of due diligence encompasses concrete 
activities and measures of prevention which are however subject to alea (risk) 
in relation to the result;39 the third type of obligation consists in the progressive 
adoption of measures with the aim of guaranteeing the effective exercise of 
particular rights. To go back to the previous categorisation, due diligence can be 
conceived as an obligation of conduct,40 and a positive obligation. If it is correct 
to argue that all due diligence obligations are positive obligations, it cannot be 
said that all positive obligations are due diligence obligations.41
… in particular the positive obligation of due diligence
Literature on due diligence is significant, and it is not the purpose here either to 
provide the entire history of the evolution of this concept or to challenge its use in 
the field of VAW. The purpose is rather to stress the importance of due diligence 
in the protection of women’s rights. Due diligence can be conceived as a standard, 
a tool, an approach, a process, to measure whether the state has undertaken all 
necessary steps to, for example, prevent a violation of women’s rights, or to 
protect a female victim of violence, or to investigate a violent act. Condorelli 
defined due diligence as a ‘basic principle of international law.’42 Due diligence 
stems from the law of neutrality, and has developed in specific areas of law: the 
security of aliens and representatives of foreign states, the security of foreign 
states, the conservation of the environment43 and, more recently, the protection of 
human rights, investment law44 and security in cyberspace.45
In the field of human rights law, Sarkin points out that due diligence ‘means 
that states take reasonable steps to stop human rights abuses from occurring, and 
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use the means they have to adequately investigate abuses committed to determine 
who was responsible, to take appropriate steps against such individuals, and to 
guarantee victim redress and reparations.’46 As clearly outlined by the African 
Commission on human and people rights in the case Zimbabwe Human Rights 
NGO Forum v. Zimbabwe:
[an] act by a private individual and therefore not directly imputable to a State can 
generate responsibility of the State, not because of the act itself, but because of the 
lack of due diligence to prevent the violation or for not taking the necessary steps 
to provide the victims with reparation … The established standard of due diligence 
… provides a way to measure whether a State has acted with sufficient effort and 
political will to fulfil its human rights obligations. Under this obligation, States must 
prevent, investigate and punish acts which impair any of the rights recognised under 
international human rights law … The doctrine of due diligence is therefore a way 
to describe the threshold of action and effort which a State must demonstrate to fulfil 
its responsibility to protect individuals from abuses of their rights.47
It can be said that the obligation of due diligence corresponds to the duty to 
protect, as I will see further elaborated at UN level, but unlike that duty, due 
diligence is a standard that already existed in international law, has been inves-
tigated by scholars,48 was later included in legal instruments and has been used 
over time by courts in their decisions. Legally, it is a ‘long-standing concept in 
international law,’49 despite its vagueness, on which a significant jurisprudence 
has been elaborated over the years. Its vagueness should not necessarily be con-
sidered a point of weakness, but rather as expressing flexibility and adaptation to 
the context of different violations. Flexibility should be appreciated, indeed, in 
terms of ‘variability’, as pointed out by Karine Bannelier in her work on ‘cyber 
due diligence’:
La due diligence n’est pas une norme indéterminée mais une obligation objective de 
comportement qui implique certains ‘facteurs de variabilité.’50
These factors of variability consist in the state ‘knowledge’ of what is happening 
in its own territory, which is subject to a standard of reasonableness applied by 
international and regional courts;51 in the state’s capacity to prevent the use of 
its territory by non-state actors or, as in the case of women’s rights, to prevent 
violations of human rights by private individuals; in the risk that a harm may 
materialise; and in the harm itself.52 The degree of diligence varies ‘in relation to 
the different standard of behaviour required by international law in each of the 
areas in which this concept is at issue.’53
Due diligence has been sometimes misinterpreted in the field of women’s 
rights. Not every obligation to protect women’s rights can be identified as a due 
diligence obligation. In her preliminary report of 1994, the then SR on VAW, 
Radhika Coomaraswamy, strongly argued that ‘a State that does not act against 
crimes of violence against women is as guilty as the perpetrator.’54 This affirma-
tion anticipates the reasoning on due diligence obligations in the protection of 
women’s rights.
DE VIDO 9781526124975 PRINT.indd   185 24/03/2020   11:01
Violence against women’s health in international law
186
In her outstanding report, a later SR on VAW, Yakin Ertürk, described the 
evolution of the due diligence standard as ‘a tool for the elimination of violence 
against women.’55 She did an excellent job of analysis, and the application of the 
standard in different contexts of violence is remarkable. However, some pivotal 
affirmations seem to depart from a rigorous international legal approach. For 
example, when she mentioned measures of protection, she stated that ‘many 
measures undertaken by States in terms of their due diligence obligation to protect 
… consist mainly of provision of services to women, such as telephone hotlines, 
health care, counselling centres, legal assistance, shelters, restraining orders and 
financial aid to victims of violence.’56 In these cases, however, it is hard to see 
obligations of due diligence; they are rather obligations either of result – to estab-
lish certain services – or of progressive realisation (therefore to guarantee the 
effective exercise of the rights). There is no indeterminate result, as conceived by 
Pisillo Mazzeschi in his work, in the adoption of laws that allow the establishment 
of shelters: they are a purpose, which the state can achieve progressively if it does 
not have the means to achieve it immediately.57 Ertürk was right to argue that 
not much effort is required to analyse ‘the more general obligation of preventing 
violence from occurring, including by supporting women’s empowerment and 
engaging in transformative change at the community and societal level,’58 but this 
does not necessarily correspond in toto to due diligence obligations; it might be a 
form of progressive realisation or, more likely, a combination of different obliga-
tions. The standard of due diligence is, according to Joanna Bourke-Martignoni, 
a ‘yardstick against which the efforts of States to prevent and respond to violence 
against women must be measured.’59 She correctly argues that the concept is 
not new – it is quite old, indeed, and was applied by arbitral tribunals during the 
nineteenth century;60 it was mentioned in the judgment by the IACHR, Velásquez 
Rodríguez v. Honduras, in which the Court posited that the state is responsible 
when an action is performed by individuals ‘because of the lack of due diligence 
to prevent the violation.’61 In this case, security agents acting on behalf of the 
state abducted, tortured and murdered Manfredo Velásquez, so their behaviour 
was directly attributable to the state. Nonetheless, the more general reasoning 
followed by the Court paved the way for further regional human rights courts’ 
jurisprudence. The standard of due diligence must be applied case-by-case, con-
sidering the context,62 and, as the ECtHR explained with regard to DV, also taking 
into account the specific circumstances of the violation of women’s rights.63
Due diligence is also included in several soft law and hard law legal instruments 
regarding women’s rights. The 1993 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence 
against Women urged states to exercise due diligence to prevent VAW committed 
by private individuals.64 GR No. 19, adopted by the CEDAW Committee in 1992, 
stressed that states are responsible for acts committed by individuals ‘if they 
fail to act with due diligence to prevent violations of rights or to investigate and 
punish acts of violence, and for providing compensation.’65 The recent GR No. 
35 on VAW does not follow the tripartite structure to respect, to protect and to 
fulfil human rights, and connects due diligence to the obligation of ‘taking all 
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appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women’ under Article 
2(e) CEDAW:
Due diligence obligations for acts and omissions of non-State actors … This 
obligation, frequently referred to as an obligation of due diligence, underpins the 
Convention as a whole and accordingly States parties will be responsible if they 
fail to take all appropriate measures to prevent as well as to investigate, prosecute, 
punish and provide reparation for acts or omissions by non-State actors which result 
in gender-based violence against women.66
One passage might appear misleading, but only at first sight. When the Committee 
states that ‘under the obligation of due diligence, States parties have to adopt 
and implement diverse measures to tackle gender-based violence against women 
committed by non-State actors,’ followed by, after a full stop, ‘they are required 
to have laws, institutions and a system in place to address such violence,’ this 
does not mean that the adoption of laws is a due diligence obligation. It seems 
to me that where the Recommendation reads ‘in place,’ it precisely means that 
it requires a precise outcome. The due diligence obligation rather arises in the 
implementation of laws, as stressed by the Committee: ‘[a]lso, States parties 
are obliged to ensure that these [laws] function effectively in practice and are 
supported and diligently enforced by all State agents and bodies.’67
Most importantly, echoing the jurisprudence of the ECtHR:
The failure of a State party to take all appropriate measures to prevent acts of 
gender-based violence against women when its authorities know or should know 
of the danger of violence, or a failure to investigate, prosecute and punish, and to 
provide reparation to victims/survivors of such acts, provides tacit permission or 
encouragement to acts of gender-based violence against women. These failures or 
omissions constitute human rights violations.68
In GR No. 28 on core obligations of 2010, the CEDAW Committee explained that 
Article 2 CEDAW ‘imposes a due diligence obligation on States parties to prevent 
discrimination by private actors;’ it then adds that in some cases, ‘a private actor’s 
acts or omission of acts may be attributed to the State under international law.’69
The Council of Europe Istanbul Convention enshrines the standard of due 
diligence in its Article 5(2), according to which states must take ‘the necessary 
legislative and other measures to exercise due diligence’ in order to ‘prevent, 
investigate, punish and provide reparation for acts of violence’ covered by the 
Convention that are perpetrated by non-state actors.70 The text here is fundamen-
tal. The Convention does not establish all the obligations it encompasses as due 
diligence obligations, but rather requires that due diligence must be exercised to 
prevent, protect, prosecute and provide reparations for acts committed by non-
state actors. When it comes to the obligation on states to criminalise certain types 
of conduct, this is an obligation of immediate result, if I follow the distinction 
explained in the previous paragraph. The application of the law that criminalises 
rape, for example, must be then assessed under the standard of due diligence. 
In the explanatory report, due diligence obligations are (correctly) conceived 
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as obligations of means, which allow state responsibility for breach of these 
obligations to be determined for what otherwise are acts of private persons. In the 
words of the explanatory report, ‘parties have the obligation to take the legislative 
and other measures’ – as I understand it, with the aim of achieving a result in 
the short or long term – ‘necessary to exercise due diligence,’ and that ‘failure 
to do so violates and impairs or nullifies the enjoyment of their human rights 
and fundamental freedoms.’71 It is true that the Convention or the explanatory 
report (or both) could have been more precise in distinguishing the different 
obligations, but it is also true that in no article or part of the explanatory report is 
it written that the standard should be applied to the adoption of laws, for example, 
which of course does not require a due diligence standard. In the first state eval-
uations, the Council of Europe’s Group of Experts on Action against Violence 
against Women and Domestic Violence (GREVIO) has shown great knowledge 
and competence in distinguishing legal obligations. In its report on Austria, for 
example, the Group does not apply the standard of due diligence throughout, but 
only in some chapters. In particular, the Group argued that ‘if a State agency, 
institution or individual official has failed diligently to prevent, investigate, and 
punish acts of violence … victims and/or their relatives must be able to hold them 
accountable.’72 This can be achieved by means of appropriate laws, which, in the 
case of Austria, were already in force.73
The obligation to respect, to protect and to fulfil human rights, and the meaning 
of core obligations
In international human rights law, three different types – ‘layers’ – of states’ obli-
gations have been elaborated: obligations to respect, to protect and to fulfil human 
rights. In 1983 the then Rapporteur to the UN Sub-Commission on prevention 
of discrimination of minorities, Asbjorn Eide, proposed four ‘layers’ of state 
obligations, namely obligations to respect, to protect, to ensure and to promote, 
later reduced to the three categories in his report on the right to adequate food as a 
human right, adopted in 1987.74 From a philosophical point of view, it was Henry 
Shue in 1980 who showed that there is no distinction between rights and that the 
distinction can be only made in terms of duties, dividing them into the duty to 
avoid depriving, the duty to protect people from deprivation by other people and 
the duty to provide for security.75
While the obligation to respect human rights can be defined as a negative 
one – the state must abstain from various behaviours – the obligations to protect 
and to fulfil them are positive ones, because they require states to take steps to 
implement human rights. Taking one relevant General Comment for my analysis, 
No. 22 of the ESCR Committee, the obligation to respect human rights means 
that states must refrain from ‘directly or indirectly interfering with the exercise 
by individuals of the right to sexual and reproductive health.’76 The obligation 
to protect human rights consists in ‘tak[ing] measures to prevent third parties 
from directly or indirectly interfering with the enjoyment of the right to sexual 
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and reproductive health.’77 Even though it can easily be said that this obligation 
resembles the obligation of due diligence, this is only partly correct, since the 
duty to protect also requires ‘States to put in place and implement laws and poli-
cies prohibiting conduct by third parties that causes harm to physical and mental 
integrity,’ which seems to me to define a specific result, rather than an obligation 
to make best efforts. Finally, there is the obligation to fulfil human rights, requir-
ing states to ‘adopt appropriate legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial, 
promotional and other measures to ensure the full realization of the right to sexual 
and reproductive health.’78
The three layers of obligation aim at guaranteeing the implementation of 
economic, social and cultural rights, which have been considered the ‘least jus-
ticiable’ among human rights, precisely because their character means they must 
be realised progressively. However, as can be seen, the different layers can be 
referred to one or more of the traditional categories of state obligations conceived 
in international law. The difference is probably in the capacity of these three 
layers to encompass the complexity of human rights in their implementation, in 
particular states’ responsibility for acts of non-state actors.
To further counter the risk that rights will be implemented weakly, in particu-
lar economic, social and cultural rights, the notion of core obligations, or min-
imum core obligations, was introduced in the 1980s. One of the 1986 Limburg 
Principles on the Implementation of the ICESCR obliges states ‘regardless of 
their level of economic development, to ensure respect for minimum subsist-
ence rights.’79 It was then that Philip Alston, once appointed as Rapporteur 
of the ESCR Committee in 1987, mentioned that corresponding to each right 
there must be an ‘absolute minimum entitlement.’80 In an interesting analysis 
conducted by four scholars, including Lisa Forman and Audrey Chapman, the 
notion of ‘minimum core obligations’ is explored in depth, with specific regard 
to the right to health. They point out the many unresolved questions surrounding 
the concept, such as, for example, ‘is the core fixed or moveable, non-derogable 
or restrictable, universal or country-specific?,’ and ‘what are acceptable methods 
to further develop the content of these entitlements and duties?’81 The positions 
in legal scholarship range from denial of the concept to detailed accounts of 
minimum core obligations.82 Minimum core obligations, as elaborated by the 
ESCR Committee, have four consequences: immediate effect, immunity from 
the excuse of ‘insufficient resources,’ not being retrogressive and being directly 
applicable.83 As argued by Martin Scheinin, ‘the ICESCR contains no under-
lying “deep theory” or positive law basis for the approach.’84 He considered 
the ‘minimum core obligation’ ‘a methodology.’85 In GC No. 14 on the right 
to health, the Committee listed core obligations, which should include as a 
minimum the non-discriminatory access to health services; access to food, basic 
shelter, housing, sanitation and water; the provision of essential drugs; the equi-
table distribution of all health facilities, goods and services; and the adoption of 
a national public health strategy.86 Obligations defined of ‘comparable priority’ 
were, among others, to ensure reproductive, maternal and child health care. As 
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clearly emphasised by Forman and the other co-authors, the debate surrounding 
the core is still open, and focuses on the question whether the core is a floor or 
a ceiling, and whether core obligations are obligations of conduct or of result.87 
The authors concluded that the concept is essential, but that greater clarity 
is required ‘about its intended role in concretising, clarifying, enforcing and 
realising the right to health.’88
In GC No. 22, the ESCR Committee defined core obligations more precisely, 
contending that they ‘should be guided by contemporary human rights instru-
ments and jurisprudence, as well as the most current international guidelines 
and protocols established by United Nations agencies, in particular WHO and 
the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA),’ and should include ‘at least’ the 
following elements, which are worth reproducing in extenso:
(a) To repeal or eliminate laws, policies and practices that criminalize, obstruct or 
undermine access by individuals or a particular group to sexual and reproductive 
health facilities, services, goods and information;
(b) To adopt and implement a national strategy and action plan, with adequate 
budget allocation, on sexual and reproductive health, which is devised, periodically 
reviewed and monitored through a participatory and transparent process, disaggre-
gated by prohibited ground of discrimination;
(c) To guarantee universal and equitable access to affordable, acceptable and qual-
ity sexual and reproductive health services, goods and facilities, in particular for 
women and disadvantaged and marginalized groups;
(d) To enact and enforce the legal prohibition of harmful practices and gender-based 
violence, including female genital mutilation, child and forced marriage and 
domestic and sexual violence, including marital rape, while ensuring privacy con-
fidentiality and free, informed and responsible decision-making, without coercion, 
discrimination or fear of violence, in relation to the sexual and reproductive needs 
and behaviours of individuals; (e) To take measures to prevent unsafe abortions and 
to provide post-abortion care and counselling for those in need;
(f) To ensure all individuals and groups have access to comprehensive education 
and information on sexual and reproductive health that are non-discriminatory, 
non-biased, evidence-based, and that take into account the evolving capacities of 
children and adolescents;
(g) To provide medicines, equipment and technologies essential to sexual and repro-
ductive health, including based on the WHO Model List of Essential Medicines;
(h) To ensure access to effective and transparent remedies and redress, including 
administrative and judicial ones, for violations of the right to sexual and reproduc-
tive health.89
It is clear that these are all positive obligations, and include obligations of due 
diligence, of result and of progressive realisation, following the categorisation set 
out in ‘Positive and negative obligations’. An important aspect of this list is the 
emphasis put on the need for positive measures in fields where the state usually 
had a duty not to interfere. Core obligations are taken from the paragraphs of the 
GC related to the duty to respect, to protect and to fulfil. Nonetheless, the negative 
duty on the state ‘to refrain from directly or indirectly interfering with the exercise 
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by individuals of the right to sexual and reproductive health’ is not included in 
the core. Does this mean that core obligations only consist in positive obligations 
requiring an action by the state? It is hard to argue that this is so. In GR No. 28 of 
the CEDAW, on core obligations, the adjective ‘core’ is included in the title only, 
and therefore it seems that all the obligations included in the document must be 
considered to be ‘core obligations’; they include negative obligations to ‘refrain 
from making laws, policies, regulations, programmes, administrative procedures 
and institutional structures that directly or indirectly result in the denial of the 
equal enjoyment of women of rights.’90 Non-retrogression, for example, can 
be considered as an element of a minimum core obligation, and it is negative 
in nature.91
The point is to consider how useful this category of core obligations is, in 
terms of state responsibility. In the part of GC No. 22 of the ESCR Committee 
relating to ‘violations’ (Part V), core obligations are not mentioned; the duties 
to respect, to protect and to fulfil may be violated. Similarly, GR No. 28 of the 
CEDAW does not refer to violation of core obligations. A second point is: to 
what extent are core obligations reflected in the views and concluding observa-
tions of the CEDAW and other UN treaty bodies? If we have a look at recent 
practice in CEDAW concluding observations, the analysis has been thematic 
rather than examining types of obligation separately.92 Accordingly, for example, 
in its concluding observations on Saudi Arabia, the CEDAW Committee does 
not refer to ‘core obligations,’ but rather recommends and encourages the state 
to adopt measures that will allow the rights included in the Convention to be 
achieved.93 Even though it refers to preceding general recommendations, the 
Committee does not structure the analysis to follow the three well-known layers 
(to respect, to protect, to fulfil human rights). In an interesting paragraph in 
the concluding observations, the Committee recommends the state not only to 
adopt provisions to legalise abortion, but also to provide ‘comprehensive health 
services, in particular sexual and reproductive health services,’ and ‘ensure the 
availability and accessibility of affordable modern forms of contraception.’94 Are 
these core obligations, or (merely) obligations to respect, to protect and to fulfil 
human rights? Similar detailed recommendations relating to the rights to health 
and to reproductive health are included in the concluding observations on Chile, 
where a verb recurrently used is ‘to ensure.’95 The recent concluding observations 
adopted by the ESCR Committee are also divided into thematic paragraphs, con-
taining recommendations that combine, for example, the obligation to protect and 
the obligation to fulfil. In one of its observations, the Committee recommended 
that Niger ‘take steps to outlaw and prevent child marriages contracted under 
customary law, including by adopting legislative and administrative measures 
and conducting culturally sensitive awareness-raising campaigns to encourage 
the abandonment of the practice.’96
Neither are core obligations included in the legal reasoning of regional human 
rights judicial bodies, although in a few cases courts and commissions have 
referred to the three layers of obligations and to the distinction positive/negative 
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obligations. The ECtHR mentioned the ‘positive obligation to protect life’ in 
Osman v. United Kingdom, for example,97 and the African Commission referred, 
in Equality Now, to the obligations to respect, to protect and to fulfil the rights 
included in the African Charter.98 The IACHR touched on the three layers in 
several judgments, including Velásquez Rodríguez.99
The tripartite structure and the theory of core obligations possess a lot of 
merit, despite being quite descriptive, in highlighting how each human right 
creates a wide spectrum of legal obligations, against which states’ actions must 
be assessed.100A possible solution to the impasse could be to conceive core obli-
gations as obligations that have consolidated as customary international law, 
thereby binding all states without requiring ratification of a specific treaty, but it is 
not my purpose here to dwell on their nature; rather to reflect on the most suitable 
‘type’ to apply to my analysis.
A more practical perspective:  
the pillars of the Council of Europe Istanbul Convention
A more practical approach to the issue of states’ obligations could be to refer to 
already existing legal instruments dealing with VAW. The Council of Europe 
Istanbul Convention is quite innovative in its structure, being at the same time a 
human rights law and a criminal law convention. It mirrors the 3Ps (plus 1) par-
adigm of state obligations that was elaborated in countering human trafficking: 
prevention, protection, prosecution and partnerships. The 2000 Protocol against 
Human Trafficking to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
is precisely focused on ‘prevention, suppression and punishment,’101 and the 
Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings of 
2005 contains chapters on prevention, protection and prosecution.102
The four pillars of the Council of Europe Istanbul Convention are prevention, 
protection, prosecution and policies.103 As I wrote earlier, even though Article 5 
of the Convention provides due diligence obligations, this does not mean that all 
the obligations included in the Convention are of this nature. The value that the 
Convention adds to previous legal instruments is precisely to address VAW from 
multiple angles and provide a spectrum of obligations states must abide by. As 
for prevention, the Convention elaborates a general obligation in its Article 12 to 
‘adopt measures necessary to promote changes in the social and cultural patterns 
of behaviours of women and men with a view to eradicating prejudices, customs, 
traditions, and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority of 
women.’ Being a general obligation, ‘this paragraph does not go into detail as to 
propose specific measures to take, leaving it within the discretion of the party.’104 
Article 12 is followed by more precise measures, such as awareness raising, 
education, training of professionals, preventive intervention and treatment pro-
grammes, and participation by the private sector and the media (Articles 13 to 17). 
The GREVIO Committee, established by the Convention, is competent to assess 
whether the measures adopted by states are sufficient to guarantee the scope 
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of the Convention, through mutual evaluation reports. Prevention also means 
ensuring that legislation is in force: Chapter V of the Convention is dedicated 
to substantive law, and requires states to have laws which criminalise certain 
behaviours (Articles 33 to 39), treat forced marriages as null and void (Article 
32), subject sexual harassment to criminal or other legal sanctions (Article 40), 
provide grounds of jurisdiction (Article 44) and decide sanctions, measures and 
aggravating circumstances (Articles 45–6).
Under the second pillar, protection, the Convention provides a general obli-
gation ‘to take the necessary legislative or other measures to protect all victims 
from any further acts of violence,’ and to ‘ensure effective cooperation’ among 
different actors, both public and private (Article 18). It then clarifies which 
measures it regards as protective, namely general support services, assistance in 
individual/collective complaints, the provision of shelters, telephone helplines 
and support for victims of sexual violence, and protection for children witness-
ing violence (Articles 20 to 26). Prosecution is based on Chapter VI of the 
Convention. It includes general obligations in Article 49, such as the obligation 
to adopt measures necessary to ensure that investigations are carried out ‘without 
undue delay,’ respecting the victim’s rights. It then lays down more specific 
obligations, such as providing legislation on emergency barring orders, and on 
restraining or protection orders, and to ensure that investigations do not wholly 
depend on the victim filing a report or complaint (Articles 52, 53, 55). Specific 
measures are conceived for migrant women (Chapter VII). In effect, the policies 
pillar surrounds and supplements the other three, since it requires the activation 
of ‘effective, comprehensive and coordinated policies encompassing all relevant 
measures to prevent and combat all forms of violence’ (Article 7). Measures 
include the allocation of appropriate resources, partnership with different actors, 
data collection and research (Articles 7 to 11).
It is difficult to pigeonhole the measures states are obliged to adopt under 
the Convention into specific categories. It is possible to say that the obligations 
included in the Convention are positive obligations, of different – and sometimes 
intersecting – nature. The obligation to adopt measures to ‘change attitudes’ in 
society, it seems to me, confers a positive obligation to ‘take steps,’ which can be 
categorised as an obligation of ‘progressive implementation’ or, in the language 
of UN treaty bodies, ‘to fulfil.’ It means that, in assessing state compliance with 
the Convention, the GREVIO Committee will examine whether the state has taken 
steps towards this outcome. Conversely, the obligation to criminalise a specific 
behaviour is an obligation of result. The adoption of certain measures can amount 
to an obligation of conduct or an obligation of result, or both as intersecting. 
Christian Tomuschat has stressed that ‘not infrequently obligations of conduct 
and obligations of result are intertwined to such a degree that the different com-
ponent[s] can hardly be separated from one another.’105 For example, adopting a 
measure could be a result, leaving discretion to the state on how to proceed (for 
instance, whether to provide a criminal or other sanction in response to a specific 
violent behaviour); at the same time, however, the Convention defines the result 
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in detail, recommends the means and guides the state in achieving the desired 
outcome. In light of the principle of effectiveness, the state has an obligation to 
choose its means diligently.106 As highlighted in GR No. 28, to ‘pursue by all 
appropriate means’ a specific policy means to use ‘means’ or a particular course 
of conduct, which gives a state party ‘a great deal of flexibility,’ but, at the same 
time, ‘each State party must be able to justify the appropriateness of the particular 
means it has chosen and demonstrate whether it will achieve the intended effect 
and result.’107 Compensation, to take another example, can be an obligation of 
result but might also be a due diligence obligation, to create the conditions 
necessary to provide individuals access to compensation.
This very practical approach suits the Convention, and will easily guide the 
work of the GREVIO Committee in evaluating situation reports from states that 
have ratified the Convention.
Methodology for treatment: reconceptualising state obligations in 
countering VAWH
Having analysed the structure of state obligations under international law, I will 
now turn to apply one of these categorisations, or, better, elaborate one of them 
to fit my paradigm. As showed in chapter 2, VAWH is an innovative concept 
capable of encompassing two dimensions of violence against women as related 
to the rights to health and to reproductive health: on one hand VAW as a cause of 
violating a woman’s right to health and to reproductive health; and on the other 
hand, health policies and laws, or the practices of actors having public functions 
(hospitals, for example), that cause VAW or contribute to causing it. In this sec-
tion of this chapter, I will bring the two dimensions under the same umbrella, in 
order to outline which state obligations exist in countering VAWH as it emerges 
in state practice and in the jurisprudence and quasi-jurisprudence of judicial and 
quasi-judicial bodies.
I first need to choose one of the categories proposed. I could have developed 
the analysis conducted by the CEDAW Committee in its GR No. 35, distinguish-
ing acts or omissions by state organs from acts or omissions of non-state actors, 
stressing how the actions of private bodies providing public services must be 
attributable to the state.108 Nonetheless, the idea of VAWH is more elaborate than 
that of VAW as known at the international level, and encompasses two dimen-
sions of violence which do not correspond to the nature of the actor (state or non-
state) committing violence, but rather to the nature of the violence itself, which 
is represented in its horizontal dimension by forms of interpersonal violence and 
in its vertical dimension by state policies in the health field that cause violence 
against women. Furthermore, due diligence obligations are only mentioned in 
the paragraph of GR No. 35 that covers acts or omissions of non-state actors. My 
purpose is to find a structure that better describes states’ obligations to counter 
VAWH as I conceive it in this book.
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At first, I was fascinated by the elaboration of ‘core obligations’ in the ESCR 
Committee’s GC No. 22. It was clear that it was the beginning of the evolution of 
positive ‘core’ obligations in fields such as the right of access to health services 
in cases, for example, of abortion. Nonetheless, the anamnesis and the diagnosis 
have led me away from this initial purpose. Despite being interesting and having 
scope to react to the ‘vagueness’ of the rights to health and to reproductive health, 
the concept of core obligations has rarely been invoked by courts and human 
rights bodies.
The layers ‘respect’, ‘protect’ and ‘fulfil’ human rights are of interest from a 
legal perspective, but they are limited to the sphere of human rights, and do not 
allow me to clearly distinguish between obligations of means and of result.109 
Furthermore, they tend to be merely descriptive, and to reduce the system of pro-
tection of human rights to a self-contained regime.110 The structure of the Istanbul 
Convention has its appeal and has proved to guide the work of the GREVIO 
Committee, at the beginning, anyway. Nonetheless, it is too far linked to the 
specificity of a Convention, which, despite having potential to become universal, 
remains anchored to the European context.
Each categorisation I have previously discussed has some merit in systematis-
ing state obligations in the field of VAWH. I found however that the structure pro-
posed by Pisillo Mazzeschi worked best for my analysis. It allows me to consider 
the two dimensions of VAWH together, and to elaborate states’ obligations in a 
more coherent and rational way, contributing to the debate on due diligence in the 
protection of women’s rights to health and to reproductive health. It also brings 
the feminist human-rights-law analysis of VAWH back to the general theories of 
the international law of state responsibility. It means, in other words, providing 
a gender perspective on already well-established categories of international law 
and challenging them, while at the same time contributing to establishing feminist 
legal scholarship within the international legal mainstream.
It especially provides more guidance in the elaboration of due diligence obli-
gations, which I consider the cornerstone of my reflection. Accordingly, in the 
following sub-paragraphs and taking into account the anamnesis (analysis of 
some of the cases decided at the international, regional and domestic levels) and 
the diagnosis (the elaboration of the concept of VAWH), I will differentiate the 
following types of obligation: positive obligations of result, positive obligations 
of due diligence and positive obligations to progressively take steps. I will con-
sider the negative obligation not to interfere when positive obligations intersect, 
to emphasise in particular that respect for women’s autonomy is pivotal in the 
protection of women’s rights to health and to reproductive health.
A positive obligation of result consists, in the words of Pisillo Mazzeschi, 
in requiring ‘an enactment (in the broad sense of the term) which respects and 
protects human rights.’111 This obligation derives from international treaties, ‘but 
also from international human rights law as a whole, given that it is an obligation 
with the function of achieving the general scope of protection of these rights.’112 
In his view, it cannot be considered a due diligence obligation, because the state 
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is obliged to enact, amend or repeal laws, not just to make ‘best efforts’ in this 
direction, the outcome not being subject to any form of alea.113 In the context 
of VAWH, it means that states must enact laws on DV, for example, or amend 
existing laws on rape to introduce lack of consent as an element of the offence, 
or decriminalise abortion, or repeal laws on forced sterilisation. To this list I will 
add the adoption of laws providing measures to grant women access to health 
services, as a preventive measure, and I will discuss the room for manoeuvre 
given to states in some cases (or margin of appreciation as the ECtHR puts it).
The second type is the positive obligation of due diligence, which (usually) 
includes the majority of obligations to prevent. However, as Pisillo Mazzeschi 
has pointed out, creating the apparatus to prevent violations of human rights 
is an obligation of result, whereas ‘the concrete activities and the measures of 
prevention required of State authorities … are subject to uncertainty (alea) in 
their results.’114 The justification of the distinction between obligations of conduct 
and obligations of result ‘rests … on the objectively different content of two cat-
egories of obligations of the State, differing by how probable it is that the obliged 
State will achieve the result wanted by law.’115 This argument is supported in my 
anamnesis by V.K. v. Bulgaria, in which the CEDAW Committee acknowledged 
the hiatus between the provisions of a legal instrument and its implementation by 
state organs. It argued:
The Committee notes that the State party has taken measures to provide protection 
against domestic violence by adopting the Law on Protection against Domestic 
Violence, which includes a fast-track procedure for issuing immediate protection 
orders. However, in order for the author to enjoy the practical realization … the 
political will that is expressed in such specific legislation must be supported by all 
State actors, including the courts, which are bound by the obligations of the State 
party. The issue before the Committee is therefore whether the refusal of the Plovdiv 
courts to issue a permanent protection order against the author’s husband, as well 
as the unavailability of shelters, violated the State party’s obligation to effectively 
protect the author against domestic violence.116
To enact laws and to exercise due diligence in their implementation are both legal 
obligations; the difference lies in the consequences of violation: breach of a due 
diligence obligation mainly affects an individual’s ability to obtain monetary 
compensation, and redress for the violation he/she has suffered, while failure to 
enact laws (and also of the obligation to progressively take steps) causes general 
recommendations to be raised in UN treaty bodies and the IACommHR, and 
references to what a state is required to do in the jurisprudence of the European 
and the Inter-American Courts of Human Rights.
Indeed, if I go back to my analysis, the cases in which the performance of 
due diligence has been assessed concerned specific activities by the authorities 
in specific individual cases (‘procedural’ due diligence). Hence, for example, in 
Talpis, the ECtHR found the Italian authorities responsible because they had not 
acted with the diligence necessary to prevent Talpis’s son being murdered by her 
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husband. In the Cotton Field case, the IACHR found that Mexico had not exer-
cised due diligence in investigating the abduction, sexual violence against and 
murder of women in Ciudad Juarez. In the sub-section below entitled ‘Positive 
obligations of due diligence in specific cases – or “procedural” due diligence’, I 
will reflect on the ‘particular’ due diligence necessary to counter, for example, 
DV, and on whether due diligence pertains to both the dimensions I have concep-
tualised in my book or only to the interpersonal one.
Finally, I will explore what Pisillo Mazzeschi called positive obligations ‘à 
réalisation progressive’ (of progressive realisation), which I call obligations to 
‘progressively take steps’. They impose on states an obligation to ‘take steps,’ 
‘through a series of measures of different nature, with the purpose of gradually 
and over time ensuring the effective exercise of these rights.’117 They do not 
require an immediate, or at least reasonably immediate, result. An example will 
be the obligation to disrupt patterns of discrimination common to both dimen-
sions. Decisions of human rights bodies and judicial bodies have shown that 
states can be held responsible for violating the norm prohibiting discrimination 
because they have ‘condoned’ or ‘tolerated’ violence against women. It is evident 
that to disrupt patterns of discrimination requires time – especially when we con-
sider this pattern at the state and at the societal level – but this does not preclude 
state responsibility. In obligations of this type the requirement of diligence has 
a role to play, which is different, as I can prove by reference to the anamnesis, 
from ensuring due diligence in specific cases. When assessing respect for the 
obligation to take steps, monitoring bodies must consider whether the state has 
shown diligence in working to disrupt patterns of discrimination. I will discuss 
how and to what extent. As observed by Rebecca Cook:
States can never guarantee that discrimination against women will not occur; they 
cannot be held liable simply because an act of discrimination is observed. States 
parties are liable only for failures to implement means the drafters considered rea-
sonably achievable.118
In GR No. 28, the CEDAW Committee clarified that ‘each State party must 
be able to justify the appropriateness of the particular means it has chosen and 
demonstrate whether it will achieve the intended effect and result.’119
The trend that I will show in state obligations is generated by state practice, 
jurisprudence and interpretation of the provisions of binding instruments. I will 
also show how, directly or indirectly, the right to health and the right to reproduc-
tive health permeate all state obligations.
Positive obligations of result
To enact, amend or repeal laws to counter VAWH
An obligation of result consists in the adoption, amendment or repeal of laws. 
These obligations can derive directly from a legal instrument, such as the Council 
of Europe Istanbul Convention, or indirectly from human rights law, since 
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 legislation is the essential prerequisite to counter VAWH and guarantee to women 
the enjoyment of their human rights and the exercise of their autonomy. Hence, 
for example, in A.T. v. Hungary, the CEDAW Committee recommended that ‘a 
specific law be introduced prohibiting domestic violence against women, which 
would provide for protection and exclusion orders as well as support services, 
including shelters.’120 In Bevacqua and S. v. Bulgaria, to take another example, 
the ECtHR acknowledged that, at the time of the facts in the case, ‘Bulgarian law 
did not provide for specific administrative and policing measures,’ which were 
later added by the 2005 Domestic Violence Act.121
Which provisions must a law on DV include? States have room for manoeu-
vre in that respect. A law should at least establish the administrative and police 
apparatus capable of effectively investigating cases of DV, and prosecuting the 
alleged perpetrators; it should provide at least a minimal range of services for 
victims/survivors including shelters, notwithstanding the resources available at 
state level. In light of the impact of DV on women’s health, laws must provide 
free medical and psychological treatment for the victim. A law need not 
 necessarily – or the state or the authorities could be obliged to progressively 
take steps to – include the establishment of special courts on domestic vio-
lence,122 or grant leave of absence to victims/survivors of DV.123 Two possible 
provisions are worth mentioning, both included in the Istanbul Convention. 
One (Article 55) is for formal investigation or proceedings to continue even 
if the report of abuse is withdrawn by the victim; the other (Article 8) covers 
allocation of resources. In chapter 2, ‘Challenges to the public/private divide’, 
I showed that the state must intervene in cases of DV, and disrupting the 
public/private divide has proved fundamental when considering DV in terms 
of violation of human rights by states. The autonomy of the woman, who can 
decide to return to her home even if her partner is violent, is not infringed 
when the authorities intervene, not even if they do so after withdrawal of the 
complaint, provided that this intervention is gender-sensitive and does not 
cause another form of violence to her; it could include, for example, issuing 
victims of domestic violence with a bracelet or waistband as ‘life-savers’, to 
use if they approach a women’s shelter but are reluctant to formally report 
to the authorities.124 With regard to the second type of provision, the Istanbul 
Convention (Article 8) requires states to allocate resources to counter the 
violent behaviours it prohibits, such as DV. Resources are clearly fundamental 
in support of laws on DV, but it does not appear from the cases examined in 
the anamnesis that an obligation exists to define a specific budget heading, 
although this would clearly be desirable.
Identifying the elements of the offence has proved to be complex in crim-
inalising rape. Chapter 1 showed that lack of consent is an essential element 
of the offence.125 The CEDAW Committee, in its concluding observations and 
views, has repeatedly clarified this aspect.126 In 2003 the ECtHR analysed state 
practice and concluded in the same way in M.C. v. Bulgaria. However, the Court 
did not exclude seeking ‘the prosecution of non-consensual sexual acts in all 
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circumstances … in practice by means of interpretation of the relevant statutory 
terms (“coercion”, “violence”, “duress”, “threat”, “ruse”, “surprise” or others) 
and through a context-sensitive assessment of the evidence.’127 There must be no 
need to prove physical resistance to demonstrate lack of consent.
Many countries in the world do not criminalise marital rape.128 Nonetheless, 
marital rape does constitute a form of VAWH, and criminalising it is encouraged 
at the international level.129 With regard to specific cultural practices, the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ rights, in Equality Now, recommended the 
state adopt measures ‘to specifically deal with marriage by abduction and rape.’130
The trend at the international level, also confirmed by regional and national 
courts, as I showed in the anamnesis, is to adopt laws prohibiting FGM/C. The 
content of the legislation varies a lot from country to country, and can include 
extraterritorial application of the law to prosecute individuals performing the 
practice abroad on girls resident or domiciled in the home state.131 As I argued 
in chapter 2, the element of lack of consent should be added to the definition of 
the offence. The Istanbul Convention provides, in Article 38, that ‘coercing’ a 
woman to undergo the practice must be made an offence. In light of the reasoning 
relating to rape, it seems likely that adding lack of consent – and presuming, also 
by law, that girls below a certain age are unable to give consent132 – could better 
guarantee the protection of a woman’s rights, and her autonomy. It could also 
be established by law that, upon women’s genuine consent as assessed in courts, 
only re-infibulation will be permitted.133 This legislation could inspire legislation 
on GCS, a practice that, as I pointed out in the chapter 2, has become widespread 
in European countries.
Turning to the vertical dimension, decisions of human rights courts and UN 
treaty bodies demonstrate that states must decriminalise abortion at least where 
it follows rape, sexual violence and/or incest,134 and in cases of severe malfor-
mation of the foetus and risks to the life or health (including mental health) of 
the pregnant woman. States could still retain room to manoeuvre, the ‘margin 
of appreciation’ in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, in deciding to what extent 
abortion can be limited, provided that, as I argue in this book, denial of abortion 
does not cause VAWH, in terms of intense suffering, and what the HRC has 
called a ‘high level of mental anguish,’ connected to an ‘intense stigma and loss 
of dignity’ for the pregnant woman.135 In terms of negative obligations, states 
must also refrain from adopting laws that oblige practitioners to give ‘false, 
misleading, and irrelevant’ information to a woman seeking access to abortion.136 
Informed consent is a ‘process … intended to ensure that a patient is left alone to 
make decisions based on a set of medical facts free from direct coercion.’137 Laws 
must ensure appropriate and objective counselling, in order to allow women to 
make free decisions, without coercion, and ensure confidentiality. In L.C. v. Peru, 
the CEDAW Committee argued that, when it comes to state intervention in a 
personal decision, ‘such intervention should be legal and regulated in such a way 
that, following due process, the person affected has the right to be heard,’ and 
added that ‘the contrary situation constitutes a violation of the right of protection 
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from arbitrary interventions in decisions that, in general, are based in the intimacy 
and autonomy of each human being.’138
In cases of involuntary sterilisation, it is an obligation well established at the 
international level that states must repeal eugenic laws. The issue is no longer 
whether or not such laws are in force – states have gradually repealed eugenic 
laws over recent decades – but whether sterilisation occurs de facto in public or 
private health structures and the state does not prevent it; and whether the state 
is capable of providing reparation for the harm caused by eugenic laws applied 
in the past.
In terms of state obligations, maternal health is the field in which the major 
steps have been taken, especially with regard to the obligation to provide access 
to health services. For what concerns the adoption of laws, an obligation that 
I consider as confirmed at the international level is the prohibition of perinatal 
shackling of women in prison.
One might wonder whether states are obliged to adopt a law on OV. For 
the time being, state practice is not sufficient to elaborate an obligation in that 
respect. Such an obligation might evolve in the years to come and might require 
states to enact laws that compel practitioners to obtain the objective and informed 
consent of a woman before performing a practice during childbirth, in order to 
avoid VAWH. Laws on malpractice, which are in place in many states, only 
address episodes of OV that have the severest consequences and fail to recognise 
the psychological and emotional harm caused by practices that sometimes are 
common in the maternity ward. A counter-argument might be that legislation 
risks ‘freezing’ the activity of practitioners, who might fear sanctions should 
they fail to comply with the will of their patient. If such a risk is faced, one might 
wonder whether a form of collective responsibility vested in the hospital, rather 
than in the individual practitioner, could be of any help.
To provide access to health services
The positive obligation to provide access to health services belongs to the category 
obligations of result, because it is not subject to the alea in the outcome that char-
acterises due diligence obligations; it is not even an obligation to progressively 
take steps, because it requires the state to immediately provide, at minimum, an 
essential level of health care.139 Since the provision of health services requires 
financial resources, one might ask what kind of services must be granted in cases 
related to the two dimensions of VAWH. It is clear that this minimum level has 
risen over time as the activity of human rights bodies, and the jurisprudence of 
domestic and human rights courts, have implemented the rights to health and to 
reproductive health of women who survive violence.
It means the state must have in place facilities that can respond to the needs 
of a woman exposed to DV (and her children). So, for example, shelters must be 
able to host disabled children, health personnel must provide immediate support 
to victims of domestic violence in a non-judgemental way and psychological sup-
port must be available.140 In Aydin v. Turkey, the ECtHR contended that, when the 
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examination of a rape victim/survivor is necessary for an effective investigation 
to be conducted, this must be done ‘with all appropriate sensitivity, by medical 
professionals with particular competence in this area and whose independence 
is not circumscribed by instructions given by the prosecuting authority as to the 
scope of the examination.’141 Along the same line of reasoning, the IACHR, in 
the well-known Ortega v. Mexico judgment, explained that ‘the psychological 
or psychiatric treatment must be provided by State personnel and institutions 
specialized in attending to victims of acts of violence,’ and that, ‘if the State does 
not have this type of service available, it must have recourse to specialized private 
or civil society institutions.’142 The Court also made some suggestions concerning 
the characteristics of the service that must be provided: it must be designed to 
respond to the specific needs of the individual, and it must be provided, so far as 
possible, in the institutions nearest to the victims’/survivors’ place of residence.143
In the vertical dimension, the evolution of the jurisprudence, and the quasi- 
jurisprudence of regional human rights courts and UN treaty bodies, have marked 
the most significant steps. The landmark L.C. v Peru decision, handed down by 
the CEDAW Committee in 2011, paves the way for an in-depth consideration 
of what positive obligations to provide access to health services entail in the 
context of abortion. The Committee acknowledged that L.C. had been the victim 
of ‘exclusions and restrictions in access to health services based on a gender 
stereotype that understands the exercise of a woman’s reproductive capacity 
as a duty rather than a right.’144 On the nature of the obligation as one of result, 
the Committee considered that, ‘since the State party has legalized therapeutic 
abortion,’ it must establish ‘an appropriate legal framework that allows women 
to exercise their right to it under conditions that guarantee the necessary legal 
security, both for those who have recourse to abortion and for the health profes-
sionals that must perform it.’145 Furthermore, in some general recommendations, 
the Committee required the state to:
[r]eview its laws with a view to establish[ing] a mechanism for effective access to 
therapeutic abortion under conditions that protect women’s physical and mental 
health and prevent further occurrences in the future of violations similar to the ones 
in the present case.146
Access to abortion services must also include post-abortion services, including 
counselling, medical care and psychological support.147 In Ireland, at the time of 
Mellet, women could get access to abortion abroad, but no protection and cover-
age from the public healthcare system, no paid leave of absence, no support from 
public or private insurance; once back in Ireland, Amanda Mellet could obtain 
medical care, but no form of public-funded post-abortion counselling, which 
was eventually granted by an association. When denial of access to abortion 
causes VAWH, there is an obligation on the state not only to abstain from certain 
behaviours – in this case abstain from interfering if the woman decided to travel 
abroad to get access to the service – but also to provide services in order to avoid 
physical and psychological consequences for the woman. The jurisprudence of 
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the ECtHR, in similar cases, focused more on the lack of access to effective 
remedies, and of provision of objective and appropriate information to pregnant 
women. Developments in the Inter-American jurisprudence, awaited in the case 
Manuela y familia v. El Salvador, might be relevant in defining what a positive 
obligation to provide access to health services means. One can object that this 
positive obligation only stems from the quasi-jurisprudence of UN treaty bodies, 
whose outcome is not binding. However, when denial of access to abortion 
services causes VAWH, there is a violation of the woman’s rights to health 
and to reproductive health which the ECtHR might regard as a violation of the 
prohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. This trend 
towards the recognition of positive obligations in the provision of health services 
still needs to be developed, but the path has been traced, both directly, through the 
views of UN human rights treaty bodies, and indirectly, through the jurisprudence 
of regional human rights courts that take health concerns into consideration in 
their decisions. The HRC’s GC No. 36 on the right to life clearly construes a ‘duty 
to ensure that women and girls do not have to undertake unsafe abortions,’ and 
acknowledges that ‘States parties should ensure the availability of, and effective 
access to, quality prenatal and post-abortion health care for women and girls, in 
all circumstances.’148
It is well established that, in operating abortion services, practitioners can 
exercise conscientious objection, but the state must ensure that the law obliges 
conscientious objectors to refer their patients to other practitioners, and hospitals 
to provide an adequate number of doctors performing abortion.149 Related to this 
aspect is physical accessibility of abortion services: access can be impaired by 
the exercise of conscientious objection and the absence of practitioners within 
a reasonable distance from the woman’s habitual residence, or by provisions 
that impose requirements on service providers, justified by a declared purpose 
to protect the woman’s health, which are not easy to meet and therefore reduce 
the number of the providers available.150 This obligation might intersect with a 
due diligence obligation, when, for example, a woman reports to the authorities 
difficulties in gaining access to abortion and the authorities do not act with 
due diligence in monitoring whether the law is being correctly applied in a 
specific hospital.
One question could be whether abortion services must be free of charge. In 
other words, does the obligation to provide access to abortion services include 
the provision of free services? In GC No. 22 the ESCR Committee stressed that 
‘publicly or privately provided sexual and reproductive health services must 
be affordable for all,’ and that ‘essential goods and services, including those 
related to the underlying determinants of sexual and reproductive health, must be 
provided at no cost or based on the principle of equality to ensure that individuals 
and families are not disproportionately burdened with health expenses.’151 Are 
these services essential? One might argue that these services are essential in all 
cases in which abortion is legitimate under national law, and they must be free. 
However, what about abortion when performed abroad? Must health insurance 
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cover it? There is no definite answer to these questions in light of state practice. 
Nonetheless, from the analysis in the anamnesis and from GC No. 22 it is possible 
to propose some reflections. In the latter, the ESCR Committee stressed that 
‘States parties [to the ICESCR] should … ensure that all individuals and groups 
have equal access to the full range of sexual and reproductive health information, 
goods and services, including by removing all barriers that particular groups may 
face.’152 Furthermore, it is suggested that ‘laws or policies revoking public health 
funding for sexual and reproductive health service’ should be avoided.153 As well 
as an interesting case at the national level, Lakshmi Dhikta v. Nepal, decided by 
the Supreme Court of Nepal, the economic issue has been addressed by the HRC 
in the Mellet and Whelan cases. The Committee stressed that discrimination 
based on social and economic conditions had occurred, because to gain access to 
abortion both Mellet and Whelan had to go abroad without any form of support:
The differential treatment to which the author was subjected in relation to other 
women who decided to carry to term their unviable pregnancy created a legal 
distinction between similarly-situated women which failed to adequately take into 
account her medical needs and socioeconomic circumstances and did not meet the 
requirements of reasonableness, objectivity and legitimacy of purpose. Accordingly, 
the Committee concludes that the failure of the State party to provide the author with 
the services that she required constituted discrimination.154
Discrimination was therefore within the same gender, between women that mis-
carried and those who sought abortion abroad. Nonetheless, as argued by two 
members of the Committee in their concurring opinions, there had also been 
discrimination on the basis of gender because the prohibition of access to abortion 
services ‘par son effet contraignant, indirectement punitif et stigmatisant, vise les 
femmes en tant que telles et les place dans une situation spécifique de vulnéra-
bilité, discriminatoire par rapport aux personnes de sexe masculine.’155 Another 
expert, Sarah Cleveland, added that state regulations must ‘accommodate the 
fundamental biological differences between men and women in reproduction and 
… not directly or indirectly discriminate on the basis of sex,’ hence they require 
states to protect ‘on an equal basis, in law and in practice, the unique needs of 
each sex.’156 Accordingly, I argue that, when this practice is allowed by law, 
abortion services must be free of charge, or at least affordable, to the extent that 
reproductive health services for men are free or affordable, and must respond to 
the specific needs of the different genders. The same can be said for post-abortion 
services, which the state must provide for free in all cases of abortion, even when 
abortion is illegal in one country and women undergo the procedure abroad 
before going back to their country of origin.157 The lack of affordable access 
to these services would entail causing VAWH. It could also be argued that a 
possible future development of positive obligations consists not only in providing 
access to abortion and post-abortion services, but also in creating the economic 
and social conditions for the autonomous and uncoerced decision of a pregnant 
woman ‘where pregnancy and motherhood are meaningful options.’158
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The jurisprudence of some national courts, combined with the practice of UN 
treaty bodies, seems to support the argument that states bear the obligation to 
provide medically indicated health services to HIV-positive women, and preg-
nant HIV-positive women in particular; and that sterilisation is a failure to meet 
this obligation.159
It can be acknowledged that maternal health has been increasingly protected 
at the international level. It is striking to see how law has provided ‘little signif-
icance to pregnancy as a source of rights worthy of consideration or as a special 
status needing of protection. In recent jurisprudence and quasi-jurisprudence, 
however, State obligations have evolved.’160 An obligation to adopt laws that 
supply a legal framework for the provision of services to which women can have 
access can be identified, though: for example, a law that allows free access for 
poor women to prenatal, natal and post-natal services. An Indian Court required 
the state to provide access to hospital to women in labour, so they would not 
be obliged to give birth in the streets.161 There is no coherent state practice or 
jurisprudence on home birth, regulation of which is left within the state’s margin 
of appreciation, as emerged in the Dubská and Krejzova v. Czech Republic case 
decided by the ECtHR. It is worth mentioning, however, the opinion of five 
dissenting judges in Dubská who, although recognising that states have a wide 
margin of appreciation in regulating home births, concluded that the interference 
in Dubská’s right to respect for private and family life had been unnecessary in 
a democratic society.162 The dissenting judges explained that the single-option 
birth model, which stemmed from a regulation imposing strict requirements on 
maternity clinics, was per se problematic as regards Article 8 ECHR. In cases of 
low-risk pregnancies in women who were not first-time mothers, the interference 
was not considered to be justified.163
In Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, the IACHR contended 
that ‘States must design appropriate health-care policies that permit assistance to 
be provided by personnel who are adequately trained to attend to births, policies 
to prevent maternal mortality with adequate prenatal and post-partum care, and 
legal and administrative instruments for health-care policies that permit cases 
of maternal mortality to be documented adequately,’ and added that ‘pregnant 
women require special measures of protection.’164 Moreover, the Court decided 
that the state must adopt general measures, obligations of result, since it was 
extremely clear in saying: ‘The obligations indicated in the preceding paragraph 
must be complied with immediately.’165 The list of measures that might concern 
pregnant or lactating women is worth mentioning here, because it is precisely the 
answer to my re-conceptualisation of states’ obligations:
(a) provision of sufficient potable water for the consumption and personal hygiene 
…
(c) specialized medical care for pregnant women, both pre- and post-natal and 
during the first months of the baby’s life;
(d) delivery of food of sufficient quality and quantity to ensure an adequate diet;
(e) installation of latrines or any other adequate type of sanitation system …166
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In the ground-breaking decision Alyne da Silva Pimentel Teixeira, concerning 
the death of the applicant’s daughter as a consequence of complications during 
childbirth, the CEDAW Committee presented several recommendations to the 
state, which can be considered as falling within all three types of obligation I have 
mentioned here. For example, it is possible to consider the obligations of the state 
to ensure that pregnant women have access to ‘safe motherhood and affordable 
access for all women to adequate emergency obstetric care,’ and ‘that adequate 
sanctions are imposed on health professionals who violate women’s reproductive 
health rights’ as obligations of result.167 The service must be affordable. This 
can be read in terms of intersectional discrimination: poor women are the ones 
that suffer the most from the lack of financial means to pay for health services. 
‘Affordable’ might mean, in certain circumstances such as emergency maternal 
care, that the service, at least a minimum service, must be provided free of charge. 
This ‘minimum level’ was evoked by the High Court of Delhi, which, in Laxmi 
Mandal, reflected on the ‘minimum standard of treatment and care in public health 
facilities, and in particular the reproductive rights of the mother.’168 In a further 
judgment started motu proprio, the High Court obliged the state – and this is an 
obligation of result, not subject to any alea and not progressive – ‘to demarcate or 
hire or create at least two shelter centres meant for destitute pregnant women and 
lactating women so that proper care can be taken to see that no destitute woman 
is compelled to give birth to a child on the footpath.’169
As for access to EC, the reasoning is similar to that on abortion. When limited 
access to EC is a cause of VAWH, an obligation falls on the state to establish 
the legal and regulatory framework to provide emergency contraception free 
of charge, and without obstacles attributable to conscientious objection. So, for 
example, in Latin American countries lack of, or limited access to, EC is an 
example of VAWH, because it is associated with high rates of clandestine abor-
tion and of teen pregnancies, which are often the result of sexual violence. The 
debate on conscientious objection is also relevant when considering the case 
of EC: may a pharmacist or a hospital refuse to provide EC on the grounds of 
personal religious and cultural belief? One author has interestingly argued that, 
even though the general view in bioethics is that pharmacists should be allowed 
the right to refuse to provide EC in areas where pharmacies are numerous and EC 
can be obtained another way, there should be strong public policy requiring that 
all pharmacists dispense EC to customers who request it, notwithstanding moral 
or religious belief.170 In countries where conscientious objection by pharmacists 
is permitted, a practitioner who does not provide EC on grounds of conscience 
must refer eligible women to an alternative pharmacist or hospital. Refusal to do 
so should constitute legally actionable negligence.171
What about public hospitals? Public hospitals might claim to have a moral 
identity, which is enshrined in their mission, or statute. This mirrors the right 
to conscience of individuals, although a hospital does not have a ‘conscience’. 
Hospitals, however, have obligations to prevent harm to their patients, and are 
indeed the institutions that must deal as a matter of urgency with women who, 
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for example, have been raped. In the analysis that I am conducting in this book, 
concerning the vertical dimension of VAW, since states are responsible for the 
actions of health services providers, hospitals should ensure that rape victims 
have access to EC and the opportunity to receive information, no matter how old 
they are, or be taken, at the expense of any hospital that does not want to dispense 
the medicine, to the closest centre for rape victims.172
To provide effective remedies for violations of a woman’s right to health 
and reproductive health
The obligation to provide remedies for violations of human rights is present in 
many international and regional legal instruments.173 To reflect on the evolution 
of this obligation through the centuries, and to highlight the passage from a 
state-centred to a human rights-based approach to the provision of remedies, is 
not the purpose of this book.174 Accordingly, I will only provide a few remarks 
on this issue, before dealing with state obligations to provide effective remedies 
in cases of VAWH. As outlined by M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘the existence of State 
duties to provide a remedy and reparations forms the cornerstone of establishing 
accountability for violations and achieving justice for victims.’175 Dinah Shelton 
sees this obligation as composed of a procedural obligation (to afford remedies 
– complaints relating to the violation of human rights must be heard and decided 
by a competent judicial body) and a substantive obligation (to provide reparation, 
strictly speaking), related to the outcome of the proceedings and to its capacity 
to provide relief to the victim/survivor of the violation.176 Redress consists in 
both ‘the substance of the relief’ and the procedures through which relief may 
be obtained.177
Starting from the procedural aspect, the state must have in place ‘un appareil 
adéquat d’administration de la justice pour ce qui est des droits de l’homme.’178 
This is an obligation of result. For example, the CEDAW Committee found that 
Hungary had violated A.T.’s human rights because the state lacked specific leg-
islation on DV and sexual harassment providing sanctions against perpetrators of 
violence, and also lacked provisions for protection orders.179 In cases of DV and 
rape, the obligation to provide access to remedies is strictly related to other obli-
gations on the state. For example, in M.C. v. Bulgaria, decided by the ECtHR, the 
Bulgarian prosecutor had refused to start a criminal proceeding against alleged 
rapists because ‘in the absence of proof of resistance, it could not be concluded 
that the perpetrators had understood that the applicant had not consented.’180 In 
Equality Now v. Ethiopia, the system was in place, but insufficient: even though 
the actions of a prosecutor and a judge led to the acquittal of the perpetrators, 
there was no mechanism capable of granting retrial of the perpetrators and pun-
ishment for the acts committed.181
Turning to the vertical dimension, a judicial remedy is fundamental in cases 
of abortion, to avoid the exercise of a completely discretionary power by medical 
personnel. In the landmark L.C. v. Peru case, the CEDAW Committee acknowl-
edged that the medical decision – to delay spinal surgery and deny abortion – had 
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been guided by ‘sociocultural pattern based on a stereotypical function of a 
woman and her reproductive capacity.’182 L.C. had been at the mercy of the med-
ical personnel, because of the lack of legislative measures regulating access to 
abortion, and her right to be heard, following due process, had ben violated.183 Not 
all judicial procedures are suitable for granting an effective legal remedy. In the 
case at issue, amparo, a procedure that works as an extraordinary legal remedy 
against violations of constitutional rights by state organs, was not considered to 
have been adequate given the time frame.184 According to the Committee, which 
analysed the issue for admissibility, the amparo procedure ‘was too long and 
unsatisfactory,’ and it had not been reasonable for the applicant to initiate ‘a 
proceeding of an unpredictable duration.’185
In Tysiac v. Poland, the ECtHR found that an ordinance issued in 1997 gov-
erning access to therapeutic abortion did not provide any mechanism to solve 
disagreements arising between the pregnant woman and her doctors, or between 
the doctors themselves, therefore ‘Polish law as applied to the applicant’s case 
[did not contain] any effective mechanisms capable of determining whether the 
conditions for obtaining a lawful abortion had been met in her case. It created for 
the applicant a situation of prolonged uncertainty.’ The law, in this case, caused 
‘severe distress and anguish’ to Tysiac.186
In cases of involuntary sterilisation, the IACHR clearly contended that a system 
ought to have been in place capable of ‘criminalising certain violations,’ and that 
it must allow the possibility for the patient to report to relevant authorities cases 
in which physician(s) have not complied with the ethical and legal requirements 
of medical practice, in order to establish responsibilities and have access to com-
pensation.187 The obligation on the state to provide access to remedies exists even 
where, at the time of the procedure, the law admitted the practices complained 
of for eugenic purposes. These proceedings can only start when the victims/
survivors of the practice are capable of speaking out and of reporting cases, even 
though many years may have passed.188
Providing access to remedies is also fundamental in cases where violations 
relate to maternal health.189
Turning to the substantive aspect, the analysis will be conducted both here 
and in the next sub-section of this book, on due diligence obligations.190 The 
obligation to provide reparations must aim not only at providing monetary com-
pensation, but also, and most importantly, at ‘re-humanising’ victims, ‘restor-
ing’ them as ‘functioning members of the society.’191 My reasoning aims to 
understand how to ‘gender’ reparations, in terms both of obligations of result 
and of due diligence obligations. To ‘gender’ reparations means to rely on the 
‘transformative potential of reparations,’ which seeks to disrupt the domino effect 
that condemns victims/survivors to continue suffering.192 As Margaret Urban 
Walker has argued, the project of gendering reparations does not aim to disregard 
men’s suffering, but rather to examine how, with women, ‘the original violation 
is extended, ramified, and augmented in multiple ways.’193 Ruth Rubio-Marín, 
though discussing large-scale reparation programmes in transitional societies, 
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has identified some elements that ‘gender’ reparations.194 She observes that due 
recognition to victims should include recognition of the wrongful violation of 
the victim’s rights, acknowledgement of state responsibility, recognition of the 
most serious harms resulting from the violation and a serious attempt to help 
victims cope with some of the effects of the violation, and to subvert, even though 
minimally, the structures of subordination.195 These elements are scattered across 
the analysis of the jurisprudence and quasi-jurisprudence that I proposed in the 
anamnesis and discussed in the diagnosis.
Reparations can consist in the acknowledgement of state responsibility, plus 
monetary compensation. The obligation to provide the amount of compensa-
tion fixed in the judgment is meant to be an obligation of result. As UN treaty 
bodies require the state to provide ‘appropriate’ compensation, in that sense I 
might suggest that the obligation to provide reparations is an obligation of result, 
whereas the definition of the amount of financial compensation is an obligation 
of due diligence, subject to the alea, the uncertainty how the courts will decide 
the case. Where it finds that a state party violated one or more rights of the appli-
cant, the ECtHR decides the amount of ‘just satisfaction’ in the victim’s favour. 
Determination of reparations is not usually gendered, and the victim’s rights to 
health and to reproductive health are only indirectly mentioned in the text of the 
judgment.
The jurisprudence of the IACHR has proved, quite to the contrary, to have 
broadened the scope of reparations, following a ‘holistic gender approach.’196 In 
da Penha, the state was required to adopt measures ‘to grant the victim appropriate 
symbolic and actual compensation for the violence …, in particular for its failure 
to provide rapid and effective remedies, for the impunity that has surrounded the 
case for more than 15 years,’ but also ‘for making it impossible, as a result of that 
delay, to institute timely proceedings for redress and compensation in the civil 
sphere.’197 The violation of the rights to health and to reproductive health is not 
only an essential element in determining the amount of compensation, but also 
leads to the inclusion, among reparation measures, of free medical and psycholog-
ical treatment for the victim. For example, in I.V. v. Bolivia, which relates to the 
vertical dimension of my analysis, the IACHR required the state to ‘immediately’ 
provide I.V., at no expense to her, through its specialised institutions, medical 
treatment relating to her sexual and reproductive health, ‘as well as psychological 
and/or psychiatric treatment,’ including all medicines that might be necessary.198 
The Court also recommended the state to provide such treatment, whether nec-
essary or not, for other members of the family. In a previous judgment on VAW, 
Cotton Field, which relates to the horizontal dimension of my analysis, the Court 
required the state to ‘provide appropriate and effective medical, psychological or 
psychiatric treatment, immediately and free of charge, through specialized state 
health institutions to all the next of kin considered victims by this tribunal.’199 In 
Cotton Field the women had been abducted, sexually violated and murdered, and 
the case was brought by their relatives, who were therefore entitled to receive 
compensation. The Court also ordered, as a measure of satisfaction, which is 
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clearly an obligation of result, the judgment to be published in the official journal 
of the state, and a public act acknowledging international responsibility to be 
organised.200 (A similar order was made in I.V. v. Bolivia.)201 In Cotton Field, the 
Court also required the state to create a legal mechanism ‘for transferring cases 
from the civil courts to the federal jurisdiction when impunity exists or when 
serious irregularities are proven in the preliminary investigations.’202
Turning back to the vertical dimension of my analysis, in I.V. v. Bolivia the 
Court ordered the state, ‘within a year’, to adopt education and permanent train-
ing programmes for medical students and health personnel on informed consent, 
discrimination based on gender and stereotypes, and gender-based violence.203 I 
consider this an obligation of result, because the Court clearly set a time frame 
within which the goal must be attained,204 although it could be considered an 
obligation to progressively take steps. Despite the innovative legal reasoning 
in terms of reparations, however, in I.V. the element of discrimination against 
I.V. as a refugee, although mentioned in the merits, was not taken into account 
in determining the amount of compensation.205 In comparison, the reasoning in 
Cotton Field was more advanced, since it considered that measures of reparation 
must be ‘designed to identify and eliminate the factors that cause discrimination,’ 
and be adopted ‘from a gender perspective, bearing in mind the different impact 
that violence has on men and on women.’206 This perspective on reparations, 
which contemplates a ‘transformative redress’ beyond mere restitution, should 
guide the legal reasoning of every court and UN treaty body.207
Positive obligations of due diligence in specific cases – or ‘procedural’ 
due diligence
To investigate without delay
The decisions that I put forward in the anamnesis show that it is well estab-
lished that acts that constitute VAWH under the definition I propose must be 
investigated by national authorities with due diligence. This obligation is linked 
to the duty to prosecute the alleged perpetrator, which can be considered as 
standing at the intersection of the three forms of obligation: it can be seen as an 
obligation of result, because the outcome is to prosecute the alleged perpetrator 
and assess his criminal responsibility; of due diligence in the manner in which 
both the investigation and prosecution are conducted, without undue delay and 
in a gender-sensitive way;208 and an obligation to progressively take steps, since 
it requires a process of training the authorities, including the judiciary, and a 
complex change of attitude in a given society.
It should be stressed that the state might be responsible for violating human 
rights, even where the victim obtained justice (arrest and conviction of the per-
petrator, for example).209 Due diligence means, in practice, ensuring that author-
ities act without ‘undue delay,’ and avoid any form of secondary victimisation 
which would place unbearable stress on injured party, with the consequence 
of causing her another form of gender-based violence. This aspect was evident 
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in particular in the decisions rendered on DV, and it is now enshrined as legal 
obligation in the Council of Europe Istanbul Convention (Article 49(1)). So, 
for example, in Yildirim v. Turkey, the CEDAW Committee recommended the 
state prosecute the alleged perpetrators promptly, and give due consideration to 
Fatma Yildirim’s safety.210 In Opuz v. Turkey, the ECtHR was not convinced that 
‘the local authorities displayed the required diligence to prevent the recurrence 
of violent attacks against the applicant,’ and the proof was that ‘the applicant’s 
husband perpetrated them without hindrance and with impunity to the detriment 
of the rights recognised by the Convention.’211 How may we clearly define the 
due diligence obligation to act without undue delay? It means to act when the 
authorities ‘know or should know’ the risk of harm for the victim, or, to borrow 
an expression used by the ECtHR, in the ‘immediacy’ of the risk.212 Harm, as seen 
in chapter 2, consists in both physical and psychological suffering for the victim. 
In that respect, the rights to health and to reproductive health, despite being 
seldom invoked even by the CEDAW Committee in cases of DV, play a pivotal 
role. In V.K. v. Bulgaria, the CEDAW Committee argued that the risk does not 
manifest as ‘a direct and immediate threat to the life or health of the victim,’ 
because DV ‘is not limited to acts that inflict physical harm, but also covers acts 
that inflict mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats of any such acts, coercion 
and other deprivations of liberty.’213 In other words, the immediacy of the harm 
was determined by the consequences of DV for V.K.’s health. The argument 
elaborated by the ECtHR in Talpis v. Italy is of utmost interest, even though not 
yet consolidated by further decisions of the Court. As I have argued elsewhere,214 
in Talpis a revised ‘Osman test’ – envisaging positive obligations on the state 
in situations presenting imminent risk to an individual’s right to life caused 
by a non-state actor – as suggested by Judge De Albuquerque in Valiulienė v. 
Lithuania, gradually entered the legal reasoning of the Court. The case involved 
DV; it caused Loreta Valiulienė minor bodily injuries; but Judge De Albuquerque 
acknowledged that the stage of ‘immediate risk’ might be too late for the state to 
intervene, and that ‘a more rigorous standard of diligence is especially necessary’ 
in societies where the problem of domestic violence is widespread. Seeming to 
refer to a ‘collective’ harm caused by DV, which affects women in a given society 
because they are women, he reformulated the test as follows:
If a State knows or ought to know that a segment of its population, such as women, is 
subject to repeated violence and fails to prevent harm from befalling the members of 
that group of people when they face a present (but not yet imminent) risk, the State 
can be found responsible by omission for the resulting human rights violations. The 
constructive anticipated duty to prevent and protect is the reverse side of the context 
of widespread abuse and violence already known to the State authorities.
The ECtHR, in Talpis v. Italy, followed the way paved by Judge De Albuquerque, 
in stressing the ‘particular context’ of domestic violence, and the aspect of repe-
tition of violent acts.215 The judges also used the expression ‘particular due dili-
gence,’ which refers to the context of DV: a very interesting perspective, although 
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quite unique at the moment, which can be reinforced in future judgments by some 
considerations on the right to health of the woman who has survived violence. 
As outlined by the CEDAW Committee in A.T. v. Hungary, a general obligation 
on the state is to ‘assure victims of domestic violence the maximum protection 
of the law by acting with due diligence to prevent and respond to such violence 
against women.’216 To borrow the expression used by Karine Bannelier on due 
diligence in cyberspace, ‘qui peut et n’empêche, pèche,’ the state is responsible 
for violating a woman’s rights to health and reproductive health if it knew or 
should have known (constructive diligence) that she risked a form of violence, 
had the means to prevent this and did not do anything.217 Of course this might 
sound easy in theory and difficult in concreto; nonetheless, the jurisprudence has 
started to identify what a ‘diligent’ prevention of violence against women means.
In femicide and rape cases investigations are fundamental. In Cotton Field, 
despite Mexico admitting responsibility for the first stage of investigations, the 
Court found that the state had not displayed due diligence in the second stage of 
investigations, owing to the ‘ineffective responses and the indifferent attitudes 
that have been documented in relation to the investigation of these crimes.’218 In 
the López Soto report, the IACommHR concluded that, ‘taking into account the 
extreme risk to which a woman who was reported missing is exposed’ – López 
Soto had been abducted and raped – the state had failed to comply with ‘its duty 
to prevent and protect once it became aware or should have known about the situ-
ation of risk she faced.’219 The Court, to which the case was referred, highlighted 
how state responsibility stemmed from the ‘insufficient and negligent reaction of 
the public servants who … did not adopt the measures that one could have reason-
ably expected to comply with the due diligence required to prevent and interrupt 
the concatenation of events.’220 Interestingly, it also argued that an alleged epi-
sode of VAW requires ‘a reinforced due diligence,’221 evoking the ‘particular due 
diligence’ in the European jurisprudence. Judges then identified how stereotypes 
prevent appropriate investigations. This means, in other words, that states have 
due diligence obligations to investigate actual cases of gender-based VAW in an 
efficient and timely way, without being misled by stereotypes.
Investigation without delay must also characterise cases belonging to the ver-
tical dimension. Here, for example, in Andrea Szijjarto v. Hungary the CEDAW 
Committee considered the complaint admissible even though the domestic rem-
edies had not been exhausted, and the reason was the ‘unreasonably prolonged’ 
delay of more than three years from the dates of the incidents, ‘particularly con-
sidering that the author has been at risk of irreparable harm and threats to her life 
during that period.’222 Even though rarely stressed by the doctrine, investigation is 
also relevant in cases of abortion. In Mellet v. Ireland, the HRC found that a peti-
tion to a domestic court ‘would have been ineffective and inadequate,’ and that ‘in 
the extremely unlikely event that a court found that she had a legal right to access 
abortion in Ireland, the author would have been unable to terminate her pregnancy 
there.’223 Furthermore, the mechanisms available were insufficient and inadequate 
because they would have caused ‘mental suffering by forcing [Amanda Mellet] to 
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undergo public litigation.’224 In other words, states must provide an expeditious 
and confidential way to decide cases in which a woman may challenge a decision 
by physicians to deny her access to abortion. She must also be protected from 
interference by third parties, so her case must be anonymous and adjudicated 
without delay. This aspect emerged in P. and S. v. Poland, where the ECtHR 
found that the provisions of the civil law ‘as applied by the Polish courts did not 
make available a procedural instrument by which a pregnant woman seeking an 
abortion could fully vindicate her right to respect for her private life,’ and that, 
furthermore, the civil law remedy was ‘retroactive’ and ‘compensatory’ only.225 
When involuntary sterilisations are performed, according to the jurisprudence of 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the investigation that follows must 
respond to an ‘urgent and careful scrutiny of the circumstances of the case.’226
To provide access to health services and to information
As I investigated in chapter 1, the jurisprudence of regional human rights courts 
and the quasi-jurisprudence of UN treaty bodies has determined a significant 
development in the elaboration of an obligation to provide access to health ser-
vices and to information, which is an obligation of result. Are there elements of 
due diligence? The answer is positive. In cases of DV and rape, for example, this 
means that real access must be provided to health services capable of providing 
support to a specific victim/survivor of violence. In other words, it must be poss-
ible for any woman to gain access to the forms of protection and support envis-
aged by the law. If the obligation of result consists in having in place adequate 
shelters and services to respond to victims of DV, the due diligence obligation 
means providing health services and information in actual cases, doing whatever 
is needed to grant protection to the victim/survivor and her children.
Since the vertical dimension includes state laws and policies in the field of 
health, it does not seem possible to find margin for the application of the due 
diligence standard. Nonetheless, I contend that there is margin. My conclusion 
in chapter 2 was that the vertical dimension is also characterised by policies and 
practices adopted by public or private bodies dealing with public services, such 
as the health service. Therefore, even though it may have put laws in place, the 
state is responsible when it does not exercise due diligence to prevent practices 
that cause VAWH in individual cases. In a case involving an entire indigenous 
community, including its women, the IACHR declared that Paraguay had ‘failed 
to take the required positive measures, within its powers, that could reasonably be 
expected to prevent or to avoid the risk to the right to life.’227 The death of many 
women before, during or after bearing children had been caused by the lack of 
an adequate state apparatus to provide minimum health services (an obligation 
of result), and because of the lack of due diligence in providing access to health 
services in the specific case.
The passage from obligations of result to due diligence obligations seems 
clear in the landmark Pimentel Teixeira decision, where the CEDAW Committee 
argued that ‘the State is directly responsible for the action of private institutions 
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when it outsources its medical services and … furthermore, the State always main-
tains the duty to regulate and monitor private health-care institutions.’228 Indeed, 
among the recommendations of the Committee to the state, ‘ensure that private 
health-care facilities comply with relevant national and international standards 
on reproductive health care’229 is relevant. It entails ‘the policy … [ensuring] that 
there are strong and focused executive bodies to implement such policies.’230 In a 
similar case, when a pregnant woman had to wait too long before getting medical 
support, the judges of the ECtHR were convinced that the negligence attributable 
to the hospital staff ‘went beyond a mere error or medical negligence, in so far 
as the doctors working there, in full awareness of the facts and in breach of their 
professional obligations, did not take all the emergency measures necessary to 
attempt to keep their patient alive.’231 The Court found that the state had violated 
the procedural obligation under Article 2 ECHR, in particular because, as I will 
discuss in the next sub-section, it had not provided an effective remedy to Mrs 
Şentürk. In a broader sense, as suggested by the CEDAW Committee, it can be 
argued that the state also has the obligation to ‘regulate and monitor’ healthcare 
institutions, both public and private, to avoid cases of malpractice.
The issue which challenges my paradigm in its vertical dimension is the 
instance of a state failing to allow pharmacists to conscientiously object to EC 
by law, but de facto allowing pharmacists to exercise conscientious objection. 
According to the analysis conducted in this book, the state bears an obligation to 
establish the legal framework necessary to grant to women access to EC (a law 
that, while permitting conscientious objection, compels pharmacists to refer the 
woman to another pharmacist, for example); to adopt all necessary measures to 
respond to an actual case in which a woman reports to the authorities difficulties 
in gaining access to the medicine; and to progressively take steps to disrupt the 
‘male’ attitude in the medical sector.
I have already argued that the obligation to provide information is an example 
of obligation of result, because it implies the enactment of laws obliging appro-
priate and objective information to be given to women. I am arguing here that 
it can also be a kind of due diligence obligation, when the law is in place but 
its application is not effective. For example, in P. and S. v. Poland the ECtHR 
considered that, despite Polish law obliging practitioners to state in writing any 
refusal to perform abortion, and to refer the case to another physician, ‘the staff 
involved in the applicants’ case did not consider themselves obliged to carry out 
the abortion expressly requested by the applicants on the strength of the certificate 
issued by the prosecutor,’ and that the applicants ‘did not receive appropriate and 
objective medical counselling which would have due regard to their own views 
and wishes.’232
The provision of objective and reliable information is fundamental where a 
woman is to be sterilised. The state violates its due diligence obligations when 
it does not act in order to prevent the provision of misleading information or 
coercion by health personnel to undergo the practice. In Szijjarto, the CEDAW 
confirmed the reasoning in its GR No. 24, and considered that Hungary ‘has not 
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ensured that the author gave her fully informed consent to be sterilised.’233 In that 
respect, the Committee recommended the state ‘monitor public and private health 
centres, including hospitals and clinics, which perform sterilization procedures 
so as to ensure that fully informed consent is being given by the patient before 
any sterilization procedure is carried out, with appropriate sanctions in place 
in the event of a breach.’234 The ECtHR followed a similar reasoning in V.C. v. 
Slovakia, when it decided that the laws in force at the time of V.C.’s sterilisation 
had required her consent prior to medical intervention, but that ‘in the applicant’s 
case, [they] did not provide appropriate safeguards.’235
The element of consent, which matters in a case of involuntary sterilisation 
but can be considered as a generally important element in all cases, was defined 
in the following terms by the IACHR in I.V. v. Bolivia: consent must be granted 
prior to the medical procedure; it must be given in a free, voluntary, autonomous 
way, without pressure of any kind; it must not be used as a condition for access 
to other procedures or benefits, and no coercion, threats or disinformation may 
be employed; it must be full and informed.236 In particular, the Court argued that 
the obligation of ‘active transparency’ (transparencia activa) requires the state 
to provide information that is necessary so that individuals can ‘exercise other 
rights;’237 in other words, access to information is instrumental to the enjoyment 
of other rights. Consequently, according to the Court, the obligation of active 
transparency the state must abide by consists in the duty of health personnel 
to provide information which can contribute to the patient making free and 
responsible decisions regarding his/her own body and reproductive health.238 
Accordingly, the obligation of active transparency includes both an obligation of 
result to establish the limits to the medical action, and a due diligence obligation 
to guarantee that these limits are adequate and effective in practice.239 As pointed 
out by the Court: ‘in the implementation of the Bolivian laws which regulate 
access to sexual and reproductive health,’ the state must adopt the necessary 
measures to ‘ensure that in all public and private hospitals the prior, free, full, 
and informed consent is obtained from the woman before interventions that lead 
to sterilisation.’240
To provide access to an effective judicial remedy with due diligence
When laws are in place, states can be held responsible for violation of due 
process rights when a woman encounters difficulties in gaining access to judicial 
remedies. I list this aspect under both obligations of result and obligations of due 
diligence: on one hand, it is true that providing access to a judicial remedy is an 
obligation of result, but I contend that the way in which this access is provided 
is subject to an alea which characterises this obligation as an obligation of due 
diligence. So, for example, the IACommHR considered the application of Maria 
da Penha admissible, although she had not exhausted all domestic remedies, 
because of the length of the proceedings and the attitude shown to victims of 
DV by courts and lawyers.241 In V.K. v. Bulgaria, the CEDAW Committee noted 
that the state party had adopted a law on protection against DV, which included 
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a fast-track procedure for issuing immediate protection orders, but that ‘the 
political will that is expressed in such specific legislation must be supported 
by all State actors, including the courts, who are bound by the obligations of 
the State party.’242 Accordingly, the Committee found that when the Plovdiv 
courts refused to issue a permanent protection order against V.K.’s husband, the 
restrictive definition of DV that was applied, along with the ‘very high standard 
of proof’ required, meant that the state had violated its obligation to effectively 
protect V.K. against DV. In Valiulienė, the ECtHR found that the national law 
provided ‘a sufficient regulatory framework to pursue the crimes,’ but that in 
the case at hand enormous delay had occurred in the proceedings: the criminal 
proceedings were discontinued, and this had been the opposite of a guarantee of 
effective protection.243 In Lenahan et al. the IACommHR, despite considering 
the USA responsible for not protecting Jessica Lenahan and her daughters from 
DV, found that the state was not internationally responsible for failures to grant 
her access to courts.244 Lenahan, whose daughters were killed by her husband 
who then committed suicide, had been able to reach the Supreme Court, which 
ruled against her, without any irregularities, omissions or delays. The due dili-
gence obligation had been met.
An effective remedy should also be characterised by gender-sensitive pro-
ceedings, in which courts are capable of ‘seeing’ how gender matters in the 
prosecution of certain offences. This aspect was highlighted by the CEDAW 
Committee in V.K. v. Bulgaria.245
In a case of rape committed by state organs, the IACommHR found that 
Mexico had not acted with due diligence in investigating the violation of Mariana 
Selvas Gómez and another ten women’s rights: their complaint to obtain jus-
tice was not thoroughly examined by courts during more than ten years after 
the facts complained of.246 Judicial ineffectiveness, as argued by the IACHR in 
Cotton Field concerning femicides committed by private parties, ‘encourage[d] 
an environment of impunity that facilitate[d] and promote[d] the repetition of acts 
of violence in general and sen[t] a message that violence against women [wa]s 
tolerated and accepted as part of daily life.’247
Turning to maternal health, the ECtHR stressed the procedural element of the 
right to life in Byrzykowski v. Poland, where the state was found in violation of 
Article 2 ECHR for not effectively investigating after Byrzykowski died as a 
consequence of epidural anaesthesia. In a similar, more recent case, Z. v. Poland, 
the Court pointed out that states are required to ‘set up an effective independent 
judicial system so that the cause of death of patients in the care of the medical pro-
fession, whether in the public or the private sector, can be determined and those 
responsible made accountable,’ and that the obligation to determine responsibility 
in the case at issue was an ‘obligation of means only.’248 Such a system could have 
considered, on one hand, the need to have a system in place competent to deal 
with the deaths of patients and to assess the possibility of granting  compensation 
– a result – and, on the other hand, the margin the state has in choosing a 
type of remedy. As the Court further argued, in the specific sphere of medical 
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 negligence the obligation may be satisfied through different means: a remedy in 
the criminal courts, or ‘a remedy in the civil courts, either alone or in conjunction 
with a remedy in the criminal courts, enabling any responsibility of the doctors 
concerned to be established and any appropriate civil redress, such as an order 
for damages and/or for the publication of the decision, to be obtained.’249 This 
argument is upheld in the Şentürk v. Turkey judgment, where the Court referred to 
the state’s positive obligation to establish an ‘effective and independent system’ 
to decide with promptness and due diligence cases of the death of patients, and 
to this obligation being violated when the protection afforded by domestic law 
‘exist[s] only in theory:’ so ‘it must also operate effectively in practice, and that 
requires a prompt examination of the case without unnecessary delays.’250
Beyond the obligation on states to establish a specific mechanism to provide 
remedies to the victims of human rights violations, there are due diligence obli-
gations to provide effective remedy, in the sense that they are subject to the alea 
of the outcome. 251
For example, in Cotton Field the Court ordered the state to ‘effectively’ con-
duct ‘the criminal proceedings that were underway and, if applicable, those that 
may be opened in the future, to identify, prosecute and punish the perpetrators 
and masterminds of the disappearance, ill-treatments and deprivation of life’ 
of the women, whose relatives had brought the case before the Inter-American 
human rights bodies.252 In identifying the elements of the obligation, the due 
diligence standard emerges strongly: the Court asked the state ‘to use all available 
means to ensure that the … judicial proceedings are conducted promptly in order 
to avoid a repetition of the same or similar acts as those in the instant case.’253 
In Fernández Ortega, the IACHR, amid a long list of measures to be adopted as 
reparation for the rape of a young woman belonging to an indigenous minority, 
pointed out ‘the importance of implementing reparations that have a community 
scope and that allow the victim to reincorporate herself into her living space 
and cultural identity,’ which required the state in this specific case, ‘to provide 
the necessary resources for the Me’phaa indigenous community … to be able to 
establish a community centre.’254 The determination of the resources ‘necessary’ 
constitutes an obligation of due diligence, on which the IACHR wished to stay 
informed. In assessing compliance with the judgment in 2015, the Court required 
the state to present a report every six months in order to verify that it had 
respected the obligation to provide redress to Inés Fernández Ortega in her status 
within the community.255
Positive obligations to progressively take steps
To change patterns of discrimination that contribute to VAWH
In the diagnosis, I argued that VAWH can be seen in terms of patterns of discrim-
ination, both in its horizontal and in its vertical dimension. I further contended 
that patterns of discrimination are not just social and cultural patterns rooted in 
society, but also the persistence of and ‘tolerance’ states demonstrate for VAWH. 
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The question now is how to disrupt these patterns of discrimination, and in what 
sense this can be identified as an obligation to progressively take steps. The 
CEDAW Committee has repeatedly considered the prohibition of discrimination 
as an obligation of immediate effect,256 and so it is, particularly when it comes 
to pursuing non-discrimination de jure, in the law, or, if read in terms of repara-
tions, obliging the state to provide public acknowledgement of its responsibility, 
condemnation of discrimination. An element of due diligence obligation could 
also be identified, if we read the prohibition of discrimination in a specific case, 
for example when investigations are conducted. For instance, in I.V. v. Bolivia, 
where I.V. was sterilised without prior and informed consent, the IACHR posited 
that consent can be extorted by forms of violence, coercion or discrimination,257 
and that the relationship of power between the physician and the patient can be 
‘exacerbated by the unequal power relations that have historically characterised 
men and women, as well as by gender stereotypes … which, consciously or 
unconsciously constitute the basis of practices that reinforce the dependent and 
subordinate position of women.’258
The obligation to eliminate all forms of discrimination against women includes 
the obligation to eliminate discrimination based on gender stereotypes,259 which 
can persist in society and in the attitude of organs of the state or of people 
working in public fields, such as health. It is an obligation to take steps progres-
sively, which implies respecting, over time, obligations both of result and of 
due diligence.260 Examples of these measures are the publication of a pamphlet 
on women’s sexual and reproductive health that includes the requirement for 
informed consent.261 This is a result, but one that requires time and an action by 
the state which is not immediate.
An interesting example of positive obligations to take steps to disrupt patterns 
of discrimination in cases of DV is found in the Maria da Penha case. The 
IACommHR acknowledged that ‘the State has adopted a number of measures 
intended to reduce the scope of domestic violence and tolerance by the State 
thereof, although these measures have not yet had a significant impact on the 
pattern of State tolerance of violence against women, in particular as a result 
of ineffective police and judicial action in Brazil,’ and recommended the state 
‘continue and expand the reform process that will put an end to the condoning 
by the State of domestic violence against women in Brazil and discrimination in 
the handling thereof.’262 In particular, the Commission called for a change in the 
pattern of discrimination both within society and within the state apparatus; the 
former, by the ‘inclusion in teaching curriculums of units aimed at providing an 
understanding of the importance of respecting women and their rights recognized 
in the Convention of Belém do Pará, as well as the handling of domestic conflict’; 
the latter, through ‘measures to train and raise the awareness of officials of the 
judiciary and specialized police so that they may understand the importance of 
not condoning domestic violence.’263
In a case of rape, the IACommHR considered, in the López Soto report, 
‘the more general contexts of gender violence and impunity for violence’ and 
DE VIDO 9781526124975 PRINT.indd   217 24/03/2020   11:02
Violence against women’s health in international law
218
 recommended several mechanisms to ensure non-repetition, which can be 
grouped within my category of ‘obligations to progressively take steps.’ These 
include designing and implementing ‘a national policy on prevention of violence 
against women and gender-based violence that includes effective supervision and 
oversight mechanisms,’ and reinforcing ‘the institutional capacity for responding 
to the structural problems identified in this case as factors of impunity in cases of 
violence against women.’264 In the judgment in the same case, the Court required 
the state, ‘[with]in a reasonable time’, to include in the education system a 
permanent programme named after López Soto with the purpose of eradicating 
gender-based violence.265 In Atenco, the IACHR asked the state to draw up a plan 
addressed to police forces in order to assess respect for the standards elaborated 
by the court on the use of force during demonstrations, and the gender-sensitivity 
of their actions.266
In abortion cases, the CEDAW Committee, in L.C. v. Peru, recommended 
that the state should ‘take measures to ensure that the relevant provisions of 
the Convention and the Committee’s GR No. 24 with regard to reproductive 
rights are known and observed in all health-care facilities,’ including ‘education 
and training programmes to encourage health providers to change their attitudes 
and behaviour in relation to adolescent women seeking reproductive health ser-
vices and [to] respond to specific health needs related to sexual violence,’ and 
‘guidelines or protocols to ensure health services are available and accessible 
in public facilities.’267 This obligation can also entail elements of due diligence, 
when the state, whose legislative apparatus is supposed to meet international 
obligations, must ensure that health services comply with laws in place. The 
CEDAW Committee found, in Pimentel Teixeira, obligations which can fall 
under the category of obligations to progressively take steps to protect maternal 
health, including the provision of ‘adequate professional training for health work-
ers, especially on women’s reproductive health rights, including quality medical 
treatment during pregnancy and delivery, as well as timely emergency obstetric 
care,’ training ‘for the judiciary and for law enforcement personnel,’ and ‘the 
implementation of the National Pact for the Reduction of Maternal Mortality at 
state and municipal levels.’268
As highlighted in the provisions of the Istanbul Convention which, except for 
sterilisation and forced abortion, mainly focuses on the horizontal dimension 
of VAWH, it is fundamental to involve men and boys in changing patterns 
of discrimination (Article 12(4)). It is important to consider why perpetrators 
commit DV, why men rape women, why women continue to perform FGM/C on 
new-born girls, why a society limits women’s access to abortion, why in hospital 
the will of the physician prevails when he/she forces a woman to be sterilised or 
to be subjected to damaging procedures while giving birth. An approach which 
combines both the dimensions of violence envisaged in this book and highlights 
the interconnections between the two in terms of states’ obligations might prompt 
an evolution of state practice and of the jurisprudence of regional human rights 
courts and UN treaty bodies alike.
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To establish mechanisms of non-repetition
The jurisprudence of the IACHR helps to identify obligations to progressively 
take steps by adopting mechanisms and procedures to counter gender-based 
VAW. So, for example, following the trend inaugurated by Cotton Field,269 in 
López Soto the IACHR acknowledged that the state had already adopted a law 
establishing tribunals on VAW, and required Peru, ‘within [a] reasonable time’ 
to guarantee the adequate and efficient functioning of these mechanisms.270 This 
obligation to take steps also entails an obligation of result – the establishment of 
efficient tribunals – but one which requires time, and action by the state which is 
not immediate. State practice would not allow me to assert that states are obliged 
to establish such tribunals; however, when they have enacted laws doing so, they 
must guarantee the efficient functioning of the tribunals. In Atenco, the Court 
recognised that Mexico had established mechanisms to monitor cases of sexual 
violence against women, but it asked the state to reinforce the system within two 
years, to include a process of diagnosis of the ‘phenomenon of sexual torture 
against women,’ and to draw up periodic proposals for public policies.271
In a case of involuntary sterilisation, the IACHR decided that the state must 
ensure that all hospitals adopt a document stating, ‘in a concise, clear and access-
ible’ style, women’s rights with regard to their sexual and reproductive health, in 
conformity with the I.V. judgment and international obligations. This document 
must be available in all public and private hospitals in Bolivia, accessible to both 
patients and doctors.272
To provide data on VAWH
For similar reasons data must be collected on specific types of violence, such as 
DV and femicide; this has been encouraged both by the CEDAW in its GR No. 
35, and by the Special Rapporteur on VAW.273 There is an increasing trend to 
collect data on such practices to better counter them, but what about other forms 
of violence? It seems to me, but this is again de jure condendo, that states ought to 
collect and make available data covering all the types of violence I have discussed 
in these pages, namely DV, rape, FGM/C, abortion, involuntary sterilisation, 
OV and limiting access to contraception. The ‘first and continuing task’274 to 
collect data has preventative purposes in the fight against VAHW, but also raises 
awareness of the existence of a pattern of discrimination and can propel reforms 
or changes in society. In López Soto the IACHR required the state to collect and 
analyse data on VAW, and during the first three years to report annually on the 
steps taken in that direction.275 As I mentioned in the anamnesis, the publication 
of data on OV in Italy paved the way for women to come forward and report 
maternity-room practices that damaged their physical and psychological health, 
while the recognition of a practice of forced sterilisation in Japan prompted the 
first case ever before a Japanese court. The EU Commission has affirmed, in its 
‘Strategic engagement for gender equality 2016–2019’, that ending VAW entails 
‘on going actions’ to improve the availability, quality and reliability of data on 
gender-based violence through cooperation with several actors.276
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Conclusions on state obligations:  
a mutually reinforcing framework and some open issues
The strength of this chapter lies in the fact that both dimensions, the horizontal 
and the vertical as conceived in this book, can be unified while discussing the 
reconceptualisation of states’ obligations. In both dimensions, I contended that, 
and provided examples of how, states bear legal obligations of result, due dili-
gence obligations and obligations to progressively take steps.
At the beginning of the chapter, the first impression could have been that 
due diligence obligations only pertain to the horizontal dimension, because they 
concern interpersonal relations and the state is responsible for preventing and 
combating violence committed by private individuals. I showed that this is only 
partly true, since practices in the field of health causing VAWH can also be pre-
vented by the state monitoring with due diligence the activity of health personnel 
operating both in the private and public sector, and responding in an efficient way 
to episodes of malpractice. It was perhaps tempting to argue that in the horizontal 
dimension positive obligations prevail, whereas negative obligations – plus some 
obligations of result – are present in the vertical dimension. I demonstrated that 
this is not the case.
The difference between the two dimensions does not lie in the ‘type’ of the 
obligations, but rather the fact that obligations ‘specialise’ along the line of one or 
the other dimension. I noticed that in cases of DV one crucial aspect of the state 
obligations stressed by courts and UN bodies alike is investigation. Be that as it 
may, DV affects women’s rights to health and to reproductive health, it causes 
VAWH, and so the authorities must respond by providing services capable of 
supporting victims/survivors of DV. As for the vertical dimension, the emphasis 
could have been solely on repealing laws that criminalise abortion and eugenic 
laws, or on adopting laws relating to maternal health, because the dimension does 
concern state policies and laws in the health field, and practices within health 
services. Nonetheless, as I showed, investigation and access to justice are also 
fundamental. When a woman is denied proceedings that expeditiously analyse 
her request for reconsideration after abortion has been refused by a physician, this 
illustrates these aspects.
In this section I turn to consider a few issues that have been left aside or that 
will open the way for future research and analysis. Given the above, one might 
ask whether the obligations that I have reconceptualised in this chapter belong to 
the category of ‘core obligations’, in the expression used by UN treaty bodies. 
Considering the ambiguous nature of these obligations, it is difficult to pin down 
in a list what is a core obligation and what is not. Furthermore, in its GC No. 22 
on the right to sexual and reproductive health the ESCR Committee has already 
performed the analysis. What seems clear to me is that there is a trend towards 
determining positive obligations, especially in fields in which it was difficult to 
conceptualise them, such as access to health services. This does not mean that all 
the obligations I have explored have been clearly established at the international 
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level. I could see a trend towards conceptualising positive obligations to provide 
access to health services, especially in the vertical dimension; but I also notice, in 
the horizontal dimension, that the provision of health services, such as psycholog-
ical and psychiatric assistance for example, has become pivotal.
In this chapter I also argued that a minimum level of health care relating to 
both the horizontal and vertical dimensions should be provided for free, or at 
least be affordable, taking gender particularities into account, to the extent that 
men’s access to reproductive services is free or affordable. This obligation stems 
from the rights to health and to reproductive health, and from the prohibition of 
discrimination on the basis of gender. Such care would include abortion services 
when abortion is legal in a given country, and post-abortion services in states that 
outlaw abortion. This argument is reinforced by the decisions and judgments that 
I analysed in the anamnesis. Nonetheless, this trend cannot be said to be entirely 
part of state practice, especially in countries such as the United States which are 
characterised by ‘an individualistic system based on private health care insurance 
for the majority.’277 This issue cannot be thoroughly explored here. Let us mention 
however that, in the USA, twenty-six states have laws that prohibit insurance 
companies from ‘offering coverage of abortion as part of a comprehensive 
health care plan sold in the insurance marketplaces,’ and that eleven among the 
 twenty-six ‘prevent all private insurers in the state – whether in the marketplace or 
elsewhere – from offering coverage of abortion as part of a comprehensive health 
care plan.’278 According to my paradigm, the state can be held responsible for 
adopting laws that cause, or contribute to causing, VAWH. Such laws might cause 
anguish and mental suffering. Furthermore, they demonstrate a clear discrimina-
tion within the female gender, and among genders. Abortion, pre- and post-natal 
services, and services during birth should be provided for free or should at least 
be affordable, and hence covered in health insurance plans. As I investigated in 
chapter 2, however, insurance companies, in Europe and elsewhere, do not cover 
in their travel insurances complications deriving from abortion.279 The pattern of 
discrimination that considers women as ‘reproductive objects’ is resilient. In this 
connection, one author has inspiringly argued that there is an ‘ethical imperative’ 
to take public health actions to eliminate the global problem of unsafe abortions, 
including family planning to reduce the need of abortion, the provision of safe 
abortion to the full extent of the law and the provision of post-abortion care.280
VAWH is a form of discrimination against women, and in both dimensions I 
identified the existence of resilient patterns of discrimination, which manifest in 
society and in attitudes of tolerance shown by the state. As argued in a study by 
the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), ‘discrimina-
tion against women includes those differences of treatment that exist because of 
stereotypical expectations, attitudes and behaviours towards women.’281 How can 
patterns of discrimination in the field of VAWH be disrupted? I found obligations 
to progressively take steps to that end, but it is true, as contended by Simone 
Cusack, that ‘many States are … unsure about the steps they should take to imple-
ment their obligations fully, which is undermining efforts to modify or transform 
DE VIDO 9781526124975 PRINT.indd   221 24/03/2020   11:02
Violence against women’s health in international law
222
harmful stereotypes and eliminate wrongful stereotyping.’282 Guidelines elab-
orated by the OHCHR might be useful in this area, and could stem from the 
jurisprudence and quasi-jurisprudence analysed in the anamnesis. In particular, 
they might address ‘taking measures to train public officials and the judiciary to 
ensure that stereotypical prejudices and values do not affect decision-making,’ 
and ‘adopting positive measures to expose and modify harmful gender stereo-
types within the health sector.’283 This has emerged in both dimensions under 
investigation in these pages.
FGM/C could be considered as atypical. It was condemned in all the judgments 
that I have analysed. However, no relevant cases have reached UN treaty bodies 
or regional human rights courts, except a few complaints citing it as persecution. 
In the analysis, I recommended that lack of consent be added as an element of 
the offence. This paved the way for some consideration of universalism and 
the relativism of human rights. I am convinced by the arguments in favour of 
universal human rights, and do not feel that reading FGM/C in relative terms 
would help new-born girls who are forced to undergo a procedure which impairs 
their reproductive health. Nonetheless, the phenomenon cannot be appreciated 
without considering the ‘context’ in which these practices are performed. If we 
examine context, we can understand how not only FGM/C, but also GCS, must 
be prohibited when a woman has not given fully informed consent. Accordingly, 
the perspective should not be on which culture determines the ‘standard’ to be 
respected at the international level – something that could be dangerous – but 
rather which lines of discrimination, in a given context, prompt the perpetrating 
of VAWH. This means, in other words, conceiving intersectionality as a tool 
for understanding VAWH. Based on which grounds is VAWH perpetrated? On 
the basis of sex or gender, or also on ethnicity, religious or social and economic 
conditions (here, for example, girls who at the age of 12 want to change their 
genitals because they ‘do not like them’ and have the money to undergo cosmetic 
surgery)? Intersectionality is rarely considered by legal scholars, and courts find 
enormous difficulty in seeing in this concept a tool not only for understanding 
whether discrimination has occurred, but also for determining the amount of 
compensation for the victim/survivor, and which measures the state must adopt to 
comply with its obligations.284 Intersectionality should enter legal scholarship and 
the practice of courts and tribunals. For example, in López Soto, the IACommHR 
clearly found that women face enormous obstacles in gaining access to ‘suitable 
and effective judicial remedies,’ and that these obstacles were especially critical 
‘because victims suffer[ed] from a combination of forms of discrimination – 
because they are women, because of their ethnic or racial background, and/or 
because of their socioeconomic condition.’285
One final comment, de jure condendo, concerns reparations. States have been 
required by human rights courts and UN treaty bodies to adopt general measures, 
such as repealing or amending laws, and/or providing reparations to victims/
survivors of violence. The missing point is the gender of the reparations offered, 
which means considering the gendered nature of reparations and envisaging 
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measures that specifically aim to address rooted causes of VAWH. This means 
that reparations cannot be limited to the victim/survivor, but must be extended 
to relatives, for example women’s children; they must include general measures 
aimed at disrupting patterns of discrimination that persist in society, especially in 
the health sector.
The obligation to provide psychological support to a victim of rape, for exam-
ple, should be combined with action at societal level that involves men and boys 
in eradicating VAW. Gendering reparations, despite some positive attempts, has 
not completely permeated the jurisprudence and quasi-jurisprudence of regional 
(especially the European) human rights courts and UN treaty bodies. In the 
Council of Europe Istanbul Convention, Article 30(2) provides that:
[a]dequate State compensation shall be awarded to those who have sustained seri-
ous  bodily injury or impairment of health, to the extent that the damage is not 
covered by other sources such as the perpetrator, insurance or State-funded health 
and social provisions. This does not preclude Parties from claiming regress for 
compensation awarded from the perpetrator, as long as due regard is paid to the 
victim’s safety.
Even though this article refers only to the types of violence covered by the 
Convention, it could provide a model for both dimensions of violence and also an 
answer to the concerns relating to insurance coverage.
Unfortunately, this provision has not been welcomed by many state parties to 
the Convention, which have appended reservations to it. It is far from being an 
obligation well established at the international level, at least for the time being. 
Nonetheless, it clarifies that state compensation is particularly necessary when 
violence impairs women’s rights to health and to reproductive health, supporting 
the importance of the relationship that I theorised.
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Prognosis: what we achieved – the dimensions intersect
The prognosis is the final step in Hippocratic medicine. It consists in ‘the predic-
tion of the outcome of the disease, as well as its fluctuations and transmutations.’1 
In my book, the prognosis will include some final thoughts on the main findings 
of the analysis. Predictions are not part of a lawyer’s work, but it is possible to 
reflect on the impact that law, in particular international human rights law, has on 
the eradication of VAWH.
The paradigm composed of anamnesis, diagnosis, treatment and prognosis has 
provided a sufficient descriptive framework for systematising my argument and 
has encouraged a reflection which has led me to the elaboration of a new concept 
in international law around which to construe states’ obligations.
I started my analysis from the conviction that VAW always relates to the right 
to health and the right to reproductive health. I contended that the relationship is 
not merely a causal one, however, in the sense that VAW causes a violation of the 
rights to health and to reproductive health (what I called the horizontal dimension, 
characterised by interpersonal violence). I also argued that state laws and policies 
in the field of health cause or contribute to causing VAW (my vertical dimen-
sion). I found confirmation of this bi-dimensional relationship in the anamnesis, 
through the investigation of judgments and decisions of regional human rights 
and domestic courts, and the views of UN treaty bodies. The idea of VAWH, 
which I constructed in the diagnosis, has proved to be capable of grasping the 
intersections between VAW on one hand, and the rights to health and to repro-
ductive health on the other. The idea is not aimed at replacing that of VAW, but 
rather at enriching it by encompassing a further, vertical, dimension, which is not 
sufficiently explored under the generally accepted definition of VAW. Despite the 
efforts of the CEDAW Committee in GR No. 35, which theorised the existence 
of an international custom prohibiting all forms of gender-based violence against 
women, the notion of VAW is generally conceived as mainly enshrining forms of 
interpersonal violence. One only has to look at the list of behaviours that states 
are required to criminalise under the Council of Europe Istanbul Convention to 
find confirmation of that.2 I regard denial of access to abortion, denial of access 
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to emergency contraception, obstetric violence and involuntary sterilisation as 
forms of VAWH in their vertical dimension, because they are the product of 
policies or laws in the field of health. I also characterise the notion of VAWH as 
having an additional element: the limitation of women’s autonomy. This element 
has proved particularly useful in reflecting on the prohibition of FGM/C and in 
broadening my view in order to include genital cosmetic surgery in the analysis.
The descriptive function of the concept of VAWH is not limited, but capable of 
embracing two dimensions of violence. It was indeed fundamental when I came 
to reconceptualise states’ obligations. In the treatment, therefore, I placed both 
the horizontal and the vertical dimensions beneath the same ‘umbrella’ in terms 
of obligations, without departing from the well-established categories of interna-
tional law. I reflected on which categorisation of states’ obligations could be more 
useful for my paradigm. To this end, I chose the tripartite structure composed of 
positive obligations of result, of due diligence and to progressively take steps. I 
demonstrated how all three types of obligation are present in both dimensions. 
The decisions I have analysed demonstrated a trend towards the affirmation of 
a positive obligation to provide access to health services, which is especially 
relevant for, but not limited to, the vertical dimension. The difference between the 
two dimensions does not lie in the ‘type’ of the obligations, but rather the fact that 
obligations ‘specialise’ along one or other of the explored dimensions.
When talking about interpersonal violence, one of the most relevant aspects 
of state obligations stressed by courts and UN bodies alike is investigation. 
Needless to say, this aspect is fundamental. Nonetheless, since interpersonal 
violence severely affects women’s rights to health and to reproductive health, 
the response of the authorities must be to provide services that are capable of 
supporting the victim/survivor of interpersonal violence. This response must be 
efficient, timely, gender-sensitive and avoid forms of secondary victimisation. In 
the vertical dimension, it was tempting to say simply that the state ought to be 
prevented from interfering in women’s autonomy. The network characterising 
this dimension, however, is composed of obligations of result (to repeal laws that 
criminalise abortion, to enact laws relating to maternal health, to adopt measures to 
guarantee the provision of health services), obligations of due diligence in actual 
cases (to respond to cases of malpractice in the health sector causing VAWH, to 
efficiently investigate episodes of violence) and obligations to progressively take 
steps, which embrace, in a longer perspective, obligations both of means and of 
result (drawing up documents for health personnel explaining what is meant by 
women’s rights to health and to reproductive health). In both dimensions lack of 
interference is not enough, because what is needed is to eradicate the root causes 
of violence, to disrupt the patterns of discrimination at societal and state level, and 
to subvert the dominant patriarchal nature of the state and the health sector. Using 
republican theory, this would mean ‘freedom as non-domination,’ rather than a 
mere ‘freedom from interference.’ In Pettit’s words, ‘freedom as non-domination 
comes about only by design: only because there are legal and social arrangements 
in place which ensure that the other people who are about cannot interfere with 
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you on an arbitrary basis.’3 Despite being neglected by feminist scholarship,4 a 
modern view of freedom as non-domination can be useful in the eradication of 
VAW, and, in my case, of VAWH: ‘the ideal for women is precisely that of being 
secured against arbitrary interference: being given freedom in the sense in which 
it connotes, not just an absence of interference, but an absence of domination.’5 
It means to emphasise positive rather than negative legal obligations, where 
positive obligations also aim at dismantling the ‘unequal power relations between 
women and men, which have led to domination over, and discrimination against, 
women by men and to the prevention of the full advancement of women.’6
My paradigm led me to conceptualise states’ obligations in both dimensions 
and can be used to transfer aspects of one dimension to the other. For exam-
ple, a femicide watch to collect aggregated data on gender-related killings of 
women, which was proposed by the SR on VAW Dubravka Šimonović, could 
be considered as a model for the collection of data in both the horizontal and 
the vertical dimension. In the latter, for instance, it would be useful to monitor 
cases of involuntary sterilisation and raise awareness of situations characterised 
by silence for decades. Furthermore, the paradigm can respond to the challenge 
posed by some countries that, on one hand, condemn DV and have taken steps to 
prevent and suppress it, but on the other hand are reluctant to recognise women’s 
reproductive autonomy. What I mean can be explained using an example that 
dates back to 2016 in Italy. On 31 August, the then Italian Minister of Health 
launched a campaign called ‘Fertility Day’, in which women were encouraged 
in dubious advertisements to become mothers ‘while they are still young’ and 
warned that the biological clock can run quickly. Italian women have perceived 
it as an aggression, an interference in their private lives, a shocking way to blame 
women for not bearing children.7 The government has stayed aloof from the 
minister, who in turn said that she would have changed the campaign. At the same 
time, the government professed to be worried about VAW and its consequences 
on women and committed to take further actions to counter it. The missing step 
here is the link between VAW and health: violence not only implies violation of 
the rights to health and sexual and reproductive rights, but also can be provoked 
by health policies which strongly and arbitrarily interfere with women’s repro-
ductive autonomy and reproduce patterns of discrimination.8 Not being aware 
of that connection means perpetuating discrimination against women, and the 
unequal power relations between women and men.
The analysis also confirmed the approach that I adopted with regard to VAW: 
the absence of the element of intent in its definition. It was interesting to find 
‘patterns of discrimination’ which I found in this book to encompass forms of 
‘tolerance’ of violence by the state, state ‘policies’ in the health field and ‘soci-
etal’ patterns of discrimination which require a response in the long term.
The reconceptualisation of states’ obligations as I conceived it in these pages 
can inspire the jurisprudence of regional human rights courts and the quasi- 
jurisprudence of UN treaty bodies, and, at the same time, reinforce the interpre-
tation of existing legal instruments on VAW. It would also support the gradual 
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 consolidation of the prohibition of VAW as an international custom, confirming 
the proposal of the CEDAW Committee in GR No. 35 of 2017.
Women’s rights to health and to reproductive health have underpinned the 
assessment: even though often not applied directly, these rights have played a role 
in determining the consequences of violence (horizontal dimension), the causes 
of violence (vertical dimension), state responsibility, how to decide reparations 
and the general measures states must adopt. This way, the content of the right to 
health and of the right to reproductive health has been clarified, reinforced and 
seen from a gender-based perspective. The rights to health and to reproductive 
health can play a pivotal role in defining, for example, the ‘immediacy of the risk’ 
in cases of DV, and the forms of support a victim of DV must receive, but also 
in identifying and ‘gendering’ reparations in order to consider women’s specific 
needs and to respond to all forms of VAWH as conceived in this book.
Prognosis:  
what we did not achieve – international law as a cause of violence?
Even so, my analysis can be criticised because, despite the framework provided 
in these pages, VAWH can be said to persist in all societies. What is the point in 
elaborating new legal frameworks if they do not work, if they do not bring change 
for many women in the world? States have adopted contradictory behaviours 
in recent years: on one hand criminalising obstetric violence, on the other hand 
restricting women’s access to abortion or putting into question women’s auton-
omy.9 Other governments have launched strategies against DV, advertising in 
populist ways the utmost commitment to fighting such a scourge for society, and 
at the same time emphasised episodes of DV only when they are committed by 
refugees or immigrants, ‘others’. ‘Let us save the women and the children only’ 
was said by one politician in the first days of January 2019, about a ship that had 
not been allowed to enter any European port, perpetuating the male structure of 
a state that ‘allows’ pity to save the vulnerable, the weak, (women and children) 
and considers men as ‘others’, ‘beasts’ that could hurt society.
My paradigm can be challenged by those who have raised doubts about the 
potential of human rights and international law. ‘Human rights remedies, even 
when successful, treat the symptoms rather than the illness, and this allows the 
illness not only to fester, but to seem like health itself,’ posited David Kennedy, 
where he stressed the contradictions of human rights movements and their ‘dark 
sides.’10 He also pointed out that the result of initiatives which aim at reframing 
emancipatory objectives in human rights terms is ‘more often growth for the 
field – more conferences, documents, legal analysis, opposition and response 
– than decrease in violence against women, poverty, mass slaughter and so 
forth.’11 Viewed in this light, my paradigm and my reconceptualisation of states’ 
obligations will not help reduce VAWH. Furthermore, as Chinkin and Wright 
argued in 1993 with regard to the right to food – which shares with the right to 
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health its (weak) position among social, economic and cultural rights – there is 
a gap ‘between legal provisions and realities of life for women,’ and that ‘the 
primacy accorded to the protection of individual rights does not correspond to 
the reality of most women’s experience.’12 We might acknowledge that states 
do ratify treaties without implementing them. The Council of Europe Istanbul 
Convention has been ratified by states that have strongly violated human rights. 
Does this mean that its existence is a paradox? That international human rights 
law is not effective? As international lawyers, we know how the system works, 
and as feminist lawyers we know how weak, to the point of sometimes being 
non-existent, are gender issues in international and human rights law. The state 
has been revealed to be a ‘male’ actor throughout my analysis. Nonetheless, my 
analysis has focused on international law, has relied on the international law on 
state responsibility, in the belief that we cannot challenge a system by looking at 
it from the outside, but can do so better when we know it from within.
One provocative conclusion can be drawn from the analysis contained in this 
book: international law, international human rights law more specifically, con-
stitutes in itself a form of VAWH. The reason is not the absence of international 
legal instruments protecting women’s rights – at least not after some very recent 
developments – but the weakness of its monitoring mechanisms, and the intrinsic 
limits of law, namely the competence of UN treaty bodies and regional human 
rights courts, the fact that the human rights to health and to reproductive health 
cannot be applied because they are missing from the legal instruments establishing 
the monitoring mechanism. Is this not a form of discrimination against women in 
itself, considering that redress for violations of women’s rights to health and to 
reproductive health depends on the ratification by states of international human 
rights law instruments that provide for those rights? In other words, is it not the 
system itself that has insurmountable limits?
A question then spontaneously follows: ‘should we abandon law altogether?’13 
Should we say that the international legal framework is insufficient, gender- 
biased, useless? My answer is No, and this book has hopefully demonstrated this 
conclusion. Legal requirements are essential because they define the rules states 
must abide by. Beth Simmons, in her remarkable book, posited that ‘rather than 
viewing international law as reinforcing patriarchal and other power structures, 
the evidence suggests that it works against these structures in sometimes surpris-
ing ways,’ and that ‘legal commitments potentially stimulate political change[s] 
that rearrange the national legislative agenda, bolster civil rights litigation, fuel 
social and other forms of mobilization.’14
Legal provisions, which might bind or not bind, are not enough, though. 
They must be accompanied by judicial action that interprets the law in a gender- 
sensitive way. The judiciary is itself biased, full of myths and stereotypes, but 
it is also the state organ that has contributed over time to the affirmation of 
women’s rights to health and to reproductive health. Another key role is played 
by groups (feminist groups, but not only them) which are not subjected to the 
legal obligations stemming from the treaties, but which know the provisions of 
DE VIDO 9781526124975 PRINT.indd   239 20/04/2020   10:38
Violence against women’s health in international law
240
international treaties and can work to put pressure on states to convince them 
to change legislation and to put women’s rights to health and to reproductive 
health at the centre of policies and strategies at national level (and by individuals 
working to the same end).
An affirmation of states’ obligations concerning the two dimensions of vio-
lence explored in this book through legal instruments and the interpretations 
given by the judiciary will not eradicate VAWH, unless combined with action 
that must start from society. Society is the actor that, through its individuals and 
groups, has filed complaints with international and regional bodies for the pro-
tection of human rights, and with national courts, participated in the elaboration 
of strategies and codes of conduct, stimulated the adoption of laws and promoted 
referenda to mark constitutional changes. The Istanbul Convention is very clear 
when stressing the importance of the involvement of society, including boys and 
men, in eradicating rooted and resilient stereotypes.
Law can help in making a change, but the international legal order must 
overcome its ‘blindness’ – which manifests through ‘false dichotomies between 
categories of rights’ – and its focus on ‘men’s needs and fears,’ through ‘priorities 
of rights that put women last rather than first.’15 If international law is the cause 
of violence, then we must go back to international law to find in the system itself 
an answer to the challenge: law as the cause and the cure; law that stems from 
society and in society finds its nourishment and its improvement. Civil society 
has ‘strong incentives to use law … to enhance the legitimacy of [its] claims and 
the prospects for realizing [its] interests.’16 Judicial and quasi-judicial bodies have 
the enormous responsibility to promote an interpretation that, needless to say, 
conforms with the law, but is capable, as I could show from many cases examined 
in the anamnesis, of taking up the challenge of recent times.
The prognosis is not of complete cure from the disease, but of long convales-
cence, with eyes wide open against attempts to undermine a fragile ‘health’ that 
has been achieved through the complex and not always straightforward develop-
ment of human rights law and through a mobilisation that comes from society.
Notes
 1 Edelstein, ‘Hippocratic prognosis’, and see Introduction.
 2 Except for forced abortion and forced sterilisation, which belong to the vertical dimen-
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 3 P. Pettit, Republicanism. A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1997), p. 122.
 4 Pettit (Republicanism, p. 48) recalls in his work Mary Astell’s words in the seven-
teenth century: ‘if all Men are born free, how is it that all Women are born Slaves?’
 5 Pettit, Republicanism, p. 139.
 6 Istanbul Convention, preamble.
 7 The campaign was reported by major international newspapers. See, for example, 
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Macmillan, 2010), p. 1.
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10 D. Kennedy, The Dark Sides of Virtue (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2004), p. 24.
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